Mr. Mullick's discussion of the strategic setting in Southwest Asia is particularly timely as the U.S. is diverting strategic resources from the Iraqi theater of war to the effort in Afghanistan. Concurrently, the new administration of President Obama is refocusing the national security strategy away from notions of a global war on terrorism to a security policy of a "broader engagement" with the countries of the world and particularly the Muslim world. As one part of this strategic vision, a particular effort will be made to dismantle or destroy Al Qaeda and its associates.
The JSOU and OSS Society hosted 68 attendees who included veterans of the OSS from WWII (including Major General [Retired] John Singlaub) as well as veterans from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflicts of the past seven decades at the Westin Harbour Island Hotel in Tampa, Florida from 2-4 November 2009. Representatives from the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) headquarters (including Admiral Eric Olson), USSOCOM components, Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) and selected interagency partners also participated.The purpose of the symposium was to gather information about the OSS model and to stimulate thinking on whether and how elements of that model might be applied to contemporary and future irregular warfare challenges. Specific areas of focus included authorities, organization, recruitment, selection and assessment, desired skill sets, training, command and control, communications, sustainment, and interagency collaboration.During the course of the symposium, several recurring themes and conclusions emerged. These are discussed within the report that follows and are listed in the conclusion.
Major General (Ret.) Alvaro Pinheiro-whose career in the Brazilian Army has seen service as a paratrooper, jumpmaster, pathfinder, commando, and Special Forces Operational Detachment commander-in this monograph addresses the challenges posed by urban guerrillas. Recognizing that urban guerrillas are far from limited to a few individual countries, he uses the experiences of Brazil in combating this complex criminal-terrorist phenomenon to illustrate the ways in which this threat can be understood and confronted within legal and Constitutional frameworks. In this assessment, General Alvaro includes their origin, operational environment, tactics, impact on society, and the role of the armed forces in countering these criminal-terrorist elements. The monograph includes both the theory and practice of the urban criminal-terrorist, and draws upon the writings and activities of the notorious urban terrorist Carlos Marighella's (author of the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla) as well as his own experience and that of other military and law enforcement specialists who have dealt directly with this destabilizing threat.
Despite the increasing employment of manhunting, the U.S. national security establishment has not developed appropriate doctrine, dealt with challenging legal issues, nor has it organized forces and assigned clear responsibility to deploy and employ these capabilities. Manhunting could become an important element of future U.S. national security policy, as highly trained teams disrupt or disintegrate human networks. This monograph reviews historical cases related to manhunting and derives lessons from a large number of these historical manhunting operations. Building on these lessons, the monograph then explores potential doctrine, evaluates possible organizational structures, and examines how to best address the responsibility to develop manhunting as a capability for American national security.
In this paper, Dr. William G. Perry provides guidelines about processing computer equipment for transfer to information and intelligence professionals who might wring out from digital storage media the critical information needed to penetrate the enemy's decision matrix. In addition, captured computer gear may often need to be protected by a chain of custody in order to support legal actions against illegal combatants-criminals. Note: This paper is not available in hard copy
By exploring the SOF future strategic environment that includes globalization, demographic trends, competition for resources, transnational non-state actors, advanced technology, and emerging powers, Brigadier General (Ret.) Howard identifies "cultural competency" as critical to the development of junior Special Forces (SF) officers. The need for the SF operator, at once, to effectively interact with indigenous peoples, interagency counterparts, and transnational, nongovernmental players suggests that a new program of graduate level study is needed early-on in the officer's career.
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Research Topics 2010 list, produced by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), is intended to guide research projects for Professional Military Education (PME) students, our faculty, research fellows, and others writing about special operations during this academic year. Research is one of the cornerstones of JSOU's academic mission as we strive to produce publications to meet joint Special Operations Forces (SOF) operational and planning needs.
Sociologists and researchers have used the term social networks for over a century to describe complex sets of relationships between members of social systems at all levels. At its core, a social network-whether face-to-face or web-based-is a map of relevant ties among participants in the network. Within this social network map, individuals in a particular network may exhibit varying degrees of interconnectedness-ranging from tightly connected cliques to those with few connections within a single network-but nonetheless, they act as gateways to other networks.
Dr. John Alexander's current JSOU Press monograph provides an assessment of the African continent with a particular focus on how Special Operations Forces (SOF) may need to operate and how the local environment impacts these operations. He provides a strategic overview and assessment of current conditions on the continent, identifies current conditions on the continent, identifies key concerns and issues, and discusses key players. For a variety of reasons, Africa is, and will remain, a region of critical importance not only to the United States but also to other regions and countries of the world.
This paper is a new initiative for JSOU's Strategic Studies Department, the first to focus on a regional-cultural topic. JSOU Press anticipates publishing additional papers on other Middle Eastern or South Asian topics this year, as well as topics from other regions in future years. Hopefully this paper will inform the reader about issues of importance and enhance an understanding of a region of critical importance to the United States and its allies.
The SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual is designed to support the Joint Special Operations University's educational mission and in particular its series of SOF Interagency courses. The volume was compiled to provide a valuable reference work for JSOU students, SOF staff officers, and partners in the interagency process. The manual provides insight and information regarding various counterterrorism players in the U.S. Government national security apparatus. While not all inclusive, this manual provides an outline of organizations, missions, and relationships that comprise the interagency process.
Sovereign Challenge is a unique approach to solving the most important issue of our day. This conference and proceedings, as outlined in this report, bring us closer to that elusive goal of confronting those who would divide us and developing a comprehensive strategy that contributes to an international community of sovereign nations working together to effectively confront that threat.
The JSOU Press presents this collection of writings from five current and former practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. The writers delve into the concept of surrogate warfare, defined as a substitute force acting on behalf of the interests of another as well as its own interests. For many special operators, the concept of unconventional warfare provides the paradigm for working "through, with, or by" other forces to achieve strategic objectives. Here the authors expand the concept by exploring "surrogate warfare." This volume provides insights into this aspect of modern warfare and should be considered by senior military leaders and policymakers. Drawing upon their recent experiences in the field, the authors provide practical lessons for their colleagues' consideration.
Joe Celeski's current work on the role of policing in confronting security threats highlights the need to shift resources and emphasis towards policing, law enforcement, and internal security. Law enforcement and internal security are key pillars in a comprehensive national security strategy and are often under-emphasized. As the campaign against terrorist networks shifts out of a combat phase, the competition between governments and terrorist groups for the public's support, a key element in irregular warfare, will occur in noncombat zones.
Dr. Turbiville's latest monograph has significant implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces as we continue to operate in both combat and noncombat zones against groups desiring to overthrow existing governments. We must take into account the insurgent organization's plans and operations, but to do so will require us and our local hosts to overcome the insurgent or terrorist group's internal security processes while protecting our operations and organizations from insurgent infiltration.
The score for the Long War can look very different depending on which scorecard is used. Emphasis is currently placed on historically-based, quantifiable, state-versus-state measures which attempt to correlate what we are doing with how we are doing. But the current fight against al-Qaeda is not a state-versus-state war and requires a different metrics that more accurately depict who is winning and who is losing.
US armed forces execute the Global War on Terror, varying strategies are required to facilitate victory within those sovereign states that are hesitant to permit a significant number of US personnel on their soil. The Philippines is an excellent example of how the US military can still achieve victory while under severe operational constraints imposed by a host government. US advisors working with the Armed Forces of the Philippines are developing creative and unconventional counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies to win the support of the local population and to sever their links to the indigenous Abu Sayyaf Group. The 'outhouse strategy' discussed herein is indicative of the peculiarities of unconventional warfare.