Special Operations Forces
Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual

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Foreword

The SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual is designed to support the Joint Special Operations University’s educational mission and, in particular, its series of SOF Interagency courses. Mr. Chuck Ricks, a JSOU Senior Fellow, compiled the volume to provide a valuable reference work for JSOU students, SOF staff officers, and partners in the interagency process. The manual provides insight and information regarding various counterterrorism players in the U.S. Government national security apparatus. While not all inclusive, this manual provides an outline of organizations, missions, and relationships that comprise the interagency process.

The interagency process is a fluid interaction involving government organizations and processes that changes the way the government is organized and adjusts its priorities to meet real-world challenges. Consequently, this document is an initial publication that JSOU expects to update and treat as an iterative product, which will keep the document current and relevant. If you have suggestions for improvements or changes to the manual, please contact either Mr. Homer Harkins, JSOU Interagency Education Division chief, 357 Tully St., Hurlburt Field FL 32544, homer.harkins@hurlburt.af.mil, 850-884-5208 (or DSN 579-5208) or JSOU Press, Attn: Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil, 850-884-1569 (or DSN 579-1569).

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Introduction

The emergence of globally linked terror threat networks in this decade present the United States, its allies, and partners a significant and long-term dynamic for viewing national security. The traditional concept of state-on-state military engagement will remain a valid security concern; but nonstate, violent, extremist terror networks in an irregular and chaotic environment means we must be agile and adaptive with our counter strategy. As these threat networks develop sophisticated operational capabilities, the United States must ensure its national security apparatus adapts to meet these challenges.

Addressing irregular, asymmetric, and nontraditional threats manifested in networks requires a collaborative, knowledge-based approach. Direct combat and kinetic operations, while remaining an element in any campaign against terror and violent extremists, should not be the primary response mechanism or a sole basis of a national strategy to combat and counter extremists. A whole-of-government approach is required that addresses the complex and multilayered nature of these groups, the motivations driving their supporters, and their diverse operational environments. To truly reduce this irregular threat will require a strategy to attack or mitigate the fabric and linkages between terrorists, extremists, and organized crime operating in an increasingly interconnected global economy and society.

To assist in developing counter strategies to these threats, USSOCOM directed Joint Special Operations University to establish a series of SOF Interagency educational programs to facilitate collaboration and understanding across the special operations community and other government departments and agencies. The *SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual* is an additional element in this educational process and will be a valuable reference guide for national security professionals across the United States Government and others.

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On the cover. The cover image includes a representative sample of U.S. Government department seals for those routinely involved in interagency counterterrorism activities with Special Operations Forces. USSOCOM is one organization within the Department of Defense and among other federal agencies who work through the interagency process to achieve synchronized results. The graphic suggests networked relationships among federal agencies to highlight the concept that any one agency may be working with multiple and different partners at any point in time.

The content of this manual represents an ongoing, dynamic project to capture existing interagency counterterrorism structures, organizations, responsibilities, and work flow. Changes driven by new presidential administrations, fresh policy and current events inevitably alter the interagency landscape. All information comes from open sources to include official fact sheets and background obtained from various official Web sites. Any omissions are completely unintentional.
Chapter 1. Interagency Counterterrorism Components

This SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual is rooted in the understanding that no single department, agency, or organization of the U.S. Government (USG) can, by itself, effectively locate and defeat terrorist networks, groups and individuals. Similarly it has become increasingly evident that it is not possible for individual countries, coalitions, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to “go it alone” against the threats of terrorists and their networks.

The USG and these various international players must seek ways to work collectively to create environments that discourage the conditions that breed terrorism in the first place and prevent the recurrence of terrorism once defeated. This manual addresses the complex mix of players and structures within both the USG interagency and, to a lesser extent, the wider international community.

It is often the case that the special operations warrior first encounters the interagency and the rest of the players in a meeting within the area of operations (AO). Thus this manual seeks to answer three basic questions:

a. Who are these people?
b. Whom do they work for?
c. Why are they here?

Chapter 1 focuses on the USG interagency in three sections:

a. The first section—The Interagency—offers a brief overview of the USG interagency process. While it is by no means exhaustive in its scope, the discussion provides basic information for the special operations warrior about both the interagency concept and its historical context.

b. The second section—Counterterrorism Roles, Missions, and Responsibilities—identifies the various department, organization, and agency components within the USG that address counterterrorism issues. It’s important to know where specific counterterrorism expertise and resources reside, but also to understand that they frequently function separately from their parent leadership.

c. The third section—Functioning of the Interagency Counterterrorism Components—describes how these various components are linked together into functional work clusters centered around a lead agency responsible for carrying out specific counterterrorism activities. For instance, the Director of National Intelligence is the focal point for all USG intelligence activities and coordinates the activities of the 16 members of the intelligence community and other supporting bodies that originate from throughout the USG.
The Interagency

Over the decades, the concept of the interagency has emerged as the process that harnesses the diplomatic, economic, informational, military, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement elements of national power to address a broad spectrum of security threats and to ensure the safety of the United States and the American people.

The primary focus of this manual is a bit narrower as it describes that slice of the larger interagency that works through the coordinative process to address counterterrorism (CT) issues and activities overseas. However, it's inevitable that domestic and international overlap among participants, capabilities, resources, and agendas leads to the occasional discussion of broader CT and antiterrorism topics to include some homeland security concerns.

As defined in Joint Publication 3-0 (September 2006, incorporating Change 1 in February 2008), interagency is “the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.”

Dealing with CT issues, however, involves more than just the departments, agencies, and organizations of the USG. The successful application of U.S. foreign policy and military power to achieve CT objectives also requires the inclusion and, if possible, commitment of host nation (HN) participants, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Because of this complexity, the special operations warrior frequently requires innovative mental flexibility to achieve assigned national security objectives.

It is important to realize that the interagency is not a body with a fixed structure and a developed operational culture. Instead, the USG interagency is a loose and often undefined process of multiple structures and cultures that is often personality and situational dependent for its success to an extent normally unfamiliar to the special operations warrior. Stepping outside the comfort zone of military operations introduces uncertainty about the ways and means to accomplish the mission.

The special operations warrior can take some solace in the recognition that working the interagency is not a new challenge. As far back as 1940, the Small Wars Manual of the United States Marine Corps identified the problem: “One of the principal obstacles with which naval forces are confronted . . . has to do with the absence of a clean-cut line of demarcation between State Department authority and military authority.” Further on, the manual asserts that a need exists “for the earnest cooperation between the State Department representatives and naval authorities.”

What has changed, however, is the complexity of the national security environment and the number of departments, agencies and organizations that now play roles in ensuring the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of our nation. What was once written about relationships between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS) now applies similarly to DoD relationships throughout the USG and beyond.

The SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual is intended to assist the special operations warrior faced with the often-bewildering array of USG interagency departments, agencies, and organizations as well as the HNs, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs who also act as players within any given AO. As noted earlier, this manual focuses on departments, agencies, organizations, and programs by identifying who they are, where they fit and how they contribute to counterterrorism efforts.

Recent experience teaches much about the rapidly changing environments of the global war on terror. However, there exists little to prepare one for the diverse mix of players and agendas encountered within the multiple venues of any battle space. Sometimes it might appear that there are lots of different people and organizations performing all sorts of unrelated and uncoordinated tasks directed toward unclear objectives.

If true, such a situation represents a recipe for failure. The reality is probably less severe. The ideal is to achieve synchronization of all the various skill sets and resources available within the USG interagency and externally with HNs, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.
At its core, the interagency process synchronizes U.S. strategic national security efforts. Navigating the interagency requires special operations warriors to be guided by achievable expectations and to maintain high levels of situational awareness, display a willingness to listen and learn, and exercise the skill of knowing when to lead, support or, when appropriate, enable others outside of DoD to accomplish their objectives.

Though it may sometimes appear to be the most efficient course of action, expecting the military to perform every required task in the AO is typically self-defeating and risks alienating those most in need of assistance. It is likely that, somewhere in any AO, there exists a USG interagency component or external organization that has the skill sets and resources to accomplish a given task. Finding them and having them “buy into” the mission is essential.

The first step is to arrive at commonly accepted and measurable end-states that will ensure the achievement of U.S. national security objectives.

Counterterrorism Roles, Missions, and Responsibilities

Awareness of the various departments, agencies, and organizations playing interagency counterterrorism roles is helpful for the special operations warrior. Though based in Washington, DC, representatives of the USG interagency are also present on the ground within the AO through the work of the U.S. Embassy Country Team and are likely to have an impact on military operations (See Chapter 2, Overseas Interagency Structures).

Beginning with the White House, this section identifies the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the USG interagency components engaged in meeting the challenges of overseas counterterrorism threats to U.S. security. As noted earlier, the interagency is not a “place” or a formal organization with clear lines of coordination. Rather it is a process of information exchange and coordination among all the various USG departments, agencies, and organizations tasked with counterterrorism responsibilities. How these individual components work together is addressed later in this chapter.

The USG interagency process seeks to orchestrate the various means and mobilize the required resources to bring each initiative to a successful conclusion. The assignment of lead agencies establishes responsibility for task accomplishment and defines the paths for the required work flow.

Beyond the USG interagency process, the coordination of the agendas of HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs in support of counterterrorism objectives is essential to ultimate success. Once again, it is predictably counter-productive to launch a multitude of well-intentioned activities that may only coincidentally focus on the true needs of the situation.

While the interagency process within the USG supports unity of effort by USG departments, agencies, and organizations, the successful inclusion of HN, Partner Nation, IGO, and NGO initiatives strengthens the shared effort. However, by its very nature, that inclusion carries with it the risk of jeopardizing the unity of effort.

The White House
http://www.whitehouse.gov/

The President, supported by and working through the National Security Council (NSC) and other senior officials, directs the development and implementation of national counterterrorism strategies and policies, oversees necessary planning, and makes the required decisions to activate those plans. Continuous liaison between the White House and the USG interagency seeks to ensure the availability of the most timely and accurate information and the clearest strategic guidance to enable the achievement of national security goals against specific threats and within the targeted areas of operation.

Interagency Work Flow

Throughout the USG interagency, the work flow of information exchange, analysis, assessments, draft strategy, policy options, courses of action, consequence analysis, and recommendations for the
way ahead moves laterally among the relevant USG interagency components. Products from that work flow then rise vertically from the USG interagency through the structure of the NSC to the President.

Once strategies, policies, and decisions are promulgated, the USG interagency uses them to guide the direction, management, and evaluation of national counterterrorism activities throughout the world. Figure 1 portrays the work-flow relationship between the USG interagency and the NSC.

Overseas, the U.S. Embassy Country Team, led by the ambassador, becomes the “face” of the USG interagency process. Staffed with representatives of the relevant USG interagency components, the Country Team takes those steps necessary to achieve U.S. counterterrorism objectives. It works with the on-scene military commander to synchronize Country Team activities with military operations and with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs to maximize the effects of the common effort.

The National Security Council (NSC)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/

The NSC came into existence under the National Security Act of 1947. It provides advice and counsel to the President on the synchronization of foreign, military, and domestic policies to ensure the national security of the United States. As the NSC is the President’s coordinating hub for national security power, its structure changes as administrations change and each version of the NSC is crafted to meet the preferences and priorities of each chief executive.

Traditionally, an early step for a new administration is to publish its vision of the ideal structure for the NSC and to define work-flow procedures and responsibilities. Predictably, some Presidents are more involved with the details of the NSC workings than others.

President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1) on 13 February 2009 to begin the process of outlining his vision for the structure and functioning of the NSC. As per PPD-1, the NSC consists of the President, Vice President,
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Treasury, Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, Chief of Staff to the President, National Security Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Counsel to the President is invited to attend every meeting; the Deputy National Security Advisor attends and serves as the Secretary.

PPD-1 specifies additional attendees from throughout the USG departments and agencies when discussing issues concerning international economic issues, homeland security or counterterrorism, and science and technology.

Figure 2 identifies the NSC participants. As noted earlier, the specific NSC structure varies from administration to administration as is seen in the provisions of PPD-1. However, the basic elements of the NSC will remain in place.

In addition to the decisions taken by the new administration, changes may also emerge as a result of the Project on National Security Reform (http://www.pnsr.org/), which has been conducting extensive analysis of interagency operations in support of national security processes and objectives. Its final report (http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdf; Executive Summary http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging_exec%20summary_12-2-08.pdf) offers a glimpse into the project’s efforts, but no final decisions have yet been taken.

The NSC staff conducts issue and situation analyses, develops policy options and courses of action, projects consequences of policy development, formalizes recommendations for the President, publishes and circulates documentation of Presidential decisions, and oversees policy execution based on those decision documents.
As we’ve seen, President Obama’s national security decisions will be documented in Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs). In the recent past they have been called National Security Presidential Directives (G.W. Bush administration), Presidential Review Directives and Presidential Decision Directives (Clinton administration) and National Security Study Directives and National Security Decision Directives (Reagan administration). Regardless of title, the documentation of Presidential decisions becomes the touchstone for the actions of components of the USG interagency.

It should also be remembered that these directives constitute the President’s Executive Department decisions. They should be in compliance with existing law and, by themselves, constitute direction rather than law.

The National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC)

The NSC/PC serves as the senior interagency body that is responsible for discussing policy issues and situations critical to the national security of the United States. It is chaired by the National Security Advisor, who sets the agenda and supervises the preparation and presentation of assessments, reports and options that support the work of the committee.

The National Security Council Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)

The NSC/DC serves as the senior sub-cabinet venue for interagency process coordination. It assigns work to and reviews the output of NSC staff and policy groups. The NSC/DC acts to ensure that issues brought before the NSC/PC and the NSC itself have been properly analyzed, staffed and structured for review and, as appropriate, decision.

Chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor, membership includes the Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Deputy to the United States Representative to the United Nations, Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. As with the NSC/PC, discussion of homeland security or counterterrorism issues, international economic, or science and technology issues will include representatives from other executive departments and agencies.

Additional members include the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy National Security Advisor, Deputy Secretary of State, Counsel to the President, and Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs are invited to each NSC/PC meeting. The heads of other departments, agencies and organizations are included as appropriate depending on the issues or situations under discussion, including international economic issues, homeland security or counterterrorism issues, and science and technology issues. Given the broad scope of its responsibilities, the NSC/PC serves as a strategic hub for interagency policy deliberations and recommendations and provides oversight for policy implementation.
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The NSC/DC serves to sharpen the focus of interagency coordination as information and recommendations flow from the Policy Coordination Committees and then through the NSC process to the President. Decisions are then documented and disseminated for execution.

The National Security Council Interagency Policy Committees (NSC/IPCs)

Oversight of national security policy development and execution is accomplished by a collection of regional and functional Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs). They are engaged in the daily management of the interagency process for national security issues and situations.

Once again, IPCs exist in every Presidential administration, though their specific number, areas of interest, and work flow are likely to vary. Likewise, individual IPC membership, meeting schedules, and work flow are likely to reflect the requirements of the individual IPC.

IPCs conduct analysis; prepare assessments, strategy drafts, policy options, and courses of action; and craft recommendations for the NSC/DC, NSC/PC, and NSC. Once issued, the IPCs monitor the implementation of Presidential decisions within their areas of responsibility.

The PPD of 13 February 2009 outlines the purposes of the IPCs and changes their previous name. It also mandates that “an early meeting of the NSC/DC will be devoted to setting up the NSC/IPCs and providing their mandates for reviewing policies and developing options in their respective areas for early consideration by the interagency committees established by this directive.”

By way of historical context, President George W. Bush’s NSPD-1, which first defined his views on the structure and functioning of the NSC, established six regional Policy Coordination Committees (the previous name of what are now IPCs):

- a. Europe and Eurasia
- b. Western Hemisphere
- c. East Asia
- d. South Asia
- e. Near East and North Africa
- f. Africa

NSPD-1 also established eleven functional PCCs:
- b. International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
- c. Global Environment
- d. International Finance
- e. Transnational Economic Issues
- f. Counterterrorism and National Preparedness, otherwise known as the Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG)
- g. Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning
- h. Arms Control
- i. Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense
- j. Intelligence and Counterintelligence
- k. Records Access and Information Security

The number of functional PCCs under President George W. Bush’s administration increased significantly over time. Such a trend is not unusual as Presidential visions and ways of doing business adapt over the course of the administration to new circumstances and changes in the threat environment. The inauguration of a new President in January 2009 will no doubt result in a fresh restructuring.

DoD representation exists on the NSC, NSC/PC, NSC/DC, and on most PCCs. The PCC for Counterterrorism and National Preparedness, called the Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG), is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Strategic Policy Documents

Acting through the NSC, the President has developed several different strategies that drive the development of additional strategies and the writing and execution of operational plans. Chief among these are:

- The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
- The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
- The National Strategy for Homeland Security
- The National Counterintelligence Strategy
- The National Strategy for Information Strategy
Given that strategic guidance, the Secretary of Defense has promulgated *The National Defense Strategy*, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided direction through *The National Military Strategy*.

In response to all of these, the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has been tasked by the Secretary of Defense to prepare *The Global Campaign Plan for the War on Terror* from which each Geographic Combatant Commander has developed a supporting theater campaign plan.

Within the DoD, these strategies and plans are further delineated under classified Contingency Plans and Execute Orders related to counterterrorism.

**Department of State (DoS)**
(http://www.state.gov/)

The Department of State serves as the designated USG “lead” in fighting terrorism overseas. Therefore, a major slice of USG counterterrorism components resides within the DoS, and these DoS components are presented below in alphabetical order.

**Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA)**
(http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm)

The ATA is managed by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance. It is designed to encourage and nurture cooperative initiatives between U.S. Law Enforcement agencies and similar organizations within those partner countries cooperating in the war on terrorism. While providing training and equipment resources, the ATA also helps to build and strengthen bilateral relations so important to the broader counterterrorism effort.

**Bureau of Consular Affairs**
(http://travel.state.gov/)

The Bureau of Consular Affairs is involved with processing and issuing passports for U.S. citizens and providing assistance and care to U.S. passport holders traveling overseas. It also manages the immigrant and non-immigrant visa programs. The visa program requires screening for possible terrorists and other undesirables while preserving access to those welcome to travel to the U.S. Because of the nature of its responsibilities, the Bureau of Consular Affairs is a major interagency participant in any AO. It also contributes to public diplomacy campaigns through its interactions with local nationals.

**Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)**
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/)

The DRL has the responsibilities to promote democracy, ensure the respect and protection of human rights and international religious freedom, and advance labor rights around the globe. Among other activities, it works with U.S.-based NGOs who coordinate the activities of those working on the ground throughout the world. DRL is involved with developing the capacity of civil and governmental institutions to promote human rights and bring about stability. DRL also participates in technical assistance projects, coordinates with local business and labor leaders, and conducts evaluation of its funding assistance programs.

**Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)**
(http://www.state.gov/m/ds/)

The DS has as its mission the responsibility to create a secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. It prepares and executes programs to protect embassy personnel, facilities and information. The criminal investigative branch of DS, the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), also conducts investigations of passport and visa fraud as a way of preventing access by suspected terrorists to the U.S. and partner nations. It operates in more than 150 countries worldwide and establishes close working relations with local law enforcement organizations. Both the Antiterrorism Assistance Program and the Rewards for Justice Program are the responsibility of the DS. Among other interagency components, the DS works closely with the Department of Homeland Security’s Document and Benefit Fraud Task Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. DS also has responsibility to provide protection for defined foreign government officials visiting the U.S. who do not receive protection from the U.S. Secret Service or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. DS, through their Regional Security Officers, plays a key role in protecting our overseas delegations.
Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EEB)  
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/  
The EEB mission is to promote economic security, both domestically and internationally. It serves as a hub for USG interagency economic policy seeking to promote national security by ensuring successful achievement of U.S. foreign economic policy goals. To this end, it also works with the European Union (EU), G-7, World Trade Organization (WTO), and other IGOs to engage the international community on issues of common interest. The EEB coordinates within the USG interagency with the Department of the Treasury and international partners such as the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, EU, and Persian Gulf States to deny terrorists access to the international financial system. EEB efforts are spread across seven sections: Energy, Sanctions and Commodities (EEB/ESC), International Communications and Information Policy (EEB/CIP), International Finance and Development (EEB/IFD), Trade Policy and Programs (EEB/TPP), Transportation Affairs (EEB/TRA), Commercial and Business Affairs (EEB/CBA), and Economic Policy Analysis and Public Diplomacy (EEB/EPPD).

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)  
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/  
As a member of the USG’s intelligence community (IC), INR’s primary responsibility is to provide quality intelligence information and resources to support U.S. diplomacy and the achievement of national security objectives. It seeks to provide global coverage of terrorist threats and other relevant concerns. INR also conducts policy reviews of counterintelligence and law enforcement activities. Its Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) provides unclassified information to the USG interagency community and other partners to support responses to humanitarian crises worldwide. INR also maintains an unclassified database of independent states and sovereignty relationships to support global security initiatives.

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)  
http://www.state.gov/p/lnl/  
The INL provides advice to the President, Secretary of State, bureaus within the DoS and other departments, agencies, and organizations that make up the USG interagency process. Policies and programs designed to address international narcotics trafficking and crime have an impact on the funding of terrorists and terrorist organizations. INL is also concerned with building capacity among international law enforcement agencies and criminal justice systems engaged with the counterterrorism effort.

Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)  
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/  
The ISN leads the USG interagency efforts to block the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. ISN also engages the international community through bilateral and multilateral relationship-building. Among these are the UN, G-7, NATO, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ISN pays particular attention to WMD threats from terrorist groups and non-state players through a variety of initiatives to include participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)  
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/  
The PM serves as the main coordination node for interface between DoS and DoD. It performs critical interagency functions by providing policy guidance on international security, security assistance, military operations, and defense strategy development and planning. The Office of International Security Operations, contained within PM, forms the essential link between DoS and DoD on all operational matters. Also contained within PM is the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis (PM/PPA), which supports the Security Assistance Team, the Political-Military Policy and Planning Team, and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

Counterterrorism Finance Unit  
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16662.htm  
The Counterterrorism Finance Unit (CT Finance) teams up with the Public Designations Unit within the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism to identify financial support structures for terrorists.
and eliminating them. It works with the other interagency components shown in Figure 7 (page 1-24) to sever terrorist financial support while building training and technological assistance in five operational areas:

- Legal frameworks
- Financial regulatory systems
- Financial intelligence units
- Law enforcement
- Judicial/prosecutorial development

CT Finance works with international organizations and governments to identify and eliminate flows of funds to terrorists and terrorist organizations.

*Foreign Service Institute (FSI)*
http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/

The FSI is the primary training base for the USG’s Foreign Service Officers and support personnel as they prepare themselves to promote U.S. interests around the world. The FSI program of instruction contains more than 450 courses (including training in some 70 foreign languages) available to the Foreign Service community, interagency departments, agencies and organizations, and the military services. The FSI serves as an important forum for gathering lessons learned and imparting them to its enrollees.

*Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)*
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/

At the direction of the Secretary of State, the Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism stands at the center of the interagency counterterrorism hub. Figure 3 identifies the USG counterterrorism components that work with the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Note that Figure 3 does not depict a command structure.
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It is important to recognize that the responsible Ambassador-at-Large serves as a coordinator. The mission of the S/CT is to “develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all the instruments of statecraft, diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military” (source: Department of State). Work is produced within the USG counterterrorism components to feed into the interagency process through the PCC for Counterterrorism and National Preparedness Counterterrorism Support Group (NSC/PCC/CSG), the NSC/DC, the NSC/PC, and the NSC to the President.

Liaison officers within S/CT also work the interagency process by interfacing with the National Counterterrorism Center, the broader Intelligence Community, the FBI and other components within the USG interagency. The Operations Directorate and the Technical Programs Unit within S/CT also play important interagency roles.

The work of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is guided by the goals outlined within the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism:

- Defeat terrorists and their organizations;
- Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists;
- Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit;
- Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.

To accomplish these goals, the Department of State has identified specific tasks that must be accomplished through the work of the USG interagency process:

- Building the political will and counterterrorism capacity of foreign governments;
- Developing public diplomacy strategies that delegitimize terrorism, encourage moderates to oppose extremism, and explain USG CT policy;
- Designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) to freeze their assets and isolate them internationally;
- Providing deterrence and rapid response to international terrorist incidents;
- Delivering creative and flexible antiterrorism and CT finance training;
- Enhancing border security and global terrorist watch listings;
- Providing expert counterterrorism assistance in support of embassies and partner nations;
- Integrating homeland security initiatives with foreign policy;
- Leading technology development to effectively combat terrorism;
- Developing the intellectual capital necessary for a decades-long struggle.

Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/c9997.htm

Working with and through the interagency process, the Office of Counterterrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy is responsible for obtaining international agreement and support for initiatives targeting terrorist financing. As conditions dictate, it also develops, adjusts, and terminates as appropriate U.S. sanctions imposed on specific countries. As part of its interagency efforts, the office also coordinates with the Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security to develop and provide policy guidance on import-export arrangements and licensing issues.

Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8650.htm

The OSAC is a Federal Advisory Committee operating under a USG charter that came into being in the wake of increased terrorist threats to U.S. businesses and organizations operating internationally. There are currently more than 4,600 participants including NGOs. The OSAC seeks to orchestrate security cooperation between its members and the DoS. As part of its activities, the council operates committees on Security Awareness and Innovation, Country Councils and Outreach, and Threats and Information Sharing.

Public Designation Unit
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16816.htm

The Secretary of State exercises the authority to publicly identify terrorists and terrorist organizations. Once defined, these identifications, or designations, trigger specific requirements about how U.S.
individuals and businesses interact with anyone on the designation list. The Public Designations Unit evaluates candidates for inclusion, submits them to the Secretary of State for review and approval, and then monitors to ensure that sanctions placed against a specific individual or group are enforced appropriately.

**Rewards for Justice Program**
http://www.state.gov/m/ds-terrorism/c8651.htm

Originally established by the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, the Rewards for Justice Program was expanded under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. Currently this DoS-managed program offers awards of as much as $25 million for information that solves or prevents terrorist acts or leads to the capture and conviction of those responsible. Information gathered through the program is shared with partner nations who are also at risk.

**Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs**  
http://www.state.gov/c/

The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs leads a comprehensive communications effort targeted at audiences both at home and internationally. The Under Secretary oversees the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, and the Bureau of International Information Programs. The Under Secretary also participates in the formulation of foreign policy. Responsibilities include active engagement in the ideological struggle with those who practice and support terrorism as a tactic.

**U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)**
http://www.usaid.gov/

The USAID plays critical roles both strategically and operationally in the USG interagency process. Operating under policy direction of the Secretary of State, the agency directs the nation’s economic assistance programs overseas. It also acts as the lead USG agency for international disaster assistance. Consequently, USAID serves as an active member of the U.S. Embassy Country Team and remains a highly visible presence throughout any AO.

As its part in an unprecedented interagency effort, USAID delivered 46,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to the port of Songrim, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) on 29 October and 15 November 2007. USAID Photo.

**U.S. Mission to the United Nations**
http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/

Established in 1947 under the provisions of the United Nations Participation Act, the U.S. Mission to the UN represents the U.S. at all meetings of the UN. It further engages the UN Secretariat and the member nations in consultations and negotiations to gain support for U.S. positions and initiatives. The U.S. delegation provides a continuous flow of information to DoS and U.S. embassies throughout the world and develops recommendations on how to proceed on issues before the UN.

**Additional Department of State Organizations and Initiatives**
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)  
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/ (See Chapter 2)

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)  
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/

International Organization Affairs  
http://www.state.gov/p/io/

Population, Refugees and Migration  
http://www.state.gov/g/prm/

Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)  
The DoD provides its full range of capabilities and resources to the counterterrorism effort. As a major participant in the NSC process, it plays an important role in the workings of the USG interagency as it goes about its work to meet national security goals by defeating the terrorist threat to the U.S. DoD further participates in a variety of interagency clusters that perform specialized roles in the counterterrorism fight. The activities of all DoD components are under specified organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence oversees the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. The DoD components listed here obviously do not represent a comprehensive survey of DoD capabilities and resources. However, they do reflect major DoD components committed to USG interagency counterterrorism efforts.

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SOLIC & IC)**
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/solic/

The ASD/SOLIC&IC is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to special operations and low-intensity conflict. The ASD/SOLIC&IC provides oversight to policy and resource issues and supervises special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. USSOCOM’s 2007 Posture statement and Section 167 of Title 10 of the United States Code (USC) provide similar, though not identical, lists of SOF activities. These include counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, information operations, psychological operations, WMD counterproliferation and synchronization of the global war on terrorism.

**Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)**
http://www.darpa.mil/

DARPA was established as part of DoD to conduct advanced research and manage development programs. DARPA’s mission is to prevent technological surprise for our enemies. Through the years, DARPA has continuously refocused its work in direct response to, or in anticipation of, national security threats and revolutionary technology opportunities. Most recently, its strategic thrusts have included: Detection, Precision ID, Tracking, and Destruction of Elusive Targets; Urban Area Operations; Advanced Manned and Unmanned Systems; Detection, Characterization and Assessment of Underground Structures; Robust, Secure, Self-Forming Networks; Space; increasing the Tooth to Tail Ratio; Bio-Revolution; and Core Technology. DARPA pushes technology transitions and seeks technological challenges.

**Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)**
http://www.dia.mil/

The DIA is the chief provider of military intelligence to DoD and serves as a major participant in the USG Intelligence Community (IC). It provides intelligence products to policy makers, war fighters and force planners for their use in meeting their responsibilities in the national security arena. DIA applies varied expertise in a wide-range of interests to include military, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking and defense-related political and economic issues. DIA has established the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) to consolidate terrorism-related intelligence gathering and reporting. October 2007 saw the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) to improve coordination of intelligence activities in support of the Combatant Commands. The DIOCC also serves as the interface with the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C), a DNI organization.

**Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)**
http://www.dsca.mil/

Working under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD-GSA), the DSCA is responsible for directing and managing security cooperation programs and resources in support of national security objectives. Figure 10 (page 1-28) reflects the interagency relationships with the DSCA serving as the hub for interagency coordination.
The military departments (MILDEPs) field unique intelligence organizations with a full-spectrum of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination capabilities, appropriately linked to the service’s areas of expertise. For instance, U.S. Air Force intelligence relies heavily on manned and unmanned air- and space-based systems such as the U-2, Global Hawk, Predator, and Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS).

Because of their mission orientations, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines rely heavily on Human Intelligence techniques continuously enhanced by other resources.

With its sustained global reach, the U.S. Navy serves as the primary agency for maritime intelligence. Intelligence gathered from the MILDEPS flows through the IC and other interagency venues to support counterterrorism efforts overseas and other national security priorities.

NGA is responsible for supplying timely, relevant and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of U.S. national security objectives. It provides imagery and geospatial information to assist decision makers and military commanders in understanding the intricacies of areas of the earth that are of interest. NGA provides information to support humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. It also manages the National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG).

The NRO serves as the “nation’s eyes and ears in space.” Because of the unique placement of its resources, the NRO is able to provide global awareness of activities on the ground while focusing specifically on locations of particular national security interest. It is a major interagency player, working with the National Security Agency, NGA, CIA, U.S. Strategic Forces Command, the MILDEPs, and the rest of the IC. NRO also draws expertise from private sector aerospace companies and research centers. Its budget, the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), comes through the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP).

NSA serves as the nation’s cryptologic organization that pursues the missions of Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance. It serves a wide variety of customers throughout the interagency process to include the military leadership, senior policy makers, and those involved with counterterrorism and counterintelligence activities. It also works with certain international allies in support of their efforts. Areas of interest include terrorism, narcotics trafficking, criminal gangs, and asymmetric threats.

Additional DoD Organizations and Initiatives

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) http://www.dtra.mil/

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/

Under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2006, the President established the position of Assistant Attorney General for National Security with responsibilities for the National Security Division (NSD) of DoJ. This step brought together counterterrorism, counterespionage, FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act), and other expertise from throughout DoJ into a single organization. Responsibilities include Intelligence Operations and Litigation, Counterterrorism to include the Antiterrorism Advisory Council (ATAC),
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Office of National Security Intelligence (NN)
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm

Operating from 86 offices in 63 countries, DEA/NN maintains a major international law enforcement presence in support of national security objectives. DEA representatives serve on U.S. Embassy Country Teams (Chapter 2). The DEA/NN works with the IC and the wider interagency process to address threats from drug traffickers, immigration violators and global terrorist networks.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—Counterterrorism
http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterterrorism/waronterrorhome.htm

The FBI, the lead federal agency for combating domestic terrorism, works both domestically and internationally to combat terrorism and other threats to national security. The FBI serves as the lead USG agency for a domestic terrorist incident.

The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) operates with the FBI’s Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) to collocate representatives of some 40 agencies from the law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, defense, public safety and homeland defense communities.

The setup allows for immediate access to FBI and participating agency databases and assures the rapid exchange of information and the working of issues and operational requirements. Information flows into the NJTTF from a variety of sources, including from some 100 JTTFs that are scattered throughout the U.S. The DoJ/FBI-led JTTFs retain their interagency identity and incorporate investigators, linguists, SWAT members, and other expertise from a cross-section of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. JTTFs are domestically focused and combine federal, state and local resources.

Internationally, the FBI maintains some 70 offices and sub-offices that provide coverage to more than 200 countries, territories, and islands. They are identified on the U.S. Embassy Country Teams, discussed in Chapter 2, as Legal Attachés. Their responsibilities include sharing information, identifying threats to national security, disabling those threats if possible, investigating crimes and incidents, and identifying, tracking and apprehending terrorists and terrorist organizations. In addition to working with local authorities to meet its responsibilities, the FBI also conducts training for local law enforcement within their geographic areas of responsibility.

Federal Bureau of Investigation—Most Wanted Terrorists
http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterterrorism/waronterrorhome.htm

In coordination with the interagency Rewards for Justice Program, the FBI maintains a listing of those terrorists wanted worldwide. Photos on Web sites and other media communicate the identity of these individuals and seek additional input and tips about their location and habits to assist in their capture and prosecution.

Federal Bureau of Investigation—National Security Branch (NSB)
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/nsb.htm

The NSB represents the consolidation of FBI national security programs into its Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence Division, and the Directorate of Intelligence. Drawing on the information derived from the JTTFs located throughout the U.S. and the Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), the NSB produces assessments of the structure, capabilities, motivation/ideology and linkages among terrorist groups and networks. NSB is also responsible for the conduct and management of all foreign counterintelligence investigations.

Additional DoJ Organizations and Initiatives
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (ATF) http://www.atf.gov/
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/
Counterterrorism Section (CTS) http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/counter_terrorism.htm
Field Intelligence Group (FIG) http://www.fbi.gov/page2/april05/fig042705.htm
As its title indicates, DHS has as its primary focus securing the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks as well as other man-made and natural threats. The department leads a variety of agencies whose purpose is relevant to both domestic and international counterterrorism efforts. DHS came into being under the terms of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. That legislation consolidated 22 existing federal agencies and many additional federal responsibilities that were then distributed throughout the DHS.

**Customs and Border Protection (CBP)**
http://www.cbp.gov/

With its core mission as “guardians of our Nation’s borders,” the CBP pursues its priority responsibility to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the U.S. It is also involved with securing trade and travel activities while enforcing immigration and drug laws. CBP works through its National Targeting Center (NTC), which coordinates within the USG interagency process to identify threats in advance of an incident, and participates in targeting support of USG counterterrorism initiatives.

**Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)**
http://www.ice.gov/index.htm

As the largest investigative agency within DHS, ICE plays a major counterterrorism role by enforcing customs and immigration laws and other supportive activities. Its principal targets are illegal immigrants who could pose threats to the U.S. and the financial and material resources they rely on to facilitate terrorist or other criminal activity. ICE is the second-largest federal law enforcement presence within the DoJ/FBI’s interagency NJTTF. As such, it participates in information exchange, planning and other work functions within the USG interagency.

**Department of Homeland Security (DHS)**
http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm

The DHS intelligence function includes I&A and other separate intelligence offices located within each of the departments’ operational components. I&A tracks terrorists and their networks based on information from a variety of resources while assessing threats to the U.S. infrastructure and from WMDs, pandemic diseases and illegal border crossings. Relationships with the CBP and ICE are particularly important for addressing border issues. I&A synchronizes internal intelligence activities through the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC). I&A has officers working out of dozens of fusion centers located throughout the country.

**Office of Policy**
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0870.shtm

The DHS Office of Policy is made up of several components with specific impacts on U.S. counterterrorism efforts. These include the Office of Policy Development, Office of Strategic Plans, and Office of International Affairs. The 13 units of the Office of Policy Development work within the USG interagency process to ensure synchronization of DHS policies with other USG departments, agencies and organizations.

The Office of Strategic Plans contains the Counterterrorism Plans Division that coordinates internal DHS planning and participates within the USG interagency process. It also works with the Implementation Plans Division to oversee the successful
execution of department and national policy. The Office of International Relations engages allies and other members of the International Community to seek both cooperation and coordination with DHS initiatives.

**Transportation Security Administration (TSA)**  
http://www.tsa.gov/

Though most familiar for its presence in some 450 U.S. airports, the TSA is further engaged through the USG interagency process to assist in the security of the nation’s highways, railroads, buses, mass transportation systems, and ports.

**U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)**  
http://www.uscg.mil/default.asp

The USCG conducts a variety of missions designed to monitor shipping traffic near and approaching U.S. shores and to secure U.S. ports, harbors and coastline. It also participates in the Intelligence Community (IC). Internationally, the USCG works with other countries to improve maritime security and to support U.S. diplomatic activities. The U.S. Coast Guard’s presence in ports and along shorelines, both domestically and internationally, positions it as a source of intelligence not always available to other collection means.

**U.S. Secret Service (USSS)**  
http://www.secretservice.gov/

The USSS has both protective and investigative responsibilities that cause it to engage the USG interagency process for information exchanges, planning coordination and other critical activities within the counterterrorism effort. It plays a critical role in securing the nation’s financial infrastructure and money supply while protecting national leaders, visiting heads of state, and various security venues.

**Additional DHS Organizations and Initiatives**

- **Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Counterterrorism Policy**
- **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**  
  http://www.fema.gov/
- **Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (International Programs Division)**  
  http://www.fletc.gov/about-fletc/locations/fletc-international.html
- **Federal Protective Services**  
  http://www.ice.gov/about/fps/contact.htm
- **Office of Strategic Plans**  
  http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0873.shtm
- **Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis**
- **Undersecretary of Homeland Security for National Protection Programs**
- **United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)**  
  http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis
- **Department of the Treasury (Treasury)**  
  http://www.treasury.gov/

The Department of the Treasury’s counterterrorism role focuses on ensuring the sound functioning of the U.S. and international financial systems in the face of security threats to their stability. Through participation in the USG interagency process and coordination with partner nations and international organizations, Treasury targets and manages sanctions against foreign threats to U.S. financial systems while also identifying and targeting financial support networks established to sustain terrorist and other threats to national security.

**Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)**  
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/

OFAC is the Treasury agency responsible for managing and enforcing sanctions against targeted countries, terrorists, drug traffickers, and those suspected in the proliferation of WMD. OFAC is linked throughout the USG interagency process and with the international community through the UN and other IGOs, international mandates and direct cooperation with partner nations.

**Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)**  
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/oia/

The OIA came into existence as a result of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004. The office operates as a subordinate agency of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Analysis (TFI) discussed below. OIA gathers, analyzes, and produces intelligence on financial support networks for terrorist networks and other threats to national security. It has developed
expertise in understanding how terrorist financial networks operate and in developing intelligence to help cut off necessary funding mechanisms. OIA is also active in tracking resources flowing to rogue states involved with the production and proliferation of WMDs.

**Office of International Affairs**
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/

The Office of International Affairs is responsible for the development of U.S. international financial and trade policy. It is led by the Under Secretary of International Affairs who is supported by the Assistant Secretary of International Affairs who overseas seven Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury. These Deputy Assistant Secretaries are responsible for Asia; Europe, Eurasia and the Western Hemisphere; International Monetary and Financial Policy; International Development Finance and Debt; the Middle East and Africa; Trade and Investment Policy; and Technical Assistance.

The office encourages international financial stability and sound economic policies overseas to address various issues to include monitoring possible threats to the U.S. It also tracks economic and financial conditions around the world and then coordinates with financial markets, other governments, and international financial organizations to develop and promote constructive policies.

The Office of International Affairs is concerned with worldwide monetary conditions, trade and investment policy, and international debt issues while working on G-7 initiatives and the annual economic summits.

**Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI)**
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/

TFI synchronizes the DoT’s intelligence and enforcement capabilities to protect the U.S. financial system by targeting rogue nations, those supporting terrorists, those involved with the proliferation of WMDs, drug traffickers and various other national security threats. It interfaces with the USG interagency process at several nodes to produce maximum effects.

**Office of the Director for National Intelligence (DNI)**
http://www.dni.gov/

The DNI serves as the head of the USG Intelligence Community (IC). The DNI began functioning in April 2005, but the concept of a coordinator of national intelligence has been under discussion since the mid-1950s. The DNI manages and oversees the execution of the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The Director serves as the principal intelligence advisor to the President, NSC and Homeland Security Council. Figure 4 identifies the USG interagency components who populate the IC.

**Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**
https://www.cia.gov/

First established in 1947 by the National Security Act, the CIA’s role was modified under the terms of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, which created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Director of the CIA works with all agencies contained within the interagency Intelligence Community (IC) and reports to the Director of National Intelligence. The CIA employs human and other resources to collect, evaluate, organize, assess and disseminate intelligence products throughout the USG interagency process to policy makers, decision takers and other users.

**National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)**
http://www.nctc.gov/

Established by the IRTPA of 2004 and defined by Executive Order 13354 on 27 August 2004, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) has as its purpose to “protect the security of the United States through strengthened intelligence analysis and strategic planning and intelligence support to operations to counter transnational terrorist threats against the territory, people, and interests of the United States of America.”

The NCTC hosts analysts and others from more than 16 departments, agencies, and organizations and provides information sharing through more than 30 networks in an effort to identify those who pose threats to the U.S. The NCTC draws on the Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and the NCTC Online (NOL), which is a data library of CT information with a worldwide reach.

As depicted in Figure 4, the NCTC, along with the DNI, serves as the principal hub for Intelligence Community (IC) coordination. In that role, the NCTC serves as the lead organization for counterterrorism intelligence and strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities while conducting business from a continuously functioning operations center that is staffed with representatives from throughout the IC and other organizations such as the Capitol Police.

The NCTC produces a range of analytic and threat information products for the President, cabinet officials, military leaders, and the remainder of the USG interagency. The NCTC is collocated with the FBI-NJTTF in Northern VA.

While the individual members of the IC carry on their traditional functions in support of their parent department, agency or organizations, intelligence of mutual interest concerning both national and homeland security terrorism issues and events is exchanged and acted on through the IC interagency process.

**Department of Agriculture (DoA)**

**Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)**

http://www.fas.usda.gov/

Among its various responsibilities, FAS provides food and technical assistance to countries in need. It also seeks to introduce resources and guidance on the ground to encourage agricultural growth as a component of economic development. FAS representatives are present in more than 100 countries and are participants on U.S. Embassy Country Teams (see Chapter 2). The organization participates within
the USG interagency process in a variety of ways, including working closely with USAID to administer various U.S. food aid programs. FAS also serves as a link to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on a variety of issues.

**Department of Commerce (DoC)**
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
http://www.bis.doc.gov/

The BIS assists in support of national defense and economic security objectives through export controls, treaty compliance and the assurance of U.S. technology leadership. It manages and enforces dual-use export controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, and to block the transfer of weapons to terrorists, those countries supporting them and rogue states.

**Department of Energy (DoE)**
Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (IN)
http://www.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/

The DoE’s intelligence programs reach back as far as the World War II Manhattan Project. IN conducts assessments of the global threats from nuclear terrorism and works to stall the proliferation of nuclear technology, resources, and expertise. Working through the interagency Intelligence Community (IC), IN enables the exchange of intelligence throughout the USG interagency process on energy matters and conducts evaluations of emerging threats to U.S. economic and security interests. Separate from IN, DoE also provides Nuclear Emergency Support Team assistance to deal with technical aspects of radiological or nuclear terrorism.

**Functioning of the Interagency Counterterrorism Components**

The previous section identified the various components of the interagency process that deal with counterterrorism. They are identified by their parent department, agency or organization. However, like the military, these various components generally do not act without coordination with other USG components or structured task organization.

The functioning of the USG interagency process is organized around a collection of coordinating “hubs” that are clustered to accommodate USG departments, agencies and organizations in pursuit of specific counterterrorism goals. Many of these interagency hubs have evolved over time and have taken on a sense of permanency with specific departments, agencies, and organizations assigned “lead” responsibilities.

Other interagency bodies are put together on an ad-hoc basis to address specific events, situations or issues. These are also led by designated leads to ensure specific national security goals are met. Once those goals have been achieved, the ad-hoc body disbands.

Chapter 2 discusses how the U.S. Embassy Country Team overseas, operating with support from the interagency process in Washington, D.C., is responsible for integrating the various interagency components on the ground to gain maximum effects. The Country Team also interfaces with HN, partner nations, IGO and NGO initiatives committed to the counterterrorism effort in the AO. It is a dynamic and potentially confusing environment within which participants often expend their skills and resources in multiple directions simultaneously.

This section identifies the functional clusters that address specific issues such as counterterrorism, intelligence, finance, disaster response and technology.

**The USG Counterterrorism Components**
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/team/index.htm

The first of these clusters is the DoS “U.S. Counterterrorism Team.” As noted earlier in this chapter, the DoS serves as the designated lead agency for coordinating and managing USG counterterrorism initiatives overseas.

As depicted in Figure 3 (page 1-10), the U.S. Counterterrorism Components extend throughout the USG to bring together a wide variety of resources to address counterterrorism threats. The Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, shown in yellow, acts as the central hub for that part of the interagency process dealing with counterterrorism. There is no command relationship defined.

However, the interagency work flow discussed earlier typically passes through the Coordinator for Counterterrorism into the NSC Process and then back through for action and management. Specific roles, missions and responsibilities for the members of the “U.S. Counterterrorism Components” are contained in the previous section.

The USG Intelligence Community
http://www.intelligence.gov/index.shtml

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 restructured the coordinative relationships among the members of the USG Intelligence Community (IC). The legislation established the Office of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with the responsibility to act as the lead agency for the IC, execute the National Intelligence Program and to serve as the principal advisor to the President and NSC on intelligence issues involving national security.

Figure 4 (page 1-19) portrays the IC. With the DNI serving as its interagency intelligence “hub,” the members of the IC represent an extensive cross-section of the USG. The IC produces a wide variety of intelligence products. These include the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and the World Intelligence Review (WIRe).

Oversight of the IC is exercised by a variety of Executive and Legislative Branch organizations. Executive Branch supervision is carried out by the NSC and by the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB), the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

The DNI and IC are responsible to provide timely and objective intelligence to the President, other department and agency heads, and the Congress as required to successfully prosecute counterterrorism activities. They are also tasked to develop, resource, execute and evaluate intelligence strategies and programs on all matters involving national security and homeland security.

With the large number of intelligence agencies scattered throughout the USG, the DNI and IC face the challenge of synchronizing USG activities in support of national intelligence requirements. In addition to the IC, there are other interagency bodies that are concerned with information exchange and intelligence operations, as described below.

Information Sharing Environment (ISE)
http://www.ise.gov/

Experience teaches that success in preventing future terrorist attacks and successfully targeting terrorists and their networks rests on the effective sharing of information among all relevant parties. This engagement involves the efficient gathering, analysis and sharing of intelligence among the organs of the USG, state, local and tribal governments, the private sector, and partner nations. The goal is to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests around the world.

It has become clear that greater institutional flexibility and resilience are required of all participants. To support a wide-ranging agenda of initiatives, the ISE was created through Section 1016 of the IRTPA of 2004 and supports the Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Defense, Homeland Security, and Foreign Affairs communities of the USG. Structurally, the ISE is led by a Program Manager and supported by the Information Sharing Council.

The ISE pursues the following goals (http://www.ise.gov/pages/vision.html):

1. Facilitate the establishment of a trusted partnership among all levels of government, the private sector, and foreign partners.
2. Promote an information sharing culture among ISE partners by facilitating the improved sharing of timely, validated, protected, and actionable terrorism information supported by extensive education, training, and awareness programs for ISE participants.
3. To the maximum extent possible, function in a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated manner.
4. Develop and deploy incrementally, leveraging existing information sharing capabilities...
while also creating new core functions and services.

5. **Enable** the federal government to speak with one voice on terrorism-related matters, and to promote more rapid and effective interchange and coordination among Federal departments and agencies and state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and foreign partners, thus ensuring effective multi-directional sharing of information.

6. **Ensure** sharing procedures and policies protect information privacy and civil liberties.

**Information Sharing Council (ISC)**

The ISC came into being as the result of initiatives contained in the Recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission). Executive Order 13356, 27 August 2004, established a council to improve the sharing of information throughout the USG. The IRTPA of 2004 changed the name to the ISC with responsibilities to advise the President and Program Manager on the development of information-sharing policies, procedures, guidelines and standards.

It also seeks to manage the efficient exchange of information among participating USG departments, agencies and organizations. Membership of the ISC includes DoC, CIA, DoD, DNI, DoE, FBI, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Joint Staff, DHS, NCTC, Department of the Interior (DoI), OMB, DoJ, DoS, Department of Transportation, and the Department of the Treasury. The membership of the ISC appears in Figure 5.

**Information Sharing & Fusion Centers**

Various states and municipalities have established fusion centers to ensure the efficient sharing of information of importance to the law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and counterterrorism communities. Most of the scores of functional fusion centers now operating follow guidelines developed through the DoJ-sponsored Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the DHS-sponsored Homeland Security Advisory Council. The National Strategy for Information Sharing (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/NSIS_book.pdf) guides the interagency effort.
Federal Support includes:

a. DHS and DoJ’s Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services.
b. DHS’s Fusion Center Initiative, including providing DHS personnel to the fusion centers to assist.
c. DoJ’s Information Sharing Resources for the Justice and Public Safety Communities.
e. National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC).
f. Criminal Intelligence Training Master Calendar.

**Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG)**
http://www.ise.gov/pages/partner-itacg.html

Established by the President and Congress, the ITACG seeks to improve the quality of “federally coordinated” terrorism-related information in support of the interagency efforts of the NCTC. As appropriate, its activities reach beyond the USG to supply relevant information to state, local and tribal officials and the private sector.

Among its priorities, the ITACG prepares “federally coordinated” views on terrorist threats and issues of interest to USG interagency members. Additionally it seeks to establish a shared sense of situation awareness among its various partners and customers.

ITACG products include alerts and warnings of terrorism threats within the U.S.; situational awareness reports that support international, national, state or local level events and activities; and strategic assessments of risks and threats to the U.S.

**National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)**
http://www.ncix.gov/whatsnew/index.html

The office of the NCIX is a component of the DNI and is made up representatives from USG intelligence and security departments, agencies and organizations. It is led by the National Counterintelligence Executive who is appointed by the DNI in consultation with the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The NCIX is responsible for conducting an annual National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and other counterintelligence reports; developing and executing the National Counterintelligence Strategy; and preparing assessments of strategy implementation with an eye toward improving the effectiveness of counterintelligence operations.

**Counterintelligence Policy Board.**
The NCIX also chairs the Counterintelligence Policy Board (Figure 6), which reports through the NSC to the President. In addition to the NCIX, membership includes senior representatives from the DoJ, FBI, DoD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoS, DoE, and the CIA. As with all such bodies, representation from other departments, agencies and organizations may be mandated by the President.
**Counterterrorism Finance Efforts**

With the DoS Counterterrorism Finance Unit serving as the functional hub, USG counterterrorism efforts to locate, track, disrupt and eliminate financial support of terrorists and their networks are coordinated within the USG as shown in Figure 7. Additionally, interagency finance activities are enhanced through interaction with other countries and IGOs who are concerned with ensuring the stability of the international financial systems and the prevention of their abuse by criminal elements, especially terrorists.

Chapter 3 identifies the major international players in this process. One of those IGOs, the Financial Action Task Force, is included in this discussion.

**Financial Action Task Force (FATF) [Link](http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_l_1_l_l_1_1_00.html)**

The FATF is an IGO that, since its founding in 1989 by the G-7 countries, has grown to more than 30 members with several more organizations holding associate or observer status. Its primary focus is on combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Because of its broad linkage through financial organizations around the world, it plays a critical role in information exchange, policy development, and the building of consensus to act.
Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement

Working through the interagency process, DoJ has consolidated a listing of counterterrorism training available through the USG, the private sector and nonprofit organizations. The Counterterrorism Training Coordination Working Group, operating under a mandate from the DoJ’s Office of Justice Programs, is responsible for this effort.

Reflecting the interagency makeup of the working group and training availabilities, membership includes the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Office of Justice Programs, the Office of the Police Corps and Law Enforcement Education, the Office for Domestic Preparedness, the U.S. Army Military Police School, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Labor.

Figure 8 depicts the Counterterrorism Training Working Group, with the hub indicated in yellow.
Interagency Organizations and Initiatives

As we've seen, the dynamic interaction of the USG interagency process requires the participation of many departments, agencies and organizations from throughout the USG. Though placed within a specific department such as the DoS or DoD, USG interagency components rely on expertise and resources far beyond the boundaries of any specific organizational chart.

Given the numbers and wide variety of participants, programs and relationships, many volumes could be written about the challenges of navigating the USG interagency process. However, for the purposes of this manual, it is most useful to identify as many participants and programs as possible and to chart their relationships to arrive at an awareness of the existing complexities. Such basic understandings empower the special operations warrior at strategic, operational and tactical levels to function credibly and effectively.

The influence of these various participants is felt in their collection and assessment of information and in their development of various options as the USG interagency process flows upward through the NSC/DC and NSC/PC to the President. Once a decision is taken, the various USG organizations, both standing and adhoc, then play important roles in overseeing the execution of policy and the evaluation of its effectiveness.

The functioning of counterterrorism efforts requires regular liaison, sometimes in the form of embedded interagency liaison teams, to ensure the closest possible coordination of efforts.

To improve the efficiency of its liaison mission, USSOCOM has placed Special Operations Support Teams (SOST) within departments, agencies, and organizations of the USG. Their purpose is to provide an embedded liaison team at critical nodes of the interagency process to facilitate the exchange of information, the development of courses of action, the preparation of recommendations, and the efficient execution of executive orders.

Because the interagency environment is continuously evolving and changing, no exhaustive list of interagency organizations and programs is possible. However, the following are the kinds of organizations that have an impact on the effectiveness of SOF.

**United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM)**

To reduce the frequently ad-hoc nature of the USG interagency process, DoD has partnered with other USG components to form USAFRICOM. USAFRICOM is the first organization of its kind to institutionalize the interagency structure necessary for the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in a very complex region of the world.

Prior to the establishment of USAFRICOM, no fewer than three U.S. military headquarters were responsible for building relationships with countries that make up the African continent. The USG interagency process was made more complex as other USG departments, agencies, and organizations pursuing diplomatic, economic, and informational national security objectives simultaneously functioned throughout the continent.

USAFRICOM is traveling the unique path of incorporating DoS, USAID, and other USG components into the staff and leadership structure of the command, resulting in far greater inclusion than the current USG interagency process could ever achieve.

For instance, USAFRICOM features two deputy commanders. One represents the traditional Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO). That officer is complemented by a senior U.S. diplomat who serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA).

The DCMA directs planning and programming for health, humanitarian assistance and demining actions, disaster response, security sector reform, strategic communications, and others related functions. Based on background and experience, the DCMA is also well suited to ensure that USAFRICOM activities are in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives, a check traditionally made through the USG interagency process. Staffing throughout USAFRICOM will support the efforts of the DCMA and provide immediate interface and coordination with the more traditional military staff structure.

Future plans call for seeking inclusion of partner nations and NGOs.
Chapter 1: Interagency Counterterrorism Components

Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16664.htm

Of particular importance to the special operations warrior is the role played by the Operations Directorate of the S/CT. One of the S/CT missions involves working with DoD to develop and execute overseas CT policies, plans and operations. The Operations Directorate also acts as a communication hub for communicating DoD CT initiatives throughout the DoS infrastructure, both at home and abroad. Additionally, the directorate is responsible for training and leading the quick-response, interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) that is designed to react to events around the world on short notice.

In 1998, two FESTs deployed to Africa in the wake of the terrorist bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Consistent with their mission, the teams provided assistance to the ambassadors and helped manage the consequences of the attacks.

A FEST also went to Yemen in 2000 in response to the attack on the USS Cole as it anchored in the Port of Aden. Other FESTs are routinely involved with events and situations around the world.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

Though a DoD component as identified earlier, the DSCA accomplishes its various security assistance missions by engaging a wide variety of members of the USG interagency process. Figure 10 identifies the various USG interagency components who play a role in the process, with the DSCA serving as the coordination hub. The interagency security assistance process asserts itself both in Washington, DC, and overseas, meaning that special operations warriors will inevitably encounter DSCA resources while pursuing their missions.

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) for USSOCOM

To ensure the most efficient environment for the exchange of information, coordination of activities and synchronization of planning, USSOCOM has established a JIACG that includes DoD, USG interagency Components, and partner nations. The intent is to move beyond ad-hoc liaison relationships to the creation of a forum where interaction is continuous and sustained. Participants in the JIACG will change
based on circumstances, but the nature of the process allows for the accommodation of such changes.

Figure 11 describes the makeup of the SOCOM JIACG with the understanding that specific members can and will vary. SOCOM continues to expand the number and dispersion of its Special Operations Support Teams (SOST) to multiple components of the interagency community. SOST partners include those in the JIACG and others not represented within that organization. The effectiveness of the SOSTs lies in the embedded nature of their members and their on-scene responsiveness to their interagency partners.

It is important to realize that SOCOM does not hold a monopoly on JIACG organizations. The DoD reliance on JIACG structures began in October 2001. CENTCOM, NORTHCOM and other commands also rely on a JIACG to support their operations. Thus efficiencies gained elsewhere are likely to assist the SOCOM JIACG even as the latter exchanges lessons learned through its SOSTs and other information-sharing venues.

The Joint Warfare Center of the U.S. Joint Forces Command has published a Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jiacg_handbook.pdf), which provides detailed, non-doctrinal information about the structure and functioning of a JIACG.

**Additional USSOCOM Organizations and Programs**

- Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE)
- Joint Combined Exercise for Training (JCET)
- Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC)
- Military Information Support Team (MIST)
- Military Liaison Element (MLE)
- Special Operations Support Teams (SOST)

![Figure 10: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)](image-url)
Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)

The CTFP was established under the 2002 DoD Appropriations Act as a security cooperation tool in support of the global war on terrorism. It provides education and training opportunities for foreign military officers, ministry of defense officials, and foreign security officials to build individual proficiency while enabling regional cooperation. It complements other programs such as IMET, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs), Counter Narco Terrorist (CNT) training, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)-related training, and Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) programs. CTFP goals include (a) build the counterterrorism capabilities and capacities of partner nations, (b) build and strengthen a global network of combating terrorism experts and practitioners committed to participation in support of U.S. efforts against terrorists and terrorist organizations, and (c) counter ideological support for terrorism. The ASD (SOLIC&IC) serves as the senior policy official for CTFP initiatives while the Director of the DSCA is responsible for the management and execution of all CTFP programs.

Figure 11: USSOCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
http://www.tswg.gov/

The Technical Programs Unit of the S/CT is responsible for providing policy oversight for TSWG, an interagency organization that draws its management direction and technical oversight from DoD through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC&IC). Figure 12 (obtained from the DoD Web site) lays out the structure of the TSWG and identifies the various interagency linkages that are involved.

Additional Interagency Programs

Several interagency programs, in addition to those already discussed, have relevance to counterterrorism operations overseas. Figure 13 presents an overview of these additional interagency programs. Each relies on the inclusion and participation of multiple partners from throughout the USG interagency process for its operational effectiveness.

Business Executives for National Security (BENS)
http://www.bens.org/home.html

While not a USG agency, BENS is concerned with providing the U.S. with a strong and efficient security sector. It is a non-partisan public interest organization whose membership includes business executives from a wide variety of professional and political backgrounds. BENS was established in 1982 by Stanley A. Weiss and has been active ever since in providing quality business solutions to U.S. national security challenges. Over the years it has established working
relationships with the White House, federal and state government agencies, and the Congress. At the same time, BENS has been active in the public arena in voicing its independent positions on the issues of the day. It has had an influence on the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar), the creation of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, procedures for the closing of obsolete military bases, and the introduction of business-management practices into the DoD.

**Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)**
http://www.opic.gov/

OPIC is a self-sustaining (no taxpayer funding) USG agency established in 1971. Its purpose is to support the execution of U.S. foreign policy by assisting U.S. businesses to invest overseas while encouraging economic and market development within more than 150 countries worldwide. OPIC initiatives are focused on establishing the reform of free markets and other institutions to support good governance and political stability. Its programs ensure that reform encourages incorporation of best business practices that promote international environmental, labor, and human rights standards. For several years, OPIC has operated its Anti-Corruption and Transparency Initiative to build credibility into the functioning of markets and the creation of wealth and social responsibility. By its very nature, OPIC works with many USG interagency components to affect conditions overseas in a way to support counterterrorism activities and other USG foreign policy goals.

**Additional Interagency Programs**

**Operations and Capacity Building**
- Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR)
- Demining Test and Evaluation Program
- Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
- DoD Counterdrug Programs
- Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)
- Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
- Global Peace Operations Initiative
- Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)
- International Foreign Intelligence Program
- International Information Programs (IIP)
- International Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
- National Foreign Intelligence Program
- Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR)
- Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)
- Pakistan Frontier Corps
- Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Programs (RDT&E)

**Training and Education**
- Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)
- Global Train and Equip Program
- International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
- International Military Education and Training (IMET)
- Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)
- Regional Centers for Security Strategies
- Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF)

**Financial and Resource Support**
- Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
- Coalition Support Funds (CSSF)
- Combatant Commanders Initiative Funds (CCIF)
- Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
- Economic Support Fund (ESF)
- Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
- Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
- Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
- Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)

Figure 13: Additional Interagency Programs
Chapter 2. Overseas Interagency Structures

It is understandable for the special operations warrior overseas to feel somewhat isolated and detached from USG activities back in Washington, D.C. However, it is prudent to recall that each department, agency, organization, program and agenda that is active in the USG interagency process back home is represented somewhere in the AO and must be accommodated.

Consequently, the distance between the U.S. and the AO is not as great as it first appears. It is also necessary to remember that the DoS serves as the lead USG department for combating terrorism overseas, which brings the interagency process immediately into play. It is not a DoD “show” alone.

The Country Team

Led by the U.S. Ambassador or Chief of Mission (COM), the Country Team serves as the multifaceted “face” of the USG interagency process. The Country Team is made up of USG representatives who are placed on the ground to ensure the successful functioning of the programs administered by their parent departments, agencies and organizations. The COM has the discretionary authority to organize her Country Team in whatever fashion she sees fit.

The various members of the Country Team each bring to the mission their own respective organizational cultures, procedures, expectations, situation awareness, and levels of experience. Thus there exists a strong tendency toward “stove piping” of the effort, with individual Country Team members frequently remaining within their comfort zones by exchanging information with and responding to direction from their leadership back in the U.S.

Ideally, the COM will be successful in integrating the stovepipes and in flattening the interagency work flow to bring about greater lateral coordination among participating departments, agencies and organizations. After all, those representatives operate within the same U.S. Embassy, sit around the same Country Team table, and are theoretically focused on the same desired end states.

As the work flow shifts to the conditions within the AO, it is also important to recall that interagency is a process and not a collection of fixed organizational charts with specific responsibilities that are managed by a structured chain of command. As policy guidance, strategy, and operational decisions move from the senior levels of the NSC through the layers of the USG interagency process to the Country Team, there is a real danger of losing track of the goals, intentions, resources, measures of effectiveness, and sensitivity to adjustments that may become necessary to improve the effectiveness of the effort.

The COM must translate the interagency policies, strategies and plans into productive action on the ground. From a narrow perspective, the Country Team can serve as an enabler for the special operations warrior, assisting with access to those within the interagency process who provide access and support for SOF missions.
Contrary to some misperceptions, the COM is not simply the senior spokesperson for DoS interests as they “compete” with other Country Team agendas. In fact, the COM is the leader of the Country Team, which essentially serves as the “cabinet” for the COM. The COM’s authority is defined by the President; the COM serves as the President’s personal representative.

Continuing a tradition begun by President John F. Kennedy in May 1961, each incoming COM receives a letter from the President defining the nature and parameters of his responsibilities. These include orchestrating the efforts of more than 30 government agencies toward achieving a wide range of diplomatic, economic, security, and intelligence objectives.

The status of the COM was codified in Section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (PL 96-465):

“Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country—

(1) shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander); and

(2) shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country, and shall insure that all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission.”

The primacy of the COM’s authority does not mean that other members of the Country Team are prevented from maintaining relationships with their parent organizations. In fact, such contacts are useful for maintaining situation awareness as long as the COM, his deputy, and Country Team are kept updated.

As the President’s personal representative, the COM is responsible for providing clarity of purpose and for ensuring the implementation, management, and evaluation of foreign and security policies within the AO.

The DCM is responsible for the management of embassy operations and works with the COM to guide the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals through the functioning of the Country Team. As with all deputy positions, the DCM acts in the absence of the principal and thus exercises the authority and responsibilities of the COM at those times.

Figure 14 portrays the operational interagency environment. The Country Team block summarizes the complexity of the USG interagency process. The participation of the others shown, many of whom could be inadvertently operating at cross purposes, renders the challenge even more difficult.

It is always a wise course of action for the special operations warrior entering an AO for the first time or returning after a period of absence to come to an early understanding about how things work and how they got to be that way. The answer may not always be satisfactory, but it’s important to be aware so as not to seek changes that are unworkable, unwanted or not needed in the first place.

Executing the work output of the USG interagency process takes place within the AO, closest to the immediate challenges and threats, and farthest away from the policy and decision makers who set the USG interagency process into motion. Any shortcomings in the USG interagency process are present and often magnified. The special operations warrior should understand the makeup of the Country Team and recognize the critical areas of expertise that reside within each functional area. All are important, but some have a greater impact than others on the SOF mission.

The Agricultural Attaché is a Foreign Service Officer from the DoA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Attaches operate from more than 100 offices in 82 countries; they also monitor and report on agricultural trade matters in more than 70 additional countries. Agricultural Attachés provide direct management of FAS programs within the country to distribute needed food supplies and provide technical
assistance. They coordinate with USAID and other agencies in support of broader USG assistance programs designed to improve living conditions for the local population. In Afghanistan and Iraq, much of this coordination takes place within the structure of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

**Defense Attaché**

The in-country representative for the Secretary of Defense is the Defense Attaché, a member of the Defense Attaché System (DAS) under the management of the DIA. The Defense Attaché serves as the advisor to the COM on security and military matters and acts as the liaison with the HN Ministry of Defense and other defense sector agencies. The Defense Attaché also is involved with intelligence collection. As the development of military capacity is a central counterterrorism task, this office provides a crucial link to the HN security sectors whose effectiveness will ultimately bring about successful outcomes.

**Drug Enforcement Attaché**

The Drug Enforcement Attaché performs a variety of functions both to enable USG counterdrug operations and to build HN capacity through relationship building, training and mentoring. The attaché serves as an interagency point of contact for those assisting in counterdrug operations within the AO.

**ICE Attaché**

The DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of International Affairs, stations ICE Attachés in offices co-located with U.S. embassies and Senior ICE Representatives co-located at U.S. consulates. The attachés work closely with the ICE Office of Investigations and with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to conduct complex inquiries into a variety of customs threats and other criminal behavior. ICE Attachés also conduct liaison with HN officials to provide training, assist
with infrastructure building, and support regulatory and compliance functions within the AO. They also establish relationships with the HN Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their local law enforcement counterparts.

Legal Attaché
Legal Attachés are assigned by the FBI to oversee its counterterrorism programs around the world. The specifics of the effort are contained in Chapter 1, in the section on the USG Counterterrorism Components under Federal Bureau of Investigation–Counterterrorism.

Narcotics Control Officer (NCO)
The NCO is an asset of the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs who is assigned to the U.S. embassy to serve as liaison to the HN and to carry out a number of tasks in support of counterdrug programs. Responsibilities include collecting information, strategic and operational planning, and training. The NCO assists in the development of the U.S. embassy counterdrug strategies and contingency plans targeting drug producers and traffickers. The NCO also seeks to harmonize USG and HN counterdrug priorities while assessing risks and evaluating progress.

NCOIC, U.S. Marine Corps Security Detachment (MSG)
Working under the supervision of the Regional Security Officer (RSO) and in coordination with the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), the MSG is responsible for providing for the security of embassy facilities and the protection of classified information. The Marines also support the protection of visiting dignitaries and assist the RSO in developing security plans for the external defense of embassy property. That external mission is often carried out by HN assets, reinforced by the MSG.

Office of Regional Affairs
Staffed by representation from the DoS Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), the Office of Regional Affairs gathers information and tracks potential WMD threats. The Office of Regional Affairs is engaged in contributing to the development of a consensus on WMD proliferation through interaction with the HN and other partner nations. It also works with the international community to identify, guard against, and respond to terrorist threats of WMD use.

Political and Economic Section Chief
As the title indicates, the Political and Economic Section Chief oversees a variety of specialties to include commercial and agricultural activities within the HN. Ultimately political reform and economic development issues that are central to the counterterrorism effort are of special importance to this official and the staff.

Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
The Country Team’s PAO performs traditional responsibilities as spokesperson, coordinator of international education and visitor programs, and facilitator of information exchanges. The office is also responsible for coordinating public diplomacy initiatives so essential to presenting an accurate narrative of U.S. efforts within the country. The public diplomacy role causes the PAO to perform front-line duties in the effort to challenge and defeat the ideological foundations of terrorists and their networks.

Regional Security Officer
The Regional Security Officer is a representative of the DSS and is responsible for creating a secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and the protection of diplomatic personnel and facilities. Of special interest to the special operations warrior is the role of the Regional Security Officer as the liaison between the Country Team and the host government law enforcement community. As an effective local, regional and national police force is central to effective governance, the development of a credible HN law enforcement capacity is a critical mission for the Regional Security Officer and the Country Team.

Resident Legal Advisor (RLA)
RLAs are assigned through the DoJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT). They focus primarily on providing assistance to Rule of Law programs within HN justice institutions and law enforcement agencies. RLAs seek to build justice sector capacity to increase
effectiveness in dealing with terrorism, organized crime, corruption and other criminal activity. In addition to building relationships with the USG, RLAs also assist HNs to develop regional crime-fighting relationships and justice reform.

**Security Assistance Officer (SAO)**

The SAO is responsible for conducting the in-country management of the Security Assistance (SA) Program to the HN. To accomplish this mission, the SAO maintains relationships with HN counterparts while coordinating with other members of the Country Team, the regional military commander, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DSCA, and the MILDEPs. Programs include equipment transfers, a wide variety of in-country and U.S. training opportunities, and other defense-related resources and services under the terms of Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) manages the financial resources to support approved LOAs.

**USAID Representative**

Chapter 1 discusses the broad range of responsibilities and programs that reside within USAID. The USAID Representative and staff on the ground are responsible for direct management and resourcing of a wide variety of activities in the areas of agricultural, health, education, economic and institutional reform. USAID also assists in reinforcing the unity of effort by coordinating with and frequently overseeing the activities of some, but by no means all, NGOs in the AO. USAID maintains an active presence that assists in the functioning of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**U.S. Military Operations**

Though generally not a member of the Country Team, SOF pursuing counterterrorism responsibilities frequently require access to the interagency representatives who serve on the Country Team. Predictably, such interactions will not be restricted to military personnel such as the Defense Attaché. They are likely to also involve interagency relationship building with USAID, DEA, RLAs, and law enforcement representatives such as the FBI and Regional Security Officer.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) can enter an AO under a variety of conditions and assistance needs. The most obvious, of course, is through the Defense Attaché, SAO, or MILGP assigned to the embassy to provide assistance. However, SOF may also be engaged in a specific HN through the need for law enforcement capacity building that comes through the various law enforcement representatives. Additionally, disasters or humanitarian assistance missions may cause the USAID representative to advocate for a SOF presence.

Many of the security assistance efforts are carried out by a Military Group (MILGP) that is tailored in structure and mission to meet the requirements of the HN. Within U.S. policy constraints, the MILGP can conduct training, support the introduction of new equipment, mentor the reform of HN security sector institutions, and provide advisory support to HN security forces.

While the COM is personally responsible to the President for the successful functioning of the Country Team, he or she exercises no control over U.S. military personnel operating under the command of a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCDR). To improve coordination, agreements have been negotiated, formalized, and put in place to define the relationship between the COM and the GCDR and how both can work together to accomplish U.S. national security objectives.

Typically, the DoS, working through the COM, assists with the entry of U.S. military forces into the HN by negotiating the specific goals of the effort, terms of the military’s presence, tasks to be accomplished, length of stay and/or measures of success leading to a withdrawal.

Beyond that, it should be clear that unique SOF capabilities frequently result in greater direct coordination and interaction with the Country Team than by conventional military organizations.
Interagency Organizations and Initiatives

While the Country Team plays the central role in meeting U.S. counterterrorism objectives, operating within the AO frequently brings the special operations warrior into contact with other coordination venues. The following organizations and initiatives serve as synchronization nodes for a wide variety of activities.

**DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)**  
(http://www.state.gov/s/crs/)

S/CRS works to reduce instability and other conditions in HNs that could contribute to the development and sustainment of terrorists and their networks. It is tasked to develop initiatives that increase and synchronize the civilian capacity of the USG to provide the skill sets and resources for post-conflict situations and to stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition.

Figure 15 shows the structure of S/CRS. In the spirit of the interagency process at the strategic level, S/CRS is staffed by representatives from a variety of USG departments, agencies and organizations:

- DoS
- USAID
- DoD
- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
- U.S. Joint Forces Command
- DoJ

Other members of the S/CRS Team include:

- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
- Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC)
- U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
Chapter 2: Overseas Interagency Structures

- DoJ (International Criminal Investigative Training Program-ICITAP)
- DoS (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement’s Civilian Police Programs)
- DoS (Office of the Director General, Diplomatic Readiness Initiative)
- DoS (Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration)
- DoS (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs)
- DoS (Foreign Services Institute)
- CIA
- USAID (Office of Democracy and Governance)
- USAID (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance)
- USAID (Office of Transition Initiatives)
- Department of the Treasury

As part of its effort, S/CRS orchestrates the output of six working groups from throughout the USG that resulted in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks highlighted in Figure 16. The entire product is quite detailed and many pages long; it can be accessed at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53464.pdf.


Civilian Response Corps

S/CRS is also working on another interagency initiative with operational implications to be named The Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America. Additional USG partners include various DoS agencies, DoA, DoC, DHHS, DHS, DoJ and the Department of the Treasury.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Governance and Participation Governance</th>
<th>Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being</th>
<th>Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disposition of Armed and Other Security Forces, Intelligence Services and Belligerents</td>
<td>National Consulting Processes</td>
<td>Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons</td>
<td>Employment Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Security</td>
<td>Transitional Governance</td>
<td>Trafficking in Persons</td>
<td>Monetary Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order and Safety</td>
<td>Executive Authority</td>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>Fiscal Policy and Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Indigenous Individuals, Infrastructure and Institutions</td>
<td>Legislative Strengthening</td>
<td>Shelter and Non-Food Relief</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Reconstruction and Stabilization Personnel and Institutions</td>
<td>Local Governance</td>
<td>Humanitarian Demining</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Coordination</td>
<td>Transparency and Anti-Corruption</td>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>Debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information and Communications</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Trade</td>
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</tbody>
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Based on the Research contained in Winning The Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, edited by Robert C. Orr, these “Essential Tasks” were adapted by six interagency working groups led by S/CRS. The completed matrix of tasks contains short-, mid- and long-term goals for a multitude of supporting tasks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justice and Reconciliation</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
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<tr>
<td>Interim Criminal Justice System</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
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<td>Indigenous Police</td>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial Personnel and Infrastructure</td>
<td>Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>General Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal System Reform</td>
<td>Public Information and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Source: DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
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<td>War Crime Courts and Tribunals</td>
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<td>Truth Commissions and Remembrance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Rebuilding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Information and Communications</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16: Essential Tasks, Post-Conflict Resolution
The Civilian Response Corps is made up of civilian federal employees and, eventually, volunteers from the private sector, state and local governments who possess the essential skill sets and are able to deploy rapidly to countries requiring assistance in stabilization and reconstruction. The Civilian Response Corps will feature three levels of participation:

a. A core of 250 full-time positions for the active component who represent the participating USG interagency components. They must be able to deploy within 48 hours of notification.

b. A standby force of 2,000 trained members from the same interagency partners who are federal employees, trained for the mission, and are deployable within 30 days for up to 180 days.

c. A reserve force of 2,000 volunteers recruited from the private sector, state and local governments who are trained in the deployment skills they need to complement the skill sets they bring to the effort. These individuals possess backgrounds that are generally not available in the USG such as civilian police officers, city administrators and port operators.

Collectively the Civilian Response Corps will be able to supply critical skills that are not available within the USG structure, but are important to achieving national counterterrorism objectives. These skills include diplomats, development specialists, public health officials, law enforcement and corrections officers, engineers, economists, lawyers, agronomists and others.

As always, special operations warriors interacting with Response Corps members should be prepared to interact with different cultures, expectations, and levels of experience.

Coordination of Humanitarian Efforts Within the AO

Because so many HN, IGO, NGO, and military organizations and resources can be operating in any given AO, there is a need for establishing some sort of coordination hub to assist in the establishment of objectives and unity of effort. While HN authorities are usually familiar with working with each other to some degree, and IGOs and military forces are familiar with the requirement to harmonize their efforts, NGOs have traditionally seen independent action as their best path to survival and success.

The perception of neutrality is essential to the NGOs. Consequently, it is predictably counterproductive to enlist NGO assistance in providing military forces with their assessments of local needs and the security situation on the ground. Information-exchange is not a task NGOs typically assign themselves.

Thus attempting to orchestrate an information network based on NGO input is rarely if ever a workable option. Seeking to control NGO operations under some sort of command relationship would be worse. If nothing else, the consequences of alienating the NGO community are unacceptably high. Tension and distrust also distract from essential mission tasks.

Part of this reluctance to cooperate is for security reasons. Once NGOs are compromised and linked to unpopular governments or unwanted international assistance, they can become targets. Their effectiveness is also diminished as the local population could become less likely to approach them for assistance for fear of reprisals.

For a variety of reasons, recent years have seen a shift in the attitude of many NGOs, resulting in a greater synchronization of efforts. Increasingly the flexible, situationally aware, highly skilled NGO staffs on the ground are doing much of the actual work of humanitarian response in coordination with HN authorities, IGOs, other NGOs, and international military forces.

Various mechanisms for coordinating collective humanitarian responses to wars and natural disasters have evolved. Given the diversity of the participants and the complexity of the operational environments, they predictably operate under different names, but frequently perform very similar functions.

Thus the careful establishment and management of interagency coordination hubs are essential to minimizing the duplication of effort and limiting the risks of excluding those wishing to participate.
Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs) have emerged as nodes for information exchange and the development of information management procedures and technology. With an eye toward developing common practices and standards, HICs serve as venues for data collection, data distribution, and coordination of plans and projects.

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACCs) are established by military organizations participating in humanitarian operations. They are designed to support all forms of interagency information exchange, coordination, planning and execution of programs. They ensure an open link to NGOs and IGOs operating within the AO. HACCs provide a means by which the diverse agendas, skill sets, and resource bases of all humanitarian response agencies can be synchronized.

A Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) may be established by the HN, the UN (UNHOC), or a lead USG agency. The HOC is designed to provide a venue for interagency policy makers to coordinate the humanitarian response. Representatives include HN organizations, international embassies involved in the effort, UN officials, IGOs, NGOs, and military forces.

A Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) is typically located within a secured, military-controlled facility. Access is limited to the key HN leadership and that of partner nations, major IGOs, and NGOs. Collectively they develop the plans and manage the execution of humanitarian operations within the AO.

A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) is both a place and a process for coordinating the efforts of U.S. military forces, the USG Interagency, HN representatives, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. It is not a command and control center and exercises no directive authority over the participants. It does, however, provide an opportunity to conduct information exchanges, build relationships, and synchronize efforts within the AO.

Management of the CMOC may fall to a multinational force commander, shared by US and multinational force commanders, or shared between a US military commander and a USG civilian agency head. As always, the specific structure depends on the situation. Civil Affairs officers typically serve as directors and deputy directors.

Other military skills present can include legal, operations, logistics, engineering, medical, and force protection. Additional expertise and resources are provided by the USG interagency (usually through the Country Team), HN organizations, partner nations, IGOs and NGOs.

A Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC), similarly to a CMOC, is located outside of a secured military facility and functions similarly to a HACC. As with the other coordinating mechanisms, a CIMIC acts as a source of information and a venue for coordinating plans and projects. It also serves as an external information source for parties to the humanitarian effort and to local populations.

Though institutional suspicion, confusion and duplication of effort remain, they are less than before. As with any interagency national or international functional area, designation of lead organizations and coordination hubs is a necessary first step. Protocols for accommodating diverse organizations and agendas lead to the establishment of procedures for information exchanges, planning approaches and shared oversight of activities designed to bring about successfully executed humanitarian operations.

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)

A JIATF is made up of USG interagency representatives, including the DoD, partner nations, and others who are tasked with taking on specific issues or missions. Their primary focus is on geographic or functional responsibilities.

Unlike the FBI’s JTTF or the USSOCOM/JACG discussed in Chapter 1, JIATFs are typically intended to be short-term organizations with specific tasks to perform and with the authority under a single commander to act on those tasks. They then disband once their purposes are fulfilled.

The ad-hoc purpose and structure of JIATFs, however, provides flexibility that allows them to adapt to changing situations and thus occasionally breed longer-than-anticipated life cycles as missions expand or threats become more immediate. Joint
Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South represents such an example.

**Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF)**
http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/

Increased DoD involvement with counterdrug operations took shape beginning in 1989 with various Commanders in Chief (CINCs) establishing individual task forces and other organizations focused on the mission. With a reorganization in 1994 and a consolidation in 1999, the life cycle of JIATF-South now spans nearly two decades in one form or another.

JIATF-South fields joint, interagency and international capabilities (Figure 17) that monitor a wide geographic area for suspected drug-related activity; train and advise counter-drug forces; and plan and execute counter-drug operations.

Although developed in the counter-drug environment, JIATF-South has become a model for the organization, staffing, coordination, information sharing, intelligence fusion, planning, and execution for other JIATFs faced with different complex missions. This includes many of the interagency features of the developing USAFRICOM discussed in Chapter 1.

Within the DoD, JIATF-South synchronizes activities with the DIA, NGA, NSA, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and the National Guard. USG interagency partners include:
- U.S. Coast Guard
- Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (DHS)
- CIA
- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DoJ)
- FBI
- Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS)

To extend its reach, several Hemispheric and European countries have sent liaison teams and, in some cases, maritime assets to support the JIATF-South mission.

**Joint Interagency Task Force-CT (Afghanistan)**

As U.S. military forces began their fight against the Taliban and other insurgent forces in the fall of 2001, USCENTCOM established JIATF-CT (Figure 18) that deployed to Afghanistan to support the effort. Its primary responsibilities were to act as an intelligence-gathering fusion center and to operate the interrogation facility at Bagram Air Base.
From its beginning, JIATF-CT maintained a strong interagency structure. Among others, membership included:

- FBI
- CIA
- Diplomatic Security Service
- Customs Service
- NSA
- DIA
- New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force
- DoJ
- Department of the Treasury
- DoS

A few allied nations also provided representatives who worked side by side with the others to exchange information and collectively apply their skill sets, experiences and resources to the effort.

As conditions on the ground in Afghanistan evolved, the JIATF-CT returned to the U.S. in the spring of 2002 and began a transformation from the temporary, ad-hoc structure and focus of a JIATF to more sustained operations as USCENTCOM’s JIACG that continues to function.

Both JIATF-South and JIATF-CT came into existence to address a specific threat to U.S. national security. Because of their effectiveness and adaptability, both continue to function well beyond the time limits one would expect for such an organization.

Though its title remains essentially the same, JIATF-South’s responsibilities have broadened significantly while remaining engaged in its original mission as a central player within U.S. counter-drug operations. By contrast, JIATF-CT has undergone a name change that reflects the expansion of its responsibilities within a mix of related missions.

What remains the same is that both organizations have survived and grown because of their abilities to accommodate the vastly different cultures, skill sets and procedures that make up their diverse memberships. Harmonizing these differences has allowed both to make continuing contributions to the accomplishment of national security objectives and to act as models for newer JIATF organizations created to address counterterrorism and other security threats.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/91433.htm

PRTs were first established in Afghanistan, where the Gardez City PRT opened in early 2002. PRTs are designed to assist in extending the influence of the central government from Kabul and other major cities into those isolated areas so that they are less likely to fall under the influence of destabilizing forces that breed and harbor terrorists and their networks. The goal is to assist the central government to build its credibility and support across a country roughly the size of Texas.

The PRTs vary in size depending on local needs and the prevailing security situation. In addition to military personnel, the PRT includes USG interagency representation (working through the Country Team), partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

PRT leadership consists of both military and Foreign Service officers who strive to synchronize the agendas, policies, strategies, procedures, and activities of all participants to gain the greatest impact of the shared effort. PRTs work closely with local village, district and provincial officials, and military
operational units to strengthen local governance, reform the security sector beginning with the police, and executing reconstruction and development projects.

Among others, PRT tasks involve establishing security, developing and executing plans for reconstruction and development, improving governance through the mentoring of local and district leaders and other measures, and judicial reform. DoS, USAID, USDA, and other members of the USG interagency play prominent roles in building government capacity, combating corruption, discouraging poppy growth, encouraging the growth of alternative crops, and local and regional planning.

PRTs also function in Iraq with structures, management, and objectives tailored to local needs. For instance, PRTs in Iraq are typically embedded within U.S. Brigade Combat Teams, which is consistent with the operational environment within that country.

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)  
http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, successor to the very effective Pan-Sahel Initiative, is an interagency program involving DoS, DoD, USAID and others in a broad initiative to confront the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the Maghreb and Sahel in Africa.

The five-year initiative brings together counterterrorism, democratic governance, military assistance, and public diplomacy activities. Beyond the USG interagency, regional IGOs such as the African Union (Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism) are involved with the efforts. Interagency participants have identified four specific strategic goals to be accomplished within the operational environment:

a. Build Local Capacity  
b. Counter Radicalization  
c. Foster Regional Cooperation  
d. Enhance Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication

The partnership focuses on nine countries, including Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.

Funding for the TSCTP comes from a variety of USG sources. Among them are DoD Title 10 funding, Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR), Development Assistance, and Economic Support financing. NGOs engaged in the region have also contributed.

Capacity-building programs focus on nurturing tactical intelligence capabilities that encourage the development of “eyes and ears” to identify and target potential terrorists and their networks. Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) efforts are also involved.

A variety of train-and-equip programs support CT efforts to provide weapons, equipment, training and tactical mentoring to stop the flow of uncontrolled weapons, goods, and people, and to neutralize safe havens where terrorists thrive.

Efforts in counter radicalization, public diplomacy, and strategic communication have contributed with a variety of initiatives. Programs to reduce the pool of potential terrorist recruits have focused on encouraging youth employment and civic education, improving educational access and quality, and reintegrating former combatants.

Additionally, programs to increase government credibility and reduce ungoverned areas have sought to improve good governance practices at the local level, the capacity of rule-of-law systems, and the ability of the government to be seen as providing necessary goods and services to their populations.

Upgrading communication capacity within the partner countries allows the government to counter extremist claims and behavior by keeping their populations informed about what is being done to protect them and improve their quality of life. Ideally, favorable views of the USG and its support of the HN government breed popular respect for a government that is able to partner with such a helpful ally.
Chapter 3. Beyond the Interagency to Other Players

Beyond the complexities of the USG interagency process experienced both in Washington, D.C., and within the Country Team, SOF must also account for and interact with representatives of the HN government and a mosaic of partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Predictably, each is operating on a separate agenda-driven path.

The USG interagency process exists to coordinate the counterterrorism activities of disparate departments, agencies and organizations with the goal of achieving assigned U.S. national security objectives. By contrast, there is no pretense that any similar mechanism exists on the ground overseas to bring about such effects once the SOF community steps outside the USG interagency and Country Team.

Representatives of the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs are not part of the USG interagency process. However, their mere presence and activities within the AO inevitably have a major impact on the establishment and sustainment of the unity of effort required to meet both U.S. and international security objectives. More than ever, knowing and understanding those working alongside you become at least as important as an awareness of active or potential adversaries.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO environment to help the special operations warrior gain a general awareness of the other players present on the ground. It is not an exhaustive survey of the environment. In fact, the specific IGOs and NGOs introduced reflect only a small slice of the total participants. However, they do represent many of the more-familiar players and offer a glimpse into characteristics that are often shared.

SOF personnel soon learn that introductions around the table at the beginning of a meeting represent more than polite hospitality. They are essential to identify the various players and their organizations and to begin to understand their agendas. Each of these other players possesses skills and resources relevant to the tasks at hand.

Again, however, it is necessary to remember that each applies its talents guided by what are often to us unfamiliar and seemingly inconsistent policies, strategies, plans, procedures, and organizational cultures. As with the USG interagency components serving the USG Country Team, HN officials, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs likewise bring with them their own unique “stovepipe” relationships.

It is frequently the case that some decisions can be made by local representatives operating at the tactical level, but more complex issues must be addressed in national capitals or in whatever country houses the headquarters of each IGO and NGO. Quite simply, many organizations operate either tactically or strategically and don’t field an operational level decision-maker to provide immediate guidance to their personnel or to help deconflict disputes.

These dissimilarities are not disqualifiers; in fact, such differences are inevitable and, one could argue, helpful if properly exploited. The immediate tasks become to identify who is on the ground, establish contact, identify goals and resources, and attempt to synchronize efforts to achieve a strong measure of unity of effort.

Success in relationship building is largely personality dependent, based on the ability of those on the ground to reach consensus on desired end states and to synchronize multilateral activities to achieve those end states.

Experience teaches that shared goals and objectives are not necessarily the same as a commonly accepted vision of a desired end state. Success will...
likely have many different definitions and metrics. In fact, sometimes the best one can hope for is a shared objective and an agreement to exchange information.

As with non-DoD USG departments, agencies and organizations, no command relationships exist with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Negotiation skills and the ability to listen emerge as premium assets. Once established, the relationships will be inevitably softer and less direct than is familiar to the special operations warrior.

Respectful coordination and, when possible, accommodation of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO agendas are most useful in achieving success. Alienation is never helpful.

As a practical matter, the combining of the USG interagency process with the effective inclusion of international partners and other outside organizations introduces efficiencies into the operational environment. The base reality remains that no one can do it all alone. Ideally those best suited to specific tasks are given the responsibility to manage those tasks.

Consistent with this principle, FM3-24 notes that “In COIN, it is always preferred for civilians to perform civilian tasks.” Though not always possible, this is a solid principle for guiding USG interagency coordination, especially in an operational setting. The guidance becomes even more relevant when dealing with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

Efficiencies are also gained by applying the right mix of skill sets and resources to a specific challenge. It is not always true that the introduction of more personnel and resources inevitably results in a better outcome. Ensuring quality work is often more helpful than merely having more people performing the same tasks as before.

Ideally, cooperation among all the parties will result in a unity of effort through which USG, HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO efforts emerge as more than a collage of random, uncoordinated acts. The inclusion of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO resources assists the common effort in working smarter in a specific direction (or several paths heading in the same general direction) toward the achievement of a desired end state.

As a reminder of the size of the IGO and NGO community, the Union of International Associations identifies on its Web site 5,900 IGOs and IGO networks; 38,000 International Associations-NGOs; and 4,100 Regional Organizations and Regional Networks. Individually and collectively, they represent a stern challenge for the special operations warrior trying to make sense of it all.

## Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

**ABCA Armies**


Initiated in 1947 with a general plan and formalized in 1954 with the Basic Standardization Concept, the ABCA Armies has a long history of seeking standardization among its member armies. Initial membership included the armies of the U.S. (America), United Kingdom (British), and Canada (C) who sought to sustain the partnerships in place during World War II. Australia (A) joined in 1963, with New Zealand moving from observer status to full membership in 2006 without any change to the organization's title.

Recognizing the coalition nature of current and future wars, the ABCA Armies are concerned primarily with ensuring the standardization and interoperability necessary “to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.”

Strategic guidance is provided by the ABCA Executive Council, made up of national representatives at the level of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. That guidance is translated into Interoperability Objectives and the annual Program Plan of Tasks by the National Directors or ABCA Board, made up of officers at the one-star level. They typically meet...
four times annually, including one session with the Executive Council.

The work of the organization is conducted by the Program Office, based in Washington, DC, through Capability Groups (CGs), Support Groups (SGs), Project Teams (PTs), and Information Teams (ITs).

**African Union (AU)**
http://www.africa-union.org/

The AU was established on 9 July 2002, by bringing together the separate countries of the continent. Current membership stands at 53 countries. It has developed several governing institutions to include the Pan African Parliament and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The AU goals are to bring about political, social, and economic integration; develop common African positions on issues; achieve peace and security; and promote good governance through reform of governmental institutions and the respect for human rights. To date, AU troops have deployed to Burundi, Sudan’s Darfur Region, and Somalia to address security and humanitarian needs.

**Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**
http://www.aseansec.org/

ASEAN was established, on 8 August 1967, in Bangkok with five founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined later. The ASEAN region is home to more than 560 million people. ASEAN represents a collective effort to promote economic growth, social progress and cultural development.

In 2003, ASEAN identified three “pillars” to assist in achieving its goals: The ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 1994 saw the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that includes the ASEAN countries plus others with an interest in the region. These include the U.S. and the Russian Federation. ARF’s goals are to promote confidence building, establish preventive diplomacy protocols and develop conflict resolution strategies.

**European Union (EU)**
http://europa.eu/

The EU consists of 27 European countries forming a political and economic partnership. Nearly 500 million people live within the borders of the EU. Its three major bodies are the European Parliament (representing the people of Europe), the Council of European Union (representing the governments of Europe), and the European Commission (representing the shared interests of the EU). Among other issues, the EU is involved with free trade, borderless internal travel, a common currency, and joint action on crime and terrorism.

A major emphasis focuses on securing the external borders of the EU while allowing free trade and open travel. The EU makes use of an extensive shared data base that enables police forces and judicial officials to exchange information and track suspected criminals and terrorists. The European Police (EUROPOL) is housed in The Hague, Netherlands, and maintains extensive intelligence information on criminals and terrorists. EUROPOL is staffed by representatives from national law enforcement agencies (police, customs, immigration services, etc). They monitor issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, financial crimes, and radioactive/nuclear trafficking.

**International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)**
http://www.interpol.int/

INTERPOL is a structured IGO with 186 members under the direction of a General Assembly, Executive Committee, General Secretariat, and National Central Bureaus. The General Secretariat is located in Lyon, France, and maintains an around-the-clock operations center staffed by representatives from the member countries.

INTERPOL supports four official languages: Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. Each member country maintains a National Central Bureau, which serves as the point of contact for international police issues and the exchange of information. The U.S. National Central Bureau is located within the Department of Justice and is staffed jointly by representatives of numerous U.S. law enforcement agencies.
In 2005, INTERPOL and the UN issued the first INTERPOL–UN Security Council Special Notice regarding individuals and organizations suspected of maintaining associations with Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist groups.

**International Monetary Fund (IMF)**

The IMF is based in Washington, D.C., and is the host to 186 member countries. It encourages cooperation among its members to ensure the secure functioning of the complex international banking systems. The IMF promotes stability of international currencies and exchange protocols. It also works to stimulate international job growth through economic development and, when necessary, assistance to countries with severe debt and other financial threats. The IMF maintains surveillance of financial and economic trends throughout the world and within individual countries. It also makes loans to countries in need and provides technical assistance to encourage self-sufficiency in the operation of the world’s interconnected financial systems.

**Organization of American States (OAS)**
http://www.oas.org/

The OAS has 35 member countries, 34 of which are active after the 1962 suspension of Cuba. It features four official languages: English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. The OAS is the principal regional forum for discussing the major issues and concerns facing the member countries. These include terrorism, poverty, illegal drugs and corruption.

Major policies and goals are outlined during the meeting of the General Assembly, which gathers annually at the foreign minister level. Regular activities are overseen by the Permanent Council that functions through the ambassadors appointed by the individual member countries. The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security is tasked with coordinating OAS actions against terrorism, illegal drugs, arms trafficking, antipersonnel mines, organized crime, gangs involved with criminal activity, WMD proliferation and other security threats. The Secretariat is also responsible for developing confidence building measures and other initiatives to ensure hemispheric stability and security.

**Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**
http://www.osce.org/

The OSCE consists of 56 countries from Europe, Central Asia, and North America. It came into existence as a result of the 1 August 1975 Helsinki Final Act to serve as a forum for east–west dialogue during the era of Détente. OSCE operates 19 missions or field operations in Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus Region, and Central Asia. These include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Zagreb, Minsk, Moldova, Ukraine, Baku, Georgia, Yerevan, Ashgabad, Astana, Bishkek, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The OSCE seeks to address the politico-military, economic-environmental, and human dimensions of conflict. Efforts include activities in arms control, confidence and security building measures, human rights, minority group integration, democratization, policing strategies, economic-environmental initiatives, and counterterrorism.

**United Nations (UN)**
http://www.un.org/english/

Founded in 1945 at the end of World War II, the New York-based UN now consists of 191 countries. There are 30 organizations that make up the UN system and work to address the peacekeeping, humanitarian and other goals of the organization. In 2006, the UN adopted the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy that “sent a clear message that terrorism in all its forms is unacceptable.” (UN) The strategy consists of four pillars. “These address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; building States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism; and ensuring the respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.” (UN)

The UN is also involved with developing counterterrorism capacity within its member countries through the training of national criminal justice
officials and the development of technology to assist in the effort. These approaches rely heavily on the effective application of the rule of law. In July 2005, the UN Secretary General established a Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force to coordinate CT efforts throughout the UN System. Chief among the initiatives is an on-line system for the exchange of CT information. The UN also plays a role in blocking terrorist funding networks through its coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

**UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO)***

The first UN peacekeepers were deployed in 1948 to monitor agreements between the new state of Israel and the surrounding Arab states. Over the years, the UN has undertaken 63 peacekeeping missions. During the early years, especially during the Cold War, UNPKO were limited in their scope, usually involving themselves with the enforcement of ceasefires and ensuring stability on the ground. Military observers and lightly armed troops employing confidence-building measures typically were the norm. The recent trend has been toward involving UNPKO in operations of greater complexity. Tasks include government institutional reform; security sector reform; human rights monitoring; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR) involving former combatants. There has also been a greater emphasis on addressing internal strife and civil wars. The required skill sets have also become more diverse. There exists a persistent need for individuals with non-military skills such as administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, election observers, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers, and strategic communicators.

**UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT)***
http://www.un.org/undmt/home.htm

In coordination with the HN, the UNDMT operates through a Resident Coordinator who is tasked with establishing such a team in each country that has a history of disasters or national emergencies. The UNDMT facilitates information exchange and discussion of initiatives designed to mitigate the impact of catastrophic events. Plans enable the team to respond quickly to needs at national, regional and district levels; install long-term recovery programs and future preparedness; and provide the necessary advice, technical resources and supplies to manage the crisis. As an example, the UNDMT in India (Figure 19) is made up of representatives from the following UN agencies: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Labor Organization (ILO), World Food Program (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

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![Figure 19: UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT)–India](image-url)
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)  
http://www.unama-afg.org/

Established on 28 March 2002, by the UN Security Council, UNAMA serves as the hub for international efforts to assist the recovery of Afghanistan. UNAMA operates under an annual renewal requirement; the Security Council has renewed the UNAMA mandate until 23 March 2009.

According to that mandate, UNAMA is responsible to “promote peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading efforts of the international community in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan in rebuilding the country and strengthening the foundations of peace and constitutional democracy.”

Afghanistan joined the UN on 19 November 1946. Because of its internal conditions, a long-term relationship has grown up between the country and the UN System and its NGO partners. UNAMA functions under the direction and with the support of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

It is guided by The Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan to rebuild the country developed during the London Conference on Afghanistan from 31 January–1 February 2006. UNA MA offers political advice and assists in institutional reform (government ministries, rule of law, security, economic and social development), the employment of Afghans in UN positions, building capacity across the elements of national governance, human rights initiatives, and reconstruction programs.

UN Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP)  
http://www.undpanbp.org/index.html

The ANBP is a UNICEF-funded organization dedicated to disarming child militias in world trouble spots. Among its efforts in Afghanistan, one of the most visible have been those involved with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) who operated under the direction of hundreds of war lords throughout the country.

The DDR Program was a product of coordination with the nation of Japan that provided funding and guidance in conjunction with the ANBP. While the true numbers in the AMF remain unknown, an early estimate set a broad range between 100,000 and 200,000 fighters. In early 2003, the ANBP set a goal of disarming 100,000. A ceremony in Kabul in July 2005 marked the conclusion of that phase of the DDR process.

During roughly the same period, the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) teamed with the Afghan Ministry of Defense to conduct a Cantonment of Heavy Weapons also held by various war lords. The process began in December of 2003 and was successful in gathering and securing large numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, surface-to-surface rockets, and multiple-launch rocket systems. Since confirmed baseline numbers for fighters and weapons never existed, it is not possible to assess the ultimate success of either program. However, the coordinative efforts of the ANBP, Japan and other participants did result in short-term efficiencies and established models for future cooperation.

UN Development Program (UNDP)  
http://www.undp.org/

UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries and has been in Afghanistan for more than 50 years. During the time of the Taliban, the organization operated out of offices in Islamabad, Pakistan. In general, UNDP focuses on education and training, leadership skill development, institutional reform, accountability, and encouraging the inclusion of all stakeholders into the processes of governance.

Goals are clustered under the general areas of Democratic Governance, Poverty Reduction, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Environment and Energy, and HIV/AIDS. Since the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, UNDP has provided Afghanistan some $1.1 billion in aid. These funds have been spent on the elections for president and national assembly, disarmament, reconstruction, institutional reform, security sector reform (police), and rural development.
UN Mine Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA)  
http://www.unmaca.org/

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was established in October 1997. It serves as the UN System organization responsible for addressing all components of mine action. In the field, it is provides mine-action support to areas affected by war, peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian emergencies.

UNMAS operates in Afghanistan through UNMACA, which maintains coordination with and receives policy guidance from the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The MOFA serves as the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) coordination hub for demining issues. UNMACA has established seven Area Mine Action Centers that support 21 Mine Action Organizations.

The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan began in 1989 with considerable assistance from partner NGOs. UNMACA seeks to reduce human suffering and remove obstacles to develop and reconstruction through mine risk education; victim assistance; survey, clearing and marking of mines; stockpile destruction; technical training; and capacity building for the Afghans themselves.

UN World Food Program (WFP)  
http://www.wfp.org/english/

Characterized as the “world’s largest humanitarian agency,” the UN’s WFP affects some 90 million hungry people in 80 countries every year. Much of the effort is focused on the world’s refugees and displaced persons. Over the years, the WFP has developed the capacity to react quickly to crises and is able to move into unstable situations to provide relief. It relies on a system of aircraft, ships, helicopters, trucks and pack animals to assist in delivering supplies to those in need.

UN World Health Organization (WHO)  
http://www.who.int/en/

The WHO is the lead agency for coordination and management of health issues within the UN System. It focuses on specific health issues, research agendas, public health standards, technical assistance to countries in need, and health policy development. Its involvement on the ground in countries around the world has as its priorities: promoting general social, economic and governmental development; fostering health security; strengthening health systems; harnessing research and information flow; enhancing partnerships with HN authorities and other IGOs and NGOs; and improving the performance of international and national healthcare systems. The WHO maintains an extensive agenda of health topics and assistance programs that result in a strong local presence, particularly within struggling countries and territories.

World Bank  
http://www.worldbank.org/

Though not a bank in the traditional sense, the organization is made up of 185 members who provide technical and financial assistance to developing countries. Its collective mission is to reduce the impact of global poverty while seeking to improve living standards around the world. The World Bank works through two component development institutions, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association. Collectively, the World Bank structure provides low-interest loans and no-interest credit and grants to encourage reform and development of education institutions, health systems, infrastructure, communications initiatives, and other pressing challenges to improve the quality of life and stability of developing nations.

World Bank International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)  

As one of the two components of the World Bank, the IBRD is concerned with middle income and credit-worthy poor countries who are struggling to improve their situations. It was established in 1944 as the first World Bank Group institution and is structured as a cooperative that is owned and operated for the benefit of its membership. IBRD issued its first bonds in 1947 and has since established itself as a major presence within the world’s financial markets where it raises most of its funding. Its purpose
is to encourage sustainable growth through loans, financial guarantees, risk management services, and advisory assistance.

World Bank International Development Association (IDA)

The IDA focuses on the very poorest countries in the world. It was established in 1960 and seeks to address world poverty through interest-free credits and grants to stimulate economic growth within the most challenging environments. Assistance programs are designed to improve equality and upgrade living conditions. IDA works in 78 countries, 39 of which are in Africa. It serves as the major source of donor funds for those countries. Since its establishment, IDA has issued credits and grants in excess of $182 billion, half of which have been targeted on Africa.

World Trade Organization (WTO)
http://www.wto.org/

Established in 1995, the WTO serves as the only IGO that focuses on the rules of trade between nations. Though a relatively young organization, it traces its roots to the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round of international Trade Negotiations. A new negotiation effort, known as the “Doha Development Agenda,” began in 2001. The broad purpose of the WTO is to assist trade to flow as freely as possible while mitigating any negative consequences of that trade. Special attention is paid to social and environmental concerns. To accomplish its goals, the WTO performs three basic roles: a forum for negotiations; the keeper of the sets of rules that emerge from negotiations; and a venue for the settlement of trade disputes.

Additional Selected IGOs
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) http://www.apec.org/
Association of Southeast Nations Regional Forum (ARF)
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/intl/io/arf/
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (G-7) http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
http://www.ifrc.org/
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
http://www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp
Organization of American States/Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE)
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
http://www.unicef.org/
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
http://ochaonline.un.org/

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs are independent, mostly privately funded and managed organizations whose purposes are to improve the human condition by applying their collective skills while gathering and distributing needed resources.

Typically they are on the ground when U.S. and partner nation military forces arrive and are likely to remain after the outside military assistance has departed. Once again, each brings its own set of goals, expectations, cultures, procedures, and experiences to the effort. Some pursue very aggressive public agendas and conduct sophisticated public relations programs to promote their organization, raise funds, and shape public opinion. Those who do so introduce an important variable for those involved with public affairs and information operations.

The following NGOs are a frequent presence in countries around the world. This list is by no means exhaustive. However, it does provide a slice of the variety of NGOs and the focus of NGO interests.
Chapter 3: Beyond the Interagency to Other Players

Many NGOs toil within an AO. Some may not seem relevant to military operations, but they do share space with military forces as both pursue their objectives within the AO. If possible, the harmonization of those objectives is an essential early step in any operation. Frequently, awareness of specific NGOs and their purpose only emerges from direct contact.

Africare
http://www.africare.org/

Established in 1970, the U.S.-based Africare organization has provided more than $700 million in aid through 2,000 projects. It focuses its work within 25 Sub-Saharan African countries from Senegal to South Africa and Chad to Mozambique. Its three priority areas of concern include Health (with particular focus on HIV/AIDS), Food Security and Agriculture, and Emergency Response. Complementary activities include water resources development, environmental management, microenterprise development, and civil-society development and governance.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
http://www.crs.org/

The CRS was founded in 1943 by the Catholic Bishops of the United States in anticipation of the end of World War II and the relief care that would be required by its survivors. Over time the CRS effort expanded and has now reached some 80 million people in more than 100 countries on five continents. Its operations and policies of inclusiveness are typical of religious-based NGOs. Areas of focus include disaster response, disease eradication, anti-poverty programs and society infrastructure building.

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE)
http://www.care.org/

As with many NGOs, CARE was founded in 1945 to provide help to the survivors of World War II. Its efforts have expanded over the years, and the organization now has international member organizations based in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Its worldwide reach enables it to respond quickly to the needs of the survivors of war and natural disaster. On a sustained basis, CARE focuses on developing self-help skills particularly by working through poor women. It is concerned with improving educational opportunities, providing access to clean water and sanitation, encouraging economic development, and protecting natural resources.

Doctors Without Borders / Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/

Originally established in 1971 by French doctors and journalists, MSF today provides aid in some 60 countries to those affected by war, epidemics, natural disasters, malnutrition, and lack of healthcare. MSF is vocal in its public statements and reports about situations it encounters, communicating through what it calls “bearing witness and speaking out.” Most of its funding comes from private sources (U.S. funding is 100 percent private). MSF received the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize for its work.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
http://www.icrc.org/

Henry Dunant founded the Red Cross in 1863. The pioneer organization became the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movements that are committed to assisting the victims of war and internal violence. The history of the ICRC parallels the development of modern humanitarian law and the development of the rules of warfare. During World War I, national societies of the Red Cross provided ambulances to assist the wounded. At that time, the Red Cross also opened the International POW Agency, expanding its influence in the development of the rules of war. In the wake of World War II, the ICRC assisted in the drafting of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two additional protocols in 1977. Today the ICRC is a major presence in providing healthcare, economic security, and water and habitat assistance all over the world. It remains a
leader in promoting International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Humanitarian Diplomacy and Mine Action.

**Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)**
http://www.oxfam.org/

OXFAM represents an alliance of 13 “like-minded organizations” operating in concert with some 3,000 local partners in more than 100 countries. Their collective purpose is to improve the human condition by alleviating poverty and providing relief to victims of war and natural disasters. Of particular note is the OXFAM commitment to serve as a voice for the disadvantaged. It is very open about its goal to “raise public awareness” through international “campaigns” for fair trade, universal healthcare and education, agricultural reform, climate change, and arms control. It maintains offices in many of the world’s major capitals and specifically targets world leaders and organizations such as the G-7, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, European Union, and the World Trade Organization. The purpose of these lobbying programs is to encourage decisions OXFAM feels are necessary to improve the world’s quality of life. It is also involved with policy research and policy initiatives.

**Refugees International (RI)**
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/

Based in Washington, D.C., RI is dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced persons around the world. The organization estimates that there are more than 34 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the world who are fleeing from the conditions of war and internal oppression. RI also reports the existence of some 11 million stateless persons. In addition to the human cost, those conditions also contribute to international instability.

Working with local governments, IGOs and other NGOs, RI conducts 20–25 field missions every year in an effort to provide solutions to the plight of those displaced. RI’s basic services include providing food, water, shelter and protection from harm.

**Save the Children (SC/USA)**
http://www.savethechildren.org/about/

Working through the International Save the Children Alliance, SC/USA defines its area of influence as encompassing more than 50 countries with some 37 million children and 24 million local parents, community members, local organizations and government agencies. It divides its focus among Africa, Asia, Latin America-Caribbean, and the Middle East and Eurasia. SC/USA responds to war and natural disasters as well as addressing the consequences of political, economic, and social upheaval.

**World Vision United States (WVUS)**
http://site.worldvision.org/

The WVUS is a Christian-inspired NGO operating within nearly 100 countries organized by region (Europe and the Middle East, Asia and Pacific, Africa, Central and South America). Its efforts focus on children and the development of strong families by addressing the broad conditions of poverty and providing assistance in response to disasters. Its earliest involvement in Afghanistan came in 1956 as it worked through the Kabul Christian Church. After the fall of the Taliban government, WVUS established a comprehensive program that began operating in 2002. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, WVUS works to provide clean water, irrigation, health clinics, and pre- and post-natal care.

**World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANGO)**
http://www.wango.org/

Based in the U.S., the WANGO is interesting as it represents an effort to organize the complex NGO community to increase its collective effectiveness. There are other such organizations pursuing similar agendas. It began with 16 international NGOs in August 2001 and now counts members from more than 140 countries. Its first stated purpose is to “unite NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing world peace, as well as well-being at all levels—individual,
family, tribal, national and world.” WANGO also promotes itself as attempting to “give greater voice to smaller NGOs beyond their national borders, including NGOs from developing countries and countries with economies in transition.” WANGO supports its membership with NGO listings for networking, training seminars and conferences, and various publications that address issues of interest to their NGO membership.

Additional Selected NGOs

- Academy for Educational Development (AED) http://www.aed.org/
- American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) http://www.afsc.org/
- American Refugee Committee (ARC) http://www.arcrelief.org/site/PageServer
- Church World Service (CWS) http://www.churchworldservice.org/
- International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH) http://www.iaahp.net/
- International Medical Corps (IMC) http://www.imcworldwide.org/
- International Rescue Committee (IRC) http://www.irc.org/
- Mercy Corps http://www.mercycorps.org/
- Partners for the Americas (POA) http://www.partners.net/partners/Default_EN.asp
- Project Hope (HOPE) http://www.projecthope.org/
- Salvation Army World Service Office (SA/WSO) http://www.sawso.org/
- Stop Hunger Now http://www.stophungernow.org/site/PageServer
- U.S. Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (USA for UNHCR) http://www.usaforunhcr.org/

International Support for Afghanistan: A Case Study

If nothing else, the commitment of the international community to the challenge of rebuilding Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. presents a useful example of the complexities in place to challenge the special operations warrior. Figure 20 captures a flavor of the international presence.

As the Taliban regime crumbled throughout the country, members of the international community, sponsored by the UN, gathered in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the way ahead.

The product of their work is called the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institution,” better known as the “Bonn Agreement” or “Bonn 1.” It established a timeline for the establishment of an elected government and an overview of the tasks necessary to accomplish that very specific objective.

The Afghan Presidential Election of October 2004, the inauguration of President Hamid Karzai in December 2004, the National Assembly Election of September 2005, and the seating of the National Assembly in December 2005 accomplished many of the goals of the agreement.

As part of the Bonn Agreement Process, the UN and many in the international community committed themselves to various specific tasks to assist in bringing stability to Afghanistan. The interagency door opened wide as many in the world saw an opportunity to display their capabilities to help out. In addition to the U.S. and other traditional international players, new partner countries made commitments.

These included Mongolia, which undertook the mission of training Afghan artillerymen because of their experience with the Soviet-era equipment used by the Afghan National Army (ANA). The NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)
SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual

(http://www.nato.int/ISAF/index.html), established by the Bonn Agreement to secure Kabul and its surroundings, swelled to some 40 countries as non-member countries signed on to assist.

Traditionally NATO has restricted its activities to the geographic boundaries of its member countries. The alliance is guided by the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Interestingly, the only invocation of Article 5 came in response to the 2001 attacks on the U.S.

Over the decades, NATO has largely stayed away from direct military involvement in security missions considered to be outside of its geographical boundaries or “out of area.” Thus Afghanistan is an entirely new experience for the collective alliance and the other military forces, although certainly not for the U.S. and other countries acting alone or in concert outside NATO.

Though exercised for generations and put to the test in limited initiatives since the end of the Cold War, NATO procedures are being used in an extended operation for the first time in Afghanistan. The challenges increased as NATO forces expanded the ISAF mandate to other parts of the country, as envisioned in the Bonn Agreement, and assumed new missions such as combat operations in the southern regions of the country.

In addition to ISAF, the original Coalition Force remained operational and continued the fight against Taliban remnants, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations.

Reform of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and ANA became the responsibility of
the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), a U.S.-led multinational organization operating from a tiny corner of a small compound in Kabul. OMC-A became the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSC-A) in July 2005 when it assumed responsibility for the reform of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Afghan National Police (ANP), and other law enforcement organizations.

With the addition of new missions and more partners working on both MOD and MOI reform, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) emerged, taking over the entire compound. The expansion of USG, partner nation, and IGO involvement was having a very visible impact. The lead IGO for the entire Afghan effort is the UN and its various UN system agencies identified earlier.

In addition to the activities of the UN, NATO, IGOs, U.S., and other partner nations, many hundreds of NGOs are deployed throughout Afghanistan and have been for decades. All of these players actively coordinate with each other to gain the greatest effects from their activities.

Over the years, separate bilateral relationships have developed between various countries and the Afghan government. This was to be expected given the strong emphasis on hospitality within the Afghan culture. Many, if not most, of these arrangements exist outside the established organizations and protocols governing the reform of the Afghan Security Forces (ANA and ANP) and other government ministries.

Thus mentors from CSTC-A, various IGOs and NGOs, and individual countries might be working alongside each other to reform the same functional area. Sometimes Afghan officials suddenly depart for training in another country without the knowledge of those with the responsibility for the reform mission.

While none of these activities is ill-intentioned, they do represent a significant disruption of the unity of effort described within the Bonn Agreement and other protocols developed over the years. It is not likely to remain an unusual case as the number of countries, IGOs, and NGOs willing to invest human and material resources into an Afghan-like situation grows.

The coordination requirements for the special operations warrior working with the USG interagency and other players will only become more complicated in such environments.
As we’ve seen, navigating the USG interagency process represents a demanding exercise in relationship building, cooperation, and coordination. It involves a mosaic of different capabilities, resources, organizational cultures, agendas, and ways of doing business. Experience with these complexities teaches that working the USG interagency process can be confusing and frustrating. That becomes even more true when interacting with the representatives and agendas of the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

But experience also proves that the successful achievement of national security objectives is not possible without the skillful navigation of the USG interagency process. No department, agency, or organization can do it all without assistance.

For the special operations warrior on the ground overseas, the functioning of the USG interagency is more than a theoretical background study. What the USG interagency process produces in Washington, D.C., has a direct practical impact on what takes place overseas. The major outputs generated by the USG interagency are strategic direction, policies, Presidential decisions, and national security objectives translated into plans that are then provided to the operators on the ground.

As noted in Chapter 1, the specifics of interagency structure, policy, and procedures will inevitably change from time to time for a variety of reasons including the preferences of different Presidents, the emergence of new issues, and the nature of the security threats facing the nation.

In general, however, the general principles of the USG interagency process remain the same. For instance, the structure and functioning of the NSC remains familiar, even as administrations and political parties exchange power. However, there will be differences in other areas such as participants, numbers of PCCs/IPCs, procedures, and work flow. Terminology will often change as each President’s administration adds its own particular flavor to the vernacular.

Additionally, individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations are continuously seeking new ways to approach the interagency challenge, resulting in fresh bureaus and offices, working groups, and programs that must be accounted for. Thus the reality of inevitable change within the interagency process demands flexibility and a strong sense of situation awareness by all participants.

Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the added complexity that comes from extending the reach of the USG interagency process overseas and then interacting with many players from outside the USG interagency. Even under the best conditions, the introduction of HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs demands that the special operations warrior remain focused on the counterterrorism objective while accommodating an array of differing and sometimes competing agendas.

With so much HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO expertise present in any given AO, it’s possible to face situations in which solutions seem to be in search of problems to solve. Random problem solving may provide immediate returns, but is rarely helpful in the intermediate or long term.

At such times, an individual’s interagency skills can assist in defining shared long-term goals and orchestrating the resources to address them. The objective becomes to establish shared goals and then to chart a path that ensures unity of effort to achieve them as efficiently as possible.

In such an environment, it becomes tempting to make promises about resources and funding,
especially to HN officials. It’s generally not wise to do so unless there exists confidence that you can keep the promises you’ve made.

An IGO official was once speaking to a group of senior Afghan military and police officials in Kabul about what assistance his organization can provide. A member of the audience challenged the official on what he charged was a failure of the IGO to make good on an earlier promise.

According to the Afghan, the IGO promised—or appeared to promise—that each family in several villages would be provided a laptop computer. The questioner wondered why the IGO never delivered any computers, providing instead a goat and sheep to each family.

One could argue that in a country of 80% illiteracy and no or unreliable electrical supplies, a goat and a sheep would provide a very helpful contribution to improving each family’s quality of life. More so, it would seem, than a laptop computer.

Regardless, the perceived promise of laptops was not fulfilled. This outcome challenged the credibility of the specific IGO and the effectiveness of others working to improve living conditions in that district.

The critical skills—both within and outside the USG interagency process—are to learn the various cultures, identify the problems, understand the needs to be met, and encourage as many players as possible to invest in the effort to assure success. Adaptability is essential, as few situations allow for templated solutions.

Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Credibility, and News Media

While the special operations warrior is interacting within the USG interagency process and with officials from the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs, there are “evaluators” present in the form of the local, national, and international news media.

Regardless of the measurements of success defined by the USG interagency process or agreed to by other participants, modern journalists tend to define their own standards and to judge performance through their own filters.

Thus it should not be surprising to discover that there exists a persistent gap between what the USG interagency and its international partners know to be happening and what the various domestic and international publics believe is going on. News media scrutiny introduces an important variable into the interagency navigation process that cannot be ignored.

The achievement and sustainment of credibility in the counterterrorism effort are essential. Since it’s clearly not possible for the special operations warrior to speak personally with each citizen of the HN, U.S., or other countries, communicating credibly through the news media is a task essential to establishing the legitimacy of any initiative.

The strategic communication challenge is to keep as narrow as possible that gap between what is being reported by the news media and what is happening within the AO. The need for accuracy and candor by both the strategic communicator and the news media is an essential requirement. This is because public support is essential to the successful accomplishment of counterterrorism operations. If the narrative developed by the news media persists in inaccuracies or negativity, either because of the flow of events or because of the tone of the reporting, public support will surely wane.

It has long been understood that the explanation and communication support of foreign policy and military activities is best achieved by consistency of message or, as it is better known, speaking with one voice. To achieve this goal, the Country Team is supported by the work of the Public Affairs Officer who is then backed up by the DoS Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the wider USG strategic communication community.

All USG public affairs programs are part of a collective interagency effort that seeks to provide accurate information to the news media while providing context and meaning through carefully crafted and coordinated strategic messaging.
Unity of Effort for USG international communications originates within the White House Office of Global Communications. Its job is to coordinate overseas communication by incorporating Presidential strategic messaging while truthfully portraying U.S. and administration policies and activities.

The distribution of common strategic messages and public affairs guidance assists all USG departments, agencies, and organizations to breed consistency into their unilateral and collective information programs. The ultimate goal is to sustain a single-voiced relationship with the news media.

It’s a difficult challenge, one made even more so by the introduction of scores—perhaps hundreds—of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO voices and agendas that are competing for exposure. It is important to remember that each serves a variety of stakeholders who provide both active and passive support. The interest of each stakeholder must be accounted for within the many disparate media relations programs that are in play.

The strategic communication environment is made even more complex by the presence of sophisticated terrorist propaganda initiatives that skew the truth while frequently attracting sympathetic news media coverage. Thus the difficult challenge of synchronizing all the public affairs agendas within the USG interagency process is just a first step toward establishing and sustaining a credible agenda internationally where both friendly voices and enemy propaganda compete for finite air time and column inches.

Experience teaches that pursuing complete strategic message control in such an environment is a waste of time. Some participants such as the HN, partner nations, and some IGOs may be willing to coordinate some messages to improve their effectiveness. However, those other players must also serve constituencies that are not relevant to the USG agenda and who must be addressed separately.

IGOs and NGOs frequently present special challenges as many operate sophisticated Web sites and frequently issue their own reports on their own progress and that of others within the AO. Those in the USG who are used to the comfort of speaking with one voice are often shaken by what those assessments assert and the degree of instant credibility they are often afforded by the national and international news media, especially if they appear to contradict official USG positions.

When such reports are not supportive of counter-terrorist operations within the AO or are inconsistent with on-going USG strategic messaging, they are frequently cited by the news media as evidence of policy failure by the USG and its various partners.

During the summer of 2004, a dispute between Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières-MSF) and the Coalition operating within Afghanistan caused the NGO to withdraw its representatives from the country. The squabble focused on what the NGO felt was an unacceptable threat to its personnel because of the appearance similarity between vehicles they used and those driven by the Coalition. MSF believed that the vehicles used by their representatives had become indistinguishable from the military’s and thus placed them in increased danger.

A similar episode took place in the summer of 2008 when aid workers from Refugees International were murdered by Taliban forces near Kabul, causing the NGO to leave the country.

In both cases, the announcement of NGO withdrawals led to flurries of reports in which the news media, many reporting from outside the country, amplified the circumstances and drew conclusions about the poor state of security in the country that may or may not have been accurate.

Considering these and other cases, those USG personnel involved with public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations should be attentive to the chorus of potentially conflicting voices present in the AO and prepare contingencies for addressing their impact on public perceptions. Once again, explanation and context—not message control—offer the most promising path to success.
The Interagency Way Ahead

Considerable effort has gone into formalizing the structure, work flow and cohesion of the USG interagency process. Even so, that process frequently remains uncertain in its purpose and direction while remaining confusing in its complexity.

By its very nature, the USG interagency process remains a coordinative system that largely depends on the relationship-building skills of individuals for its success. What is required for that success is for leadership to take the initiative within the midst of uncertainty and imprecise direction. Experience teaches that such steps don’t always happen.

Institutional and personal credibility are essential to functioning successfully within the interagency process. Those who are the most responsive, provide the best data bases, listen closely, craft the most perceptive assessments, and present the most promising options are most likely to have the greatest positive impact.

Major strategic and operational challenges remain to cut through the stovepipes that flow vertically through the traditional management practices of individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations. The goal is to ensure inclusion of the relevant skill sets, experiences, and resources needed to address the most pressing security challenges. Ideally, the USG interagency process will fit the appropriate expertise to the specific problem.

Predictably, the special operations warrior within the AO will face situations that don’t fit traditional military problem-solving models. Even those most skilled and experienced within the SOF community will face expertise limitations from time to time.

For instance, special operations warriors are not necessarily well positioned to offer advice to local mayors on how to interact effectively with village councils and community opinion leaders to build a consensus for action in a given situation. But there are others within the USG and throughout the private sector who have those experiences and can contribute if properly engaged and deployed.

The broad question remains how best to gather the necessary human and material resources and set them on the path to achieve the nation’s national security objectives. The USG interagency process has progressed to some extent in precisely defining those objectives.

Shortcomings remain, however, in determining how the interagency process should improve the efficiency of information exchanges; technology interface; analysis; assessment; development of policy options and operational courses of action; anticipation of consequences; presentation of recommendations; the translation of strategic guidance, policies and Presidential decisions into workable operational plans; and the management and adaptation of those plans once introduced into the operational environment.

In the absence of standardized USG interagency work flow and coordination procedures, gaining agreement in identifying shared end states remains a challenge. This is particularly true overseas where HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO influences beyond the USG Interagency inevitably complicate the factors of where we’re going (goals), how we’re getting there (ways), and how we’re going to support the effort (means).

For instance, those from the international community assisting with the institutional reform of HN parliaments or national assemblies inevitably bring with them their own knowledge and expectations of how the systems function within their own home countries. An American mentor relying on U.S. Congressional history as a backdrop will offer different advice than someone from a parliamentary tradition, or individuals from several different parliamentary traditions.

Faced with what appears to be conflicting guidance, HN officials sincerely trying to develop the most effective representative democracy for their own country may find themselves receiving different and perhaps conflicting advice on how legislative bodies “should” work.

The presence of representatives from several different military forces, each with its own doctrine, procedures, and tactics, introduces similar confusion when all are advising the same HN military using their own familiar points of reference. The problem is
compounded when those from different services from within the U.S. military and those of other countries train the HN more narrowly on “how we do it” in our service or, more narrowly, on our base.

Whether domestically or internationally, the USG interagency process seeks to achieve efficiencies by leveraging diverse human and material resources toward a shared end state. Part of the effort involves minimizing task duplication and structural redundancy. Elimination of either is not possible.

While horizontal coordination is necessary within the USG interagency process, it is essential within the AO.

In the absence of the familiar unity of command, the special operations warrior must learn to work within an interagency process guided by lead agencies pursuing a unity of effort or, in some cases, the even-softer unity of purpose.

As always, individual and organizational credibility is gained through producing results. Operating within the USG interagency process requires a difficult balancing act between loyalty to one’s own home agency and allegiance to the objectives of the United States. Understandably, that loyalty is a powerful motivator, one correctly viewed as essential to self-preservation.

Those seeking to improve the functioning of the USG interagency process must wrestle with that reality and others. The USG interagency process is in a condition very similar to the one that led to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433). Goldwater-Nichols reorganized the DoD and redirected the efforts of the U.S. defense community.

Though shortcomings remain, the DoD is a vastly more efficient defender of U.S. national security than it was 25 years ago. The process has taken time, as will any broader effort to bring similar reform to the entire USG structure.

Though complex in its provisions, Goldwater-Nichols answered the basic question, “Who’s in Charge?” Such clarity would quickly boost the effectiveness of the USG interagency process. Establishing responsibility enables the reform of relationship-building, coordination and work flow shortfalls.

It also leads to a harmonization of organizational cultures, but not their replacement. If done well, establishing clear responsibility and follow-on reform initiatives will improve interagency flexibility and responsiveness by creating consistency. It has worked in the JIATF structures and can, with effort, in more complex organizations.

Just as many countries display maps that portray themselves as the center of their region or of the entire world, many participants regard the USG interagency process with themselves as the central point of focus. Thus the question for them becomes, how does the interagency process support my department, agency or organization?

It’s the wrong question. Rather we should ask how the interagency process can better support the achievement of U.S. national security objectives.

The seemingly simple act of identifying Who’s in Charge? is an important first step in interagency reform. Until then, the special operations warrior must continue to navigate through a situationally and personality dependent environment, with all its attendant uncertainties and frustrations, to accomplish the counterterrorism mission.
Appendix A. List of Organizations

The following USG departments, agencies and organizations, IGOs, and NGOs provide the human and material resources to wage the fight against terrorists, their networks, and their ideologies. They also work to eliminate the conditions that breed terrorism and seek to replace them with reforms and initiatives that bring about stability and good governance. Some of the components listed here are not discussed in the text or have only a limited mention, but can be reached through the links to allow for individual research as required.

The CT environment is ever changing with new structures and programs regularly joining the fight. This list is not exhaustive, but it does identify the major players. As noted several times, this caveat is particularly apt for NGOs because there are many thousands that operate around the world. A comprehensive list would be more confusing than helpful; it would also never be completely accurate.

ABCA Armies (IGO)

Academy for Educational Development (AED) (NGO)
http://www.aed.org/

Action Against Hunger (USA) (NGO)
http://www.actionagainsthunger.org/

Afghan New Beginnings Program (UN) (IGO)
http://undpanbp.org/index.html

Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) (DoD)

African Union (Regional IGO)
http://www.africa-union.org/

Africare (NGO)
http://www.africare.org/

American Council for Voluntary Action (Interaction) (NGO)
http://www.interaction.org/

American Friends Service Committee (NGO)
http://www.afsc.org/

American Refugee Committee (NGO)
http://www.arcrelief.org/site/PageServer

Antiterrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) (DoJ)
http://www.justice.gov/usao/moe/attf.html

Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16885.htm

Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Regional IGO)
http://www.apec.org/

Assistant Attorney General for National Security (DoJ)
http://www.usdoj.gov/nns/

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/isa/about.html

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities)
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/solic/

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Regional IGO)
http://www.aseansec.org/

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) (Regional IGO)
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/intl/io/arf/
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (ATF) (DoJ)
http://www.atf.gov/

Bureau of Business and Security (BIS) (DoC)
http://www.bis.doc.gov/

Bureau of Consular Affairs
http://travel.state.gov/

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) (DoS)

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance-Office of Military Affairs (DCHA-OMA) (DoS)

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/

Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EEB) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS)
http://www.ice.gov/index.htm

Bureau of Industry and Security (DoC)
http://www.bis.doc.gov/

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/

Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/r/iip/

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/

Bureau of Justice Assistance (DoJ)
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/

Business Executives for National Security (BENS)
http://www.bens.org/home.html

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) (NGO)
http://www.crs.org/

Center for Special Operations (CSO) (USSOCOM/DoD)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
https://www.cia.gov/

CIA Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC)

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (DoS)
http://www.jcs.mil/

Chief of Mission (COM) (DoS)

Church World Service (CWS) (NGO)
http://www.churchworldservice.org/site/PageServer

Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/07/107063.htm

Civil-Military Cooperation Center

Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)

Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC)

Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) (DoD)

Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE) (DoD)

Coalition Support Funds (CSF) (DoD)
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-735R

Combatant Commanders Initiative Funds (CCIF) (DoD)

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) (DoD)

Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) (USAID)
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) (NGO)
http://www.care.org/
Appendix A. List of Organizations

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) (DoD)

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)-related Training (DoD)

Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) (DoD)

Counter Narco Terrorist (CNT) Training (DoD)

Counterterrorism Financial Unit
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16662.htm

Counterterrorism Section (CTS) (DoJ)
http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/counter_terrorism.htm

Counterterrorism Training Coordination Working Group

Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) (NSC/PCC)

Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement

Counterterrorism Training Working Group (DoJ)

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (DHS)
http://www.cbp.gov/

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
http://www.darpa.mil/

Defense Attaché (DATT) (DoD/DIA)

Defense Attaché System (DAS) (DoD/DIA)
http://www.dia.mil/history/histories/attaches.html

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)
http://www.dfas.mil/

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
http://www.dia.mil/

Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) (DoD)

Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) (DoD)

Defense and Management Contacts (DMC) Programs (DoD)

Defense Planning Committee (NATO) (Regional IGO)
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070102.htm

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (DoD)
http://www.dsca.mil/

Defense Security Services

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
http://www.dtra.mil/

Demining Test and Evaluation Program

Department of Agriculture (DoA)
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome

Department of Commerce (DoC)
http://www.commerce.gov/

Department of Defense (DoD)
http://www.defenselink.mil/

Department of Energy (DoE)
http://www.energy.gov/

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
http://www.hhs.gov/

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm

Department of Justice (DoJ)
http://www.usdoj.gov/

Department of State (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/

Department of State Counterterrorism (S/CT)
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/

Department of the Treasury (Treasury)
http://www.treasury.gov/

Department of Transportation (DoT)
http://www.dot.gov/

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) (DoS)

Deputy to the Commander for Civilian-Military Activities (DCMA) (USAFRICOM)
http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp
Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) (USAFRICOM)  
http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp

Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) (DoS)  
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/

Director of National Intelligence (DNI)  
http://www.dni.gov/

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)  
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/

Department of Defense Counterdrug Programs

Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (NGO)  
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DoJ)  
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm

Economic Support Fund (ESF)  

Energy, Sanctions and Commodities (EEB/ESC) (DoS)  
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/22734.htm

Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)  
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/index.htm

European Police Office (EUROPOL) (IGO)  
http://www.europol.europa.eu/

European Union (EU) (Regional IGO)  
http://europa.eu/

Excess Defense Articles (EDA)  
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda/edomain.htm

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (DoJ)  
http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterrorism/waronterrorhome.htm
http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterrorism/waronterrorhome.htm

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (DHS)  
http://www.fema.gov/

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center-International Programs Division (FLETC) (DHS)  
http://www.fletc.gov/about-fletc/locations/fletc-international.html

Federal Protective Services (FPS) (ICE/DHS)  
http://www.ice.gov/about/fps/contact.htm

Field Intelligence Group (FIG) (FBI)  
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/april05/fig042705.htm

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (IGO)  
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (UN) (IGO)  
http://www.fao.org/

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (DHHS)  
http://www.fda.gov/

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) (DoA)  
http://www.fas.usda.gov/

Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) (DoS)  
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16664.htm

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)  

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (DoD)  
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_07_1.pdf

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) (DoD)  
http://www.dsca.mil/home/foreign_military_financing%20_program.htm

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (DoD)  
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/foreign_military_sales.htm

Foreign Service Institute (FSI)  
http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/

Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)  
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) (DoJ)  
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/transformation/ct.htm
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/tscpr091603.htm

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  
http://www.gatt.org/

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (DoS)  
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/
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Global Train and Equip Program

Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC) (DHS)

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)

Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP)

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) (DoD)

Humanitarian Information Center (HIC)

Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) (DoS)

Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
http://www.ice.gov/index.htm

Information Sharing Council (ISC) (DNI)
http://www.ise.gov/pages/isc.html

Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (DNI)
http://www.ise.gov/

Information Sharing & Fusion Centers
http://www.ise.gov/pages/partner-fc.html

Intelligence Community (IC) (USG)
http://www.intelligence.gov/index.shtml

Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)

Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) (DNI)
http://www.ise.gov/pages/partner-itacg.html

International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH) (IGO)
http://www.iaahp.net/

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (IGO)
http://www.iaea.org/

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (IGO)

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (IGO)
http://www.icrc.org/

International Communications and Information Policy (EEB/CIP) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/cip/

International Cooperation Development Fund (ICD)

International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) (DoJ)
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/7262.htm

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (IGO)
http://www.interpol.int/

International Development Association (IDA)

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (IGO)
http://www.ifrc.org/

International Finance and Development (EEB/IFD) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/

International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
http://www.icrc.org/Eng/ihl

International Labor Organization (ILO) (UN) (IGO)

International Medical Corps (IMC) (NGO)
http://www.imcworldwide.org/

International Military Education and Training (IMET) (DoS/DoD)
http://www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm

International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IGO)

International Organization Affairs
http://www.state.gov/p/io/

International Organization for Migration
http://www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp

International Rescue Committee (IRC) (NGO)
http://www.theirc.org/

International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) (UN Mandate/NATO)
http://www.nato.int/ISAF/index.html
INTERPOL United States Central Bureau (DoJ)  
http://www.usdoj.gov/usncb/  

Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) (DoD)  
http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy08/08-026.pdf  

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (DoD)  
http://www.jcs.mil/  

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) (DoD)  
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rls/fmtrpt/2007/92073.htm  

Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (JICC)  
(DoD)  

Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC) (DNI)  

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JJACG)  
(DoD)  
http://www.jficom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm  

Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) (DoD)  

Joint Interagency Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JIATF-CT) (DoD)  

Joint Interagency Task Force-CT (Afghanistan)  
(DoD)  

Joint Interagency Task Force-South  
http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/  

Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) (DoD)  

Joint Operations Center (JOC) (DoD)  

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (DoD)  

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) (DoJ/FBI)  
http://www.usdoj.gov/jttf/  

Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx)  
(DoJ)  
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ndex/ndex_home.htm  

Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) (NGO)  
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/donate/?msource=AZD0408H1001  

Mercy Corps (NGO)  
http://www.mercycorps.org/  

Military Committee (NATO) (Regional IGO)  
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1101.htm  

Military Department Intelligence Services (DoD)  
http://www.af.mil/  
http://www.army.mil/  
http://www.uscg.mil/  
http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/activities/?Section=MCIA  
http://www.nmic.navy.mil/  

Military Group (MILGP)  

Military Information Support Team (MIST) (DoD)  

Military Intelligence Program (MIP) (DoD)  

Mobile Training Team (MTT) (DoD)  

Narcotics Control Officer (NCO) (DoS)  

National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) (DNI)  
http://www.ncix.gov/whatsnew/index.html  

National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC)  

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) (DNI)  
http://www.nctc.gov/  

National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) (DoJ)  
http://www.ncirc.gov/  

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)  
http://www.intelligence.gov/2-business_nfip.shtml  
http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&tr/Concepts/2001/PDF/C&l%202001%20chap%204%20part%205%20Other%20NFIP.pdf  

National Geo-Spatial Agency (NGA) (DoD)  
http://www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx  

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) (DoD)  
http://www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx  

National Intelligence Centers  
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National Intelligence Council (NIC) (DNI)
http://www dni gov/nic/NIC_home.html
http://www fas org/irp/dni/icd/icd-207 pdf

National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) (DNI)

National Intelligence Program (NIP)

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) (DoD)
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ csi-publications/ csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art8.html

National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) (DNI)
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/july04/njttf070204. htm

National Military Joint Intelligence Center (MJNIIC) (DNI)
http://nsi.org/Library/Intel/8.html

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (DoC)
http://www.noaa.gov

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) (DoD)
http://www.nro.gov/

National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)
http://www.nro.gov/

National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) (DoD)
http://www.nsa.gov/

National Security Branch (NSB) (FBI)
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/nsb.htm

National Security Council (NSC)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/

National Security Council Deputy's Committee (NSC/DC)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/

National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/

National Security Council Principal's Committee (NSC/PC)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/

National Security Division (NSD) (DoJ)
http://www.usdoj.gov/nds/

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) (White House)

National System for Geo-Spatial Intelligence (NSG) (DoD)
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/n/03624.html

National Targeting Center (NTC) (DHS/CBP)

NCTC Online (NOL) (NCTC/DNI)

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) (DoS)
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp108&sid=cp108OD42V&refer=&r_n=hr222.108&item=&sel=TOC_207044&

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Regional IGO)
http://www.nato.int/

Nuclear Incident Reporting Team (NIRT) (DHS)
http://orise.orau.gov/nsem/nit.htm

Office of Commercial and Business Affairs (EEB/CBA) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/cba/

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (UN)
http://ochaonline.un.org/

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/http://www.state.gov/s/crs/

Office of Counterterrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/c9997.htm

Office of Democracy and Governance (USAID)
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/
Office of the Director General, Diplomatic Readiness Institute (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13742.pdf

Office of Economic Policy Analysis & Public Diplomacy (EEB/EPPD) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/eppd/

Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) (DoT)
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) (USAID)
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/

Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action (HDM) (DSCA) (DoD)
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) (DHS)
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_122086590914.shtm

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) (Treasury)
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/oia/

Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (IN) (DoE)
http://www.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/

Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) (DoJ)
http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/oipr-redirect.htm

Office of International Affairs
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/

Office of International Security Operations (ISO) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/iso/

Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (OJVOT) (DoJ)
http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/ojt-redirect.htm

Office of Justice Programs (OJP) (DoJ)
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (White House)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/

Office of National Security Intelligence (NN) (DEA)
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm

Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) (DoJ)

Office of Policy (DHS)
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0870.shtm

Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis (PM/PPA) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/

Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/g/prm/

Office of Regional Affairs (ISN/RA) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/t/isan/58372.htm

Office of Strategic Plans (DHS)
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0873.shtm

Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA) (CIA)

Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) (Treasury)
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/

Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/t/eeb/c9997.htm

Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/

Office of Transitional Issues (OTI) (CIA)

Organization of American States (OAS) (Regional IGO)
http://www.oas.org/

OAS/Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (Regional IGO)

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (IGO)
http://www.opcw.org/

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (IGO)
http://www.osce.org/
Appendix A. List of Organizations

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) (DoD/DoS)

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (USG)
http://www.opic.gov/

Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)
http://www.osac.gov/
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8650.htm

Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) (NGO)
http://www.oxfam.org/

Pakistan Frontier Corps

Partners of the Americas (NGO)
http://www.partners.net/partners/ Default_EN.asp

Political-Military Policy and Planning Team
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/ppmpt/

Populations, Refugees and Migration
http://www.state.gov/g/prm/

President's Daily Brief (PDB) (DNI)

President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) (White House)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2008/02/20080229-5.html

President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) (White House)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2008/02/20080229-5.html

Project Hope (HOPE) (NGO)
http://www.projecthope.org/

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/91433.htm

Public Affairs Officer (PAO)

Public Designations Unit (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16816.htm

Refugees International (RI) (NGO)
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/

Regional Centers for Security Strategies (DSCA)

Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) (DoD)

Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Programs (RDT&E)

Resident Legal Advisor (RLA) (DoJ)

Rewards for Justice Program
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8651.htm

Salvation Army World Service Office (SA/WSO) (NGO)
http://www.sawso.org/

Save the Children (SC/US) (NGO)
http://www.savethechildren.org/about/

Security Assistance (SA)

Security Assistance Officer (SAO)

Security Assistance Team
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
http://www.defenselink.mil/osd/

Special Operations Forces (SOF)
http://www.socom.mil/

Special Operations Support Team (SOST) (DoD)

Stop Hunger Now (NGO)
http://www.stophungernow.org/site/PageServer

Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) (DoJ/FBI)
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/siocfs.htm

Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) (DoD)
Technical Support Working Groups (TSWG) (DoS/DoD)
http://www.tswg.gov/

Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS) (DoJ)
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/transformation/ct.htm

Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division (TIVASD) (DoJ)
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/welcovc/tivu.html

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) (NCTC/DNI)
http://www.nctc.gov/docs/Tide_Fact_Sheet.pdf

Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) (FBI)
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/transformation/ct.htm
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/tscpr091603.htm

Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) (DoD/USAF)

Trade Policy and Programs (EEB/TPP) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp/

Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (DoS/USAID/DoD)
http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp

Transportation Affairs (EEB/TRA) (DoS)
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/tra/

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (DHS)
http://www.tsa.gov/

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence-USD(I) (DoD)
http://www.intelligence.gov/0-usdi_memo.shtml

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-USD(P) (DoD)
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
http://www.state.gov/r/

United Nations (UN) (IGO)
http://www.un.org/english/

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (IGO)
http://www.unama-afg.org/

UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) (IGO)
http://www.unicef.org/

UN Development Program (UNDP) (IGO)
http://www.undp.org/

UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) (IGO)
http://www.un.org/in/undmt/home.htm

UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (IGO)

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) (IGO)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (IGO)
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home

UN Humanitarian Operations Center (UNHOC) (IGO)
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/services/HOC/index.asp

UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA) (IGO)
http://www.unmaca.org/

UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
http://ochaonline.un.org/

UN Peacekeeping Operations (IGO)

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)
http://www.africom.mil/

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
http://www.usaid.gov/

United States Army Corps of Engineers
http://www.usace.army.mil/
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United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) (DoD)

United States Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
https://pksoi.army.mil/

United States Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (NGO)
http://www.usaforunhcr.org/

United States Coast Guard (USCG) (DHS)
http://www.uscg.mil/default.asp

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) (DHS)
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis

United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
http://www.jfcom.mil/

United States Marine Security Detachment (MSG)

United States Mission to the United Nations
http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/

United States Navy Oceanographic Office (NAV-OCEANO) (DoD)
https://oceanography.navy.mil/legacy/web/

United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
(DoD)
http://www.northcom.mil/

United States Secret Service (USSS) (DHS)
http://www.secretservice.gov/

United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
http://www.socom.mil/

United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
(DoD)
http://www.stratcom.mil/

USSOCOM Center for Special Operations (CSO)
(DoD)

USSOCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group (USSOCOM/JIACG)
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jwfc5pm56.pdf

USSOCOM Interagency Executive Council
USSOCOM Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (USSOCOM/JICC)

USSOCOM Joint Interagency Task Force (USSOCOM/JIATF)

USSOMCOM Joint Operations Center (USSOCOM/JOC)

Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) (DoD)

Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) (CIA)

White House
http://www.whitehouse.gov/

World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANGO) (NGO)
http://www.wango.org/

World Bank
http://www.worldbank.org/

World Food Program (WFP) (UN) (IGO)
http://www.wfp.org/english/

World Health Organization (WHO) (UN) (IGO)
http://www.who.int/en/

World Intelligence Review (WIRE) (DNI)

World Trade Organization (WTO) (IGO)
http://www.wto.org/

World Vision (United States) (NGO)
http://site.worldvision.org/
# Appendix B. Ranks of Military, Foreign Service, and Civil Service Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Foreign Service</th>
<th>Civil Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral</td>
<td>FE-CM (Career Minister)</td>
<td>SES-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General, Rear Admiral (Upper Half)</td>
<td>FE-MC (Minister Counselor)</td>
<td>SES-3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General, Rear Admiral (Commodore)</td>
<td>FE-OC (Counselor)</td>
<td>SES-1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel, Captain (USN)</td>
<td>FO-1, FP-1</td>
<td>GS-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel, Commander (USN)</td>
<td>FO-2, FP-2</td>
<td>GS-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major, Lieutenant Commander (USN)</td>
<td>FO-3, FP-3</td>
<td>GS-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain, Lieutenant (USN)</td>
<td>FO-4, FP-4</td>
<td>GS-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant, Lieutenant (Junior Grade)</td>
<td>FO-5, FP-5</td>
<td>GS-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant, Ensign (USN)</td>
<td>FP-7</td>
<td>GS-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENT. Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with U.S. allies or coalition partners that allow U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense, and may or may not be delegated. Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-serving agreement. (JP 1-02, JP 4-07)

AMBASSADOR. A diplomatic agent of the highest rank accredited to a foreign government or sovereign as the resident representative of his own government; also called the Chief of Mission. In the U.S. system, the Ambassador is the personal representative of the President and reports to him through the Secretary of State. (JSOU Special Operations Reference Manual)

ANTITERRORISM. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorists acts, to include limited response and containment by local and civilian forces. (JP1-02, 3-07.2)

AREA OF OPERATIONS. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

ATTACHÉ. A person attached to the embassy in a diplomatic status who is not normally a career member of the diplomatic service. In the U.S. system, attachés generally represent agencies other than the Department of State such as the DoD, and others. (JSOU Special Operations Reference Manual)

BILATERAL. Bilateral discussions or negotiations are between a state and one other. A bilateral treaty is between on state and one other. “Multilateral” is used when more than two states are involved. (http://www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES, A.I. Formerly a chargé d’affaires was the title of a chief of mission, inferior in rank to an ambassador or a minister. Today with the a.i. (ad interim) added, it designates the senior officer taking charge for the interval when a chief of mission is absent from his or her post. (http://www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

CHIEF OF MISSION (COM). The principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission’s direct responsibility. (JP 1-02, JP 3-10)

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (CA). An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02, JP 3-10)

CIVIL AFFAIRS. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 3-57)

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO). The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives.
Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

**Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).** An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Coalition.** An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

**Combatant Command.** A unified or specified command with a broad continuing command under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

**Combatant Commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Combating Terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

**Consequence Management.** Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. (JP 1-02, JP 3-28)

**Consulate General/Consulate.** A constituent post of an embassy in a foreign country located in an important city other than the national capital. Consulates General are larger than Consulates, with more responsibilities and additional staff. (JSOU Special Operations Reference Manual)

**Counterinsurgency.** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 2)

**Counterterrorism.** Actions taken through approaches applied directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05)

**Country Team.** The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

**Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.** Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts from the United States Government. (JP 2, JP 3-13)

**Developmental Assistance.** U.S. Agency for International Development function chartered under chapter one of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, primarily designed to promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Direct Action.** Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05)

**Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).** United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A disaster assistance response team provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of U.S. Government response to disasters. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**End State.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Foreign Assistance.** Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural disasters.
and manmade disasters; U.S. assistance takes three forms — development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FHA).** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**HOST COUNTRY/HOST NATION (HN).** A nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (JP-2, JP 2-01.2) A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP-2)

**HOST COUNTRY/HOST NATION SUPPORT (HNS).** Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02, JP 4-0)

**HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE.** Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

**HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CENTER (HOC).** An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other major players in the operation. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS.** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 1-02, JP 3-13)

**INFORMATION SHARING.** Providing a common platform for ideas, information (including databases), strategies, approaches, activities and plans and programs. (UN)

**INSURGENCY** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05)

**INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC).** All departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

**INTERAGENCY.** United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**INTERNAL CAPACITY BUILDING.** Facilitating capacity building and skills development of members with critical expertise to support actors in disaster management and other activities through training, joint activities and sharing lessons-learned experiences. (UN)

**INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSON (IDP).** Any person who has left his residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.6)
IRREGULAR WARFARE. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (JP 1-02, JP 1-06)

INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (IGO). An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE. A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or civil-military operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05.1)

JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP. An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of U.S. Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported joint force commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the joint force commander with the capability to coordinate with other U.S. Government civilian agencies and departments. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

LEAD AGENCY. Designated among U.S. Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

LETTER OF ASSIST (LOA). A contractual document issued by the United Nations (UN) to a government authorizing it to provide goods or services to a peacekeeping operation; the UN agrees either to purchase the goods or services or authorizes the government to supply them subject to reimbursement by the UN. A letter of assist typically details specifically what is to be provided by the contributing government and establishes a funding limit that cannot be exceeded. (JP 1-02, JP 1-06)

LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. Standard Department of Defense form on which the U.S. Government documents its offer to transfer to a foreign government or international organization U.S. defense articles and services via foreign military sales pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act. (JP 1-02, JP 4-08)

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

MOBILE TRAINING TEAM (MTT). A team consisting of one or more U.S. military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host-nation requests. (JP 1-02)

MULTINATIONAL. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

MULTINATIONAL FORCE. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1, JP 1-02)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. The terms “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national security” each refers to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside of the United States, which pertains, as determined consistent with any guidelines issued by the President, to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and that involves (a) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; (b) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or (c) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAM (NIST). A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or other intelligence community agencies as required. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)
NATIONAL POLICY. A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1-02)

NATIONAL SECURITY. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by (a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, (b) a favorable foreign relations position, or (c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02)

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE (NSA). The senior theater or military command representative of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service in a specific country or military command headquarters who provides the Director, National Security Agency, with information on command plans requiring cryptologic support. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service representative serves as a special advisor to the combatant commander for cryptologic matters, to include signals intelligence, communications security, and computer security. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY. A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

PARTNER NATION. Those nations that the United States works with to disrupt the production, transportation, and sale of illicit drugs or to counter other threats to national security, as well as the money involved with any such activity. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

PEACEKEEPING. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.3)

PERSONA NON GRATA. An individual who is unacceptable to or unwelcome by the host government. (http://www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-53)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE). Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02)

SECURITY ASSISTANCE (SA). Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)

SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS (SAO). All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.1)

SECURITY COOPERATION. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a Host Country. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.1)

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA). An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the
extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. (JP 1-02, JP 3-16)

**STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION.** Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

**STRATEGY.** A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 2-0, JP 3-0)

**TERRORISM.** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

**TERRORIST.** An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

**TERRORIST GROUP.** Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological goals. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

**WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.** Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. (JP 1-02, JP 3-28)
### Appendix D. USG Interagency Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAH-USA</td>
<td>Action Against Hunger (USA) (NGO)</td>
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<td>AED</td>
<td>Academy for Educational Development (NGO)</td>
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<td>United States Africa Command (DoD)</td>
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<td>American Friends Service Committee (NGO)</td>
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<td>Afghan New Beginnings Program (UN) (IGO)</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Regional IGO)</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Refugee Committee International (NGO)</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (Regional IGO)</td>
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<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(GSA)</td>
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<td>ASD(ISA)</td>
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<td>ASD(ISP)</td>
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<td>ASD(SOLIC &amp; IC)</td>
<td>ASD (Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities)</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
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<td>CPG</td>
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DoS)</td>
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<td>DCHA-OMA</td>
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<td>Deputy Chief of Mission (DoS)</td>
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<td>DCMA</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
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<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
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<td>DoA</td>
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<td>DoC</td>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
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<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>Department of Labor</td>
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<td>DSS</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>Excess Defense Articles</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEB/CBA</td>
<td>Commercial and Business Affairs (DoS)</td>
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<td>EEB/TPP</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union (Regional IGO)</td>
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<td>European Police Office (IGO)</td>
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<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force (IGO)</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (UN) (IGO)</td>
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<td>FAS</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (DoJ)</td>
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<td>FDA</td>
<td>Food and Drug Administration (DHHS)</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)</td>
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<td>FFA</td>
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<td>FIG</td>
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<td>FPS</td>
<td>Federal Protective Services (ICE/DHS)</td>
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</table>
Appendix D. USG Interagency Acronyms

FTO. Foreign Terrorist Organization
FTTTF. Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (DoJ)
GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPOI. Global Peace Operations Initiative (DoS)
HACC. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (DoD)
HAP. Humanitarian Assistance Program (DoD)
HCA. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HDM. Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action (DoD/DSCA)
HIC. Humanitarian Information Center
HIU. Humanitarian Information Unit (DoS)
HN. Host Nation/Host Country
HNS. Host Nation/Host Country Support
HOC. Humanitarian Operations Center
HOPE. Project Hope (NGO)
HSIC. Homeland Security Intelligence Council (DHS)
HUMINT. Human Intelligence
IA. Interagency (USG)
IAAH. International Alliance Against Hunger (IGO)
I&A. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS)
IAEA. International Atomic Energy Agency (IGO)
IBRD. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IGO)
IC. Intelligence Community (USG)
ICE. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)
ICITAP. International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (DoJ)
ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross (IGO)
IDA. International Development Association (IGO)
IDP. Internally Displaced Person
IFRC. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IGO)
IGO. Intergovernmental Organization
IHL. International Humanitarian Law
IIP. International Information Programs (DoS)
IMC. International Medical Corps (NGO)
IMF. International Monetary Fund (IGO)
IMET. International Military Education and Training (DoS/DoD)
IN. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DoE)
INL. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DoS)
INR. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DoS)
INTERPOL. International Criminal Police Organization (IGO)
INTERPOL-USNCB. INTERPOL United State National Central Bureau (DoJ)
IOB. President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (White House)
IOM. International Organization for Migration (IGO)
IRC. International Rescue Committee (NGO)
IRTPA. Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
ISAF. International Security and Assistance Force (UN Mandate/NATO)
ISC. Information Sharing Council (DNI)
ISE. Information Sharing Environment (DNI)
ISN. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (DoS)
ISN/RA. Office of Regional Affairs (DoS)
ISSF. Iraq Security Sector Fund (DoD)
ITACG. Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (DNI)
JCET. Joint Combined Exchange Training (DoD)
JCS. Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM. U.S. Joint Forces Command (DoD)
JIACG. Joint Interagency Coordination Group (DoD)
JIATF. Joint Interagency Task Force (DoD)
JICC. Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (DoD)
JICC. Joint Intelligence Community Council (DNI)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>JITF-CT</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (DoD)</td>
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<td>JMISC</td>
<td>Joint Military Information Support Command (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Operations Center (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Terrorism Task Force (DoJ/FBI)</td>
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<td>Mobile Training Team (DoD)</td>
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<td>National Intelligence Program</td>
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<td>National Joint Terrorism Task Force (DoJ/FBI)</td>
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<td>National System for Geo-Spatial Intelligence (DoD)</td>
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<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Targeting Center (DHS/CBP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States (Regional IGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS/CICTE</td>
<td>Organization of American States/Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (Regional IGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJP</td>
<td>Office of Justice Programs (DoJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPIC</td>
<td>Overseas Private Investment Corporation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OSCE. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (IGO)

OFAC. Office of Foreign Assets Control (DoT)

OFDA. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)

OCHA. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)

OHDACA. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (DoD)

OIA. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (Treasury)

OIPR. Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (DoJ)

OJVOT. Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (DoJ)

OMB. Office of Management and Budget (White House)

OPCM. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (IGO)

OPDAT. Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (DoJ)

OSAC. Overseas Security Advisory Council (DoS)

OSI. Office of International Security Operations (DoS)

OTA. Office of Terrorism Analysis (CIA)

OTI. Office of Transnation Issues (CIA)

OXFAM. Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (NGO)

PAO. Public Affairs Officer

PIAB. President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (White House)

PKO. Peacekeeping Operations

PKSOI. US Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

PM. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DoS)

PM/PPA. Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis (DoS)

PNG. Personal Non Grata

POA. Partners of the Americas (NGO)

POLAD. Political Advisor

PDB. President’s Daily Brief (DNI)

PRM. Office of Population, Refugees and Migration (DoS)

PRT. Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSI. Proliferation Security Initiative (DoS)

RDT&E. Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Programs (DoD)

RI. Refugees International (NGO)

RLA. Resident Legal Advisor (DoJ/FBI)

SA. Security Assistance

SAO. Security Assistance Officer

SA/WSO. Salvation Army World Service Office (NGO)

S/CT. Department of State Counterterrorism (DoS)

S/CRS. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (DoS)

SC/US. Save the Children (NGO)

SECDEF. Secretary of Defense (DoD)

SIOC. Strategic Information and Operations Center (DoJ/FBI)

SMEE. Subject Matter Expert Exchanges

SOCOM. U.S. Special Operations Command (DoD)

SOCOM/IATF. SOCOM Interagency Task Force (DoD)

SOF. Special Operations Forces

SOFA. Status of Forces Agreement

SOST. Special Operations Support Team (DoD)

TARS. Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (DoD)

TFI. Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (Treasury)

TFOS. Terrorism Financing Operations Center (TFOS) (DoJ)

TIDE. Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (NCTC/DNI)

TIP. Terrorist Interdiction Program (DoS)

TIVASD. Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division (DoJ)

TSCTP. Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (DoS/USAID/DoD)

TSC. Terrorist Screening Center (FBI)

TSA. Transportation Security Administration (DHS)
**TSWG.** Technical Support Working Groups (DoS/DoD)

**UCP.** Unified Command Plan (DoD)

**UN.** The United Nations (IGO)

**UNAMAUN.** Assistance Mission Afghanistan (IGO)

**UNDMTUN.** Disaster Management Team (IGO)

**UNDPUN.** Development Program (IGO)

**UNESCOUN.** Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

**UNHCR.** The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (IGO)

**UNHCHRUN.** High Commissioner for Human Rights (IGO)

**UNHOCUN.** Humanitarian Operations Center (IGO)

**UNICEF.** United Nations Children’s Fund (IGO)

**UNMACAUN.** Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (IGO)

**USACIL.** U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (DoD)

**USA for UNHCRUS.** Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (NGO)

**USAID.** United States Agency for International Development

**USD(I).** Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (DoD)

**USD(P).** Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DoD)

**USCG.** United States Coast Guard (DHS)

**USG.** United States Government

**USCIS.** United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS)

**USSS.** United States Secret Service (DHS)

**USSTRATCOM.** United States Strategic Command (DoD)

**WANGO.** World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO)

**WFP.** World Food Program (UN) (IGO)

**WHO.** World Health Organization (UN) (IGO)

**WIF.** Warsaw Initiative Funds (DoD)

**WINPAC.** Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (CIA)

**WIRe.** World Intelligence Review (DNI)

**WMD.** Weapons of Mass Destruction

**WTO.** World Trade Organization (IGO)

**WVUS.** World Vision (United States) (NGO)
Appendix E. Bibliography

The following references provide both sourcing material and content for additional understanding about the USG Interagency Process.


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