Report of Proceedings

6th Sovereign Challenge Conference

Borders and Security

Similarities, Differences, and Shared Affinities

7–10 November 2010, El Paso, Texas
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Borders & Security: Similarities, Differences, and Shared Affinities

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Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the Sovereign Challenge Team, HQ USSOCOM, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621. Copies of this publication may be obtained by contacting Mr. Jeff Alderson at 813-826-8158, DSN 299-8158 or william.alderson@socom.mil.

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Preface

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) hosted 103 Foreign Defense and Military Attachés, Law Enforcement Attachés, and Diplomats representing 67 countries at the 6th Sovereign Challenge Conference in El Paso, Texas from 7-10 November 2010. The conference theme was Borders & Security: Similarities, Differences, and Shared Affinities. In keeping with the theme, this conference explored a wide range of topics to include border control/management, trust, corruption/transnational crime, development of public support for education, a whole-of-government/whole-of-nation approach, and dealing with the unique challenges a border “ecosystem” presents.

This year’s event is ground-breaking in that more law enforcement and legal attachés attended than ever before. A “hands-on” border visit and briefing hosted and conducted by the U.S. Border Patrol certainly contributed to the success of the Sovereign Challenge program. Hallmarked by open and honest discussion, this conference stimulated participants to voice personal insights, perceptions, and as expected, cordial disagreements.

The global environment is complex, and all nations have a role in building and protecting sovereignty. The threats emerging from this environment cannot be addressed without international cooperation and long-term holistic strategies. As a forum, Sovereign Challenge is bringing us closer to the day when we can, at the very least, come to a mutual understanding of the existential threats we face as sovereign nations. As we begin to look at ways to counter these threats, it is clear our sovereignty will only strengthen via the full understanding that results from conversations undertaken in forums like this conference.

Sovereign Challenge is a unique approach to discussing some of the most important security issues of our time. This conference and the proceedings provided herein help lay the foundation for confronting those who abuse and exploit the fissures and niches in a globalized world. Dialogue among senior national and international level representatives is also another step in developing a comprehensive strategy that contributes to an international community of sovereign nations working together to effectively confront these emerging threats.
Conference Agenda

Sunday, 7 November

1430-1600 El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Presentation

1830-1930 Opening Event at the Camino Real Hotel
   Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Dean and Executive Professor at George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University — Opening Event Remarks

Monday, 8 November

0800-0815 Mr. Stan Schrager, Center for Special Operations, USSOCOM (SCSO-J55-SEG) — Administrative Remarks
   Major General Salvatore F. Cambria, Director of Interagency Task Force, USSOCOM — Welcome Remarks

0815-0830 Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander of USSOCOM — Welcome Remarks

0830-0900 Mr. Stan Schrager — Sovereign Challenge Update

0900-1000 Panel Discussion
   • Mr. D. Rick Van Schoik, Director of North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University
   • Major Bernard J. Brister, CD, Ph.D., Royal Military College of Canada
   • Dr. Tony Payan, University of Texas at El Paso and Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juarez
   • Dr. Jose Luis Valdés-Ugalde, Lecturer-Researcher for the Center for Research on North American (CISAN) at National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)
   • Mr. Gustavo Mohar, General Secretary of the Center for Investigation and Nation Security (CISEN)

1000-1100 Honorable John F. Cook, Mayor of El Paso—“New Perspective of U.S.-Mexico Border”

1130-1215 Panel Discussion (continued)

1330-1430 Chief Randy Hill, Chief Patrol Agent of El Paso Border Patrol Sector — U.S. Border Patrol Briefing

1430-1730 Chief Randy Hill — Tour of U.S.-Mexico Border

1830-1900 Initial Breakout Group Discussions

1900 Evening Dinner at the Camino Real Hotel
   Remarks by Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., Commander of USNORTHCOM; and Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander of USSOCOM
Tuesday, 9 November

0815-0830  Sovereign Challenge Web Site Presentation
0830-0930  Brigadier General Xicotencatl de Azolohua Nunez Marquez, General Staff for Ministry of Defense of Mexico — “The Mexican Military in Combating Narco-Trafficking”
1000-1100  Ms. Gretchen Peters, author of *Seeds of Terror: How Opium Funds Al Qaeda and the Taliban* — “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan”
1100-1230  Breakout Group Discussions
1400-1500  Ms. Mozhdah Jamalzadah, Afghan TV commentator on Women’s Issues — “Improving the Conditions for Afghan Women”
1530-1630  Mr. Stanislav Cadjo, Minister of the Interior of the Republika Srpska — “Post-Conflict Societies”
1630-1730  Breakout Group Discussions
1900-2100  Dinner at the Cattleman’s Steakhouse

Wednesday, 10 March

0930-1130  Breakout Group Discussions
1130-1200  Conference Wrap-up (Mr. Stan Schrager)
6th Sovereign Challenge Conference
Borders & Security: Similarities, Differences, and Shared Affinities

Introduction

Securing borders demands a sustained effort to “move the borders out… not in an imperialistic sense… not in a physical sense” but rather by creating protocols for the exchange of information and the coordination of activities.

—Alan Bersin, Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) hosted 103 Foreign Defense and Military Attachés, Law Enforcement Attachés, and Diplomats representing 67 countries at the 6th Sovereign Challenge Conference in El Paso, Texas from 7–10 November 2010. The gathering included more attendees than ever before and was notable for the increasing numbers of national law enforcement officials and legal attachés. This year’s conference theme was Borders & Security: Similarities, Differences, and Shared Affinities.

Sovereign Challenge is a USSOCOM international engagement action program that focuses on the sovereignty of independent nations and how terrorism and related activities violate that sovereignty. The program is based on the premise that each nation’s sovereign responsibility to act in its own self-interest and maintain faith with its citizens, cultures, and national interests conveys the specific responsibility to develop national programs to prevent and counter terrorism.
The 6th Sovereign Challenge Conference began with a visit to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) for a tour and briefing by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). EPIC was originally established in the mid-1970s to serve as an intelligence center to collect and disseminate information relating to drugs, illegal aliens, and weapons smuggling in support of field enforcement agencies throughout the region.

As the attendees learned, EPIC today engages various Federal agencies, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, Canada, and various other international partners. This visit, and a later one to the U.S.-Mexico border, captured the very practical context for the gathering. In fact, the close proximity of the conference to the border provided attendees direct exposure to the current issues of border security, illegal drug trafficking, and migration.

As the attendees gathered several hours later for the first plenary session, Admiral Eric T. Olson, USSOCOM commander, reminded them that “we provide the forum; you provide the content” as the discussion and exchange of ideas moved forward during the 2.5-day conference.

Eight speakers and a panel of five researchers and academics explored a wide variety of issues that were later amplified within the discussions of six breakout discussion groups. Prompted by the comments of the formal presentations and the breakout group exchanges, attendees engaged in lively discussions of relevant issues. The results of these interactions are reported in the sections entitled Themes & Thoughts (page 3) and Breakout Group Reports (page 39).

Comments by Admiral Olson and Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USNORTHCOM commander, provided additional insight and context for the program.

USSOCOM’s Stan Schrager emphasized that the concept of sovereignty serves as the “international norm” for the age of terrorism and transnational crime, a touchstone for nations seeking to live their lives free of external intimidation.
Question from the floor

Admiral Olson and guests
Themes and Thoughts

The six breakout groups engaged in discussions of the conference speakers and exchanged their own views on topics related to the conference theme. There was great interest in sharing how individual nations, regions, and international organizations—particularly the European Union—coordinate their border security efforts.

Perhaps the most important theme that emerged is that the concept of a “border” has evolved from a linear geographic or political limit to a border “ecosystem” characterized by interdependency and interaction among all those with an interest in the border. The concept of an ecosystem captures the complex dynamics whereby permanent residents and stakeholders of a border region increasingly interact with flows of humans, goods, information, cash, and other commodities. The degrees of permeability along any given border are best managed by information exchanges, policy coordination, and operational collaboration among all affected nations.

General observations included the following:

a. Borders are taking on new roles.
b. Trust among domestic and international agencies is essential.
c. Success requires extensive coordination along all borders.
d. A whole-of-government approach—even a whole-of-nation approach—is necessary.
e. The military role in border security is unique to each country and typically based upon prevailing threats and the capability and capacity of law enforcement.
f. A credible rule-of-law system must support all efforts.
g. Public support is an important component of effective border management.

Some of the specific observations and recommendations that emerged from the groups follow.

Border Control/Management

- The presence of a border, even if arbitrarily drawn and perhaps disputed, provides a physical manifestation of sovereignty and a sense of what it means to be a member of that nation state.
• It is increasingly the case, especially after the attacks of 11 September 2001, that nations are imposing security protocols over the traditional revenue-collecting protocols that have been the traditional domain of border management. It is essential that nations become able to accommodate both functions without stifling revenue or threatening security.

• A distinction was made regarding whether control or management of a border was more appropriate. Discussions tended to use control when referring to border threats/illicit activity and management when referring to legal border activities.

• Neighboring states must share their border challenges, leading to solutions that are beneficial to all parties and rendering border regions less threatening.

• The efficient management of multiple flows across borders requires technology transfers among nations.

• Both physical and virtual fusion centers are essential for executing the complex tasks of information sharing, cooperation, and collaboration.

• Security measures that harm a neighboring country are actually counterproductive in the long run.

• As a practical matter, countries tend to “extend themselves” across borders in cases where immigrants cross, establish themselves, and neglect— for whatever reason — to assimilate into their new country.

• Borders are important to governments, criminals, and terrorists. Successfully controlling borders against criminals and terrorists involves employing all the instruments of national power.

• The level of concern about border issues correlates directly with current national interests.

• Borders serve as a “filter” for states and either an obstacle or source of revenue for criminals and terrorists. Current interests affect the security level of filters and the methods employed by criminals and terrorists.

• The functions of borders must bend to the needs of the people by allowing for the managed flows of people, goods, information, capital, ideas, and services while ensuring security of both sides of the border and the nations beyond.

• While attendees observed border control operations along the U.S.-Mexico border and regarded such activities as necessary for establishing and sustaining border security, a consensus developed that such efforts are no longer sufficient. Several speakers and discussion groups affirmed
that comprehensive, whole-of-government approaches — as represented by the EPIC and similar structures within their own countries — are essential to the development of a new paradigm, which is not restricted by the notion that a border is a static, geographic line.

- It sometimes appears that criminals and terrorists are better organized collectively than nations. Often states fail to recognize the true threat to their interests that they confront. Even when governments understand, they may lack the political will to act. By contrast, criminals and terrorists pursue clear goals of profit and power.

- Border control requires an awareness of the presence of illicit networks, driven by various motivations that facilitate the illicit flows of human beings, drugs, weapons, and other forms of contraband.

- Motivations for illicit activity can be economic or ideological/religious, any of which have important security, economic, and cultural consequences for those living along a border, nations sharing a border, the immediate region, and the wider global community.

- Solutions to the challenges of border control and management include, but are not limited to, the affirmation of human and cultural values among both individuals and groups; the development of a strong sense of trust among all those stakeholders focused on border control issues; the willingness to share and accept the ideas of others; active cooperation in the sharing of information and resources; and close collaboration in the conduct and exploitation of border control operations.

- Mutual respect among nations for another’s sovereignty and issues affecting sovereignty is an essential first step in finding acceptable, suitable, and feasible cross-sovereignty and cross-border solutions.

- You must see the problems faced by your neighbors and other international partners as your own and work collaboratively to resolve them. Otherwise, those problems will become your problems as global “flows” deliver them to your doorstep.

**Corruption/Transnational Crime**

- Corruption is a concern for many nations and regions, but one made worse by the infiltration of powerful criminal influences, which not only have a corrosive effect on a society but also potentially create a lethal partnership with extremist organizations, resulting in a nexus between crime and extremism.
The mixing of the legitimate and illicit complicates the free flow of international trade and creates the conditions favorable for corruption to take root.

The presence of active “money trails” that flow across borders feeds the for-profit motives associated with the flows of persons, illegal drugs, weapons, stolen property, and other contraband and fuels corruption as Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) establish themselves and expand their influence by corrupting local, regional, and national officials.

While anticorruption laws exist, credible governance, transparency in transactions, and equal economic opportunity for all citizens are the true bulwarks against such criminality.

Development

Beware of excessive focus on the symptoms of terrorism, transnational crime, and general lawlessness at the expense of ignoring the root causes such as poverty and unconstrained immigration patterns that create instability.

As people frequently cross borders seeking a better life, economic development and credible governance at home reduce the need for such migration. Thus most border issues are connected to broader development issues.

Investment in people and institutions is necessary to build and strengthen capacity and to resist and counter threats. What kinds of investment and how they are directed for maximum effect in stabilizing a nation are crucial to its success.

People cross borders seeking a better life for their families and themselves. Development efforts can fulfill those aspirations at home and remove the motivation to migrate.

Weakness in a country’s social fabric and governance lie at the heart of transnational threats such as crime and terrorism. Weakness and failure lead populations to seek alternative solutions to their conditions of existence.

Crises over territory have been replaced by crises caused by economic conditions and disputes over cultural identity. Borders can protect against the former, but less so against the latter.
Especially in the case of post-conflict societies, a strong economic component of national power is essential to support both former members of a nation’s military as well as to integrate former foes.

**Public Support/Education**

- Comprehensive education programs are needed to prepare disparate organizations that are central to a whole-of-nation approach to border security and other national security issues.
- Too often opportunities for professional development to freshen one’s skills or learn new ones are viewed as “costs — not value” as they take individuals away from their daily routines.
- Effective strategic communication programs are necessary to ensure that populations understand and support what governments are doing to secure their borders, build trust, and bring stability to border regions and beyond.
- Strategic communication/education initiatives are important to help the news media, nongovernmental, and private sector communities of interest understand individual national and regional security efforts.

**Trust**

- The need for trust was a recurring theme that set the tone for the entire conference. One attendee suggested that instead of co-locating watch officers, communication systems, operations centers, and other fixed facilities, a more practical manifestation of trust is to enable watch officers to contact their counterparts in neighboring countries to ask, “Are you seeing what I’m seeing? What do you make of it?” A sense of trust was seen as clearly vital for border issues, but also central to related discussions of countries’ broader relationships with their neighbors.
- Trust among countries, institutions, and individuals means a reasonable expectation that a person or entity will act in a certain way and so consistently play a specific role in a predictable manner.
- Respect and trust lead to mutual appreciation and understanding, contributing to the framework for effective cross-border, regional, and global partnerships.
- Regional and global threats require regional and global solutions, and it is the obligation of powerful nations to help weaker nations while not imposing their values and ideas on their partners.
• Measures must be sought out to “leap frog” trust relationships to new levels, much as cell phone technology replaces the laying of copper wire for traditional telephone service.

Whole-of-Government/Whole-of-Nation Approach
• A whole-of-nation approach that amplifies and expands the whole-of-government model is essential for addressing the various border challenges and includes the wide range of public and private border stakeholders and an emphasis on the development of protocols for effective intelligence gathering, assessment, and sharing—both domestically and internationally.
• The successful execution of whole-of-government strategies by a government—augmented by information exchanges, cooperation, and collaboration with neighboring countries and regional partners—emerges as a counter to the challenges of contemporary border security.

Role of the Military along the Border
• Many of the issues discussed fall into the realm of law enforcement. However, there was also acceptance of the fact that circumstances can create the need for military assistance as seen in the current example of the employment of the Mexican armed forces. This dynamic leads to the larger discussion of the relationship between law enforcement and the military.
• The appropriate relationship between police and military regarding border security continues to be a major issue.
• Social norms and political thresholds governing a nation’s use of its military depend on its unique history and experience.
• Perceptions of growing threats to borders raise issues about the appropriate use of military forces.
• Sometimes it is necessary to exercise a reluctant acceptance of the pressures to “use the investment” in military forces, even in a less-than-optimal revised policing role.
• There is a need to accept the fact that the insurance of a nation’s security is more than just the role of the military.
• Debates persist as to whether national militaries ought to transform their organizations and capabilities, skills, and authorities to more
law enforcement-like security functions or leave those responsibilities strictly to law enforcement agencies.

- Challenges to border security require joint, regional, and global solutions. States that share borders must accept responsibility for managing the border.
- The military’s role in combating crime remains ill-defined in many countries. Thus its use against criminals can be dangerous because of the historical concerns of individual states.
- The collaborative efforts undertaken by a state’s law enforcement institutions and military are a sovereign issue based on a country’s history, cultural values, and threat assessment.
- Strong and informed political leadership must establish a context for the relationships between a nation’s military and law enforcement resources and then specifically delineate their respective responsibilities.
- The challenges of the 21st century have expanded the military’s focus and efforts from traditional defense and deterrence responsibilities to include irregular threats. This expansion has implications for the apportionment of capabilities and the understanding of the new missions.
- Each sovereign state’s relationship with its military is unique. It is this sovereign singularity that will ultimately define how the military will be organized and what role it will play.
Ambassador Ryan Crocker centered his comments on that essential requirement for cooperation within the United States government and with other nations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). He drew linkages with the EPIC visit earlier in the day and said, “I like the Sovereign Challenge title” and the “unique opportunity to exchange views and perspectives among yourselves.” He affirmed the shared concern for nonstate actors challenging sovereign states resulting in transformational threats that require transformational responses. These threats are so compelling as to affect the way we think about sovereignty.

He assured the attendees that “I am not here to proclaim that the Westphalian Order has passed into history. It has not.” However, the Ambassador acknowledged that “sovereignty has to be a little bit fuzzed and a little bit diluted” when addressing the challenges of dealing with those who seek those fissures and spaces between sovereign nations where they can move in.

He noted that the “uni-polar world,” envisioned after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, did not materialize. And while some debate whether we live in a multi-polar or non-polar world, cooperation among all players is essential regardless of which is the accurate description. The elimination of the familiar problem of a stove-piped approach to the collection, analysis, and storage of intelligence information must be a priority.
The Ambassador noted that one of the lessons gained from the 11 September 2001 attacks is that a resourceful, committed enemy found fissures within a state. That event and others since have taught that strategic and tactical cooperation in the name of national security is essential. Rethinking and revisions in structures, protocols, and procedures continue because one intended fix leads to a whole new round of complications that must be addressed.

Within such an environment, civil-military cooperation has become a huge and essential challenge to meet in the post-Cold War disorder. The Ambassador argued that purely military contingencies ended when the Fulda Gap lost its strategic significance. Thus the military has had to adapt. But those changes have also created the need for a radically different mindset on the part of the civilian agencies. After all, “we operate embassies in war zones… So how do we make that work?”

He suggested that the comments of U.S. Army General Ray Odierno just a few days before in Washington, D.C. offer insight to the answer to that and other questions. General Odierno said that “you can't have a unity of command between civilian and military authorities,” but “what you must have is a unity of effort… and ultimately this becomes a very broad unity of effort.”

The Ambassador cited four case studies from his own experience to outline specific initiatives to illustrate successes in civil-military relations. The first of these involved his experiences as Ambassador to Kuwait when Saddam Hussein made what appeared to be another threatening move against the country in 1994, an apparent rerun of 1990. The response to this perceived threat was to deploy U.S. troops to fall in on prepositioned stocks of armor, artillery, and other heavy equipment to deter further Iraqi aggression.

After the immediate danger passed, Ambassador Crocker spent the next 2 years interfacing with the government of Kuwait, the commander of the U.S. Central Command, and other agencies throughout the U.S. government to help put in place the architecture that would mean Saddam could never come back. The initiatives included the prepositioning of larger equipment sets in more secure areas and the development of the concept of the expeditionary Air Force that freed air power from fixed bases and created deployable units, self-sustainable, able to operate in harsh conditions at all different parts of the world.

The Ambassador argued that these and other innovations represent a different way of thinking that allowed for adaptation to the political-military world, which was starting to evolve again out of the end of the Cold War.
His second case study captured his experiences in the early days after his arrival in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2002. One of his first tasks was to contact the senior U.S. military commander in the country. The problem was that no such single individual yet existed. Scattered Special Forces units and other tactical leadership were present in various parts of Afghanistan. Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) Lieutenant General (Ret.) Mikolashek designated a 0-7 officer with an office in the Embassy as primary liaison, and he and the military leadership on the ground took the initiative to establish relationships with the evolving government of President Hamid Karzai.

Ambassador Crocker also began reaching out to the United Nations (UN) and other IGOs and NGOs that were present. Though early coordination meetings of such diverse organizations did not always go smoothly, what resulted was the basis for the establishment of a civil-military assistance organization that eventually became known as the Provincial Reconstruction Team that has proven successful in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The devastating 2005 earthquake in Pakistan presented Ambassador Crocker with a challenge that caused him to bring together military and civilian disaster relief resources to meet the enormous demand for assistance. To coordinate the effort, those involved with disaster relief met in the Ambassador's office three times a day, 7 days a week for 5 months.

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s Disaster Relief Team (DART) continued to work with the military task force in what became the longest and largest airborne U.S. humanitarian relief operation since the Berlin Airlift. As an indicator of the wider international contributions, the Ambassador noted that the relief effort engaged NATO within Pakistan for the first time.

Ambassador Crocker’s fourth case study addressed his service in Iraq in what he described as the mother of all political-military challenges. He reported that he and General David Petraeus began working together even before arriving in Iraq, while one was still in Islamabad, Pakistan and the other at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Even at those long distances, they were able to put together Joint Strategic Assessment Teams (JSATs) that were co-chaired by a senior military officer and a senior diplomat. Below the leadership level, military and civilian representatives were matched throughout the team, ensuring both an interagency and international flavor to JSAT activities.
The output of the JSAT led directly to the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) that guided the efforts contained in each of the five, later six, lines of operations (LOOs). Interestingly, only one of those LOOs was kinetic in nature. To support the JCP and other activities within Iraq, various venues for interaction emerged in the forms of Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF), Joint Working Groups, and Interagency Working Groups. Various working groups came into existence to address problems and issues that defied immediate solution and then were dissolved when their tasks were completed.

In spite of the successes, Ambassador Crocker noted that the problems have been in many respects as great as the achievements. Chief among these is the absence of a mechanism to require and guide a whole-of-government approach to problem solving and operations. Too often interagency efforts on the ground are personality dependent and rely on trial and error to gain traction. For instance, experience has taught that the best rule-of-law advisors were assistant U.S. attorneys. “We can make it work in the field,” he reported, “but we still can’t formulate a whole-of-government approach.”

He spoke of his concern about the future of Iraq, citing what he called the “short U.S. attention span” and a lack of “strategic patience” for Iraq. The consequence is that many Americans will misinterpret the ongoing “turning of the page” as a final “closing the book.”

In talking about Afghanistan, the Ambassador returned to the discussions earlier in the day at the EPIC. He reported that he was struck by the similarities in language in describing the situation along the U.S.-Mexico border and the conditions along the Durand Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. He highlighted the similar accusations and recriminations about what governments are and are not doing in both cases.

He recalled a question raised earlier in the day by a DEA briefer: “What’s the solution?” The Ambassador argued that it is not enough to stand aside because things are too hard, too complicated. What is required is to get as much of a holistic effort as possible in such complex situations. The 6th Sovereign Challenge provides the venue for orchestrating such efforts.
Panel Discussion

- Mr. D. Rick Van Schoik, Director of North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University
- Major Bernard J. Brister, CD, Ph.D., Royal Military College of Canada
- Dr. Tony Payan, University of Texas at El Paso and Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juarez
- Dr. Jose Luis Valdés-Ugalde, Lecturer-Researcher for the Center for Research on North American (CISAN) at National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)
- Mr. Gustavo Mohar, General Secretary of the Center for Investigation and Nation Security (CISEN).

As the panel facilitator, Mr. Van Schoik spoke from his long years of experience and study of border issues and his perspectives gained as the director of the North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University. The mission of the center is to promote cooperation among a consortium of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican universities concerned with issues such as security, sustainability, competitiveness, and awareness of the challenges posed by border security concerns in a rapidly changing security environment. To illustrate the degree of change, he reported that in the 1970s, he might drift into Mexico while parachuting and simply walk back out. That is no longer the way things are done.

He emphasized the need for understanding diverse perspectives and argued that harm occurs when either side takes unilateral action without and even with consultation. He emphasized that differing perspectives result in differences in the ways threats are identified and framed for response. Cooperative efforts are necessary to achieve substantial progress.

Mr. Van Schoik spoke of the need to balance both responsibility and self-interest to counter threats to sovereignty and argued that borders become the focus of what matters. This requires nations that share borders to each respect the other’s needs, frequently resulting in trading elements of sovereignty for mutual benefit of security. Central to this concept is the need for mirrored enforcement of borders to ensure layered mutual security.

Each of the speakers discussed the role that diverse perspectives and trust play within the process of international cooperation. Dr. Brister addressed
the issues associated with state sovereignty within the context of interrelated North American continental security (Canada, Mexico, and the United States), most particularly the concepts of national sovereignty, individual national security priorities and motivations, and limitations to the evolution of an effective trilateral security infrastructure for the continent.

Dr. Brister identified three areas of concern that could serve to limit cooperation among the major players in North America and similarly elsewhere:

a. Domestic public perceptions of the intent and objectives of a foreign country will strongly influence and limit the courses of action that their elected officials can take with respect to the cooperation necessary to build a strong security relationship.

b. The specific and different reasons that each state enters into the security relationship will determine their individual actions and reactions to shape the collective response to security issues and crises.

c. The last major concern or barrier to an effective security relationship occurs at the operational level or tactical level and concerns technical or practical issues associated with the actual execution of the day-to-day interactions between the members of the security relationship.

As an example of his third point, Dr. Brister raised an issue that has been of interest in previous Sovereign Challenge conferences and reemerged during the EPIC visit. He spoke of the difficulties associated with the sharing of information between security partners and noted that trust among the various parties plays a crucial role. Additional issues include differing systems of classification and analysis, different interpretations of similar information, and different perceptions on the rights of the individuals who are being reported on.

Drawing on both his own experiences and research, he argued that “the complete sharing of information between agencies and between countries will never occur, nor should it.” The challenge will remain to determine what information should be shared, with whom, and when. The degree of sharing that will take place is inversely proportional to the number of partners involved.

Dr. Payan asserted that the border is where we see the issues of sovereignty most clearly. He focused his comments on the conditions within Ciudad Juarez, suggesting that the city is a highly desirable place for all cartels. He argued that the current state of violence within the city is not an aberration. In
fact, he reported that Ciudad Juarez has “traditionally been a problem … The first to fall for every new trend in history.” He cited various historical examples and then said that the city has become the first and most intense city to fall into organized crime today.

He reported that both Mexico and the U.S. share a common approach to their border regions that contains inherent limitations on their governments’ ability to act to address border issues. Unlike European countries where power has devolved to the border regions, neither the Mexico nor the U.S. has laws that allow such local autonomy. In both cases, control over border issues remains in the national capitals and thus remote from the specific conditions and issues on the ground. The consequence of this approach results in no local interactive framework because all constitutional and legal tools reside at the federal level. Dr. Payan strongly asserted the need to reconsider the autonomy of local/border regions in both Mexico and the United States.

Dr. Payan surveyed a wide range of social problems to include high levels of social inequality, a severe deficit in educational facilities, and extreme poverty. The accompanying deficits in infrastructure and low levels of urban development result in high rates of prostitution and drug addiction. The vulnerability of young citizens in Ciudad Juarez is apparent in the some 120,000 between the ages of 13 and 25 who have no access to an education or to the labor market.

His research has identified 15 major areas of violence in the city, each corresponding almost exactly with those areas of the city with the lowest levels of infrastructure expansions, human development, governmental investment, educational opportunities, and public services/quality of life. To address these problems in Ciudad Juarez and elsewhere, Dr. Payan suggested expanded cross-border investments in infrastructure, efficient delivery of services, social stability, and human development. A high degree of cooperation in ensuring the exchange of intelligence and the availability of training are also essential.

Dr. Valdés-Ugalde began with several observations about the conditions both along the U.S.-Mexico border and elsewhere within the region. These include the following:

a. The governability of the U.S.-Mexico border is at risk, making bilateral cooperation a necessity.

b. Mexico has become the unsafe and perhaps unreliable partner of the continental formula.
c. Despite the war on crime (or perhaps as a result of it), new spaces of lawlessness have been created along the Mexican territory.

d. These “failed authority spaces” have allowed drug barons and smugglers to dominate.

e. The struggle between cartels is no longer only about illicit drugs or crime, but has expanded to become a struggle for power among the cartels, gangs, and civil government. It is in fact a relatively organized attack against the institutions of the state.

f. Mexico finds itself in a situation in which crime, terrorism, and insurgency (a “new kind of insurgency”) are interwoven to threaten the security of both the state and society.

As a result, if the continental homeland is bound to remain protected and safe, Mexico’s spaces of lawlessness must be eradicated with energy and all the necessary support that is required.

He identified 22 typical criminal activities, meaning that there are many other threats besides drug trafficking. Among these are currency counterfeiting; terrorism; commercial activity based on illicit resources; human, organ, and arms trafficking; prostitution; vehicle theft; kidnapping; and home invasion. He said clearly that even if the financial impact of drugs would fall to zero, profits generated by the 21 other activities would continue at some 50 percent of the current rate.

Arguing that U.S. security is tied more closely than ever to the security and stability of the south, Dr. Valdés-Ugalde suggested that the U.S. must focus on “cleaning its own house” as part of cooperative efforts to solve common problems. The U.S. should support effective policing actions against cartels, reduce the use of illegal drugs within its own borders, and fight to reduce the gang culture in American schools and among its youth.

At the same time, Mexico has to stop corruption in all its forms and eliminate the “lawlessness spaces” that affect both bilateral and international relations; reorient the justice system from an inquisitorial process to an adversarial model based on the collection of intelligence and credible prosecution; enact deep reforms in the law and in police enforcement policies and procedures; replace the army with a reliable, well-trained, and trustworthy national police force at all levels of governance; and nurture a culture of lawfulness to support institutional reform.
Mr. Mohar sought to put the violence within Ciudad Juarez into perspective by pointing out that in Mexico, violence is concentrated in specific areas. That did not mean that he sought to minimize the effects of the violence. He freely admitted that “organized crime has a lot of money and a lot of weapons … and they are able to use the new media.” He was clear in stating that “violence is a very serious organized crime threat to Mexico … They use terrorist tactics, but there is no insurgency.”

He went on to assert that the issues are far more complex than assumed. Arguing that regional perspectives are essential to dealing with such national security threats, he presented a detailed strategic assessment of the U.S.-Mexico border. His key points are shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borders matter</td>
<td>Multidimensional (physical, political, legal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional (various forms of trafficking, drugs, and other criminal activity flowing in multiple directions along with the exchange of cash)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking of border risks</td>
<td>Drug trafficking, violence, arms trafficking, state actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border cooperation is multipurpose</td>
<td>Economic development, human rights, environmental protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border problems, inland solutions</td>
<td>Inland facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Immigration reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preclearance of passengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preclearance of goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Elimination of nontariff barriers (e.g., trucking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regulatory convergence (e.g., health standards)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inland security</td>
<td>• Institutional coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved intelligence sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved joint prosecutorial capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enhanced inland interdiction capacity on both sides (e.g., drugs and arms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gun law reform (e.g., a ban on semiautomatic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>New border vision required</td>
<td>Enhancing public safety</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security flows of people and goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expediting legitimate commerce and travel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engaging border communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving policy coordination</td>
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He noted that traditional bilateral relationships (U.S.-Canada/U.S.-Mexico) have evolved into various trilateral mechanisms to address a wide range of mutual interests. These include the North American Leaders Summit (SPP), the Bilateral Security Group, various political-military talks, information sharing, emergency management, labor mobility, environment and forestry, trade and investment, science and technology, and pandemic diseases.

While considerable focus remains on the issues associated with the U.S.-Mexico border, Mr. Mohar discussed the challenges his country also faces along and within its southern border region. He continued with his focus on different perspectives by presenting the contrasting border priorities as expressed by the U.S. and Mexico. For instance, while the U.S. regards terrorism as its top border priority, Mexico views terrorism as no higher than fifth on its list. The different priority lists are shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. U.S. and Mexico Priority Lists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| United States | 1. Terrorism  
|               | 2. Drug trafficking/border violence  
|               | 3. Migration  
|               | 4. Arms trafficking  
|               | 5. Bulk cash smuggling  |
| Mexico       | 1. Drug trafficking/border violence  
|               | 2. Arms trafficking  
|               | 3. Bulk cash smuggling  
|               | 4. Migration  
|               | 5. Terrorism  |

In general terms, Mr. Mohar noted that drugs, humans, and terrorists move north across the border while money flows south and arms go both ways. While he does not regard Mexico as a target of Islamist extremists, he asserted that Mexico shares a regional interest in preventing terrorism in all its forms. As others have noted, he argued that a regional perspective is essential to dealing with such national security threats.

In dealing with those challenges, Mr. Mohar admitted that we have lots of questions, but have no answers yet. Those seeking the answers need to look at the problem in the long term. He also mentioned the need for a whole-of-government approach to problem solving and mentioned what he characterized
as the unprecedented military cooperation with the U.S. as a major contributor to addressing this huge challenge.

**New Perspective of U.S.-Mexico Border**

Honorable John F. Cook, Mayor of El Paso

The mayor’s comments focused on the new perspectives that have evolved concerning the U.S.-Mexico border and the security of that border. In fact, he reported, the entire environment has changed, noting specifically how different it is now to travel across the bridge to Ciudad Juarez given the current violence and security threats.

He spoke of the strong interdependence that both Ciudad Juarez and El Paso share for economic development and quality of life. With the now $70 billion in trade between the two cities, El Paso and Ciudad Juarez represent the largest economic metroplex in the world. Many in El Paso retain family roots across the border, and many still live there and cross over daily. Nearly 50 percent of his staff maintains links with Mexico. All of these relationships have become complicated by the new emphasis on border security.

There is no doubt that the current security situation in Mexico poses a threat to both communities because they are so closely linked perceptually. Violence in Ciudad Juarez has caused businesses to reconsider both current and future operations on both sides of the border. Experience teaches that for every 10 jobs created in Ciudad Juarez, one is created in El Paso. Thus job losses to the south affect job security in the north.

Given the high murder rates in Ciudad Juarez (some 6,000 during the past 2 years), attendees were interested in how El Paso could be considered the second safest major city of its size in the U.S. with only five murders in the past 2 years. (Note: shortly after the conference, El Paso was named the safest city of its size.) The mayor suggested that the number of local, state, and federal agencies and the respect the public has for their competence and
credibility have, among other factors, convinced the cartels that “they don’t want to bring violence here.”

By way of confirmation of Mayor Cook’s observations, members of the panel later suggested that the strategy of the drug cartels is to not have the violence spill over the border. Some rogue groups and individuals may do so, but not the cartels themselves. However, Mr. Mohar argued that while the violence may not be spilling over, the evidence suggests that cooperation is increasing between the drug cartels and U.S. drug dealers.

Mayor Cook repeated a point he made during Ambassador Crocker’s presentation the evening before when he said he believes that “another revolution is happening in Mexico now” and suggested that the same efforts at reform and reconstruction that the U.S. carries out in distant lands should also be directed at a country with which we share a border. The “social fabric” of Mexico is the root of the problem, resulting in a lack of jobs, medical care, educational opportunities, and other basic needs. Faced with heavily armed, desperate young men, there are no safety nets to assist in eliminating or mitigating existing conditions.

The mayor also asserted that the U.S. should assist Mexico in establishing a good credible judicial system with an eye toward losing the tradition that
everyone is briable. A practical consequence of the current situation is that intelligence sharing with the Ciudad Juarez police is hampered because it is impossible to know with certainty whom you are talking to and whom you can trust.

In discussing the challenges of immigration reform, the mayor insisted that such reform is necessary but must be based on an assessment of the actual number of immigrants needed within the U.S., not on an arbitrary number allowed to enter annually.

**U.S. Border Patrol Briefing and Tour**

Chief Randy Hill, Chief Patrol Agent of El Paso Border Patrol Sector

The afternoon featured a well-received briefing by officers of the U.S. Border Patrol and an extensive tour of facilities and of the border itself. The attendees learned that the U.S. Border Patrol mission for the El Paso area is not limited to a fixed geographic line and, in fact, reflects a comprehensive whole-of-government approach that also reaches out to engage Mexico and others with a stake in a secure border region. The U.S. Border Patrol’s national goal is to maintain operational control of the U.S. border. Its mission statement is as follows:

To detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States. Together with other law enforcement officers, the Border Patrol helps maintain borders that work — facilitating the flow of legal immigration and goods while preventing the illegal trafficking of people and contraband.

It pursues that goal through five objectives supported by six core elements. The five objectives are as follows:

a. Apprehend terrorists and their weapons entering the U.S.
b. Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement.
c. Detect, apprehend, and deter smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband.
d. Use Smart Border technology.
e. Reduce crime in border communities to improve the quality of life.

The six supporting core elements are as follows:

a. The right combination of personnel, technology, and infrastructure
b. Mobility and rapid deployment of people and resources
c. Defense in depth using interior checkpoints and coordinated enforcement operations
d. Partnership with other law enforcement agencies
e. Border awareness and intelligence
f. Centralized chain of command.

The unification of effort by all parties is achieved through the following:

a. Enhanced intelligence collection/sharing through co-location and/or access to the broader intelligence community
b. Enhanced situational awareness for agency jurisdictions
c. Government of Mexico intelligence sharing and collaboration
d. Enhanced enforcement capabilities through interagency and joint operations
e. Enhanced officer safety
f. Enhanced border security in border communities
g. Asset sharing.

The U.S. Border Patrol recognizes that illegal immigrants are traditionally drawn to the country because of national or socioeconomic conditions such as a stronger economy and more employment opportunities than are available at home or elsewhere. Specific migration patterns, especially for those engaging in criminal activity, are frequently shaped by the presence of transportation hubs or the existing smuggling infrastructure.

The recent statistics, shown in Table 3, reflect the level of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operations.
Table 3. CBP Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>At the Ports of Entry (POE)</td>
<td>352 million passengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>244 million vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 million containers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between the POE</td>
<td>More than 460,000 arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 2.4 million pounds of illegal drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats embedded in the border activity</td>
<td>463,382 arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,083 major crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>144 homicides/murders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42 kidnappings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>209 sexual assaults/rapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,855 aggravated assaults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>270 robberies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,563 dangerous drugs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall border security strategy involves gaining control of a particular area, maintaining that control, expanding the reach of the control, and applying available resources to existing priorities.

The U.S. Border Patrol establishes and maintains operational control of the border by seeking consistency in detecting entries when they occur, identifying the nature of the entry and classifying the level of threat it poses, effectively and efficiently responding to the entry, and bringing the situation to the appropriate law enforcement resolution. When the process to detect, identify/classify, respond, and resolve is carried out effectively, an area is considered to be under operational control.

After a detailed discussion of strategy, techniques, and procedures, the attendees boarded buses for the short trip down the street to the processing station at the border crossing. Border Patrol officers displayed their various weapons and other equipment, demonstrated K-9 operations, and allowed attendees to view the inner workings of the operations center and processing station.
After re-boarding the buses, the group moved westward along the border to observe and learn in greater detail about the actions of the Border Patrol in urban, rural, and remote environments. This practical experience with the men and women of the U.S. Border Patrol animated many of the concepts presented during the plenary session briefing.

**Conference Dinner Remarks**

Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., Commander of USNORTHCOM

Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander of USSOCOM

Admiral Winnefeld began his remarks by describing the missions and roles of the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). He then expanded on the important roles played by two key partners, Canada and Mexico, in achieving regional security. He emphasized the mutual challenges we must address and the operational framework that has evolved to overcome them, all of which are based on a foundation of trust and respect.

USNORTHCOM is a regional combatant command that was established 1 October 2002 with the mission to defend the United States and provide
directed support to civil authorities. NORAD was established in 1958 and is a bi-national U.S.-Canadian organization charged with the missions of aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. In his USNORTHCOM role, Admiral Winnefeld’s No. 1 priority is homeland defense. USNORTHCOM is different from other U.S. geographic combat commands and has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the President.

Admiral Winnefeld noted concerns and important distinctions associated with working in both a defense and security environment where military and law enforcement coexist, and where both are faced with the same threats and the same “fuzzy” borders. Within its civil support mission, USNORTHCOM works with a complex suite of partners (law enforcement and government agencies at different levels), and must be successful. Underpinning regional security is the cooperation with Canada and Mexico.

Canada is the largest U.S. trading partner and the largest supplier of crude oil to the U.S. Canada has been a member of NATO since 1949 and a member of NORAD since 1958. As the NORAD commander, Admiral Winnefeld has two chains of command: a U.S. chain of command to the President and the Canadian chain of command to the Prime Minister. This military interaction and economic interdependence have contributed to strong mutual security.

The admiral shifted his focus to Mexico, noting it is the third largest U.S. trading partner and the second largest supplier of crude oil to the U.S. The U.S. also imports 85 percent of Mexico’s exports. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) are today a common security problem most profoundly affecting Mexico. The TCOs are vicious, well-armed and sophisticated, and can co-opt poorly paid officials.

Admiral Winnefeld asserted that it is in our mutual interest for Mexico to be successful. He noted that President Calderon did not have to take on the challenge of TCOs, but courageously did so. To support Mexico, Admiral Winnefeld presented a 3-D framework:

a. The first dimension is directly taking on the TCOs where their vulnerabilities lie, strengthening/building Mexican institutions, building strong communities, and modernizing our approach to our common border.

b. The second dimension is making the sub-regions where TCOs exist and operate inhospitable. These regions include inside the U.S., along the U.S.-Mexico border, inside Mexico, Mexico’s southern border
region, the maritime commons, and Central and South America. The two most decisive sub-regions are within the U.S. and Mexico, and he noted the situation will not be resolved on the border. Within its own border, the U.S. must get control of the drug demand, get control of gang warfare, and prevent weapons and illicit cash from moving south. Within Mexico, we must focus on strong communities and institutions in addition to assisting our Mexican partners in directly confronting the TCOs.

c. The third dimension involves applying all elements of national and international power — diplomatic, information, military, and economics (DIME) — and determining how we apply those to the current threat environment. Law enforcement in Mexico has not been able to do it alone. Together, we must work on creative ways to bring new tools to bear without violating laws and while preserving Mexican sovereignty. More resources are also needed to build Mexican institutions.

Admiral Winnefeld emphasized the importance of the way we talk about the threats, for instance by not using toxic terms such as insurgency. The TCOs may employ insurgent tactics and attempt to co-opt the government, but what is going on is not an insurgency. He sees his job as setting the conditions to work with Mexico, beginning with the fusing of intelligence and operations. In closing, the admiral asserted that there is a lot of work to do with Mexico; it will get harder before it gets easier, and we must develop relationships built on trust and respect.

Admiral Olson is the senior Special Operations officer and is the eighth commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). He began his address by explaining why USSOCOM is involved with the Sovereign Challenge initiative. Within the U.S. military structure, there needed to be a command that took a step back to synchronize and think across the geographic combatant commands — to provide understanding and perspectives.
The concept of Sovereign Challenge emerged from this broader perspective and is based upon the idea that individual nations solve their own problems better and that it is better to support regional stability before a crisis occurs. These ideas underpin USSOCOM strategy because USSOCOM units conduct operations in over 75 countries to assist partner nations. Sovereign Challenge has evolved as a series of programs, a unique forum and opportunity to discuss a broad range of topics of mutual and shared interest while recognizing that sovereign nations always take care of their own interests first.

The second part of Admiral Olson’s remarks focused on a series of world maps that shape and influence how we see the world. The first was a U.S. map of the world with the United States in the center with Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Asia to the right and the Far East and parts of Asia to the West, a U.S.-centric view.

The next was a world map that had national borders drawn on it. This contrasted with the next map that presented a terrain overview but without borders drawn, which showed that nations do not always follow terrain. This was followed by a map of the former Soviet Union that had the Soviet Union in the center with the United States split in half. The next was an upside-down map, perhaps depicting how nations in the Southern Hemisphere may view the world with them at the top.

The second-to-last map was a map of the world at night, with borders drawn that showed lights. The final map was also a map at night that displayed lights, but had no borders drawn. Admiral Olson noted that the final map was how the world really works. He argued that the strategically important areas are where the lights are not on and that the threats we face are traceable there.

He concluded by stating that the US military is insufficiently prepared for how the world really works — where the lights are not on — and that we do not have sufficient knowledge in those areas about the people, culture, history, languages, economics, and governance. It is within the Sovereign Challenge forum that we can have the conversations across all perspectives and help us to understand how the world really works.
The Mexican Military in Combating Narco-Trafficking

Brigadier General Xicotencatl de Azolohua Nunez Marquez, General Staff for Ministry of Defense of Mexico

BG Marquez serves on the General Staff of the Mexican Ministry of Defense with responsibilities for combating the narco-trafficking threat directed at the country. Under the direction of the President of the Mexican United States, the Federal Government, acting through the Attorney General’s office, established “Mexico's Integral Strategy for the Fight against Drug-Trafficking.” This document specifies the rules and responsibilities for all the national institutions involved in the fight against drug trafficking, including the armed forces. Within the context of this document, BG Nunez Marquez clearly stated that the military has become involved because the narco-trafficking threat and related violence have exceeded the capacity of law enforcement and other civil authorities who are normally responsible for addressing those problems. While the armed forces are engaged in assisting with the narco-trafficking threat, law enforcement and other civil agencies are then able to grow their capacity through training and other activities so that they can eventually resume their traditional roles.

The efforts directed by the Secretariat of National Defense include operations to eradicate drugs, intercept shipments, and identify criminals and assist in their prosecution. Essentially the targets are the economic operations of the drug operators. Central to this effort are steps to identify and eliminate planting areas. In cases where drugs have been already processed, a system of interdiction is in place to prevent movement of contraband on roads, sea, and air.

The general pointed out that coordination with U.S. authorities is essential to disrupt both the movement of drugs from south to north and the movement of weapons and cash from north to south. It is necessary to ensure a sustained exchange of information because too often evidence is lost and must be preserved to pursue cases against the criminals. Throughout his comments, the general stressed the need for a whole-of-government approach to the narco-trafficking threat.
Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan

Ms. Gretchen Peters, author of Seeds of Terror: How Opium Funds Al Qaeda and the Taliban

Anchoring her comments on her research report, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” published by the Harmony Project at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Ms. Peters credited ten Afghan and Pakistani researchers who conducted the field research work for the study. The extensive interviews they conducted revealed an important realization perhaps lost in all the talk about the events in the region: that “Afghan and Pakistani people want to live in safe communities just as much as we do in the United States, just as much as people do in Mexico and Colombia and other parts of this continent.”

Ms. Peters suggests that over the past decade, concerns about such scourges as drug trafficking, extortion, and corruption have challenged and perhaps surpassed the challenges posed by ideologically driven violence and insurgency. She went so far as to propose the intriguing possibility that the story of the Taliban is becoming a story of criminality. Asserting that the Taliban are increasingly behaving like a drug cartel, she suggested that if you want to know the future of the Taliban, look to the FARC in Colombia because the Taliban are following a similar trajectory that the FARC took.

While it is familiar to talk about the Taliban using drug profits to finance their insurgency, Ms. Peters reports that they are earning far more than it takes to run their operations. So extensive are their drug trafficking, extortion, and corruption activities, they have transformed the focus of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and to some extent also in Pakistan. She quoted from a 2004 Stanford University study that found wars in which conflict actors have come to depend on valuable contraband tend to last five times longer on average than other wars.

The Taliban in many ways behave like network of criminal gangs, not just in their illicit activities but also in their organizational structures, funding flows, and interaction (and sometimes conflict) among themselves. Ms. Peters identified three broad categories of criminal activity:

a. Smuggling of lootable resources such as timber, marble, gemstones, antiquities, and narcotics has a strong emphasis on protecting shipments
of such contraband. Extortion and racketeering practices surround such activities to include forced taxation of local citizens and businesses and the payment of protection money.

b. Abduction and kidnapping are activities that have increasingly become thriving business initiatives rather than political statements. Targeted killings continue of those suspected of spying or collaborating with the coalition and others who threaten the criminal activities.

c. Looting and theft of coalition convoys, bank robberies, and payrolls of teachers and other workers continue.

As Taliban motivations become increasingly economic in nature, Ms. Peters asserted the need to understand those motivations, study how their financial systems operate, and develop intelligence networks that track the impacts of their financial strength, including the frustrations felt by local populations over their financial exploitation. While some of the younger fighters may retain their ideological fervor, the trend has been for the Taliban leadership to become increasingly interested in generating profits from criminal behavior. So important is this financial component that she suggested, “Maybe it is not the No. 3 of Al Qaeda that we need to remove from the battlefield. Maybe it is their accountant!” To do so, we need better financial intelligence.

She argued that the Taliban situation is not unique, identifying similar evolutionary patterns in places like the Balkans, Iraq, Northern Ireland, and Colombia during which “rebels morph into reprobates.” What began as a movement that was politically and ideologically motivated evolves into a for-profit criminal enterprise. Faced with the need for money, movements typically begin by taxing farmers and small businesses, usually in the form of increasing fees for protection.

In the cases of the FARC and the Taliban, those fees focused on those growing the drugs and processing them into usable products. Eventually those groups entered the refining businesses and then expanded into the transportation and export of the drugs — that is, the value of drugs doubles once they cross the Afghan border. Expansion into other organized crime activities such as kidnapping, extortion, and robbery become almost inevitable. In the academic world, this is referred to as the path from grievance to greed.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, such organized crime activities have amplified, reshaped, and sustained the conflict by spreading insecurity, slowing development, and raising the cost for the coalition for reconstruction and
stabilization. The instability created has both encouraged corruption at various levels and reinforced perceptions that governments, particularly at the local level, are weak and unable to act effectively to address the needs of their populations.

Ms. Peters outlined the increasing sophistication of the Taliban drug operations and encouraged the attendees to read the Taliban’s 2009 “Code of Conduct.” While the document does order Taliban fighters to avoid harming local populations, more than 50 percent of the passages in that document address new financial regulations to include the percentage of profits to be “kicked upstairs,” protection fee levels, and the percentage of loot the Taliban commander can keep by raiding a coalition convoy and other fee schedules.

This evolution may pose a strategic threat to the Taliban — and a strategic benefit to the coalition — as there are questions about the loyalty of various Taliban commanders who appear not willing to share the fruits of their labor.

Already some Taliban fighters apparently see their leaders who are safely in place in Pakistan as “out of touch” with what is actually going on. Additionally, there is a quiet sense of rage developing among the population at the financial exploitation to which they have become subjected. Ms. Peters again reminded the attendees that Afghans and Pakistanis want to live in stable communities as much as anyone else.

She said she’s been interested in seeing similar public opinion polls from Afghanistan and the U.S. that cite jobs, security, health care, and education as primary concerns. Given the discontent with Taliban behavior that threatens these desires, this situation offers a strategic opening for the coalition to accelerate the protection of civilians from both exploitation and violent criminal behavior.

The emerging discontent follows the initial popular acceptance of Taliban fighters because of their expectations that the insurgents would improve living conditions to include the replacement of weak and ineffective local governments. This follows a similar pattern that began in the mid-1990s when the spread of Taliban forces across the country was met with initial optimism, only to be replaced with disillusionment when the consequences of the Taliban rule became clear.

Ms. Peters argues that the behavior of U.S. and coalition forces have contributed to the growth of organized crime activity within the region. In the early years, allied forces tended to place the highest priority on the capture and elimination of terrorists and frequently ignored the harvesting,
processing, and transport of drugs as long as those responsible for the drug trade contributed to operations against those terrorists. From the U.S. perspective, the threats posed by the Afghan drug trade posed little threat to the U.S. when compared to Europe and other regions.

Another counterproductive activity involves payments to local warlords to ensure security. Doing so provides no incentives for improving the security situation because the elimination of terror threats and an increase in stability result in a loss of the funds paid to the locals to provide security. Militant extortion of development and aid projects also contribute to the funding of insurgents and other fighters.

Thus the U.S. and other members of the coalition find themselves within a “moral hazard” where they tolerate drug trafficking and other criminal behavior while funding security and development activities that leak funds to local warlords and insurgents. The result is a self-sustaining war that has become termed a “self-licking ice cream cone.”

Though the picture she painted was rather bleak at times, Ms. Peter’s description of the Taliban as a criminal cartel rather than a purely idealistic insurgency offers important new insight into the security challenges present within Afghanistan and Pakistan. She also identified various Taliban vulnerabilities resulting from increasing popular frustration with their violent tactics and exploitative techniques that can be addressed by fresh coalition strategies.

**Improving the Conditions for Afghan Women**

Ms. Mozhdah Jamalzadah, Afghan TV commentator on Women’s Issues

Ms. Jamalzadah — an Afghan television personality, acclaimed singer, and women’s rights activist — presented a compelling narrative of her experiences and those of the women of Afghanistan. She began with an historical overview by noting that in the 1920s, Afghan King Amanullah proclaimed that religion does not require women to veil their hands and faces or enjoin any special type of veil. Tribal customs must not impose themselves on the free will of the individual.

Women were given the right to vote in 1964, but the Afghan Civil War and the resulting Taliban rule (1991–2001) resulted in severe limits on the roles of women in society. Even though the new National Assembly has set aside
seats for the election of women, they continue to struggle to have their voices heard even when they have assumed those seats.

Interestingly, she reported that during the occupation by the Soviet Union (1979–1989), Afghan women had more freedoms than at any other time in the country’s history. Though a terrible time for Afghans in general, women benefitted from compulsory education and from being allowed to work, live, and dress as they pleased.

She asserted that Afghanistan is one of the worst places for women to live. Examples she cited included the second worst infant and maternal mortality rates in the world. She spoke of the persistent violence against women and how so much of it is underreported, especially away from the major urban areas. “The police turn a blind eye on most of those cases.” She also spoke of the suicides that result from such treatment and the continued practice of honor killings. The level of violence increases the farther away one travels from the major cities.

She argued that education must become mandatory for boys and girls throughout Afghanistan and called on the international community to pressure the Afghan government to ensure it happens. Echoing the comments of Mr. Greg Mortenson at the last Sovereign Challenge Conference, she reported that educated women would be more likely to get married at a later age and be able to manage a family much better while still playing an active role in society.

She also called for vocational training and assistance for women so they can begin their own businesses. She presented an example of an Afghan woman who employs five others who wash and iron clothes for her customers. The availability of women’s shelters and family counselors would also go a long way to empowering women and assisting them to function effectively within Afghan society.

Ms. Jamalzadah acknowledged that she is a talk show host and singer, but “I don’t think of myself as an artist … I am an activist, and the best way to get my message across is through music.” Though not always spoken about,
many women have played important roles in the history of Afghanistan. Her popular song, *Afghan Girl*, captures much of that tradition.

She said that the media are the most effective short-term solution for women and there should be a requirement that 20 to 30 percent of all television programming be educational in nature. Thus she is quite proud of her own television show, modeled on that of America’s Oprah Winfrey, because she takes on topics such as divorce, domestic violence, child abuse, forced child marriage, and the need for education. “It is necessary for Afghanistan to have a show like this.”

Ms. Jamalzadah reported that Afghans have become confused with what is religion and what is culture. Education is necessary to ensure that the Afghan people clearly understand the real meaning of Islam and the freedoms that it provides for women. Once again, the media have an important role to play in that educational process.

**Post-Conflict Societies**

Mr. Stanislav Cadjo, Minister of the Interior of the Republika Srpska

One of the consequences of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords was the creation of a multi-ethnic and democratic government within Bosnia and Herzegovina with the responsibility for conducting foreign diplomatic and fiscal policy. As part of the governmental structure, two second-tier governmental entities were formed, the Bosnian-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian-Serb-led Republika Srpska.

Mr. Cadjo, the Minister of the Interior of the Republika Srpska, stressed that the Balkans today are a quiet, peaceful region without conflict, with no risks for any major armed conflicts. He assured the group that “Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a security issue anymore.” He said that the greatest value of the Dayton Peace Accords was that it established and organized the structure of the country as it is now. He spoke on the importance of the Dayton Peace Accords from 1995 — established Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) with two entities, not just formally stopped the war. Mr. Cadjo stressed that there is still a great deal of distrust of officials within BiH. He spoke about organized crime and terrorism that had taken root in the absence of clear political conviction of such movements in some parts of BiH. In fact the need to establish and sustain trust among government entities and, perhaps most importantly, with the population became the central theme of his comments.
The establishment of such trust is essential for creating a secure environment in which the population feels comfortable with sharing information about criminal activity and other threats to local stability. People must trust in the dialogue with credible governance so they believe that their views are heard. Most importantly, a permanent communication between law enforcement and the people must be in place.

In the wake of the conflict, organized crime and terrorism were joined by human trafficking, prostitution, drug trading, weapons smuggling, car attacks, and similar crimes as threats to national security. In such an environment, the development of public trust through dialogue and community policing became major priorities in the fight against criminal threats to civil society.

Mr. Cadjo cited examples that speak to the success of his efforts to develop a sense of trust. He reported that the 27 percent of the population who expressed trust in the police when he took office had recently risen to 78 percent. At the same time, the number and frequency of violent crimes have decreased as have the levels of corruption. When people provide information to the police, they act on it. He reported that there is “not one street, place, village for which you will say you should not go there during the night because it is not safe. There is no such place.”

He spoke of making personnel changes and establishing special units to deal with specific threats posed by organized crime, terrorism, and other instability. The unit’s structure includes subordinate organizations targeting general criminal offenses, financial investigations, and cybercrime.

Mr. Cadjo summarized by attributing the success in fighting organized crime and terrorism to identifying their weak points, organizing government structures to fight those threats, necessary personnel changes, and creating an atmosphere of trust leading to the performance of joint activities against those threats.

He spoke about the efforts of the international community to assist in the changes that have taken place in his homeland. He mentioned the commitment of Republika Srpska to the process of European integration and spoke of his country’s interest in working with other international organizations including NATO.
Building a 21st Century Border

Commissioner Alan Bersin, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Commissioner Bersin began his remarks by giving the audience a perspective on the scope of the CBP. The organization has 57,000 employees and an annual operating budget of $11 billion. Their priority mission is to keep terrorists and their weapons out of the U.S. It also has a responsibility for securing and facilitating trade and travel while enforcing hundreds of U.S. regulations, including immigration and drug laws.

He reflected that the day of his comments, 10 November, marked the 235th United States Marine Corps birthday, and 11 November is celebrated in the U.S. as Veteran’s Day. Originally known as Armistice Day, Veteran’s Day is recognizing the end of World War I — the first major U.S. involvement overseas. He noted that a dramatic paradigm shift in how we see our borders is reflected in his linkages to the observance of the end of World War I.

In the past, the physical lines of World War I trench warfare and subsequent fortified defenses represented borders as divisions, a “fixed line along which we massed to define us from another” in ways that separated national sovereignty. He cited the traditional view of the nearby Rio Grande/Bravo River dividing the U.S. and Mexico as marking the beginning of one country, the ending of another.

Today requires a different view of the borders, a massive change in paradigms. The idea of a border is no longer a clearly defined “hard point.” Instead, the instantaneous flow of goods, people, capital, ideas, and information across borders presents new challenges and demands new approaches to identify and interdict potential threats. Thinking about those complex flows has replaced linear thinking defined by political boundaries or terrain. Confronting contemporary border challenges demands an extensive whole-of-government
approach to protect our citizens, encourage and grow trade opportunities, and embody our tradition of an open, welcoming society.

Commissioner Bersin provided some examples that are shaping today’s border environment. Each of the last three terrorist efforts directed against the U.S. (the UPS/FEDEX plane bomb plot, the Time Square bomb attempt, and Umar Abdul Mutallab — the underwear bomber) crossed both a border and a juridical line. Meeting such threats requires the cooperation of countries who share specific borders as well as others in the region and elsewhere around the globe. He noted that it was information from Saudi Arabia that enabled the U.S. to intercept the UPS/FEDEX bomb attempt.

He expanded the notion of regarding border security in terms of flows of goods, people, capital, ideas, and information in an increasingly borderless world where we must keep dangerous people and things away from the homeland. To do this, we must identify the threat earlier; the farther from the physical line the safer we will be. Therefore, we must secure those flows having a destination in the U.S. Doing so demands a sustained effort to “move the borders out . . . not in an imperialistic sense . . . not in a physical sense” but rather by creating protocols for the exchange of information and the coordination of activities.

He illustrated how the new thinking has evolved from concept to action by describing the post-9/11 changes in U.S. border control policies, techniques, and procedures. In the wake of those attacks, it was assessed that the linear approach to securing the U.S. border was insufficient, especially since various functions were split among major departments of the U.S. government. For instance, responsibility for the flow of people (immigration) resided in the Departments of State and Justice, cargo and goods in the customs offices of the Treasury Department, and threats to agriculture (e.g., pests) in the Agriculture Department.

It became apparent that a more efficient and effective organizational construct was required, and in 2003 the Customs and Border Protection was created under the Department of Homeland Security to address border issues in a unified way. Mr. Bersin noted they are still in the early stages of integrating the various functions while retaining the uniqueness and pride of all branches within the new agency.

Another change lies in the relationship between the U.S. military and law enforcement. Traditionally, military forces have focused on missions
overseas with no authority to act within the U.S. under the provisions of the 19th century Posse Comitatus Act, which grants internal security authority to law enforcement. That clear distinction has become more complex. Mr. Bersin argued that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not traditional wars and are instead part of a larger effort to keep dangerous things and dangerous people away from the homeland.

Relations between the military and law enforcement have expanded to include National Guard cooperation with law enforcement agencies along the U.S.-Mexico border. Law enforcement also borrows from the military for its approach to strategic thinking, employment of technology, development of intelligence resources, and structures, data management, and information exchange.

Commissioner Bersin then turned to the changing nature of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, noting that thinking of border security in terms of “flows” has changed how the two countries interact. The U.S. and Mexico are both relatively new countries and need to talk honestly with one another. In the past there has been an accusatory relationship with each side believing the other is not doing enough. While the U.S. talked about drugs, violence, and illegal immigration from Mexico, Mexico countered by talking about the U.S. demand for illegal drugs and cheap labor that sustained the flow of both northward. Mexican concerns about the flow of weapons and cash southward complicated the interaction.

Starting with Presidents Vicente Fox and George W. Bush, and continued by Presidents Felipe Calderon and Barack Obama, a new sense of a shared responsibility has created a political basis for shared solutions with mutual respect for sovereignty.

Returning to the concept of flows, Mr. Bersin emphasized that we must differentiate between lawful and unlawful flows and keep dangerous people and things away as far as possible by identifying them as early as possible. He invoked the familiar metaphor of looking for a tiny needle in a large haystack to describe the threats to border security. While it is not possible to stop and examine each person or package at a point of entry without creating chaos throughout the system, it is possible to manage risk by exploiting available intelligence and putting the necessary procedures into place.

What results are systems focused on differentiating high-risk and dangerous people and goods from those who are lawful and legitimate. Ideally, the
emphasis on flows ensures that when people and goods arrive at the physical boundary, we will be able to focus scarce resources on those people and goods about whom we have adverse information or on those we know too little about.

This comprehensive strategy, demanding both a whole-of-government approach and shared solutions with partner nations and organizations, is the cornerstone of border management. An example of this approach is the recent UPS/FEDEX bomb attempt. Once the threat was identified, the first response was to stop shipments from Yemen and other high-risk countries. The second was to stop high-risk packages. This success was possible by sharing information and managing the information received. However, Mr. Bersin argued that you cannot do it without partnership. The U.S. cannot live in a world isolated behind borders because of the digitalization and instantaneous flow of information. This reality creates two contradictory trends: knitting the globe together while the centrifugal effect on politics tends to divide us and causes us to get back behind our physical lines for security.

It is essential that we realize that security is not a zero-sum game. You do not become more secure by making someone else feel less secure. The fact is that any feeling of security is very temporary. True stability comes when both parties feel equally secure, a sense that develops only from a strong cooperative relationship.

The last paradigm change concerns the notion that information is power. Most of U.S. history has reflected the belief that I must hoard my information so that others must come to me. The emerging international security environment dramatically challenges that old belief. The way to grow influence and assert power is by sharing information, by reaching out to both domestic and international partners to manage the flows of goods, people, capital, ideas, and information as early and as far away as possible to create a more stable security condition.

Echoing a theme that resonated throughout the conference, Mr. Bersin concluded by emphasizing that such complexity puts a premium on effective collaboration and partnership between governments and their agencies responsible for border management and public security, underpinned by shared solutions and a mutual respect for sovereignty.
Breakout Group Reports

The six discussion groups met periodically during the conference to discuss the issues raised by the speakers both during their comments and in response to questions asked by attendees in the plenary sessions. As each discussion group functioned independently, the structures of their findings varied. These differences are reflected in the brief reports that follow. A summary of discussion points appears in the section called *Themes and Thoughts* beginning on page 3 herein.

Discussion Group Red

This group began by inviting members to discuss the various policies, strategies, tactics, and procedures that their countries employ to ensure border security. Several questions emerged:

a. Is border security a law enforcement function (internal) or a military function (external)?

b. How does the whole-of-government approach impact border security?

c. How can law enforcement and the military conduct mutually supporting operations along the border and with friendly or neutral nations across the border?

d. How does a country prevent a neighboring country from providing sanctuary to a criminal or armed group?

The group generally agreed that the *control* of borders is not a realistic way to define the challenge, preferring instead to discuss the *management* of borders. Given the wide variety of law enforcement, military, and paramilitary organizations that share border security tasks, it is important to define clearly the organizational structures and establish the responsibilities for each. Also essential is the requirement to identify the lines of authority and establish guidelines for supporting supported relationships among the various agencies.

Because a country is not likely to achieve complete control (i.e., of the entire length of a border and its surrounding environment), an effort must be made to identify the tools required to ensure both operational control and management of the boundary. This area would include the development of appropriate doctrine that outlines how to control the risks and manage the threats that challenge a border. Concepts such as operational control must be clearly understood so that officials can identify who and what crossed the
border, where, and when. Risk assessments must take into account the reality that penetrations of a border frequently impact security in the national capital and other regions of the country away from the border itself.

The fact no single country can manage or control a border 100 percent of the time means that information sharing, cooperation, and collaboration are necessary among agencies on both sides of a border while reaching across the boundary to ensure security by engaging one’s neighbors. As a practical matter, countries tend to “extend themselves” across borders in cases where immigrants cross, establish themselves, and neglect — for whatever reason — to assimilate into their new country. The instability resulting from such uncertain allegiances tends to undermine local authorities and disrupt local order, thus providing a welcoming environment for illicit activity of all types.

The presence of active “money trails” that flow across borders feeds the for-profit motives associated with the flows of persons, illegal drugs, weapons, stolen property, and other contraband and fuels corruption as Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) establish themselves and expand their influence by leveraging corrupt local, regional, and national officials.

Once again, the group considered several questions about how to address the challenges of transnational crime:

a. Is there a link between extremism and transnational crime? What are the indicators that you seek out to target that nexus?
b. What roles, authorities, and functions accrue to the military in the whole-of-government effort to address transnational crime, migration, and border security?
c. How can law enforcement agencies and the military share intelligence and conduct joint operations to defeat transnational crime? What barriers and affinities exist to include legislative and legal issues, organizational structures, individual and shared responsibilities, chains of command, and tactics?
d. Under the umbrella of a whole-of-government approach, what agencies or instruments of power are especially important in dealing with the complex challenges of a border region?

Members of the group asserted that if fences were the answer, they would already be employed successfully by countries throughout the world. Instead, an active and collaborative cross-border effort is necessary. Efforts to stop
terrorists, criminals, and other unwanted flows must be addressed by holistic, whole-of-government initiatives relying on rapid communications, intelligence sharing, targeted joint operations, and continuous cooperation animated by well-trained and credible liaison officers (LNOs).

The level of threat along any given border determines whether the military or law enforcement will exercise the lead authority. For instance, while Mexico has brought its armed forces into its counter-drug programs because the problem has exceeded the ability of law enforcement authorities to manage, the government has made the deliberate decision not to militarize its border with the United States. Once again, however, there was agreement that the military has a role to play when threats and circumstances exceed the capacity of law enforcement.

The group discussed the role of education in preparing the disparate organizations that are central to a whole-of-government approach to border security and other national security issues. Members made the point that military forces are familiar with the process of attending periodic formal education and training sessions while other agencies receive the necessary training as they come onboard and then are expected to function for the rest of their careers with few or no upgrades to their skills.

One member regretted that too often opportunities to freshen one’s skills or learn new ones are viewed as “costs — not value.” This is frequently the case because, while the military is usually large enough to allow for periodic breaks for individuals to attend extended education and training courses, civilian agencies are not staffed to do so.

More positively, individual nations reported a strong trend toward whole-of-government collaboration programs. Various educational, training, and exercise programs reside or are under development in national institutions of higher learning and/or within various government departments who invite members from throughout the government to participate.

Several attendees reported that their countries conduct various multi-week national security courses and workshops that engage critical personnel from throughout the government and include parliamentarians and other senior stakeholders to ensure their understanding. Various countries also reported the existence of operational whole-of-government cells staffed by members of appropriate civilian and governmental organizations at the local, state, and national levels.
A particularly interesting thread of the discussion considered the need to educate the population on the efforts of the government to ensure their security. More specifically, the group pondered whether the military has a role to educate the news media, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector on those efforts. Part of the motivation for this discussion lay with the notion that support for government national security initiatives could be enhanced through such programs. This initiative reflects the awareness of a need for credible strategic communication strategies that have emerged from the 5th and 6th Sovereign Challenge Conferences.

Discussions on the development of whole-of-government capacity noted the role that events and circumstances play in convincing relevant parties of the need for such cooperation. For instance, one country spoke of the necessity to train its military in police tasks such as gathering evidence, conducting investigations, and making arrests as they assume law enforcement responsibilities when deployed to external operational areas. Similarly, forest fires, disaster relief, health threats, and the support of major sporting and political events are supported by an “escalating series of exercises” in advance to merge together military, law enforcement, and other agencies to prepare them for the challenges ahead.

Discussion Group Orange
This group expended significant effort in coming to an understanding of borders, border regions, the threats and opportunities that accrue to borders, and the multiplicity of consequences that flow from globalization. Traditionally, borders have been important to states because they provide a clearly delineated sense of political identity. The presence of a border, even if arbitrarily drawn and perhaps disputed, provides a physical manifestation of sovereignty and a sense of what it means to be a member of that state.

A physical demarcation line also provides a sense of individual exclusiveness, a shared national identity, and perspective anchored in a common cultural foundation and historical experience. Geography and borders matter physically and emotionally, helping to shape the destiny of a state. Thus borders express not only what you are but who you are.

Globalism and other factors now challenge the very nature of borders. Borders remain useful to states, but nonstate actors increasingly challenge them in ways unfamiliar to the shared experiences of contemporary nation
Consequently governments have often come to find themselves com-
peting with criminals, terrorists, and insurgents to manage their own sov-
eign borders. Perhaps the most important realization emerging from the con-
temporary environment is the requirement for joint solutions to manage
the complexity.

Interaction and friction coexist and bring about two compelling para-
doxes: the first of these is that the connectivity and interaction of globalism
exert such pressure on the tenets of traditional sovereignty that the state
is becoming more important by the moment. To balance the simultaneous
border roles of filters and barriers, the sovereign state must employ a greater
portion of the elements of national power to ensure security and remain
credible.

A related border paradox is that in the 21st century, border management
demands increased local autonomy for efficiency and responsiveness to imme-
diate threats, even as the severity of those threats requires greater national
control within the context of regional and global interaction. The successful
execution of whole-of-government strategies by a government — augmented
by information exchanges, cooperation, and collaboration with neighboring
countries and regional partners — emerges as a counter to the challenges of
the contemporary border.

The group also pursued the metaphor of borders serving as “mirrors” in
which the comparative social inequities, levels of economic prosperity, educa-
tion opportunities, and quality of social services are reflected back upon the
population of a given state. Unfavorable contrasts create issues that result in
internal and cross-border friction. One recurring theme was that social and
governance failures give rise to the conditions that bring about crime and
terrorism.

A state’s quality of life, level of human development, and variety of eco-
nomic opportunities contribute to social stability and either foster or mitigate
against the development of grievances. Too frequently the criminals and
other miscreants are (or are seen to be) better organized than the agencies of
government. Perceived social and governance failures encourage individuals
and then groups of increasing size to seek alternative solutions. Increasing
instability on one side of a border inevitably has an impact on the other. Both
the plenary sessions and group discussions addressed the principle that border
problems have inland solutions. However, it is also true that border problems have inland causes.

Thus borders reveal themselves as multidimensional, regional in both context and consequences. Not surprisingly, countries along a common border or nearby tend to view threats differently and set their priorities of effort using different lenses based on their own cultures, perceptions of the security situation, and domestic concerns. Such inconsistencies in perception are legitimate, making negotiation a natural and necessary feature of any border problem resolution. The resulting border cooperation must be multidimensional, holistic in perspective, and have multipurpose in resourcing and action.

Specific observations and comments include:

a. The challenges of the 21st century broaden the military’s focus and efforts from traditional defense and deterrence responsibilities to include irregular threats. This expansion has implications for the apportionment of capabilities and the understanding of the new missions.

b. Respect and trust lead to mutual appreciation and understanding, contributing to the framework for effective cross-border, regional, and global partnerships.

c. Mutual respect among nations for another’s sovereignty and issues affecting that sovereignty is an essential first step in finding acceptable, suitable, and feasible cross-sovereignty and cross-border solutions.

d. You must see the problems faced by your neighbors and other international partners as your own and work collaboratively to resolve them. Otherwise, those problems will become your problems as global “flows” deliver them to your doorstep.

e. People cross borders seeking a better life for their families and themselves. Development efforts can fulfill those aspirations at home and remove the motivation to migrate.

f. A unity of effort is a solution only when it occurs at home, across borders, regionally and globally. Until then, it can only facilitate action, which is no small accomplishment.

g. Each sovereign state’s relationship with its military is unique. It is this sovereign singularity that will ultimately define how the military will be organized and what role it will play.
h. Weakness in a country’s social fabric and governance lie at the heart of transnational threats such as crime and terrorism. Weakness and failure lead populations to seek alternative solutions to their states of existence.

i. Crises over territory have been replaced by crises caused by economic conditions and disputes over cultural identity. Borders can protect against the former, but less so against the latter.

j. More important than what is happening at the physical border is what is happening among those living and working around the border.

k. Long-term solutions to border problems are political in nature.

l. It is impossible for a country to solve its own border security problems without understanding the similar problems of their neighbors. Border issues must be perceived as shared problems, requiring mutual respect between neighboring countries for resolution.

m. As people frequently cross borders seeking a better life, economic development and credible governance at home reduce the need for such migration. Thus most border issues are connected to broader development issues.

n. Border security requires a local, autonomous-response approach, but with centralized control.

o. Precisely identifying the nature of a threat is the primary challenge when confronting external security challenges.

p. Security measures that harm a neighboring country are actually counterproductive in the long run.

q. A country’s military is for defense (as of a border barrier), not for border control.

r. The military’s exact role in border management and anticrime operations must be clearly defined and only temporary to ensure public trust and confidence in the institution.

s. Globalization results in a greater flow of people, ideas, goods, services, and capital across borders and an increased need for cooperation and collaboration among sovereign states.

t. Neighboring states must share their border challenges, leading to solutions that are beneficial to all parties and rendering border regions less threatening.

u. The efficient management of multiple flows across borders requires technology transfers among nations.
Effective strategic communication programs are necessary to ensure that populations understand and support what governments are doing to secure their borders, build trust, and bring stability to border regions and beyond.

Discussion Group Yellow

This group defined the actors, factors, attributes, and dynamics present along a border and then proposed two models for analyzing and understanding such an environment. Members of the group began by identifying the actors and communities of interest typically found along a border: a large and diverse group including businesses, tourists, law enforcement, families, industry, cartels, transportation, local communities, and various government agencies such as port authorities, customs, immigration, law enforcement, and ministries of trade. Associated border factors include health, culture, insurance, communications, energy, water, and technology. Given such a dynamic and complex environment, the group sought to develop a construct to manage the various challenges.

The two overarching concepts that shaped the construct were concerns about national sovereignty and the nature of a border itself. Sovereignty was broadly defined as various practices that must be addressed with the recognition that where there is a border, sovereignty looms as a major concern. The community of stakeholders who have an interest in the activities associated with a national border need to show respect and acceptance of that sovereignty.

In a broad sense, the group identified a border and its surrounding environment as recognizable places that both separate and gather together. A border provides a clear definition of who we are and how we interact. Borders can be physical (where two or more countries come together) or they can be virtual or cyber in nature. Whether physical or virtual, borders are places wherein different migratory, economic, social, cultural, and security agendas meet and inevitably interact. Recognizing that borders are places of encounter and interaction gives rise to a fundamental mindset that views borders as areas of connectivity instead of separation.

As the next step in developing a border-management model, the group sought to describe the attributes necessary for an effective border construct. The first attribute was trust among countries, institutions, and individuals. The group defined trust as a reasonable expectation that a person or entity
will act in a certain way and so consistently play a specific role in a predictable manner. Associated with trust is the need for information and intelligence sharing, not just across borders but within the border environment itself. Implicit in the notion of trust is the realization that it is not possible to know everything, so sharing becomes more important than ever as complexity increases.

Another attribute called for seeking a balance between the employment of law enforcement and military resources at the border. In some countries the border is purely a law enforcement issue, and when the military does get involved, it sends negative signals to the various actors. In other countries, border control lies beyond law-enforcement capabilities, and it has become necessary to call on the capabilities and capacity that the military provides. The group acknowledged that each country is unique; however, some collaboration is necessary with the military to draw on their procedures, training, technology, and equipment.

In summarizing these various attributes, the group recognized that their interaction helps shape the message or “public face” that a country sends to all the actors along the border, which may or may not lead to a healthy border atmosphere.

Taking into account the border actors, factors, and attributes, the group then turned to the development of border constructs or models. The first construct was the need to go beyond a whole-of-government approach to seek a more comprehensive whole-of-nation approach. In a whole-of-nation construct, businesses and other entities wishing to function within a nation recognize that it is in their best interests to comply with and enforce border rules/regulations, thus making the “haystack” from Commissioner Bersin’s presentation smaller and illegal/illicit activity easier to detect. Two concepts emerged: the glass and the cell.

In the glass concept, borders define a country like a glass holds its content. A glass protects and defines the nature of its drink. A controlled exchange can happen by taking or adding ingredients; the exchange is controlled by rules and regulations. The owner of the glass is responsible for what and how much is added or removed from his glass and thus the composition of the resultant drink in his glass. Within the whole-of-nation construct, the composition of the drink is a mixture of actors concerned with factors such as labor, educa-
tion, development, trade, immigration, and tourism. An overfilled glass is difficult to manage, and a broken glass represents dysfunctional borders.

The second model proposed was based on the cell concept. States are viewed as functioning like living cells where they share the same environment and inevitably develop a state of interdependency. Thus it is natural for them to take part in the process of exchanging substances. Some of these cells are strong, while others are weak. Each has a different capacity for controlling the various types of exchanges in order to foster healthy development and growth. Each has its own ability to mobilize resources for protection and to isolate threats in order to survive and develop. The cell model implies osmosis, allowing flows to take place across the borders and the cells to grow, survive, and die or, alternatively, for new cells to be created. This construct also implies the essential survival relationship between cells/states and illustrates why isolationism from fellow cells/states does not work. The challenge then becomes a question of how to control the osmosis or flows across the borders between nations.

Discussion Group Green

The group began its discussions by identifying the threats to their individual borders, including the contributing factors, prioritization of the threats, and the root causes of those threats. The plenary session presentations provided the foundation from which to explore and conceptualize the nature of the threats. By understanding these threats, group members then proposed solutions and some overarching guiding principles.

Drawing upon the U.S.-Mexico border presentations, to include the U.S. Border Patrol briefing and tour and Mayor Cook’s comments, they noted the similarities between the conditions along the U.S.-Mexican and Afghanistan-Pakistan borders. They also highlighted the requirement for security, governance, development, and rule of law. However, these were seen more as solutions than as the root causes that have grown into threats in the absence of such initiatives.

There was a general consensus that the reason nations have borders is for protection, thus meaning that borders still matter. The group found Dr. Valdés-Ugalde’s presentation of how Mexico and the U.S. view and prioritize border threats illuminating in that they share the same threats but have assigned different priorities to those threats; see Table 4.
Table 4. Mexico-United States Border Threats

<table>
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<th>United States</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
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<td>Terrorism</td>
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<td>Arms trafficking</td>
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The members of the group then identified the border threats that their respective nations consider of concern. The border threats included the following:

a. Illegal immigration (4 nations)
b. Illegal drugs (3 nations)
c. Terrorism/insurgency (3 nations)
d. Illegal arms (2 nations)
e. Criminal activity (2 nations)
f. Other countries (1 nation)
g. U.S. policy (1 nation)
h. Human trafficking (1 nation)
i. General lack of security (1 nation).

Using the threat discussion as a point of departure, the group moved on to tackle the issue of root causes of those threats.

Among the most important root causes identified were poverty, greed, corruption, and the demand for criminal services. Of these root causes, the two that generated the most discussion were poverty and the demand for criminal services (particularly illegal drugs). Regarding poverty, Dr. Valdés-Ugalde’s presentation revealed that the average hourly wage in Mexico is $2 an hour, while in the U.S. it is $10 an hour. Because of this disparity, the group members commented that the U.S.-Mexico border tour stimulated sadness in that on one side you clearly find the *haves* and on the other, the *have nots*.

On the issue of drug-traffic violence, it was agreed that it is not sufficient to address only the supply side of illegal drug trafficking; it is equally important, if not more so, to address the demand side. The group came to the consensus that the fight against drug trafficking has failed as the motivation to make money is too strong and the demand too great. Some members recommended
legalizing drugs as a solution (with the side benefit of being able to tax it), while a smaller number of group members were opposed and suggested that by legalizing drugs we would be “writing off” 5 percent of the population.

The group discussion reflected a fundamental starting point that different countries have different priorities and interests. Taking this one step further, there are also local interests to consider. These local interests include, but are not limited to, the commerce that occurs at borders — beneficial to both sides — and the fact that related families often live on both sides of borders.

While examining specific solutions, it was widely agreed that the military cannot solve the various problems alone and border security is best left for civilian law enforcement as the primary responsible agencies. Most countries use the military in a limited supporting role when the civilian authorities do not have enough capacity. However, some countries use the military for border security because the threat they face is too great for law enforcement to take a lead role.

A European Union (EU) nation noted that they maintain minimal border security because they entrust their border security to their EU neighbors. Although this arrangement may represent a unique situation, it could also be reflective of the evolving nature of border security where security is not achieved with just a single nation, but through nations working together, perhaps in the absence of a formal EU-styled arrangement.

The security situation along the Canadian-U.S. security was cited as another example of coordination among nations, noting how the “air” sovereignty of both nations is a shared responsibility as was detailed in Admiral Winnefeld’s address about the roles of NORAD. Clearly the nature of border security is evolving into the multidimensional environments of land, maritime, air, and cyber.

The group noted that regional and global threats require regional and global solutions; in addition, powerful nations have an obligation to help weaker nations while not imposing their values and ideas on their partners. The fact is that asymmetric strategies generate consequences that are not immediately apparent. For instance, the decision of the Netherlands to decriminalize so-called soft drugs resulted in youth from throughout Europe flocking to the Netherlands, resulting in significant internal social tension. Mitigating these threats will often require nontraditional strategies that go beyond the familiar physical barriers defined by borders and the employment
of specific agencies to secure those fixed lines. Nations cannot restrict them-
selves to military solutions as all the elements of national power must be
employed collaboratively to achieve effective border security.

The group concluded by establishing guiding principles for the way ahead.
The first of these is that, though border security requires increasing inter-
national cooperation and collaboration, individual national sovereignty still
matters. Strategies to face down transnational threats rely on political support
at the national and local levels. Failing strategies must be reevaluated; new
policies must be considered. The effort to combat the trafficking of drugs
is an example. Collectively we must improve and build new institutions to
confront these threats and empower them holistically to mitigate and then
eliminate the effects of drug trafficking.

Authorities and resources must be provided, gaps must be closed, and cor-
ruption must be minimized. By sharing information, intelligence, techniques,
and procedures regionally and globally, nations can better confront these
global transnational threats and better secure their borders and sovereignty.

Discussion Group Blue

This group began by polling attendees to identify the greatest security threats
perceived by their nations. Following the general trend, the group identified
terrorism and transnational crime in its various forms as issues of greatest
concern. To address these threats, it became clear that a whole-of-government
approach is necessary through which specific roles are established to avoid
both overlap and gaps in exercising specific responsibilities.

The recurring issue of balance — between military and law enforcement
approaches to address these threats — generated various insights. One gen-
eral conclusion was that, as in Mexico today, a nation’s military provides
assistance when the levels of violence reach a point that law enforcement
and other agencies cannot cope and then steps away when violence recedes
below that point. One example cited concerned the FARC in Colombia that
at one time essentially represented an army requiring the intervention of the
nation’s armed forces. As the military has succeeded in reducing both the
size and influence of the FARC, the military will return to its traditional role
of defending the nation while law enforcement agencies deal with the small
band of terrorists that remain.

Group members were clear that no competition should occur between the
military and law enforcement, especially in an antidrug effort. The process
relies on the integration of complementary skills such as law enforcement evidence collection and criminal investigation techniques with military capabilities such as intelligence-gathering procedures, Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, and surveillance technology. The theme of cooperation reached beyond the inclusion of military and law enforcement agencies to include the reality that multiple law enforcement agencies with their own cultures and procedures will share responsibility for border security within many nations. Both physical and virtual fusion centers are essential for executing the complex tasks of information sharing, cooperation, and collaboration.

Echoing a theme introduced by French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere at the 5th Sovereign Challenge Conference in March 2010, the group sought to ensure that all actions taken against criminal actors are anchored in law and the prosecutors and other members of the judicial structure are engaged to ensure legitimacy and gain convictions.

Some members warned against excessive focus on the symptoms of terrorism, crime, and general lawlessness at the expense of ignoring the root causes such as poverty and unconstrained immigration patterns that create instability. Thus actions taken to invest in persons and institutions are essential elements in any comprehensive, whole-of-government national security strategy. Even then, as several group members noted, some former terrorists, insurgents, and transnational criminals will continue to act as threats to society as persistent criminals or may morph into new threats. Although often domestic in nature, such threats can become problems in neighboring countries if strong action is not taken.

Again the situation dealing with the FARC emerged as a viable example. The past 10 years have seen the demobilization of more than 32 percent of FARC forces and supporting cadres. The program to carry out this mission has relied on a military psychological operations capability down to the platoon level that operates in the field and other remote areas. A special office has been established to administer initiatives focused on health care, economic development, resource acquisition, and loans to start local businesses.

Also included are education programs to incorporate opportunities for FARC members seeking reintegration into Colombian society. This whole-of-government approach also features a rewards program to generate intelligence on the remaining FARC leadership and to purchase FARC weapons. As representatives of other nations agreed, a strong economic component of national power is essential to support both former members of a nation’s
military as well as to integrate former foes as in the case of the FARC and in similar circumstances elsewhere. One concern left unresolved addressed the reintegration of children soldiers in Africa and other post-conflict societies. Quite simply, how do you integrate them?

The group also considered the corrupting influences of loosely managed borders and the transnational criminals who take advantages of the gaps created by corrupt practices. Several nations asserted that their national policies established a standard of zero tolerance for corrupt behavior. The unmonitored and uncontrolled flow of financial resources, including cash, across borders creates the environment for the growth of corruption. One member argued that it is a two-way street, where there is one person who seeks to corrupt and another who is willing to accept the offer.

While anticorruption laws exist, credible governance, transparency in commercial transactions, and equal economic opportunity for all citizens are the true bulwarks against such criminality.

A recurring theme of Group Blue discussions was the realization that we do not become more secure by making others less secure. Cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and international levels is essential for success in countering common threats to national sovereignty. One “takeaway” cited was that the group sessions allowed attendees to appreciate the different approaches taken by other nations to address shared threats. It is increasingly true that my problems are your problems; and information sharing, cooperation, and collaboration are essential.

In a general sense, group members believed that existing systems and institutions, such as the UN, may have the capacity to be successful if properly resourced, sustained, and adapted to changing threats. Recreating the wheel in the face of a new or freshly perceived challenge is generally counterproductive. Because we tend to create new organizations, we either undermine the limited and shrinking resources available to support existing structures or encourage competition among institutions, which detracts from the achievement of desired effects.

In recognizing the diverse threats that create the instability (which enables the development of terrorism, insurgencies, and transnational criminal threats), the group recommended that future Sovereign Challenge Conferences address partner capacity building in a variety of environments with an emphasis on sharing or trading off traditional national capabilities. These could include discussions of good governance; terrorism; development; crisis
management; cyber security; strategic communication; maritime issues such as piracy, humanitarian operations, and logistics; and developing irregular capabilities to address irregular challenges.

**Discussion Group Purple**

This group launched its deliberations by reporting on how their individual countries view the challenges of border security and how each structures its domestic institutions, policies, and procedures to cope with them. Borders are fluid and constantly changing. Their functions must bend to the needs of the people by allowing for the flows of people, goods, information, capital, ideas, and services while ensuring the security of both sides of the border and the nations beyond.

What resulted was an animated exchange of information about how different countries adapt general border control principles to their own situations. Many of the members prepared diagrams so they could more clearly explain the complexities of their own border situations. One highlighted the “long border with my friend [country deliberately not named]”, who was also a member of the group.

Regardless of specific cases, the group generally emphasized that nations sharing a border must also have a mutual appreciation for needing border security to be truly effective. Even with a mutual understanding of the demands of border security, the level of effectiveness can be constrained by the resources available. Central to an effective border management scheme is the availability of accurate, timely, and useful intelligence and willingness by all parties to share it appropriately — both domestically and cross-border.

One representative, recalling the visit to the U.S.-Mexico border where private property reached to the fence line, reported that his country’s government owns all the land adjacent to the border, thus requiring official permission to approach. Others reported similar protocols. Still others noted that residents and business owners along the frontier represent valuable sources of information and, in many cases, are informally organized to keep an eye on activities along the border. More specifically, group members discussed what one country called a “Volunteer Defense Corps” of villagers, trained by the army and responsible for participating in the layered defense in their tribal area.

Depending on the nature of the border region, levels of threat and sovereign prerogatives, nations described the employment of law enforcement,
military, paramilitary, or a mixture of forces. As a demonstration of how
diverse border regions can be, two neighboring countries described the beauty
and uniqueness of a golf course where an individual plays the first hole by
hitting a drive in one country and putting on the green in the other.

Concerns about climate change reminded group members that melting
ice packs are opening up new sea lanes and exposing coastlines to the move-
ment of people, goods, and contraband for the first time. Such displacement
becomes attractive as nations tighten border crossing protocols elsewhere,
thus forcing terrorist, criminal, and migratory elements to seek alternative
access to their territory.

Legitimate movement is also made more complex in places like Africa
where borders were often drawn without regard to established tribal bound-
aries. Thus the movement of individuals within their traditional tribal lands,
but across political boundaries, for tribal ceremonies or merely to visit family
members becomes quite complicated. Of course, in many cases, tribes simply
do not recognize the borders that split their tribal areas. Thus tribal chiefs
are frequently responsible for people and lands that straddle contemporary
political borders.

Various members of EU countries explained the rationale of secured
external borders while allowing essentially unfettered movement among
the internal borders of the member countries. There emerged a consensus
among EU representatives that it is worth giving up a bit of sovereignty on
border security issues to allow for free internal movement. There was also a
confidence that the “operational depth” afforded by loosening internal move-
ment assists in the apprehension of criminals, terrorists, and other potential
threats. Of course, political and economic cooperation, anchored in a strong
foundation of trust, are essential to make the system work.

The group discussed how border security is viewed as a defensive system
in which your neighbor’s problems must be seen as your own. Representa-
tives of countries cited examples in which they practice an in-depth focus on
partners throughout the region, not just on their immediate border neighbor.
Such approaches require the kinds of cross-border, regional and global infor-
mation exchanges, cooperation, and collaboration discussed in both plenary
and group sessions and demonstrated during the tour of the EPIC and the
U.S.-Mexico border.

One representative spoke of the need to balance the traditional functions
of a border with contemporary security realities. Much of the complexity flows
from the fact that nations are imposing security protocols to guard against terrorists, criminals, and illicit trafficking on top of the revenue-collecting protocols that have been the traditional domain of border management. As this process of harmonization of efforts continues, it is essential that nations become able to accommodate both functions without stifling the collection of revenue or threatening security.

This challenge is particularly complex in countries or regions used by criminal elements as transshipment points for drugs and other contraband. Such operations exploit existing trade relationships built upon the movement of legitimate goods through established sea and air networks. Thus the mixing of the legitimate and illicit complicates the free flow of international trade and creates the conditions favorable for corruption to take root.

Given the various complexities emerging from the conference, the need for trust was a recurring theme that set the tone for both domestic cooperation in whole-of-government approaches and collaboration with neighbors and regional/global partners. One group member suggested that instead of co-locating watch officers, communication systems, operations centers, and other fixed facilities, a more practical expression of trust would be to enable watch officers to contact their counterparts in neighboring countries to ask, “Are you seeing what I’m seeing? What do you make of it?”

The group concluded that measures must be sought out to “leap frog” trust relationships to new levels, much as cell phone technology replaces the laying of copper wire for traditional telephone service. Such a sense of trust was seen as clearly vital for border issues, but also central to related discussions of countries’ broader relationships with their neighbors.

One idea that emerged from group discussions calls for the creation of a bilateral border committee to address the day-to-day issues of border management; for larger, more complicated problems, a regional border committee may be necessary. Regardless, contemporary border security calls for a comprehensive engagement of neighbors and regional partners through their law enforcement, military, legal, and intelligence organizations. As the speed of information sharing plays an important role in efficient cooperation and collaboration among nations, such structures for face-to-face interaction better exploit the actionable nature of intelligence gained from both human and technological sources.
Conclusion

The 6th Sovereign Challenge Conference generated a great deal of animated discussion and idea exchanges in both the plenary sessions and during the multiple discussion group sessions. Much was learned from the visit to EPIC and to the U.S.-Mexico border. The format encouraged participants to discuss their nation’s perspective on border security threats and security protocols. These opportunities then allowed for the exchange of ideas and their adaptation to other settings.

Recurring themes included the following:

a. Borders are taking on new roles.
b. Trust among domestic and international agencies is essential.
c. Success requires extensive coordination along all borders.
d. A whole-of-government approach — even a whole-of-nation approach — is necessary.
e. The military role in border security is unique to each country and typically based upon prevailing threats and the capability and capacity of law enforcement.
f. A credible rule-of-law system must support all efforts.
g. Public support is an important component of effective border management.

As with previous conferences, many of the recommendations for future conferences emphasized the need for the broader inclusion of other agencies in the fields of law enforcement and perhaps intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to strengthen the whole-of-government approach and increase the number of tools available to policy makers, strategists, and operators. More specifically, attendees welcomed the expanded inclusion of law enforcement and legal attachés.

As noted earlier, a general interest in addressing the development of partner capacity emerged, to include the sharing or what one discussion group called trading off traditional national capabilities. Specific future topics could include good governance and the responsibilities of sovereign nations; actions against terrorists; social and economic development; crisis management; cyber security; strategic communication (a recurring area of interest); maritime issues such as piracy, humanitarian operations, and logistics; and developing irregular capabilities to address irregular challenges.