Joint Special Operations University and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense leadership.

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment.

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and the commander’s priorities.

Mission. Provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.

Priorities. • Deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats.
• Develop and support our people and their families.
• Sustain and modernize the force.

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Top left. Night training mission, two CV-22 Osprey aircraft, assigned to the 58th Special Operations Wing, at Kirtland AFB.


Bottom left. Marines from the 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion discuss their imminent jump 2,500 feet above Camp Pendleton, California.

Bottom right. Naval Special Warfare combatant-craft crewmen operate a Rigid Inflatable Boat from a forward location.
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917.

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The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press.

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## Contents

Foreword ................................................................. ix

Preface ........................................................................ xi

A. Combating Terrorist Networks ........................................ 1

B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy and Operations ......................... 15

C. Interagency (IA) ............................................................. 27

D. Regional and Cultural Studies ........................................ 33

E. Miscellaneous .................................................................. 39

F. Topics Retained from Previous Years ................................. 47
Foreword

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 2009 Research Topics list, produced by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), is intended to guide research projects for Professional Military Education (PME) students, our faculty, research fellows, and others writing about special operations during this academic year. Research is one of the cornerstones of JSOU’s academic mission as we strive to produce publications to meet joint Special Operations Forces (SOF) operational and planning needs. Each year representatives from USSOCOM, the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), SOF chairs from the war colleges, and JSOU senior fellows develop a list of salient issues confronting SOF in the near term. The list is vetted through the components and TSOCs to ensure that research will advance SOF missions and support SOF interests. The final recommendations for research topics are approved by the USSOCOM commander.

The topics list is organized into six sections with the first four addressing the most pressing needs or issues facing SOF today. The first section, unsurprisingly, is focused on research issues related to Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs) as this is the critical fight the United States and its allies are in today. The following three sections expand on issues crucial to understanding CbTNs: irregular warfare, the interagency process, and regional and cultural studies.

The “interagency” is often discussed today, but frequently misunderstood. The interagency is best understood as a community or process that links different elements of government. Two key locations where the interagency comes together are Washington, DC and at U.S. embassies in foreign countries. The overarching focus of interagency research is how to best ensure the interagency process meets requirements for successful prosecution of the current irregular type of war. Irregular war engenders much debate and its concepts are strongly linked to the interagency process. The third key element in the current conflict is the critical concept of cultural or regional studies. Defining what are cultural, regional, or linguistic requirements for CbTN is itself a major challenge.

These critical topics, concepts, and processes reflect the challenges of winning the current conflicts and meeting the needs for the conflicts
most likely to face us in the foreseeable future. This alone speaks to the need for more debate, research, and study. Therefore, I encourage you to review the topics and to make use of the research tools found on the JSOU Education Gateway at http://jsoupublish.socom.mil. If you have any questions about this document, JSOU Press in general, or how JSOU can assist you in your academic research, contact Mr. James Anderson, JSOU Research manager at (850) 884-1569 (DSN 579) or james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
Preface

This booklet represents an effort to list and categorize special operations-related research topics presented to professional military education (PME) students, JSOU part-time senior fellows, and other SOF researchers. The commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) places high emphasis on Special Operations Forces (SOF) students writing on timely, relevant, SOF-related topics. This list is simply a guide to stimulate ideas; topics may be narrowed, broadened, or otherwise modified as deemed necessary (e.g., to suit school writing requirements or individual experiences).

Sections A through E contain new topic categories with major ideas/concepts for 2009 from which topics can be derived, depending on the interest/experience of the researcher and the desired level of detail. Some are intentionally broad in scope and are designed to provide a start point for your topic selection.

Section F is a list of topics retained from previous years.

Limited TDY funding will be available from JSOU for researchers (e.g., PME students) to support their projects (e.g., to conduct interviews or visit USSOCOM or component headquarters). These research “grants” are subject to approval by the director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department depending on the topic selected and the value added to the project.

For questions and clarification of a given topic or for requesting funding to support your research, contact the manager of JSOU Research, Mr. James D. Anderson, at james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil, DSN 579-1569 or (850) 884-1569. Share this reference with fellow researchers, thesis advisors, and other colleagues; and feel free to submit additional topics for inclusion in updated editions.

JSOU Press has released several publications; because one may relate to your topic of interest, see the complete list at http://jsoupublish.socom.mil.
A. Combating Terrorist Networks

**Topic Titles**

A1. Illicit trade and the financing of transnational terrorism
A2. What are the missions and roles of SOF in the economic domain as it applies to narcoterrorism; should SOF do more there?
A3. When is terrorism a tactic and when is it a strategy?
A4. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy—enabling partners
A5. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations
A6. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement agencies (LEAs)
A7. Sharing of methods and long-range power projection of various types of groups
A8. Disaggregating counterterrorism operations: Al Qaeda is not Hezbollah is not the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
A9. How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in combating terrorism?
A10. What levels of analysis model should the U.S. military use?
A11. Global reach: clandestine and covert special operations counterterrorism
A12. How can special ops better leverage unclassified information technology (IT)?
A13. Intelligence for counterterrorism operations: best practices, future requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM and other U.S. agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less savory options
A14. Antiterrorism: more than defense—SOF contribution to application of national power to prevent terrorism
A15. What are the issues inherent to the rise of civil society and increasing roles of nonstate actors in the international environment for the use of U.S. power? What are the implications for U.S. policy and strategy in regard to counterinsurgency?
A16. Raising the costs—counter value strategies in counterterrorism
A17. Use of surrogates for clandestine counterterrorism
A18. What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations and organized crime?
A19. Is the cyber terrorism threat real? Is it different in kind than a threat to any other critical infrastructure or national asset?
A20. Generational terrorism: a strategy for the next 50 years
A21. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: case studies and theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism
A22. Poverty is a pawn: the myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism and how poverty is used by terrorist leaders
A23. Who really gains from the existence of terrorism?
A24. Terrorist “safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned areas”
A25. Toxic cultures—long-term strategies for their transformation or elimination
A26. Employing private security firms to conduct counterterrorism in nonpermissive environments
A27. Information operations and counterterrorism
A28. Can terrorists be deterred?
A29. How to conduct strategic human targeting of a terrorist organization’s senior leadership
A30. What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of SOF in this strategy?
A31. Case study in Saudi Arabia counterterrorism efforts
A32. Engaging the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology
A33. Fatwas against extremism—engaging the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology
A34. Synchronizing U.S. public diplomacy efforts and methodologies to undermine the ideological foundations of terrorism
A35. Should there be a single DoD campaign plan to address all violent extremist organizations, or should there be multiple plans that address each organization individually?
A36. NSPD-41/NSPD-46 transition
A. Combating Terrorist Networks

**Topic Descriptions**

**A1. Illicit trade and the financing of transnational terrorism**

The Joint Forces Command joint operating environment of the future somewhat warns us that the military may be more and more exposed to the effects of transnational criminality, as it becomes more terrorist and insurgency like. Discuss the needed education to SOF personnel that identifies linkages. What incentives are necessary to encourage the cooperation of financial institutions in support of the U.S irregular-warfare effort and combating global terrorism? Give analysis of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), arguably one of the most powerful organized criminal institutions worldwide.

**A2. What are the missions and roles of SOF in the economic domain as it applies to narcoterrorism; should SOF do more there?**

Discuss how SOF leverages and grows host-nation capacity to deter narcoterrorism. Analyze one or both of the two levels to this issue:

a. The operational/tactical level may deal with the training of law enforcement agencies, conducting operations against the drug fields/lords, intelligence activities, and coordination of assets (information operations, allies, interministerial). Clearly, SOF has roles at this level (training, planning, and executing).

b. The strategic/operational level areas of interest deal with strategic relations, crop substitution, justice, drug treatment, money laundering, and international legal issues.

**A3. When is terrorism a tactic and when is it a strategy?**

Has terror been elevated to a strategic concept in the 21st century? If so, how does it work and what are the implications for a counterterrorism strategy? Discuss insurgent violence as terrorism in strategic communication/information campaigns. Examine recent history on insurgent use of terror and terror for the sake of terror (Red Brigade, Oklahoma) versus terror to advance an enemy strategy, policy writing on the use of terror, and counter efforts (which the host nation must be able to support with their limited resources) to defeat terrorists. Possible outcomes of this paper could be tools to identify or predict the use of terror as a tactic and tools to assist in identification of groups using terror as a tactic and then exploit in information-operation campaigns.
A4. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy—enabling partners

Our partners and allies do not view the war on terrorism as a global problem, and often have a problem with preemptive strategies. Counterterrorism is often viewed from the perspective of the host nation and its relations with its bordering states. Gather, analyze, and consolidate best practices in combating-terrorism strategy that could be useful at a regional level—similar to a counterterrorism Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plan. What are some important regional factors and issues with combating terrorism? What are some useful policy, strategy, and operational techniques for consideration when developing a host nation’s counterterrorism IDAD plan? This study should be a regional specialist topic—analyze selected partner nation(s) facing common problems to determine U.S. priorities and appropriate methods of assistance.

A5. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations

Analyses of groups using terrorist activities have resulted in typologies of different sorts (e.g., groups with political aspirations, ideological/religious motivations, financial/criminal basis; and Rapoport’s four historical “waves”). Review these typologies, looking for differences and commonalities. Assess our experience with Al Qaeda against them and assess the utility of each. Apply the results of these analyses to the current geopolitical climate to discuss possible future terrorist activities. This effort may support strategic and perhaps operational planning.

A6. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement agencies (LEAs)

The focus is how to make LEAs’ work complementary with SOF. At least 75 percent of successful counterterrorism operations are as a result of law enforcement or other internal security forces (nonmilitary); in combat, much intelligence to run down terrorists can come from police access to population. SOF will never achieve effectiveness and strategic utility in combating terrorism if it disregards coordination, cooperation, and combined operations with LEAs. Ascertain roles for SOF to operate in conjunction with LEAs, both international and host nation when operating abroad; identify policy and regulatory changes, including budget, needed for SOF to operate in this domain. Recommend unique training and equipping
requirements for SOF to perform this function. Illustrate role of community policing and international law enforcement in combating terrorism, then explain why SOF is failing to operate in this medium, hamstringing our efforts to fully prosecute GWOT plans designed by USSOCOM. This project could describe a successful indirect strategy for GWOT and one which SOF could perform well.

A7. **Sharing of methods and long-range power projection of various types of groups**

Terrorist groups are accelerating their learning from each other and their collaboration. This situation makes counterterrorism exponentially more difficult. Identify trends in how terrorist groups learn and how they collaborate. Examine case studies of past attacks where collaboration existed at the greater or smaller scope of activities. Identify trends and extrapolate. Consider global trends in causes of terrorism and anticipate where/to what those trends will lead. The product of this research could be a road map of what is coming, innovative methods to interdicting this collaboration, and a method to keep updating the road map.

A8. **Disaggregating counterterrorism operations: Al Qaeda is not Hezbollah is not the FARC**

Because of the information age and Web use, terrorist networks share common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), both successful and unsuccessful. Identify links between various organizations, training, and education. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was caught in Colombia, showing a link between IRA and the FARC. Repeated activity in propaganda shows support to Middle East insurgents from Brazil, which in turns shows a link between the two regions. Breaking apart the organizations is one piece, but showing how they are interlinked may be useful when looking for elusive targets.

A9. **How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in combating terrorism?**

A lack of understanding in how people in a given society see things—you cannot influence them, neither with your message nor your largesse. Acquaintance with language, culture, and local customs is only the first step in entering into a foreign environment. This study would provide analyses of specific terrorist or insurgent organizations highlighting how their cultural background has influenced their choices and actions. Show how cultural values determine
the correctness or rationality of specific terrorist actions. Objective is to raise awareness in this area and lead to additional studies of specific terrorist organizations focused on the culture that shapes their operational planning, decisions, actions, and reactions.

A10. What levels of analysis model should the U.S. military use?
We are beginning to understand that adversaries adopt terrorism as a strategy for the simple reason that it works. The literature on terrorism has grown exponentially over the past 5 years. One useful technique that has grown in popularity is the level of analysis approach. A number of experts have advanced specific models. Levels of analysis are useful in allowing the military to understand the complexity of the terrorist phenomenon and where and how it can be countered. Yet no one has articulated an approach that has universal appeal to the military. The articulation and logic for such a common military model would improve both the quality of thinking and communication about terrorism, its appeal, and why it works. It is a contribution that the SOF community can provide because of extensive experience and credibility.

A11. Global reach: clandestine and covert special operations counterterrorism
Under what circumstances should SOF conduct low/no visibility counterterrorism operations on a global scale? What is the potential cost/benefit to such activities? Is this the purview of SOF or CIA or both, depending on the situation? Should a more robust partnership between SOF and CIA be built to conduct this type of activity? When has this been done historically and what were the results? The case study approach may be beneficial if sufficient documentation is available. Survey and analyze (e.g., covert operations, assassinations, sabotage) to determine what factors lead to these activities, what factors determine the success of the operations (tactical and strategic), and potential TTPs. This study will certainly be classified.

A12. How can special operations better leverage unclassified information technology (IT)?
Track historical use and success of using open source intelligence and show how it was used as a lever to success. Only a small percentage of useful intelligence is classified. We must develop a way, get approval to share both open and closed source intelligence with our international partners. Discuss the need to form elements using IT experts with the SOF warriors to lever IT. Harness SOF creativity
and innovation with IT power. An alternate approach would be an operator-focused study on setting up essential elements of information. Most existing lists are either obvious-tactical or a huge hodge-podge of data (not information relevant to the mission). Study would analyze one or more classes of SOF threats/targets and demonstrate what data (from all sources) provides information relevant to determining enemy intent and action.

A13. **Intelligence for counterterror operations: best practices, future requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM and other U.S. agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less savory options**

Discuss and analyze the following statements: The intelligence community is moving beyond ‘need to know’ to ‘need to share.’ Counterterrorism operations need to be in the share business, and lessons observed from Iraq show success in this area. Agencies, tactical to national, need to share information because target sets are illusive and the most current information/intelligence supports operations. The counterterrorism mission is global in scale and the ability to have the most current intelligence, at all levels, predictive in nature (as applicable), is available to planners at any possible time. Each day this topic is more relevant. U.S. SOF must acknowledge that HUMINT is essential in this business.

A14. **Antiterrorism: more than defense—SOF contribution to application of national power to prevent terrorism**

How can SOF contribute to expanded national power (DIMFILE) globally to prevent terrorism? Specifically, which interagency partners should SOF be involved with in which activities? How does this fit with Ambassadorial Mission Performance Plans? This study can result in suggested strategy and could be regionally based.

A15. **What are the issues inherent to the rise of civil society and increasing roles of nonstate actors in the international environment for the use of U.S. power? What are the implications for U.S. policy and strategy in regard to counterinsurgency?**

Discuss the various issues—for example, legitimacy, access to resources, flexibility, stability, and ability to address complex tasks. How should a state characterize insurgents? Overt statements, legislation, and action (e.g., use of police vs. military for suppression and social sanction vs. legal penalties/ detention vs. extra legal action)
should be analyzed with a specific context to show effectiveness in short-term, tactical, and strategic areas as well as how the effects of a single policy may have varying effects on those levels. Result would be a text for teaching counterinsurgency interagency strategies.

A16. **Raising the costs—counter value strategies in counterterrorism**
Most counterterrorism work is counterforce targeting—how to find and kill terrorists. The study objective is to examine the terrorist organization at all levels to identify what that enemy values, determine vulnerabilities in those areas, and propose strategies to attack those vulnerabilities. This approach provides a foundation for deterring terrorist actions rather than responding to their initiatives. Study could examine general principles or a specific terrorist organization and also focus on one specific area of vulnerability or contrast the vulnerabilities of different levels of the terrorist organization (leaders value control, ideology; ideological supporters may value their social standing or business interests). Proposed strategies could range from information campaigns to economic manipulation or various kinetic options.

A17. **Use of surrogates for clandestine counterterrorism**
How can the U.S. accomplish counterterrorism objectives without direct involvement? Should SOF be the basis for external support to state or nonstate actors pursuing U.S. counterterrorism strategies or counterterrorism strategies complementary to U.S. counterterrorism goals? What is the cost-benefit of such an approach? Do historical examples or recent situations exist where this approach could have been considered? What are some examples where this approach would not be viable?

A18. **What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations and organized crime?**
Consider one of two approaches:

a. The global operating environment is changing to where transnational criminals and transnational terrorist organizations are “cooperating” to replace the state-sponsored system with a new system of business enterprise to raise funding. As this threat becomes larger, it will work to delegitimize international regulatory control over business and trading. Study this phenomenon as it relates to national security interests and threats to the U.S.; ascertain what requirements and capabilities SOF needs to thwart this threat. Describe current nexus, identify costs to
A. Combating Terrorist Networks

national interests, predict trends, and provide solutions using SOF.

b. Treasury officials in many countries, with a U.S. lead, have been successful in interdicting the flow of terrorist and drug networks through transnational cooperation, particularly since 9/11. Establish a compendium of best practices and lessons learned from the most successful of those rooting out terrorist financing.

A19. Is the cyber terrorism threat real? Is it different in kind than a threat to any other critical infrastructure or national asset?
Identify possible targets for cyberterrorist attacks. Who might conduct these attacks and for what gain? SOF has the mission of counterterrorism, and does a cyberterrorist fall into USSOCOM’s mission when attacks are taken against critical and economic infrastructure targets? Does LEA/FBI have the lead inside the U.S., and USSOCOM/other government agencies have the lead outside the U.S.? Where does the Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO)/JTF-Naval War College (NWC) fit into the problems of cyberterrorists and what agreements need to be made between USSOCOM, the Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and other agencies? Analyze and prepare for possible cyber attacks from terrorist organizations against vital U.S./allied interests.

A20. Generational terrorism: a strategy for the next 50 years
No grand strategy exists on the part of U.S. to handle generational war from extremists, which may last 50 years or more (like containment in Cold War). Ascertain the weakness of U.S. government to develop grand strategy—What does that portend for trying to craft a grand strategy of this measure? What would a grand strategy have to do for us and what would it look like? What do we need to do in a given system to get it adopted? Describe grand strategy, how to craft it; show some analogous case studies to explain how it works; conduct a strategic assessment of the long war and offer strategic tools for crafting a grand strategy; outline detractors inherent to getting it adopted, then propose recommendations. NSC-68 defined the generations-long strategy that was successful in the Cold War.

A21. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: case studies and theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism
Discuss and analyze the current U.S. government strategy for counterterrorism through this lens, with recommendations for adjustments. The Shining Path in Peru is a great case study for
excessive governmental response to terrorism. Another approach is to reexamine USSOCOM CONPLAN 7500; using the unclassified threat model, campaign framework, and method, determine if the strategy is sufficient to achieve U.S. goals and which aspect are necessary to reach U.S. goals? What is missing? What is unnecessary or insufficient and why?

A22. Poverty is a pawn: the myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism and how poverty is used by terrorist leaders

Terrorist leaders prey on the poor as a pool for foot soldiers, suicide bombers, and both witting and unwitting supporters through various means of exploitation. However, the vast majority of terrorist leaders do not come from poverty, but rather from the middle (Zarqawi) and even upper classes (bin Laden). How can governments mitigate this exploitation of the poor, knowing that poverty cannot be extinguished? Discuss the mix of conditions that serve to create fertile territory for developing terrorist actors. Establish a list of conditions (e.g. poverty, religious fervor, education levels, distribution of wealth) that when existing concurrently, create an environment for growing terrorist actors. Will SOF need to prepare for contingencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

A23. Who really gains from the existence of terrorism?

How can state actors and the international community make the use of terrorism an impractical strategy? This study would examine who really gains from the existence of terrorism? Who does it threaten and who does it empower? What are the implications for U.S. policy, strategy, and military operations? How does or should this effect SOF missions and structure?

A24. Terrorist “safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned spaces”

The intelligence apparatus of the U.S. government has fairly precise locations for terrorist safe havens throughout the world. Moreover, U.S. SOF, coupled with interagency partners, arguably has the capability to “terrorize” the terrorist in selected locations such as training camps and marshaling areas. Examine needed changes in policy, force structure, and legalities for the U.S. government, with or without host-nation cooperation/approval, to affect these strikes against terrorists in their safe havens—that is, no longer make them safe. History is replete with examples of rear-area attacks destroying critical nodes of command and control, demoralizing the enemy, and degrading his ability to go on the offensive. Determine which
A. Combating Terrorist Networks

are the most problematic of current and future safe havens—that is, which provide most succor and protection to terrorists and fellow travelers.

A25. Toxic cultures—long-term strategies for their transformation or elimination

While many conditions give rise to terrorism and violence, specific cultures and societies seem more prone to lashing out in this way. The study would analyze historical campaigns (ancient warfare, Mongols vs. sedentary populations, Tamerlane vs. Arabs, U.S. vs. plains Indians, Cold War, post-World War II Japanese reconstruction) where specific cultural change or destruction was required to achieve victory or peace. Principles derived would be applied to the global conflict against terrorists, but would expand to encompass actions to change or destroy those cultures that produce transnational terrorists.

A26. Employing private security firms to conduct counterterrorism in nonpermissive environments

Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this idea. Numerous issues surround this course of action, very few of them good (e.g., disregarding the checkered history of private security firms in Iraq and assuming the firms had a clear-cut chain of command, mission set). Analyze the value added to employing these elements in the battlespace.

A27. Information operations and counterterrorism

Discrediting our enemies’ extremist ideologies is a major part of eroding their support. The Colombian government and use of Plan Colombia changed the perceptions of the FARC to the populous and to the world. Can the experience and activities taken by the Colombian government be applied to activities and actions by U.S./allied entities in the realm of information operations and strategic communications? Several angles to study could be to research the history of using terror and where it has been effective in turning the population either for or against the government, examine successful counterinsurgencies and their use/work of the media dealing with terrorism, review how a government can gain support during a period of terrorism, and identify groups by the type of terror tools used (e.g., Taliban uses different tools than Al Qaeda) in order to point blame. Products of the study could be to develop training tools for mobile training teams to present to host nations, develop
training tools for use in military education, and to review/update, as 
required, information operations/PSYOP tools.

A28. **Can terrorists be deterred?**
The limited literature in regard to this question reaches different 
conclusions. A good analysis might look at the fundamental ques-
tion and conclude who can be deterred and how at both the tactical 
and strategic levels. The latter is particularly critical in regard to 
weapons of mass destruction. For example, such an analysis would 
reveal that a number of Arab countries have been particularly suc-
scessful; while perhaps we would not want to use their means, they 
have curtailed actions in their homelands. Examine what we think 
we know about terrorism and deterrence and attempt to provide a 
conceptual framework for how we should think about it. It would 
be helpful to policymakers, the state governments, and military and 
SOF communities.

A29. **How to conduct strategic human targeting of a terrorist organiza-
tion’s senior leadership**
Does strategic human targeting of senior leadership truly affect the 
organization? Research should look at how many toppled/seized 
leaders have lead to the demise of an organizational whole—Is it 
possible to pull the head from a snake and not have a Hydra? Use 
social network analysis and other organizational analysis techniques 
to characterize a selected terrorist organization. Use computational 
tools, as appropriate, combined with qualitative analyses. Identify 
and justify key targets. Suggest possible organizational reactions 
based on your analysis if the targets are eliminated. The value of this 
study will lie in lessons learned from the combination of a range of 
analytic techniques. It is possible that the most valuable outcomes 
will be identification of what existing analytic approaches cannot tell 
us (either applied singly or in combination) and the identification of 
areas of theoretical or computational development.

A30. **What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist 
terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of 
SOF in this strategy?**
Despite all the effort U.S. policy makers and media pundits have 
contributed to talking about the problem, no one has produced a 
satisfactory answer. Because this question has not been properly 
examined and appropriately answered, the U.S. largely plays a game 
of “whack a mole” in a global landscape where the moles look like
everyone else. If insights to an answer were developed and successfully advocated, the potential for success in the GWOT would increase exponentially. Obviously, such a strategy would involve multiple instruments and might even change the classical way in which some instruments like to view themselves. What will be the SOF role?

A31. Case study in Saudi Arabia counterterrorism efforts
Recent efforts by Saudi Arabia to defeat Wahabi extremism are proving to be effective countermeasures against the ideology. For example, the government has taken back primary and secondary education from Salafi jihadists, instituted rehabilitation and reconciliation programs in prisons to convert extremists to moderates, leveraged scholarly Muslim leaders (through coercion, threats, and deception) to denounce terrorism, and constrained financial freedom of extremist charitable organizations. A Saudi Special Forces officer at National Defense University gave a presentation at the Moors Counterterrorism Workshop (held at Naval Postgraduate School) that was an outstanding summary of the government response to terrorism. This study would analyze the Saudi response to pull best practices and lessons learned from their operations.

A32. Engaging the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology
Focusing primarily on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Pakistan, and Europe, what are the barriers to the flow of information among 10–40-year-old Muslims? What can the U.S. government, and others, do to reduce these barriers? Which U.S. policies and/or actions should be increased, strengthened, and/or reduced to enhance positive engagement of the constructive Muslim Ummah? Which instruments of U.S. government “soft power,” as identified by Secretary of Defense Gates, should be engaged or enhanced? Lastly, since countering violent extremist ideology is not solely a U.S. issue, how can we better involve our coalition partners and allies in this engagement? Identify avenues and methodologies to positively engage the constructive Muslim Ummah (especially in the 10–40-year-old demographic) to counter violent extremist ideology.

A33. Fatwas against extremism—engaging the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology
What fatwas against extremism have been issued, by whom, and from what region of the world? What response did the fatwas provoke
from violent extremist organizations? Were the fatwas effective, dissuading individuals from joining extremist groups or pursuing jihad? Among what segments of the populations were the fatwas effective, ineffective? How can planners further disseminate the messages of the fatwas? Identify avenues and methodologies to positively engage the constructive Muslim Ummah (especially in the 10–40-year-old demographic) to counter violent extremist ideology.

A34. **Synchronizing U.S. public diplomacy efforts and methodologies to undermine the ideological foundations of terrorism**

How can U.S. public diplomacy efforts be synchronized to best undermine the ideological foundations of terrorism? How can U.S. public diplomacy efforts help empower partner nations, the constructive Muslim Ummah, and their leaders to reject violent extremist ideology? It is commonly believed by the majority of Muslims, and their religious and government leaders, that terrorism is illegitimate, violates a country’s sovereignty, and carries a high social cost—how can U.S. public diplomacy efforts best reinforce those beliefs?

A35. **Should there be a single DoD campaign plan to address all violent extremist organizations, or should there be multiple plans that address each organization individually?**

There is currently one DoD campaign plan for the Global War on Terrorism, broadly addressing all violent extremist organizations. Is it appropriate to maintain a single campaign, or are terrorist organizations so different in structure and integration (or non-integration) into various cultures and societies that different campaign plans need to be developed to address each? In a broader campaign plan, is it possible to account for the different organizations by simply adding annexes or appendices? For a broad campaign plan, is it necessary to provide the level of analysis and detail related to each violent extremist organization that might be better expressed in separate plans?

A.36 **NSPD-41/NSPD-46 transition**

What are the appropriate mechanisms for transition of maritime terrorist events between NSPD-41 and NSPD-46 regimes at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels? How well have those mechanisms been institutionalized? How could they be improved? Is there a difference between WMD-related events and non-WMD events?
B. Irregular-Warfare Strategy and Operations

**Topic Titles**

B1. Delineating roles of SOF and conventional forces in Security Forces Assistance (SFA)
B2. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare to date
B3. Revolutionaries and criminal groups
B4. Organizing interagency for irregular-warfare campaigns
B5. What is the role of strategic communications for SOF in irregular warfare?
B6. Clarifying the nuances between irregular warfare, stability operations, and special operations
B7. What are the theoretical objectives of irregular warfare in the 21st century?
B8. Strategic theories on irregular warfare
B9. Recognizing irregular warfare when you see it
B10. Operational art design for irregular-warfare-centric campaigns
B11. How do state or nonstate warriors erode or preserve the others’ power, will, and/or influence?
B12. Understanding police investigation and intelligence operations in irregular warfare/GWOT
B13. How is irregular warfare financed and who controls the resources?
B14. Security Forces assistance (anti-insurgency)
B15. Noninstitutionalized lessons—the Phoenix Cycle and irregular war
B16. How have affected host nations been engaged and advised on irregular warfare/counterinsurgency?
B17. How is irregular war predicted?
B18. How do policy, strategy and planning interrelate in irregular warfare?
B19. What is the joint, common operating environment for SOF in irregular warfare?
B20. Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key partner nations
B21. Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in irregular warfare
B22. Using social network analysis (SNA) in incomplete, dynamic non-state actor networks
B23. How to advise host nations engaged in irregular warfare
B24. SOF aviation in unconventional warfare roles for the 21st century
B25. Strategic decision making for irregular warfare—case studies on irregular-warfare success and failure
B26. Various roles for SOF in helping host-nation governments to develop the capability for self governance
B27. Building partner capability and capacity—What do our partner nations need?
B28. SOF-conventional habitual relationships
B29. Needs analysis for GWOT
B30. What strategic factors are key to success or failure in irregular warfare?
B31. Analysis of JTF-510 (Philippines) and reasons for its success
B32. Are Rangers and MARSOC contributors to the irregular-warfare fight?
B33. Conventional/SOF cooperation

**Topic Descriptions**

**B1. Delineating roles of SOF and conventional forces in Security Forces Assistance (SFA)**

This topic deals with a critical concept in the long-war strategy. The questions of the roles and responsibilities between the conventional forces and SOF need to be discussed and clarified to ensure the right force is employed in the right assignment. In short, what is the appropriate role for SOF in the long-war strategy?

**B2. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare to date**

The GWOT has occurred for 5 years in Iraq and 6 years in Afghanistan. Since their respective beginnings, much experience has been garnered in both countries. While many lessons have been learned, much has yet to be realized. These unlearned lessons need to be explored to determine if they are of value for learning and if so,
what lessons are we missing or failing to understand? Information operations do not seem to be effective, campaign planning continues to be conducted in the absence of the host nations, and operations are still being run without complete integration. Who needs to learn these lessons and why they are important may help in the successful desired outcomes to these current conflicts.

B3. **Revolutionaries and criminal groups**
The lines are blurring between insurgents, revolutionaries, militias, and gangsters. The focus of this topic would be on their similarities, differences, and why they are natural partners. FARC represents a model, but the question is whether they are the model for the future. Does the consolidation of these groups necessitate a rethinking of key GWOT, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency doctrine?

B4. **Organizing interagency for irregular-warfare campaigns**
The current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the struggle in interagency coordination, cooperation, and unity of effort. As these events blur into the long war, the U.S. needs to review whether an organizational structure exists to fight irregular war from an interagency design. Who has the lead, when do they lead, and why is an agency/organization in the leadership role? What is the process used to make the interagency design function properly? How does USSOCOM fit into the interagency design?

B5. **What is the role of strategic communications for SOF in irregular warfare?**
The roles and responsibility for strategic communication by SOF is still in the maturing process. Much misunderstanding and some competition exists between the players. Key to the issue is how to effectively synchronize the effort from the national level down to at least the operational level. Additionally, how are the disciplines of PSYOP, information operations, Public Affairs, and strategic communication linked/coordinated in the current conflict or in irregular warfare?

B6. **Clarifying the nuances between irregular warfare, stability operations, and special operations**
The lines between these terms and environments have become confusing to the general audience. Articulating them ensures their proper application. An important element of this issue is to ensure SOF is their best use within this environment.
B7. What are the theoretical objectives of irregular warfare in the 21st century?
The desired outcome of this study should include the placement of the strategic concept into the grand strategy of the U.S. in this century. The idea that irregular warfare will be the common battlefield strongly suggests that SOF must understand its role in the concept. Additionally, the strategic coordination requirements (interagency and services) need identification to avoid or reduce missteps in future operations. Some consideration should also be given to the integration of other supporting elements—nongovernment offices, allies, and information/influence agencies.

B8. Strategic theories on irregular warfare
What approaches can be considered for the study of irregular warfare as a traditional (nationalistic) or nontraditional underdog. Like unconventional study, Is there merit in approaching irregular warfare from the position of the insurgent/terrorist? This writing could begin with a review of current unconventional-warfare doctrine and experience to determine if they need to be revalidated or require rethinking.

B9. Recognizing irregular warfare when you see it
The current conflicts have illustrated a struggle in the proper identification of what is being fought, what phase is occurring and applying the correct solutions to the problems. The objective of this study would be the development of indicators, tools, and practices that will assist in early understanding of the operational environment. This understanding will support developing a strategy, operational campaign and the application of diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements in a given crisis.

B10. Operational art design for irregular-warfare-centric campaigns
This study should focus on the development of a format of campaign designs for SOF planners specifically and conventional planners generally. The design would be meant to ensure the proper application of SOF in the fight. This view is important because little exists to help planners, SOF, or otherwise.

B11. How do state or nonstate warriors erode or preserve the others’ power, will, and/or influence?
The topic suggests a need exists for understanding of “will” and how to influence it in irregular warfare to determine the outcome of a struggle. Linkage of elements of national power with strategic
communications is critical to the successful outcome for the host nation/coalition in irregular warfare. Therefore, the study helps to answer the question, How effective is the current effort in defeating Al Qaeda or the Taliban?

**B12. Understanding police investigation and intelligence operations in irregular warfare/GWOT**

Law enforcement, in all nations, is essential in maintaining stability throughout all levels of irregular warfare. The employment of criminals, the illegal drug industry, and insurgency all require law enforcement that must be integrated into the campaign plan of any country. One of the measures of legitimacy is the public confidence in their law enforcement and legal systems. The role of law enforcement, linkage with other security force, and their integration into plans require study.

**B13. How is irregular warfare financed and who controls the resources?**

The topic for study would include the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, how are they the same, how are they different, and are they models for future nonstate irregular-warfare players? This scope includes examination of past irregular war funding and the constraints legitimate governments have in fighting irregular war.

**B14. Security Forces assistance (anti-insurgency)**

This topic would examine the effectiveness of the shape/deter phases in struggling countries. It implies that countries can identify they are facing problems, and the U.S. (or other nations) has interests to protect. This writing would include review and examination policies and programs for the GWOT and drug wars. An historical review may also be useful to determine where, when, and how the shape/deter phases have been effective.

**B15. Noninstitutionalized lessons—the Phoenix Cycle and irregular war**

The vogue term *irregular warfare* is really not new, but it does reflect a reoccurring phenomenon—the Phoenix Cycle. Past experiences get forgotten, shelved, or temporarily discarded only to be revived later. The war on terrorism has given rise to some old experience that should be reexamined. Counterinsurgency is an example of the Phoenix Cycle. Has the Petreaus counterinsurgency field manual improved our knowledge of counterinsurgency or did it ignore the lessons of the past?
B16. **How have affected host nations been engaged and advised on irregular warfare/counterinsurgency?**

This topic deals with combining *advising* and *adapting* based on the specific country (e.g., culture, history). Is there an art to advising and if so, what should be taught to qualify a soldier to be an advisor?

B17. **How is irregular war predicted?**

Can irregular warfare be predicted? If so, what tools are used to make the predictions, who is trained to make them, and can making them be taught? This topic may require some historical study to evaluate whether sufficient evidence exists to be able to predict the event and the possibility of preventing the event.

B18. **How do policy, strategy, and planning interrelate in irregular warfare?**

The topic begs for leadership in linking strategy, policy, and planning into a cohesive process. This study will help clarify the process from beginning to end, assist in the tasking of the proper organizations for the correction of missions in the proper sequence, and define an end state that is achievable.

B19. **What is the joint, common operating environment for SOF in irregular warfare?**

This study will analyze the joint and global environment to understand and ascertain distinct and unique threats, trends, and opportunities for SOF in the next decade. Recommend any force structure changes and new capabilities required as a result of this analysis.

B20. **Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key partner nations**

This topic is one that is undefined, except for a planning guide in Appendix B of Joint Publication 3-07.1 written several years ago. A methodology for framing the situation faced by a host nation to determine an IDAD strategy is absolutely necessary. The Civil Affairs course provides a political-social analysis guide as an initial starting point. However, it is not widely known, disseminated, or understood by the conventional military. Case studies (such as El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan) to highlight success and failure in this endeavor are a good study vehicle.

B21. **Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in irregular warfare**

This topic could be a basis for strategic special operations theory and/or serve as a primer for geographic combatant commander
planners. If we do not understand how to create strategic effects, SOF becomes less effective. To better understand, identify what is the range of strategic effects that might be of use to SOF—that is, how SOF produces each of those types of strategic effects, looking at case studies with effective and ineffective creation of strategic effects.

B22. Using social network analysis (SNA) in incomplete, dynamic non-state actor networks
Many agencies—for example, DHS, Department of State, and Counterintelligence Field Office (CIFO)—are doing studies using SNA methodologies. They believe SNA has “predictive” possibilities. Review the studies to see whether some or a combination apply to SOF needs. The Jebsen Center completed one for the CIFO on predicting what personality traits might make one want to be a suicide bomber. While an interesting exercise, it was not conclusive. An understanding of the adversary’s social structure and interconnections can contribute to tactical and strategic planning through the identification of high value targets and weak points in organizational function, which can be exploited in a wide variety of ways. SNA has been increasingly used to map terrorist organizations and, in some cases, attempt to predict future activities. Examine such analyses to identify what and how they apply to SOF needs. Identify and discuss not only strengths but weaknesses of the analyses and the methods. If possible, identify additional analytic methods that can be combined with SNA to provide more robust input. As part of SNA, technical reliance or intrinsic use of media and types of information networks needs to be applied to each specific individual. In performing SNA, not only should a link of individuals exist but also how the individuals connect (e.g., face to face, phone, e-mail, runner) and a weight of influence between actors.

B23. How to advise host nations engaged in irregular warfare
Advising host-nation counterparts is a slow process (requires time). We suffer with time conditions that cause pushing rather than guiding counterparts to a resolution of a problem. A need exists to teach the art of advising, much like what was done during the Vietnam era, yet no time goes to adequately train advisors. The other condition of time is length of service “in the box” by the respective services. These vary from 4–6 months to a year. Nothing effective can be achieved in 4–6 months. Advising/mentoring tours need to be at least 18 months, and an effective handoff to the incoming advisor is
necessary. Finding and interviewing Vietnam-era advisors would greatly benefit this study.

**B24. SOF aviation in unconventional warfare roles for the 21st century**

Briefly define unconventional warfare (UW) and its significance in achieving national security objectives. Examine historical cases of airpower supporting UW operations. Determine the distinct capabilities/characteristics that airpower offers in UW operations based upon these studies. Also, identify consistent shortfalls/limitations. Determine if these capabilities still exist within today’s airpower providers (U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps). If they do not exist or the capacity is limited, offer several ways to grow/ enhance these capabilities. Provide a general framework for using these airpower UW capabilities in supporting future joint/interagency UW operations.

**B25. Strategic decision making for irregular warfare—case studies on irregular-warfare success and failure**

Understanding how key decisions are made at the national level helps prepare for the next conflict/incident. Who made what recommendations to whom with regard to force structure, size, objectives of war in Afghanistan? For example, examine transitions of the lead effort from CIA to SOF to conventional force to NATO. How did we get approval to use CIA predators to strike terrorist targets in Yemen? Analyze recent case studies of irregular warfare to understand the decision-making process, planning mistakes, incorrect assumptions, and mission effectiveness. Operational planners will use the case-study analysis to improve the planning process. Possible case studies include Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, U.S. assistance to Ethiopian forces engaged in Somalia, effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara targeting AQIM, JTF-510 and the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) origins, methods and effectiveness. The purpose of this study is to capture lessons learned from recent, relevant irregular-warfare activities to better understand national decision-making process, accuracy of planning assumptions, and effectiveness of operations to improve future operations.
B26. Various roles for SOF in helping host-nation governments to develop the capability for self governance

This task may be beyond the means of the DoD, let alone SOF. DoD SOF can certainly provide initial support, based on the short-term Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) objectives developed by the Department of State (DoS) Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). However, that support should be based on a plan providing for the DoS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to assume responsibility for the development program as soon as the security situation allows. Given this stipulation and the S/CRS PCR objectives, what steps can SOF take to ensure that indigenous political structures are on track to support U.S. objectives in a country as the security situation is resolved? How do SOF liaise with and coordinate for the arrival of the DoS and USAID representatives? What are the measures of effectiveness to be agreed upon by both DoD/SOF and DoS/USAID that will determine when transition of mission responsibility occurs? Upon transition of mission responsibility, how much stay-behind support do SOF provide?

B27. Building partner capability and capacity—What do our partner nations need?

It is difficult to create an effective capacity in much lesser developed partner nations if no legal and judicial system is developing. Perhaps the best approach would be to train partners as follows:

a. How to interact with other parts of their government to develop the lines of communication between military, Intel, social agencies, and the political class

b. How to include partner contingents in foreign operations, where they will be free to develop their skills outside their home environment, and where indigenous power relationships hinder their operation.

Discuss the simple differences between capability and capacity, perhaps using the elements of national power as a framework. This writing would be a study of “before and after”—what a given nation had in the way of capacity and capability before SOF involvement (e.g., foreign internal defense, military training team, and/or joint/combined exchange training) and how the capacity and capability differed after the interaction with U.S. SOF. Examine certain indicators
of capacity and capability—for example, strength levels, operations conducted, and human-rights issues.

**B28. SOF-conventional habitual relationships**
In a recent speech, the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Near East Affairs touted great successes/improvements in the interoperability between SOF and conventional forces. Examine the underlying reasons for the improved synergies between SOF and conventional forces in the battlespace. Discuss factors such as access to intelligence products, technological advances, and changes in command climate/emphasis. Discuss the position that conventional U.S. forces are becoming more “SOF like” each year. Need to put more emphasis on multinational-conventional-force relationships.

**B29. Needs analysis for GWOT**
What current areas/types of instability (e.g., bandits, insurgents, and extremists) have the potential to threaten U.S. territory, U.S. citizens, or U.S. interests? Separate treatment of capability and will (Tamil Tigers have capability but no interest in attacking external to Sri Lanka-Armenians vs. the Turks similar). What U.S. actions are needed to deal with these threats? Result of the study would be a system/framework of determining strategic priorities for USSOCOM action in coordinating GWOT.

**B30. What strategic factors are key to success or failure in irregular warfare?**
In the 21st century environment, irregular warfare is assumed to play a significant role. If true, what is really important in regard to irregular warfare at the strategic level for the U.S. and its adversaries, friends, and other state and nonstate actors? What is important would be the key strategic factors. A generic discussion or model that helps strategists and planners to grasp both the need and potential characteristics of such factors would contribute significantly to a theory of irregular warfare and help define the roles and capabilities of both SOF and conventional forces. Discussing the “ends” that ensure balance with ways and means and adapting as needed, success will generally be realized. Strategic factors would be maintaining will to accomplish the job, maintaining alliances, guaranteeing legitimacy of the friendly regime, separating populace from effects of adversary, and destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s message, leadership, and key organizational structures.
B31. **Analysis of JTF-510 (Philippines) and reasons for its success**

The writing is a dissection into the successes of this operation. Prepare a focused study with the view of a potential model for future operations. Project will provide a case study of JTF-510 operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Phillippines, addressing both the global context and specific Philippine perspectives. Outcome will provide lessons learned and how those lessons relate to the specific details of the Philippine situation.

B32. **Are Rangers and MARSOC contributors to the irregular-warfare fight?**

Research and analyze the role of specialized units conducting long-range, long-duration operations behind enemy lines or in denied territory, with particular focus on U.S. Marines and Army Rangers. Determine why these roles no longer exist doctrinally within these two forces and propose recommendations to doctrine and missions for providing more capability to USSOCOM. Historically, Rangers have been used both for long-duration raids behind enemy lines and for extended reconnaissance patrols. MARSOC’s added capabilities to USSOCOM do not include their historical role in raiding behind enemy lines. Irregular warfare requires specialized forces to operate for long duration behind enemy lines or in denied enemy territory (i.e., hunter-killer teams). Neither MARSOC nor the Rangers currently provide this capability.

B33. **Conventional/SOF cooperation**

Conventional forces and SOF have coordinated and cooperated to an unprecedented degree in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, SOF have developed a reliance on conventional forces for certain battlefield operating systems (e.g., maintenance, logistics, and quick reaction forces). Discuss the impact of the potential drawdown of general purpose forces in theater on this reliance on SOF units in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
C. Interagency (IA)

**Topic Titles**

C1. Embassy role in U.S. government irregular-warfare effort
C2. Legislative requirements for effective IA campaigns
C3. Completing the irregular-warfare “spear”
C4. NSC-68 for IA
C5. Beltway strategies to create effective IA action organizations
C6. Integrating IA efforts to build partner capacity
C7. IA and SOF mini-field exercises in irregular-warfare environment
C8. Does irregular warfare suggest major restructuring of the U.S. government?
C9. Who are the natural supporters of irregular warfare in the military, legislature, executive branch, academia and intellectual communities, business community, and populace at home and abroad?
C10. What diplomatic resources, capabilities, and initiatives need to be pursued so that the U.S. can conduct irregular warfare effectively and efficiently?
C11. United States Information Agency (USIA)—Do we need to bring it back?
C12. How do we create a revolution in the U.S. services’ and government’s thinking in support of irregular-warfare strategy?
C13. What are the divisions or types of IA efforts?
C14. Resourcing essential 21st century strategic capacity: deployable civilian departments and agencies
C15. Country team approach
C16. What is USSOCOM’s role in strategic communication?
C17. Evaluation of planning methods of the IA and Department of Defense (DoD)
Topic Descriptions

C1. Embassy role in U.S. government irregular-warfare effort
This topic would explore initiatives for restructuring the DoS—Do they go far enough to address the requirements for the long war/persistent conflict of the 21st century? Should more of a regional hierarchy exist to DoS than independent embassies that can report directly to the President of the U.S.? How can/should SOF better work with embassies in pursuit of U.S. interests in the long war? How can IA-SOF synergy at the embassy level better achieve U.S. interests?

C2. Legislative requirements for effective IA campaigns
This topic would review current and pending legislation required to establish organizations and authorities to effectively conduct irregular warfare and large-scale foreign internal defense for combating terrorism. It could also suggest who should write this IA campaign.

C3. Completing the irregular-warfare “spear”
This topic would be discussion on how to connect the tip of the spear (SOF) to the rest of the spear (IA). A new NSC-68 to coordinate IA activities may be required to make this happen. Currently, no lead exists amongst stakeholders. Concerning IA involvement in irregular warfare, education is needed amongst the players. An effective action organization could be developed from existing IA pieces (or developing new pieces) to conduct various missions in support of the facets of irregular warfare.

C4. NSC-68 for IA
A study will analyze the history, structure of, and strategies that resulted from NSC-68 in the Cold War and apply those lessons to designing an analogous document to shape U.S. conduct (strategic IA campaigns) of future indirect conflicts (Iran, terrorists). No coordinating agency for the U.S. irregular-warfare policy currently exists. The military is viewed as the leader, but what is the role for the DoS? Should they be the execute authority as the political arm of the government? A rewrite of the National Security Act of 1947 may be required—that is, perhaps that is the problem needing research. A possible study from a SOF point of view would be to write suggested components of the Act from a USSOCOM point of view, which perhaps would be heavily committed to a restructured-IA working relationship.
C. Interagency (IA)

C5. **Beltway strategies to create effective IA action organizations**
What actions are needed (legislation, executive order, reorganization) to build organizations capable of taking effective action that encompass multiple agencies’ areas of expertise? How can those actions be initiated? The study could propose an action plan for HQ USSOCOM that includes legislative initiatives, IA reorganization, and/or establishment of new organizations to achieve a command structure capable of conducting an effective IA-action campaign.

C6. **Integrating IA efforts to build partner capacity**
This topic could examine what IA partnerships exist today or use historical, regional, and nation-specific Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans to frame the process that integrates IA efforts. The foreign internal defense design should be developed to force whole-of-government activities around IDAD plans, thereby causing actions that meet objectives to help friendly nations protect themselves from lawlessness, insurgency, and subversion.

C7. **Interagency and SOF mini-field exercises in irregular-warfare environment**
This study objective is, How do we “operationalize” foreign internal defense? How do we begin shaping the campaign of unconventional warfare for long-term, persistent conflict focused on U.S. embassy direction? Specific tactical DoD units and other U.S. government agencies seldom meet—let alone exercise—together prior to real-world operations in a consistent and meaningful way. Thus both sides struggle to overcome different cultural perspectives, organizational structures, and operating procedures to achieve the operational objectives in support of national objectives.

C8. **Does irregular warfare suggest major restructuring of the U.S. government?**
This topic would determine how we enhance cooperation among institutions, particularly U.S. agencies that will create a national security “community of interest.” This community would include military, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, aid lobbies, and other interests.
C9. **Who are the natural supporters of irregular warfare in the military, Congress, executive branch, academia and intellectual communities, business community, and populace at home and abroad?**

This topic begs two questions: Who are the natural supporters and the adversaries of irregular warfare and why? This study would provide the SOF community these initial benefits:

a. Basis for understanding the resistance to the concept of irregular warfare

b. Ideas about how to pursue convincing arguments

c. How to build constituencies for gaining the necessary support and resources to prepare for such a future.

C10. **What diplomatic resources, capabilities, and initiatives need to be pursued so that the U.S. can conduct irregular warfare effectively and efficiently?**

This study looks at irregular warfare, the relationship of SOF, and the diplomatic instrument of power at the regional or country level. It seeks to identify those operating concepts, tasks, and models that would help both the SOF and DoS communities think about how to pursue successful strategies for irregular warfare.

C11. **United States Information Agency (USIA)—Do we need to bring it back?**

Secretary Gates said “Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come to mind when discussing U.S. Strategic Communications” in his Beyond Guns and Steel speech to Kansas State University. The USIA was an effective national strategic communications agency because it was not subordinate to DoS or DoD. Analyze the success and failures of USIA during the Cold War and apply to the shaping lines of operation in the GWOT campaign. Address the rationale for disbanding USIA, the effectiveness of the disjointed organizations in DoD, and DoS attempting to promote American ideas and discrediting extremist-terrorist ideologies. Outcome may be the recommendation for new USIA.

C12. **How do we create a revolution in the U.S. services’ and government’s thinking in support of irregular-warfare strategy?**

The topic of professional education requires change. First, identify likely allies across the services, then enlist them to the cause; second, identify the decision-makers; research decision-makers’ past decisions to see how best to influence them; develop your options and
choose your plan; and develop your core metaphor or idea. The study would start with directing services to emphasize educating their officers. Increasing the emphasis and scope of the USSOCOM IA Partnership Program and SOF Support Teams is another, more direct, avenue to change.

**C13. What are the divisions or types of IA efforts?**

Does it make sense to divide IA efforts into groups: *domestic* (relationship in the U.S.), *international* (within a given host nation and to include coalition partners), and *regional* (the host nation and its regional partners)? What degree of disconnect exists between IA coordination, at least overseas? Give any areas of interest for SOF and IA toward understanding the desired end states of developing military plans and operations. Where are the regional relationships located—that is, those that may be more indirect in their supported nation (surrounded by hostile nations vs. friendly nations)?

**C14. Resourcing essential 21st century strategic capacity: deployable civilian departments and agencies**

This study will address measures needed to enable various government departments (e.g., State, Commerce, and Justice) to train and equip personnel toward supporting U.S. policy goals and related activities in the international environment. U.S. policy goals require applying all the elements of power that are represented by the various government agencies, not just the military. Examine what is important to SOF because they must interact with various government agencies overseas in accomplishing their mission.

**C15. Country team approach**

In an era of irregular warfare, SOF may find itself deployed in a number of countries and supporting the ambassador’s country team. Does SOF need specific representation on the country team or is the normal representation sufficient? In either case, how would this work? What interaction is appropriate or required? Who is in charge of what? How are disputes resolved? How can this support be revived, updated, or replaced to ensure that U.S. players in a given country are working for common causes?

**C16. What is USSOCOM’s role in strategic communication?**

An effective strategic communication plan considers behavior and presence as well as more traditional messaging techniques. To be effective, strategic communication should be executed not as a series of discrete events but as a coordinated campaign lasting over time.
Because SOF often are the only or the first indication of a U.S. presence in a targeted area, they can have significant impact on the success of such a campaign. What is the appropriate organization to lead such a campaign? What would be the SOF role in such a campaign? How should USSOCOM participate? A strong analysis will include a discussion of IA interactions as well as an examination of the appropriate ways to engage elements of SOF. Discussion of training/education requirements (if any) also would be useful.

C17. Evaluation of planning methods of the IA and DoD
Determine the seams that may be available to improve methods (e.g., planning, cycle, timelines, approaches, and tasking). This study would review the current planning methods, compare, contrast, and develop an understanding of planning. Who plans, how are plans developed, and what is the result of the effort? The study would provide a better understanding of how to better plan within our national-level government agencies.
D. Regional and Cultural Studies

Topic Titles
D1. What are the evolving standards for judging legitimacy made by various types of state and nonstate actors?
D2. Cultural awareness
D3. Are cultural, religious, and world view factors in motivating irregular warfare?
D4. Special Forces Group regional orientations
D5. Cultural knowledge in irregular-warfare campaign planning
D6. U.S. military engagement with Mexico: past, present, and future
D7. Regional studies
D8. Should SEALs and air commandos be concerned with cultural/regional awareness? If so, to what extent and how should they be educated?
D9. What is the need to effectively integrate language and culture training/education?
D10. Assist/enhance deploying soldiers in imparting cultural experiences
D11. Ethics for SOF behavior: What are the first principles that do not change?
D12. SOF culture—What is special?
D13. Utilizing “SOF for Life” to rapidly and flexibly increase cultural awareness
D14. The realities of human terrain (HT): clarifying what SOF means by HT and how that applies to strategy, planning, and operations
D15. SOF and cultural engagement
D16. Culturally attuned engagement

Topic Descriptions
D1. What are the evolving standards for judging legitimacy made by various types of state and nonstate actors?
This topic goes to the heart of U.S. foreign policy—that is, who to support. Are some terrorist’s groups “legitimate” in the eyes of their
fellow citizens (Kosovo)? The evaluation of a potentially supported group would implicitly point out what needs to be done to build legitimacy. Problems of understanding legitimacy for a given society and what is acceptable from our perspective requires further study as well. Understanding legitimacy from an economic point of view is another challenge to be investigated. One of the little appreciated aspects of globalization is an evolving conceptualization of legitimacy. In power relationships, legitimacy is important to “great powers” because it defines what must be done to sustain a world order favorable to them. The “small powers” and nonstate actors see legitimacy as a means to limit the actions of great powers.

D2. Cultural awareness
Understanding of culture will assist in finding an enemy’s weakness, especially in irregular warfare where the enemy will resort to any action to achieve objectives. The need is to understand what is acceptable to that enemy, what is not, what his cultural constraints are, and what does not constraint his actions. This information will permit development of successful courses of action. Population’s trust/will is culturally based, and the effective understanding of it is critical to a successful outcome. Three areas of potential study follow: a) regional specific information for a culture and population, b) generic information on awareness, and c) tools to rapidly get specific information on a culture to operators.

D3. Are cultural, religious, and world view factors in motivating irregular warfare?
Cultural education must include orientation on comparative analysis of religions of the world. Americans have a secular culture; some estimates put 80 percent of the rest of the world as more faith based. Many of the conflicts throughout world history have been motivated by religious reasons. Warrior culture is the way in which violence is valued and managed by the collectivity, and it varies from culture to culture. Research how each group handles violence and threats against the collectivity; two example questions follow:

a. Is fighting a recognized road to high status?

b. Are fighters separated from the group in some formal way—as we do with our military—or are they integrated and interspersed?

c. Are there forms of warfare/fighting seen as higher status than others?
D4. **Special Forces Group regional orientations**
Examine alternate rotation concepts for Special Forces Groups to regain regional focus and preserve quality-of-life issues. What impact does the increase in the Special Forces have on the current rotational strategy? To what extent have the past group rotational plans degraded readiness in the non-Central Command (CENTCOM) Special Forces units (e.g., language and down-range relationships)? Since SOF personnel are high demand, low density resources, it is difficult to commit to only one region of the world. However, it is critical that all teams have access to orientation education about the region to which they are deploying. This orientation must cover the political, military dynamic history that is contributing to current hot topics, demographics, basic economics, local military cultures, and the U.S. national security strategy in the region.

D5. **Cultural knowledge in irregular-warfare campaign planning**
This lack of cultural understanding also has lead to confusion. Because some cultures do not like to be confrontational, their acknowledgement is believed to be agreement. In fact, they are only agreeing that they understand a position or proposal, not accept it. The lack of cultural understanding is a handicap in achieved outcomes by set time schedules. Examine the need to understand the actors in the environments that the campaign will be conducted. How can this lead to some understanding of the motivations of these actors? How can this better prepare planners to tailor the campaign plan toward influencing those actors in accordance with the commander’s intent?

D6. **U.S. military engagement with Mexico: past, present, and future**
This topic is of interest for the Northern Command J-32 systemic operational design. Some of the SOF engagements with Mexico in the past are classified, but the need for a concise history of engagements as well as the vision of near-term to far-term—especially in terms of counterterrorism and counternarcoterrorism (CNT)—is needed for homeland-defense purposes. This challenge can also be linked to the cross-border threat of organized crime, its possible nexus with terrorism, and illegal immigration. This complex area deserves considerable study. Mexico is attempting to reign in drug lords that may not be possible. The senior Mexican officials do not trust law enforcement agencies in the country; efforts have included putting the military in counterdrug operations.
D7. Regional studies
Review regional studies to better meet the needs of the combatant commanders. Courses that look at the regions from a strategic and operational perspective are desired, illustrating the linkage between the countries within a given commander’s area of responsibility as well as the adjacent countries. Many of the countries currently engaged in the conflict were drawn in Europe and do not reflect what is occurring in either the country or the region. Ethnic groups straddle those borders and they are unrecognized by the people, and the numbers of languages further complicate the region. This writing is an opportunity to leverage the revamped discipline of geography, which is now more than maps and physical terrain. Geography is now a multidisciplinary study area involving traditional geography as well as aspects of sociology, geology, political science, and economics (and some cultural anthropology may also exist).

D8. Should SEALs and air commandos be concerned with cultural/regional awareness? If so, to what extent and how should they be educated?
SEALs, Rangers, and air commandos are being asked to operate with coalition partners more and more; however, they have never developed an overarching training system to develop the necessary cultural understanding capability. What should be the cultural knowledge or understanding in order to understand and motivate partners so they will work with us?

D9. What is the need to effectively integrate language and culture training/education?
This topic would review realistic objectives for language and cultural training for SOF personnel. How many SOF personnel are fluent at the 3/3/3 levels? What is the standard for cultural training? Should new standards be developed for a combined culture and language test? Should cultural studies be more integrated into language training?

D10. Assist/enhance deploying soldiers in imparting cultural experiences
This study would address the issue of how cultural understanding is transferred by incoming and outgoing personnel. What is really important to deploying soldiers/units with respect to cultural awareness? This writing would include (but not be limited to) the do’s and don’ts in a country or an ethnic group, religion(s) of the area, the
work ethic, the difference between assistance and “feel good,” and a clear understanding of how their tour supports the end state of the campaign. Assuming the soldiers immersed in a given culture can offer much, what are the other pieces to give them when new to the environment? History is another topic for the soldiers—that is, knowledge of how the locals think about their country.

D11. Ethics for SOF behavior: What are the first principles that do not change?
This paper would address behavioral expectations—including cultural accommodation in the field—that may conflict with traditional military ethics as taught during formation at the service academies and other personnel acquisition programs. What major issues exist, and how are they accommodated? How are outcomes affected by cultural awareness?

D12. SOF culture—What is special?
Analyze characteristics of SOF personnel and contrast the characteristics that define successful special operators with successful conventional forces. Use case study analysis to determine those characteristics that lead to success in special operations. Examine characteristics of Special Forces, SEAL, and Special Mission Unit (SMU) leaders in relation to conventional counterparts. Describe SOF culture relative to conventional culture by examining core values, personal and professional rewards, risk mitigation and acceptance, unique camaraderie, selection, and assessment. Are SOF really special, or are they just specifically trained and equipped to do special missions, like many conventional leaders believe? Examine the pros and cons of establishing a fifth service. What (if any) would be the performance advantages gained by establishing such a service?

D13. Utilizing “SOF For Life” to rapidly and flexibly increase cultural awareness
The U.S. has countless former SOF warriors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The topic would be how to capture and share the knowledge, not only for the current operations but also as a database. How can they be engaged in-country and upon return to the U.S.? There probably are many ways to extract the information that they have acquired while in-country. That information could be used to better support the deploying troops. The result would be a valuable and flexible reservoir of cultural knowledge combined with SOF experience. What
are the pros and cons of utilizing this resource? Do legal, experiential, procedural, cultural, or other barriers preclude it?

D14. **The realities of human terrain (HT): clarifying what SOF means by HT and how that applies to strategy, planning, and operations**
This topic can focus on defining HT, how it is applied, and determining its benefits. Examination of its outcomes can also be considered and whether better ways to accomplish this mission exist.

D15. **SOF and cultural engagement**
The SOF community has cultural challenges; a few examples follow:
  a. One “big mother” service relationship with SOF subculture
  b. IA cultural issues with SOF as well as the nongovernmental organization environment
  c. Cultural concerns for the host nation and its regional role.
These different cultures all require a different approach/strategy. Examine one or more of the cultures, balanced against the SOF warrior culture. These challenges could be approached like engagements to ensure that the right applications of resources are used for the desired result.

D16. **Culturally attuned engagement**
One of the tenets of the USSOCOM mission is to “emphasize culturally attuned engagement.” Analyze the critical need for cultural skills (not just language skills) and discuss specific ways to enhance these skills. Give lessons learned from deployments, advantages of forward-based SOF elements, and leveraging of educational opportunities (e.g., fellowships and exchange assignments).
E. Miscellaneous

Topic Titles
E1. Understanding the underworld: black markets, gray markets, and how to exploit them to U.S. advantage
E2. How is strategy developed for special operations, and what is the framework for such development?
E3. What is the nature of conflict in the 21st century and what is the role for SOF?
E4. Why is Phase Zero important and how can SOF support the geographic combatant commander strategy: informing the joint conventional community
E5. Who has doctrinal responsibility for irregular warfare and where is it taught?
E6. Civil Affairs as influence maker: theory and practice
E7. The MilGroup and SOF: force multiplier for U.S. embassies
E8. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to develop irregular-warfare skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic communications)
E9. Can the U.S. ever overcome the propensity for political correctness (an essential element for success in irregular warfare)?
E10. Risk acceptance—case studies in how risk-adverse DoD is in times of crisis
E11. Is the U.S. transitioning from super power to great power status and what does this mean for SOF structure?
E12. NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC)
E13. Irregular-warfare personnel system: rewarding people from the conventional military and SOF for actively seeking irregular-warfare career paths that do not involve direct action
E14. Optimizing the USSOCOM mission
E15. Innovative SOF recruiting
E16. Integrating SOF and “big service” requirements/systems
E17. SOF and service convergence
E18. What do we know about eliciting emotional responses and cognitive change in the virtual world, and how can we best apply it to disrupt or impede terrorist recruitment in cyberspace?

Topic Descriptions

E1. Understanding the underworld: black markets, gray markets, and how to exploit them to U.S. advantage
This topic would focus on the study of criminal activities and how they are similar to that of insurgent activities. Further, it could compare activities of FARC and that of the Taliban/drug lords in Afghanistan. Does a transfer of tactics and techniques occur between terrorist groups? Does a link exist between crime and terrorism in the early phases or is this aspect a natural progression?

E2. How is strategy developed for special operations, and what is the framework for such development?
This question should consider the operational role of SOF in each of the phases (0-V) and assess the effectiveness of their employment in those phases. Afghanistan and Iraq could serve as case studies. The unconventional warfare operations in Afghanistan are excellent examples of pre-phase III operations. They lead into two questions:
   a. How does the U.S. government as well as DoD consider SOF use in all campaign phases?
   b. What are effective employment techniques in terms of strategy and operational art for SOF/IA synchronization to include measures of effectiveness?

E3. What is the nature of conflict in the 21st century and what is the role for SOF?
This study will consider the viability of technology, impacts of cultural/religion, and other variables. What tools can be developed for early detection of an irregular conflict? Will the battlefield be economic rather than terrain oriented? How will SOF be employed in an economic conflict?

E4. Why is Phase Zero important and how can SOF support the geographic combatant commander strategy: informing the joint conventional community
Phase Zero can be described in terms of anti-insurgency, in the same manner that the Army delineates between antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Phase Zero is rapidly becoming an outdated term.
The Africa Command (AFRICOM) already calls it *active security*. In general, countries are very uncomfortable with Phase Zero; if we go active security, what are the resource implications, and is the approach even doable?

**E5. Who has doctrinal responsibility for irregular warfare and where is it taught?**

A study that analyzes the “who” should have doctrinal lead and what could limit the negative aspects of service competition over that role to more rapidly advance the progress of fielding it. Is the DoD or Army the lead organization?

**E6. Civil Affairs as influence maker: theory and practice**

This study would define how Civil Affairs (CA) operations work in “by, with, and through” the foreign people/government to further U.S. interests and increase host-nation legitimacy. What is the CA role in information operations? What is the strategy that employs CA to support U.S. goals and interests in the long war? How can CA be incorporated in a theater campaign plan or long-term strategy in an age of persistent conflict (the long war)? How is that plan linked to the host nation’s campaign plan?

**E7. The MilGroup and SOF: force multiplier for U.S. embassies**

This topic would review the current and future role of Military Groups/Office of Military Cooperation and the U.S. embassy. How can the MilGroup concept be revived, reinforced, and/or broadened to enable embassies to be efficient headquarters/command posts in the long war? What is the role of SOF in the MilGroup? Should a MilGroup be commanded by a SOF operator? Is the MilGroup the wrong structure for enabling ambassadors to employ the military element of national power in pursuit of U.S. interests in the long war?

**E8. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to develop irregular-warfare skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic communications)**

This topic would study the value of creating internships for SOF in successful companies or organizations to develop a knowledge base of nonmilitary functions (e.g., power-economic and diplomatic). Strategic communication could be explored from a marketing point of view. Strategic thinking at the multinational should also be considered. Computer operation and electronic transfer of funds could be examined because are often the terrorist’s means of moving...
illegal money around the world. Also respond to the question, What academic credit should be granted from the internship (M.A. or Ph.D.)?

E9. **Can the U.S. ever overcome the propensity for political correctness (an essential element for success in irregular warfare)?**

This subject should lead to serious review of military culture, military ethics, and morale courage. Senior officials have become adept at parroting politically correct policy when moral courage is the requirement. How are ethics, values taught? What are their roles in modern society? Who wins in the struggle between civil vs. military control of the armed forces? Has “political correctness” spilled over into the SOF community? What role will they play in irregular warfare (unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency)?

E10. **Risk acceptance—case studies in how risk-adverse DoD is in times of crisis**

This case study would deal with acceptance and avoidance risk. It would also deal with the development of a matrix or format that would determine acceptable levels of risk compared to the threat to national interest. Acceptance of more risk early in the planning of the operation may have given the President of the U.S. more options or opportunity to prepare the nation once a decision is reached. Cost-benefit analysis of risk acceptance through case studies would help future operational and strategic planners understand constraints and restraints imposed by senior decision makers.

E11. **Is the U.S. transitioning from super-power to great-power status and what does this mean for SOF structure?**

This topic would examine the status of the U.S. in the world today. The post-Cold War made the U.S. a super power, but is that still the status today? Has the war on terrorism eroded our international standing? What other factors are included in the power-status model (e.g., the strength of our dollar, debt to surplus ratio)?

E12. **NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC)**

This subject would explore how SOF works within coalition warfare. Does “white” and “dark” SOF have the same reporting/coordinating requirements? How does U.S. SOF interface with international SOF regarding operations and intelligence?
E13. Irregular-warfare personnel system: rewarding people from the conventional military and SOF for actively seeking irregular-warfare career paths that do not involve direct action

Historically, DoD jettisons/ignores the capabilities and talents of personnel who excel in irregular warfare after an irregular-warfare conflict is complete. Thus experience, knowledge, and investments are lost. Furthermore, it discourages other personnel from seeking opportunities to develop their irregular-warfare skills/capabilities during peacetime or when the focus is only on conventional war. In fact, irregular warfare is considered a passing fad that does not warrant the investment. Determine the factors that led to DoD’s organizational culture—that is, the treatment of irregular warfare as a lesser endeavor and how this conduct negatively impacts the development of irregular-warfare-focused personnel. Use case studies, interviews, and surveys from Korea, Vietnam, and Operation Enduring Freedom to determine the key factors and attitudes. Based upon these findings, create recommendations to improve the personnel system and PME institutions, thereby encourage the enhancement and sustainment of irregular-warfare-capable personnel.

E14. Optimizing the USSOCOM mission

Optimizing the synchronization of the Title X functions of USSOCOM and/or the standardization of the force(s)? Examine the three prongs of the revised USSOCOM mission statement. Pick one or more prongs and analyze ways to improve on “performance.” For example, for the “develop and support our people and families” prong, instances for discussion might be initiatives to improve the quality of life, improved training opportunities within USSOCOM or a component, and educational program incentives.

E15. Innovative SOF recruiting

Two successful military recruiting programs in recent history have the Filipino Enlistment Act and the Lodge Act. After a discussion of these two programs, propose a similar program beneficial to SOF, which outlines the recruiting of foreign nationals. Assess the impact of such a new program in the context of one facet of the USSOCOM mission to “emphasize culturally attuned engagement.”

E16. Integrating SOF and “big service” requirements/systems

Survey and analyze current U.S. and allied approaches to integrating SOF requirements and equipment into “big service” requirements
and equipment. Include recommendations and associated impact analysis of potential alternative approaches.

E.17 **SOF and service convergence**
Investigate the degree to which services have taken and continue to take on more SOF roles and become more “SOF-like.” Analyze the future of SOF, given trends identified in the investigation as well as discuss/recommend “core” SOF missions that should/must be kept separate from service activities.

a. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Buy-Try-Decide approach to include the effectiveness of UDAs and JUONs, the quality and effectiveness of the final products, and pitfall from the approach

b. Investigate past commonality efforts, their cost and effectiveness, and any common traits among those efforts that succeeded as well as those that failed

c. Research the value of UID to SOF

d. Research the value of performance-based logistics to SOF

e. Evaluate and recommend for better SOF leverage of service and DLA systems

f. Personnel-perspective-related research—how to get long-term perspectives from short-term personnel

g. Investigate the technical limiting factors of “roll-on/roll-off” ISR, communications, or weapons systems for commercial or common airframes.

E18. **What do we know about eliciting emotional responses and cognitive change in the virtual world, and how can we best apply it to disrupt or impede terrorist recruitment in cyberspace?**
The behavioral sciences (including psychology, sociology, and anthropology), the intelligence community (through overt and covert virtual interactions and lessons learned), and the private sector (such as on-line dating and advertising) have compiled a lot of information about emotional responses (liking, disliking, love, hate, trust, disgust, for example) and cognitive change (thoughts, opinions, perspectives, for example) in virtual interactions. Islamist web sites, forums, blogs, chat rooms, and list serves are sometimes sites of extremist and terrorist recruitment. There is a need for analyses and studies to determine and compile what is reliably known about these virtual phenomena. There is a further need to then interpret and apply “what is known” to enhance efforts to disrupt, impede, or block recruitment into, or supportive affiliation with, extremist
and terrorist causes and organizations via these various cyber mechanisms. Research that enhances our state of knowledge and its application in this domain will be useful in psychological operations, information operations, asset recruitment and handling, and intelligence gathering in the Global War on Terrorism.
F. Topics Retained from Previous Years

Topic Titles

F1. Counterinsurgency methods
F2. SOF role in current/future Afghanistan
F3. Case studies
F4. SOF stations at embassies
F5. “No borders, no boundaries”
F6. Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations
F7. How are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) used to provide funding to terrorist groups?
F8. Role of SOF in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear environments
F9. Maritime SOF and the war on terrorism
F10. Countering ideological support for terrorism (CIST)
F11. SOF prevention or moderation of the onset of warfare
F12. The role of SOF in coalition and surrogate warfare in the 21st century
F13. SOF and HUMINT/SIGINT/IMINT
F14. Islamic extremism in the Americas
F15. Intelligence indicators to detect emerging insurgency
F16. Roles of SOF and NGOs in complex humanitarian emergencies
F17. Foreign internal defense/counterinsurgency operations in the contemporary operating environment (COE)
F18. Joint SOF training center
F19. Integrating SOF into conventional force training
F20. Medical unconventional warfare: guerilla, resistance medicine, and hospitals
F22. SOF PME considerations
F23. Iraq in 2011
F24. Islamic and Islamist movements in the Sahel region of Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa
F25. SOF and less-than-lethal weapons
F26. What are the appropriate missions and best force structure for Air Force SOF in 2020
F27. Medical enhancements for special operations personnel
F28. Future role of contracting and SOF
F29. War outside of combat zones: joint/IA special operations organization
F30. Statecraft vs. kinetic solutions
F31. USSOCOM core activities
F32. “Policy of Reprisal”
F33. Political consequences surrounding the use of SOF
F34. Keys to successful coalitions
F35. SOF/conventional force operations in a coalition environment
F36. Impact of increased Army SOF participation in evolving regional security arrangements
F37. Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)/Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) operations
F38. The casualty care interface between the Air Force Medical Service and SOF
F39. Should SOF be given Title 50 responsibilities?
F40. Special operations role in the Proliferation Security Initiative
F41. Streamline PSYOP approval process
F42. Navy and maritime SOF
F43. Effects of IA bypass
F44. War outside of combat zones—an historical perspective
F45. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional development
F46. SOF/Joint Task Force in counterinsurgency operations
F47. Counterinsurgency strategy—victory vs. management (containment)
F48. Coalition support teams
F49. SOF and Joint Fires
F50. Capabilities of services’ SOF logistical units/elements
F1. **Counterinsurgency methods**
   Treating this new era of conflict as a form of global insurgency implies that counterinsurgency methods are fundamental in combating the new form of transnational terrorism. These methods include the following:
   a. Focus on protecting and securing the population
   b. Politically and physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted political and development measures, and conducting precise intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal collateral damage.

F2. **SOF role in current/future Afghanistan**
   In the context of the U.S. national interest, examine the SOF impact and effects of the war in Afghanistan and recommend strategic options based on this 4–5 year assessment. Which elements of U.S. national power can/should be applied there to counter drug production, empower the national government, and continue the progress made since 2002?

F3. **Case studies**
   Many students have written timely, thoughtful accounts of recent (or historical, with linkages to recent or future operations) operations. If
leaning toward this technique, ensure recommendations (e.g., command and control; tactics, techniques, and procedures) are provided after the analysis of the operation to add value to the project.

F4. **SOF stations at embassies**
Discuss the costs and benefits of creating standing, funded SOF elements within selected embassies akin to the current practice of CIA stations. Example issues that could be examined are roles and missions for these units, command and control, funding, and IA coordinations.

F5. **“No borders, no boundaries”**
This is more of a mindset from the USSOCOM commander than a topic. At a March 2006 speech, General Brown challenged special operations professionals to develop new ways of thinking and innovative ways of warfighting and training, equipping, and employing the warfighter. To paraphrase, the legal, moral, and ethical boundaries are non-negotiable and will not be stretched or broken. Everything else is on the table, said General Brown. This type of approach to writing has been evident among many special operations authors and should be used in tackling any topic selected in pursuit of the writer’s duties.

F6. **Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations**
Assess the actual impact of arresting religious leaders and/or entering into mosques/madrassas as a tactic against Islamic extremists. The thesis posed via this topic is that when we are oversensitive and overstate Middle East sensitivities, we hamstring our efforts. Costs and benefits are associated with this type of approach. Can the real protagonists of terror be stopped using this method? Consider U.S. public opinion, reprisals against the U.S., reaction of coalition partners, and other factors.

F7. **How are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) used to provide funding to terrorist groups?**
Analyze the efforts of several NGOs, including stated mission, target population groups, and impacts on these target groups. Does some of the aid rendered to indigenous groups get redirected to terrorist organizations? If so, is it intentional or through mismanagement, crime, or something else? Discuss how this phenomenon can be prevented by the U.S. government or other agencies.
F8. **Role of SOF in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear environments**

Which of the SOF missions can be accomplished in a contaminated environment? Discuss the tactical and logistical aspects with a focus on what each of the services are doing for conventional mission sets. How can the threat be reduced? Mobility concerns, force protection, and detection/decontamination equipment could be examined. This topic could be broadened or divided to include operating in difficult environments.

F9. **Maritime SOF and the war on terrorism**

Explore and develop a detailed concept of operations for maritime SOF involved in the war on terrorism. Evaluate the statement that the vast majority of weapons of mass destruction proliferation transport is maritime. Pay particular attention to the force structure, basing implications, and logistics support required for Naval Special Warfare and U.S. Marine Corps SOF. Other areas that could be addressed are joint command and control, relationships with other governmental agencies, and interoperability with coalition forces.

F10. **Countering ideological support for terrorism (CIST)**

The concept of CIST is integral to the U.S. government and military strategy for the war on terrorism. Investigate the tenets of CIST and provide an awareness of the culture, customs, language, and philosophy of the enemy. Analyze measures to more effectively counter the extremist ideology driving terrorists and providing cover for them to operate within their society.

F11. **SOF prevention or moderation of the onset of warfare**

Examine the ramifications of the following statement: “The key application of SOF is to prevent or moderate the onset of warfare by skillful application of their capabilities early.” Two facets of this topic could be studied—early in the development of a crisis or continuing positive relations through a continuous presence in a given country.

F12. **The role of SOF in coalition and surrogate warfare in the 21st century**

Determine the proper mix of forces, skills, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to fight and win beside surrogate armies. Analysis of historical works and lessons learned could result in a notional future employment of SOF and surrogates. Alternatively, a different approach could be used to outline experiences with coalition SOF, either unilaterally or with conventional forces. A key to this study is
to identify which foreign forces can be suitable partners and developing a notional scenario to validate the thesis.

F13. **SOF and HUMINT/SIGINT/IMINT**
SOF success is inextricably linked to the quality and quantity of intelligence professionals. Examine the current and future capabilities of one of the aspects of intelligence crucial to SOF. A sample of the subsets studied under this intentionally broad topic follows: how to better share data collected, improved ways to use geospatial products, how a conventional intelligence soldier becomes a SOF intelligence professional, the synchronization of various systems, or new SOF intelligence-support structures.

F14. **Islamic extremism in the Americas**
This topic is an analysis of the threat to the U.S. and to North and South America from the “tri-border area.” This region of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil is home to many Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, neo-Nazis, FARC, and other terrorists. Smuggling, terrorist fund-raising, and law enforcement ineffectiveness make this area a haven for criminal organizations. How should SOF and other agencies be employed to combat this threat?

F15. **Intelligence indicators to detect emerging insurgency**
Review existing studies to determine indicators of instability in a particular country or region. What is the SOF role in operational preparation of the environment (OPE) regarding this intelligence requirement? Discuss mechanisms of sharing information and intelligence methods and products between SOF units and country teams.

F16. **Roles of SOF and NGOs in complex humanitarian emergencies**
SOF have played an increasingly critical role in the international response to complex humanitarian emergencies. The liaison between these two elements requires that SOF understand the diversity of NGO objectives and organizational cultures. This topic could take an approach of the division of labor involved or education of SOF (e.g., on NGO capabilities, limitations). Give advantages and disadvantages of “collaborating” with NGOs. Include a discussion of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international organizations. The relationships between SOF and other U.S. contractors could also be explored.
F17. **Foreign internal defense/counterinsurgency operations in the contemporary operating environment (COE)**
Research could be based on experiences in a particular region and the potential for future operations in that region. Analyze the strategic implications of a SOF presence and the resultant benefits. Examine SOF interaction with other selected elements of the COE (e.g., law enforcement and coalition operations). Include case studies of successful operations including pre-existing conditions (DIME) in the country and an analysis of what factors will contribute to a successful operation today.

F18. **Joint SOF training center**
Should USSOCOM invest manpower and other resources to design, build, and staff an integrated training center for all components of SOF? Analyze the worth of current training opportunities at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the other existing training centers. Discuss resourcing, logistics, meshing of schedules, and IA aspects of this concept with recommendations as to how a joint SOF training center could work. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a dedicated facility to bring together SOF components in a joint training environment.

F19. **Integrating SOF into conventional force training**
Synergistic opportunities exist throughout the spectrum for SOF integration into conventional operations. The best example is occurring now at JRTC; this project could include an assessment of the program there and plans to integrate into other areas. Any discussion of this integration should include how this integration will be accomplished within the Joint National Training Center (JNTC) construct.

F20. **Medical unconventional warfare: guerilla, resistance medicine, and hospitals**
Propose a study to determine relative and pertinent medical unconventional warfare doctrine for the 21st century. The final product will determine the importance of integrating medicine to support long duration and unconventional warfare operations.

This range of topics would address problems and solutions (nonmaterial) with U.S. SOF conducting operations with forces of differing
capabilities. Examine the procedures and techniques for forming bonds with dissimilar units, with the purpose of achieving synergistic effects on the battlefield. Collecting and analyzing unclassified lessons learned would be a start point if interested in this topic.

F22. **SOF PME considerations**
Explore educational strategies to enhance the SOF personnel ability in handling uncertainty. Explore distance learning, joint aspects of education, interface with service PME institutions, and other ways to leverage existing programs to achieve the goal. Interesting facets of this topic include critical thinking, critical writing, speed reading, and the art and skills of negotiating.

F23. **Iraq in 2011**
The November 2005 *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* states that the United States security objective is “to develop the Iraqis’ capacity to secure their country while carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency.” (This document is available at www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf.) In the context of existing SOF doctrine and USSOCOM core tasks, analyze this objective with a clear picture of SOF presence and activities in Iraq in the year 2011. What conditions must be set in order to create and maintain an effective Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program in Iraq? How can SOF manifest the elements of national power to ensure achievement of the above national objective? How can the U.S. achieve parallel objectives (political, economic) in concert with the stated security objective? Discuss the role of coalition partners in this effort and the limitations that will preclude an effective IDAD climate in Iraq.

F24. **Islamic and Islamist movements in the Sahel region of Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa**
According to most experts in this region, this area of Africa is a safe haven for terrorists, replete with failed or failing states, and with conditions ripe for insurgency. Analyze the Islamic strongholds in the region and examine religious conflict and its implications for regional stability in Africa. Determine if a U.S. national interest exists there. If so, offer suggestions for development of democracy and predict the impact of SOF involvement, either in a foreign internal defense or Civil Affairs role. Include the evolution of profes-
sionalism in African militaries in the region and the future of modernization in African military forces.

**F25. SOF and less-than-lethal weapons**

Report on the state of nonlethal weapons development and deployment in SOF. Anticipate future developments and legal limitations in this arena. Describe the organizational and force structure changes required to make best use of these weapons. Discuss required changes in law or doctrine to make these weapons effective. Detail actions SOF should be taking now to ensure we get the best utility from these weapons.

**F26. What are the appropriate missions and best force structure for Air Force SOF in 2020?**

Outline appropriate missions for Air Force SOF and determine force structure for these missions. Identify traditional SOF missions that may migrate to conventional forces, new missions for which SOF are uniquely suited, and the possible impact of these developments—for example, on force structure, training, and doctrine. This research problem may also be tailored to look specifically at the requirements for an “M-X” transport and its potential roles and missions in the future operating environment.

**F27. Medical enhancements for special operations personnel**

Recent advances in medical technology have created opportunities for improving human performance. Examples include LASIK surgery to improve/correct vision and performance-enhancing drugs to move faster, longer, and better. Examine impact on recruiting, assessing, and effects on attrition rates among the various “pipelines.” This topic is a study of current and future programs, including long-term human effects and the potential for future developments.

**F28. Future role of contracting and SOF**

Should USSOCOM expand capacity—for example, in training, force protection, and convoy security—through the use of contractor personnel? Analyze issues deemed germane to this concept—for example, resourcing, legal ramifications, and physical readiness.

**F29. War outside of combat zones: joint/IA special operations organization**

Develop and propose an organizational construct for a joint or IA organization tailored to war on terrorism operations outside of combat areas. Analyze the impact of proposed recommendations on
existing units and force structure. Discuss command relationships for the new organization. Include rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimates for all courses of action and identify/propose locations for any new commands.

**F30. Statecraft vs. kinetic solutions**
Interagency partners, particularly the Department of State (DoS), offer an approach to combating terrorism for which SOF can benefit. Discuss how together, SOF and DoS personnel can reduce conditions favorable to terrorist activity, including enemy leadership and safe havens. Recommend ways to complement unconventional warfare with statecraft by combining these two elements of national power from the local to (and including) the strategic level.

**F31. USSOCOM core activities**
Are the U.S. SOF direct-action-oriented assets? Should USSOCOM review and adjust the stated core tasks? Should USSOCOM change their perspective on the stated core tasks in light of the current threats? Analyze one or more of the core tasks and offer new perspectives based on the threat and emerging capabilities of USSOCOM.

**F32. “Policy of reprisal”**
Examine the effectiveness of a “policy of reprisal” as a deterrent to terrorist attacks, in particular directly against the United States. Is this a viable counterterrorism policy (i.e., a deterrent future terrorist act) or was it done to meet the domestic demand for action? Should we fight networked terrorist organizations with networked organizations of our own? To ask the question differently, discuss different ways U.S. and coalition counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces could be structured to defeat the terrorist threat.

**F33. Political consequences surrounding the use of SOF**
SOF are a unique, well-trained, and lethal asset; the use of these forces often has strategic consequences. For a number of reasons, however, past administrations have been hesitant to use SOF, notably in the fight against terrorism prior to September 11, 2001. Examine this phenomenon to determine some of these factors, why they influenced senior-level decision making, and why the current administration had little reluctance to put SOF on the battlefield early on after 9/11.
F34. **Keys to successful coalitions**
Three of the SOF attributes (presence and access, regional expertise, and influence), as well as historical examples, suggest that SOF personnel are experts at coalition-building and maintaining these alliances at the small-unit level. Examine the potential for these same soldiers, sailors, and airmen to affect the same thing at the strategic level working with national military leaders.

F35. **SOF/conventional force operations in a coalition environment**
The U.S. is seeking to expand or maintain the concept of coalition operations as the preferred modus operandi for major undertakings overseas. Collect and examine observations and lessons learned. Analyze the SOF roles, both internal and external, in establishing and maintaining a coalition during complex operations.

F36. **Impact of increased Army SOF participation in evolving regional security arrangements**
Define regional security arrangements and a measure of the projected Army SOF positioned to support these regional arrangements. This topic is tied closely to a discussion of appropriate missions for SOF versus conventional forces. It is also tied to which “arrangements” are in the national interest, thus raising the OPTEMPO of limited assets.

F37. **Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF)/Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) operations**
Give lessons learned from duty inside the headquarters element or in the field of one of these task forces. Regional obstacles/concerns, doctrinal issues, or integration with other SOF elements/conventional forces could be discussed with suggested changes for future operations.

F38. **The casualty-care interface between the Air Force Medical Service and SOF**
Give suggested solutions to the problem of the SOF interface. What characterizes it, how should it be planned and programmed, and how and where will the patient-flow integration/transfer process occur?

F39. **Should SOF be given Title 50 responsibilities?**
This Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis would address the topic in enough detail to fully answer the question, which would include the following subareas of investigation:
a. What are the facets of Title 10 responsibility for SOF?
b. What are the facets of Title 50 for covert agencies?
c. What are the unique aspects of SOF missions that are conducted under Title 10 authority?
d. What are the unique aspects of missions conducted under authority of Title 50 responsibilities?
e. What authorities would have to change under both Titles 10 and 50 to allow U.S. SOF to conduct covert-action missions that are currently being conducted under Title 50?
f. If these authorities have to be changed, is the Congress willing?
g. What would be the impacts on force structure, personnel requirements, training, and equipment for SOF conducting Title 50 missions?
h. What would the impact be on other governmental agencies (OGSs) associated with this change of mission?

The magnitude of the study suggests a group effort (5–7 personnel). Each member of the group would be responsible for a portion of the research, such as Title 10 responsibilities for SOF, Title 50 responsibilities for other government agencies, SOF missions conducted under Title 10 authority, and covert-action missions conducted under Title 50 authority.

F40. Special operations role in the Proliferation Security Initiative

The Proliferation Security Initiative reflects the need for a more dynamic, active approach to the global proliferation problem. It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of tools (e.g., legal, diplomatic, economic, military) to interdict threatening shipments of weapons of mass destruction and missile-related equipment and technologies. Analyze SOF roles in this initiative.

F41. Streamline PSYOP approval process

Current methodology requires staffing of the request through the Joint Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for approval per CJCSI 3110.05C. This process can hold up the movement of the request to OSD for months by a nonconcurrence from one 06 in the JS chop chain. This paper would ideally be staffed at the service chief, combatant command, JCS, and OSD levels.

F42. Navy and maritime SOF

Explore the historical and evolving relationship between Naval Special Warfare (NSW) and the Navy, anticipating the future
relationship given the current emphasis on the war on terrorism. The SSGN submarine could be added as a focus area. Analyze the needs of NSW and the command relations with USSOCOM and the Navy. Focus on operational support in both a historical context and in future predictions. Include MFP-11 implications.

F43. Effects of IA bypass
What are the pros and cons of DoD bypassing the IA to deploy and/or employ military forces without ambassador chief-of-mission approval and/or knowledge? What are the tactical, operational, and strategic factors and implications? Are the tactical, operational, and strategic costs/benefits at odds? What possible unintended consequences might be caused by unilateral or uncoordinated operations? Will bypassing facilitate or impede U.S. Government unity of action in the GWOT? Investigate new instruments of authority under consideration for the IA. On a broader scale, does current chief-of-mission policy and protocol provide valuable checks-and-balances, factoring diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power (IOPs), or does it cause inappropriate and/or detrimental friction? If so, should the chief-of-mission role and authority be revised?

F44. War outside of combat zones—an historical perspective
This topic is derived from a larger proposed study by USSOCOM, entitled “Conducting the War on Terrorism Outside of Combat Zones.” Conduct an historical perspective study of organizations that have had similar objectives. Examples of organizations that could be studied are the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), operations against the Irish Republican Army both in Ireland and internationally, Russian efforts against Chechen rebels, and law enforcement efforts against organized crime syndicates, particularly narcotraffickers and arms smugglers. Analyze the degree of integration between SOF, law enforcement, and intelligence entities and the success of each operation.

F45. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional development
Provide a collection of personal SOF accounts throughout recent history. While this perspective has been done (e.g., in support of briefings and courses), a research-paper-length compendium will yield not only lessons learned but aspects of strategy, revolutionary thinking, and command-and-control issues for future planners and
commanders from interviews with senior SOF leaders. The finished product will benefit SOF leaders as a “handbook” on relationships with IA and coalition partners and furnish a range of considerations for SOF noncommissioned officers and officers. Some travel may be involved, or the collection could be gleaned from individuals living near the respective PME schools; this topic is ideal for a USACGSC or SAMS student because of access to a wide range of distinguished SOF senior leaders supporting the SOF elective at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

**F46. SOF/Joint Task Force in counterinsurgency operations**
What is the value and likelihood of a SOF JTF with conventional forces in support of conducting counterinsurgency operations? Discuss the advantages to such a construct with a perspective on current operations and offer its views in fighting a counterinsurgency in the Western hemisphere. Would a standing JTF built around SOF and focused on a host nation’s Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy be effective in preventing an insurgency? Case studies and historical examples would be ideal to support the writer’s position.

**F47. Counterinsurgency strategy—victory vs. management (containment)**
There are two distinct courses of action in developing and implementing a counterinsurgency strategy, and both have implications for SOF. Determine the preferred method in light of transformation, globalization, and grand strategy objectives, using Iraq or another potential insurgency as the war on terrorism continues. Historical examples of each option can be used to determine what the U.S. strategy should be, given the existing variables.

**F48. Coalition support teams**
Examine the effectiveness of coalition support teams in recent operations. To ensure success in future operations, should the makeup of these teams be different? Should these teams expand their mission set to enhance the coalition itself? Perspectives on these teams and their employment might be a focus of research in this area.

**F49. SOF and Joint Fires**
Review current thoughts and insights on integration of Joint Fires across the spectrum of conflict in special operations, focusing on concepts of how Joint Fires support SOF core tasks and small-scale counterinsurgency. Discuss the capabilities needed in the future
operating environment to provide timely, accurate, and deconflicted Joint Fire support.

F50. **Capabilities of services’ SOF logistical units/elements**
After examining each of the services’ logistical requirements, analyze the feasibility and costs/benefits of a joint SOF logistics command. Propose a framework for this organization, determine roles and missions, interface with existing service logistical units, and so forth.

F51. **Adaptive thinking and SOF**
Explore how to develop adaptive/critical thinking in future force soldiers and leaders. This writing covers how to best select for, train, and test for adaptive thinking/leadership in Special Forces. Discuss how critical thinking skills can be learned and developed within the existing framework of SOF training and education venues. Include theories and military writing forwarded by senior leaders.

F52. **Prediction of future Special Forces manning**
This project could take many forms—for example, personnel entering into Special Forces (e.g., demographics and propensity to enlist), organizing for 21st century missions, location of Special Forces bases, and new concepts for manning structure. Examine the British Special Operations Executive (SOE)/Office of Strategic Services (OSS) recruitment as part of the study. Consider also including a discussion of the SOF for Life concept.

F53. **Filling gaps in critical skills with technical expertise**
This topic is an innovative look at leveraging personnel outside of SOF, who possess certain SOF-related skills, to alleviate recruiting and retention shortages. A possible starting point could be looking at the World War II Office of Strategic Services, followed by a discussion of what skill sets are needed based on current and future threats (e.g., cultural anthropologist, city manager, banker, and teacher). Include practical solutions on how to bring these uniquely skilled people in for a short time. Discuss the use of technology to aid in locating, assessing, managing, and retaining these augmentees. The concept of SOF for Life could be incorporated into this project.

F54. **SOF senior leader competencies for joint warfare—preparing for joint SOF combat command**
Explore organizing Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) at the O6 level of command and the associated leader competencies required, based on actual experiences of recent commander
Combined JSOTFs. Offer solutions of successful wartime leadership techniques for ongoing and near-future senior SOF leaders, anticipating wartime commands during the GWOT. Derive key lessons learned from the research for possible incorporation into current leader development methodologies.

F55. **Cross area-of-responsibility operations**
At the operational level, command and control as well as support relationships need to be well-defined early on in the operation. Examine the supported/supporting relationships between USSOCOM and conventional forces belonging to the regional combatant commander and/or Joint Task Force commander. This topic could be discussed in the context of tactical operations, then at the operational level.

F56. **Integrated small-unit operations**
Explore current experiences of SOF units attached, operational control, tactical control, or other relationships. With the advent of transformational concepts in the Army, how should units with differing capabilities be organized to maximize effectiveness? Can the services take good ideas in this regard from recent operations? Provide detailed analysis of an Army unit of action (UA) and how SOF could become a force multiplier when working with a UA.

F57. **The relationship between the TSOC and a standing Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters**
Examine the current authorizations against the needed structure for a JSOTF. What capabilities are essential to the standing JSOTF not embedded in the TSOC? Discuss interaction and relationships with combatant commanders. Different areas of responsibility may warrant modified recommendations for staffing and fighting this organization.

F58. **U.S. national security initiatives in Africa and the war on terrorism**
Address the question of creating an African unified command or a U.S. subunified command within Africa in order to protect U.S. national interests. Analyze a proposal to establish a political-military organization, such as an African regional JTF/Special Operations Command within Africa, to promote democratic initiatives and influence regional stability. Discuss roles and capabilities for Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations (CA/CMO) and IA partners, framing operational preparation of environment throughout Africa,
foreign-internal-defense opportunities in the region, and the rising U.S. national interests in Africa.

F59. **SOF measures of effectiveness**
Examine measures of effectiveness of SOF units. This scope would be at least twofold. At the small-unit level, examine how successful SOF has been in both combat operations and winning support from local population. Employing historical case studies, is SOF a strategic capability? The broader question is determination of the impact of SOF on strategic outcomes. How is the command measuring its effectiveness now? How could the system be improved?

F60. **PSYOP and terrorism effectiveness**
Evaluate the effectiveness of the PSYOP campaign in the war on terrorism and how to better use it as a force multiplier in the war. Discuss the limitations of PSYOP with respect to radical Islamists and the techniques to target specific groups with an aggressive PSYOP strategy. A profile of a prominent terrorist group and a proposed PSYOP plan would help to “know the enemy.”

F61. **Effective PSYOP in a mostly illiterate population**
Determine the effectiveness of a full PSYOP campaign in an area where most of the intended audience is illiterate. Using detailed analysis, develop possible operations—taking in account the literacy and technology of targeted audiences—for future PSYOPs in these environments. How do we reach and educate such audiences?