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Resistance Views:
Tartu Resistance Seminar Essays on Unconventional Warfare and Small State Resistance, 2014

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Seminar Opening Remarks by
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Essays By
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In an uncertain geopolitical environment of state and non-state threats, a revanchist Russia continues to challenge regional and global order with the clear intent to destabilize the European Union and undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia’s unilateral and deliberate seizure of neighboring states’ territory has created enduring conflicts from Abkhazia to Donetsk, demonstrating blatant disregard for established international laws and norms regarding state sovereignty and national legitimacy. Truth has become a casualty of Russian disinformation campaigns directed at the United States, its allies, and partners. Russia takes aim at the NATO alliance—attempting to undermine the social, political, and economic fabric that holds the alliance together, while directly threatening the countries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. This Russian aggression, both overt and clandestine, is a major security challenge for NATO.

In the face of this growing threat, core NATO nations are reconstituting their European-based military forces to their highest levels since the end of the Cold War, accelerating force modernization, and preparing conventional forces to deter, and if necessary, respond to Russian force-on-force aggression. Yet, conventional preparation is not enough. An important lesson from the Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent assault on Donetsk was that resistance operations are a necessary and critical part of any national defense plan.

In 2014, my predecessor, Major General Greg Lengyel, initiated the SOCEUR-sponsored Resistance Seminar Series as one pillar in countering Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The aim of the series is to develop a network of academics and practitioners to discuss, study, and examine resistance as a means of national defense, and incorporate their findings into national defense plans, while promoting interoperability. As a product of the Resistance Seminar Series, the multinational contributions to the Resistance Operating Concept provide a common lexicon of terms and conditions critical to informing and sustaining allied resistance planning and interoperability, as well as actual vignettes on relevant resistance operations.
Today, in 2017, allied irregular defense forces, supported and trained by elite NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF), are primed for resistance operations in occupied territory. This irregular warfare capability now compliments NATO’s more visible conventional forces and capabilities in the land, maritime, and air domains.

The citizens represented by the nations of the Alliance can rest assured that their SOF are prepared to resist Russian influence and prospective intent to seize NATO member sovereign territory. The threat of strong indigenous resistance can deter a reasonable state actor. Even Moscow, from its Afghanistan occupation experience, knows the cost of irregular force resoluteness, bolstered by a global allied network. With unbroken resolve, NATO allies and European partners will stand together and act firmly, relying upon collective security strengths and their global network of supporters. In closing, I commend the academic institutions, seminar participants, and authors whose support and contributions have made this publication possible.

Mark C. Schwartz
Major General, U.S. Army
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe
Introduction

Colonel Kevin D. Stringer, U.S. Army

In over a decade of warfare in the Middle East, Special Operations Forces (SOF) skewed their activities heavily to direct action missions against Islamic insurgents and terrorists in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen. This shift not only overly focused SOF on the Middle Eastern area of operations, but also underemphasized other SOF missions, particularly those of unconventional warfare (UW) and resistance. Yet like a phoenix arising from the ashes of the Cold War, a revanchist Russia created the conditions for renewed concentration on UW activities and resistance planning through its actions in Crimea and Ukraine, and its application of hybrid warfare concepts throughout Eastern Europe and even in Syria.

This situation has catalyzed both discussion and action in the UW domain, and this book derives from one such activity. This volume is based upon the discourse, dialogue, and outcomes of the 2nd Senior Unconventional Warfare and Resistance Seminar, hosted by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU); Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL); U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (US SOCEUR); Estonian Special Operations Forces; and the Centre for Applied Studies, Estonian National Defence College in 2014. Specifically, from 4–6 November 2014, a multinational and interagency group of academics and practitioners gathered at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia to discuss and debate the study and practice of UW and resistance. As an outgrowth of the seminar, the facilitators and organizers, Kevin D. Stringer (US SOCEUR) and Richard Newton (JSOU) initiated the genesis for this book by encouraging several of the participants to contribute their thoughts and research to this important subject. With Seminar Opening Remarks by Major General Gregory J. Lengyel, then Commander of US SOCEUR, this book’s aim is to spark intensive discussion on both UW and counter-UW approaches, doctrine, and capabilities.

Colonel Stringer is the Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5) for US SOCEUR.
This book begins with Janis Bērziņš examining “Asymmetry in Russian New Generation Warfare” where the author postulates that it is a conceptual mistake to try to fit Russian New Generation Warfare into a Western framework of fighting. The Russian view of modern conflict is based on the idea that the main battle-space is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare. The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to an absolute minimum, while making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country. In this concept, the Russian notion of permanent war implies a permanent enemy—in this case Western civilization: its values, culture, political system, and ideology.

This section is followed by two perspectives on how small states and societies can defend themselves from such a threat. First, Tomas Jermalavičius and Merle Parmak explore developing communal and national resistance in Estonia with “Societal Resilience as a basis of Whole-of-Society Approach to National Security and Defence.” Their aim is to discuss societal resilience, its constituent elements, methods for its achievement and—if societal resilience is to be instrumental in advancing national security—the requirements for the national policy. They demonstrate that societal resilience provides a whole-of-government approach rooted in Estonia’s national security and defense policies because the nurturing of its constituent elements—channeling investments in various forms of national capital (social, human, economic, physical, natural)—is obviously something which can only be done by concerted long-term efforts by different Estonian organizations.

Karl Salum in “Small State Unconventional Warfare Doctrine: Feasibility and Application for National Defense,” demonstrates that small states face unique considerations regarding UW. For instance, being able to mount an UW campaign can be an existential question for a small state which possesses neither territorial depth nor superiority of conventional forces to bolster its defense. This chapter breaks down the different aspects of UW for a small state and the foundations of small state UW doctrine. Terminology and definitions are discussed as well as the need for a distinct UW policy. Although it will not be an easy exercise in planning, proper execution brings together multiple organizations and structures for a solid national defense.

In “NATO Special Operations Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach,” Heather Moxon highlights how NATO leaders, both political
and military, are considering options to deter Russia from further destabilizing actions against its neighbors. She examines the advantages of employing NATO special operations forces as a deterrent and elaborates the opportunities and challenges that the Alliance faces in this regard. Focusing on the way ahead, NATO special operations forces already possess the flexibility and education to implement an approach, especially the need to cooperate with non-governmental organizations, such as industry, and local law enforcement. She notes that while the current focus is on Russia, the application of special operations forces should also be considered for UW relevant conflicts in the Middle East and beyond.

Linda Robinson’s “Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Unconventional Warfare” takes three cases from recent history to illustrate the U.S. experience in UW. The cases highlight both the keys to success as well as the impediments involved in UW scenarios. For the cases, the focus is on U.S. support to indigenous movements: the contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001–02, and the Kurdish peshmerga in Northern Iraq in 2003. Ms. Robinson shows that UW can be used as a singular element in a conflict or as part of a broader, multi-faceted strategy to achieve U.S. national aims.

Dick Shultz illustrates the value of civil resistance in his chapter “Non-violent Civil Resistance Movements: Theory and Practice.” He examines this phenomenon from the perspective of social movements challenging the authority and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. Using the case of Serbia, he demonstrates that the theory and practice of civil resistance has applicability today for small states facing the threat of intervention by more powerful neighbors. For small states, armed resistance may not be realistic, but civilian nonviolent defense offers an important alternative for integration into a comprehensive defense plan.

Finally, Michael Ryan shows in “Winning the Peace by Living the Way We Fight” that strong partnerships and collaboration are essential to a comprehensive approach to tackling future conflicts. Ideally, these activities would include the collaboration among different actors from civil society and non-governmental organizations with the military to bring the relationships together to meet a common goal. This approach can also help minimize the high cost of war. It is often easier and more economical to work toward conflict prevention instead of crisis management. Forming a joint, interagency, combined and multi-organizational approach is paramount. By bringing
together these varied participants to work toward conflict prevention, there are ways to reduce the human and financial toll of international crises and contribute to a preventive defense.

Overall, this book seeks to expand both dialogue and research in the UW and resistance field among practitioners and academics, while extending interest to the broader general public. It also aims to refresh the literature on UW and resistance by widening the aperture on the subject through the contributions of a multinational group of contributors offering different perspectives to this complex form of warfare. However, for each individual chapter the views and opinions presented are solely those of each author.
As I speak to you today, we are faced with an indisputable fact that over the past decade, militaries across the globe have confronted a new breed of threat—hybrid and unconventional, violent and nonviolent—and their doctrinal responses are left wanting. From Mosul to Crimea, we have seen that conventional doctrines of combined arms maneuvers, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency no longer apply.

We must respond by adapting our thinking. In this new security environment, we must be prepared not simply to react, but to act. We cannot cede the strategic initiative to aggressors seeking to use unconventional means to undermine our economies, government institutions, and societies and attack our shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and rule of law. To retain the strategic initiative, we must systematically reevaluate our doctrine and its applicability to the current threat environment.

Luckily, this need not be a journey of academic discovery. The litany of academic and media perspectives calling current conflicts ‘new’ or ‘revolutionary’ is misinformed. We are dealing with an older form of warfare—one predating modern wars of maneuver by centuries. Even the supposed disciples of maneuver warfare such as Clausewitz knew this. In many of his writings that predate the opus On War, Clausewitz focused not only on Napoleon’s levée en masse but also on Kleinkrieg—small war. Impressed by the success of the Spanish resistance to Napoleon during the Peninsular Campaign, Clausewitz even attempted to inspire his Prussian compatriots to adopt similar tactics after their failure against the French in open combat at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806.

Kleinkrieg, guerrilla warfare, irregular warfare, unconventional warfare—much has been said and argued vehemently about the applicability and scope of each of these terms. In the simplest interpretation, they all refer to one
thing—the art of fighting small wars, where conditions of asymmetry exist in the relative combat power of the combatants involved. Spaniards lever-aged this asymmetry against Napoleon, that Clausewitz himself wished to use against the French, and that state and non-state actors attempt to exploit against us today.

Unconventional warfare (UW) tools, not its nature, have changed. Glo-balization has brought the proliferation of potent and portable weapons, and the rapid expansion of worldwide communications. Twenty-first century wars are now waged via internet social media platforms—such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. The internet enables Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to boast of acts of terrible barbarity across the modern world, while its supporters in the West abuse the privileges granted them by liberal democracy to radicalize minority populations and promote disunity by proclaiming our actions at home and abroad oppressive and exclusionary.

Wherever our adversaries mass conventional forces, the forces of our alliance can destroy them. ISIL recently received this reminder outside of Baghdad. In contrast, we struggle to keep pace with ISIL’s manipulation of modern media, its ability to radicalize citizens of our own societies to conduct attacks at home or join their forces abroad. How do we defend ourselves against adversaries’ efforts to use the liberal foundations of our democratic societies and the rule of law as armor and weapons against us?

Let me return to Europe by quoting from the NATO press release from September 5, 2014, following the Wales Summit: “Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.” As our heads of state and government announced in the Wales Summit Declaration, NATO poses no threat to Russia and does not seek confrontation. It must be ready, however, to contend with uncon-ventional challenges. It is essential for us to analyze what has taken place in Georgia and Ukraine and the implications for our combined military doctrine, but also for the whole of government responses to this new breed of threat. How do we best deter and defend against hybrid threats? More-over, doctrine is not an end in itself. We should strive to achieve something more—an intellectual interoperability within our Alliance that provides our governments with the sort of adaptive military leadership the current threat environment demands.

I would like to recognize our esteemed colleague Mr. Jānis Bērziņš of the Center for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy
of Latvia, whose work in analyzing the primary sources regarding Russia’s “new generation warfare” has been invaluable to our collective understanding. Our Alliance requires this type analysis, to counter the unconventional threats we face. We have made progress. As my colleague, General Riho Terras, of the Estonian Armed Forces stated at a conference earlier this year, “We have put a lot of emphasis in the last years to create units that are able to deal with unconventional threats.” However, the work is not finished, and we must recognize that the ability to counter unconventional threats such as the ones witnessed in the Ukraine will be incumbent upon a systematic and continuous reevaluation of our capabilities.

I return to Clausewitz, and his analogy of war as a true chameleon—that it is interactive and non-linear by nature. The shape of tomorrow’s threats will not take those of yesterday; to think otherwise would force us into a reactive stance, ceding the strategic initiative. We must be prepared to act. To act, our analysis must focus on two primary lines of effort. The first is to understand and counter unconventional current threats. The second is to ensure that we accept and implement counter-unconventional warfare throughout the Alliance. We must accomplish these lines of effort to ensure a unified, swift, and resolute Allied response when we detect the threat within our borders.

The history of Europe is a history of resistance to tyranny. From the legends of Giuseppe Garibaldi to the anti-Soviet Resistance of the Forest Brothers here in the Baltic Region, we have numerous blueprints for resistance campaigns. It is from the Jedburghs of WWII and their heroic missions to enable the French resistance to the Nazis that our own special forces in the U.S. Army draw their lineage, and our own doctrine of unconventional warfare was born. All of this is to say that a blueprint, a baseline, exists in our doctrine, and we should not be swayed by the pundits classifying this a “new era” of warfare, or those consistently inventing new doctrinal terminology to label the same phenomena. We have a doctrinal foundation from which to draw and adapt—we need not engage in attempts to reinvent the wheel.

This is not to say that this doctrine does not require updating. The conditions of 2014 are different from those of 1944, and the tools with which people wage unconventional warfare today differ greatly. We must advance from the nostalgic vision of remote guerrilla bases in denied territory and adapt to a world of split-second communications and data transfer, nonviolent
resistance, cyber and economic warfare, and the manipulation of international law to undermine national sovereignty.

Unconventional warfare no longer conjures up visions of partisans largely detached from the civilian populace engaging in sporadic attacks on conventional militaries and successfully producing strategic effects in a vacuum. In our era, unconventional warfare is more likely to take the form of a civil resistance movement, perhaps manipulated by foreign powers, that seeks to provoke a violent government response in order to destroy that government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Waging and countering this new unconventional warfare demands great sophistication and agility.

And so, it is incumbent upon all of us to pursue the analysis of the current threat environment with a third line of effort, and ensure that the doctrinal responses we develop to unconventional threats respect and uphold the principles of liberal democracy which we are charged to defend.

The Alliance possesses offensive, kinetic capabilities the likes of which the world has never seen. We can strike targets in any corner of the globe with impunity, and those who take up arms against us cannot hide from the reach and precision of these capabilities. In U.S. Army special operations doctrine, this is what we term surgical strike. However, in the asymmetry that characterizes the current threat environment, enemies can make surgical strikes counterproductive by leveraging legal and political frameworks. Therefore, we must utilize and update the complement of surgical strike—special warfare—the doctrine that includes the missions UW and foreign internal defense (FID), and adapt it to 21st century circumstances.

David Maxwell of Georgetown University argues that special warfare is “counter-intuitively characterized by slow and deliberate employment—long duration actions and activities, relationship establishment, development, and sustainment.” His statement underscores a political necessity. Slow and deliberate, along with complicated and uncertain, are words that civilian leaders do not always welcome when briefed on military operations. It is precisely this kind of capability, however, that the current threat environment demands. I look forward to working with all of you as we strive to codify and build this sort of capability throughout our individual armed forces, our interagency partners, and across the Alliance as a whole, to provide our national decision makers with the most durable and adaptive capability possible.
We must consider an additional capability while developing counter UW doctrine. In the current environment, it is incumbent upon us to prepare our populations for these contingencies. While respecting the rule of law, we must assist in preparing the populace by instilling national resilience, to ensure survival of democratic principles as the foundation of our societies.

The U.S. special operations community is committed to this process. We are here; we stand ready to assist and defend our allies in this chaotic and constantly changing threat environment. Through engagement, we can achieve our goal of developing UW and counter-UW capabilities that are second-to-none. The coming days here in Tartu will be essential to this process. Mr. Maxwell said it well in his reflections on the future of special operations: “While [we] may not choose to conduct UW often, it is imperative that [we] have the ability to counter it.”

We have accomplished much together. For years, through our collective training, numerous deployments, and steadfast commitment to safeguard the freedom and security of our member countries, the Alliance is stronger today than at any point in its history. The brotherhood of our soldiers has been forged in the fire of combat. This bond will not be broken. We will face the challenges of tomorrow the same way that we faced those of yesterday—united, resolute, and indivisible. Our heads of state and government reiterated our greatest responsibility in the Wales Summit Declaration—“to protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”

I stand here to echo their declaration and our collective calling to respond and adapt to the threats we currently face. I am honored to be among you, and stand ready to assist in the task at hand. Our predecessors prepared for a wholly different kind of threat. Raised in this doctrinal environment, it would be shortsighted of us to apply yesterday’s methods to today’s circumstances. To update existing doctrine and develop new ones is difficult but not impossible—we must remember that when military thinkers conceived a plan to counter potential Soviet advances in the Fulda Gap, it had not previously existed. They could not rely on their predecessors’ experience as panacea; neither can we. We must be prepared to act, not simply react. Thank you for your time, and welcome to the Unconventional Warfare Seminar here in Tartu.
Chapter 1. Asymmetry in Russian New Generation Warfare

Jānis Bērziņš, Ph.D.

Introduction

A brief examination of warfare and Russian strategists’ use of influence is necessary background to gaining an appreciation of asymmetry in Russian New Generation Warfare. Categorizing Russian Crimea and Ukraine-based operations has been difficult, but evolutionary characteristics of warfare suggest these Russian operations are neither fourth generation nor hybrid warfare. Line and column tactics, with orderly battlefields and formal battles, characterized the First Generation of Modern War (1648–1860). Second Generation warfare addressed the contradiction between military culture and a battlefield’s disorderliness. Second Generation warfare was attrition that synchronized centrally controlled firepower with the infantry: the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies. Third Generation warfare developed from Second Generation warfare as Blitzkrieg, maneuver warfare. Finally, Fourth Generation warfare, insufficient to define Russia’s armed aggression, represents a return to cultures in conflict. In Fourth Generation warfare, states lose domination on violence in fights with non-state adversaries.¹ General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Russia’s General Staff, identified evolutionary changes between traditional and new military methods of conflict applicable to hybrid warfare.

¹ Dr. Bērziņš is director of the National Defence Academy of Latvia’s Center for Security and Strategic Research and has been a Potomac Foundation Senior Fellow since 2016. He has authored over 60 publications and has lectured as a guest in Europe, the United States, and Brazil. Dr. Bērziņš has advised the British, Swedish, and Polish governments, while also providing insights into private sector strategic issues. His areas of expertise include Russian military thought, new generational (hybrid) warfare, geopolitics, and economics.
Resistance Views

Even though hybrid warfare has become the most accepted term in referencing new conflict methods and Russian warfare in the Crimea and Ukraine, Russian modern warfare methods are not hybrid. In hybrid warfare, state and non-state actors employ technologies and strategies in a multimode confrontation. Hybrid conflict may involve exploiting modern capabilities to support insurgent, terrorist, and criminal activities, the use of high-tech military capabilities, combined with terrorist actions and cyber warfare operations against economic and financial targets. Hybrid warfare largely presupposes military application of kinetic force to defeat an enemy; thus, it does not suffice to describe Russian warfare in Crimea and Ukraine.

Two problems exist with applying the hybrid warfare term to understand modern Russian warfare. First, hybrid may represent a mix of anything, but hybrid warfare presupposes application of kinetic force when Russian
actions in Crimea did not involve kinetics. Second, it is a methodological mistake to try to mold Russian modern warfare methods to a Western model, when hybrid warfare stems from a U.S. military concept. Different cultural thinking and strategic understandings can invalidate conclusions reached from molding an independently formed Russian military theory to a western military paradigm, or model. A proper understanding of Russian military theory or doctrine, activities, and rationale help identify Russian warfare in Crimea and Ukraine as a new model.

Russia incorporates three interrelated concepts into its military theory or doctrine: doctrinal unilateralism, legalism, and ambiguous terms, thus exploiting conflicting perspectives to create an alternative reality. First, doctrinal unilateralism postulates that successful use of force creates legitimacy. Second, all Russian actions in the Ukraine were backed by some form of legal action. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin asked for and received, a Russian parliament referendum authorizing Russian military use in Ukraine. Third, Russia denies that its use of Crimea local self-defense forces constitutes occupation. A Russian troop increase in Crimea was still within limits of the Russia-Ukraine bilateral agreement. In such manner, Russia combines its concept of “legal action” (the referendum) and use of Crimea local self-defense forces to rationalize that it has peaceful intentions and never used military force in the Crimea.

Russian and Western reasoning differ on the referendum that Crimean pro-Russian political forces helped pass to legitimate, from the pro-Russian perspective, Russia’s incorporation of Crimea. Russia views Crimea’s case to be a Kosovo-like instance of self-determination. The West views the referendum as a violation of the Ukraine’s constitution, and because there was no ballot option for Crimea to remain part of the Ukraine. Russia views this Western perspective as legal cynicism, arguing that the West follows its own interests and considers some events legitimate, but other events illegitimate, despite two events being of the same essence. Russia argues that its actions represent its commitment to Ukrainian territorial defense in accordance with the many international agreements signed during the 1990s. Russian use of influence is the keyword for understanding this argument and Russia’s new form of warfare.

The Russian Crimean campaign is an impressive demonstration of strategic communication and applied influence to shape the operational environment. Russia’s Crimea activity is comparable to Russian intervention
Resistance Views

in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, but different because the Crimea case reflects Russian understanding of new military guidelines intended for implementation by 2020. The Crimean campaign’s success is measurable by the fact that within three weeks, without a shot fired, the Ukrainian military morale broke, and all 190 bases surrendered. Instead of Russian reliance upon a mass deployment of tanks and artillery, Russia’s Crimean campaign deployed less than 10,000 assault troops—mostly naval infantry, already stationed in Crimea, backed by a few airborne battalions and Spetsnaz commandos—against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel. The heaviest vehicle used was the wheeled BTR-80 armored personal carrier. This form of warfare is centered on influence.

**Russian Strategists’ Use of Influence**

Russia places the idea of influence at the very center of operational planning. Their planners use levers of influence to achieve operational planning: skillful internal communications; deception operations; psychological operations and well-constructed external communications. In the Ukraine case, Russian planners demonstrated an innate understanding of three key target audiences and those audiences’ most probable behavior: Crimea’s Russian speaking majority; Ukraine’s government; and the international community, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Russian planners relying upon the ancient Soviet art of reflexive control used their knowledge of the Ukraine’s target audiences to plan operational courses of action that could achieve Russian objectives.

Russia bases its main military guidelines for developing its 2020 objectives on influencing an enemy audience to legitimize its strategic objectives, as they did with the Crimea referendum. Russia uses indirect methods to plan and conduct warfare, focusing on an opponent’s inner socio-cultural decay ensuing from a culture war exploited by specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings. The battleground extends beyond the traditional three dimensions to incorporate contactless information or psychological warfare to become a perception war in cyberspace and the human mind. A combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological influence campaigns creates permanent asymmetric warfare as the natural state of life in an identified operational environment.
Russian use of influence operationalizes a new form of warfare not characterized as a military campaign in the classical sense. An invisible military occupation cannot be an occupation by definition. Troops that Russia used in Crimea were already on Crimean territory at Russian naval bases, officially part of Crimea’s civilian militia. Russian deception operations occurred inside Russian territory as military exercises, including in Kaliningrad to increase Baltic States and Poland insecurity. Simultaneously, the Crimean parliament officially—although not legally per Ukraine’s constitution—asked to join the Russian Federation, and the Ukrainian media became inaccessible. Within the Ukrainian media vacuum, Russian communication channels propagated the Kremlin’s narrative and influence to establish an alternate reality that legitimized Russian actions in a war of ideas within the minds of Crimean citizens.

In implementing its influence operations, Russia recognizes the human mind as warfare’s main battlespace. Information and psychological warfare subsequently dominate new-generation Russian wars, to achieve troop and weapon control superiority by morally and psychologically depressing an enemy’s armed forces and population. As illustrated in Crimea, Russia’s main objective is to minimize the need to deploy hard military power by compelling an opponent’s military and civil population to support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country. These tactics involve a notion of permanent war that denotes an equally permanent enemy.

In the current Russian paradigm, Western influence—its civilization, its values, culture, political system, and ideology—is the clear enemy. Russia would like to undermine NATO’s Article 5 and weaken the West’s geopolitical influence. Thus, Russia aims to leverage its influence to debase support for NATO and the EU. Russian strategy has focused on using political means to create schisms to disrupt common security interests. Mark Galeotti, senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague, indicated Russia employed single-issue lobbies with divisive messages, well-funded fringe parties, Russia Today, think tanks, business lobbies, among other means. Russians identify these activities and their strategy and actions on the periphery of NATO’s influence in the Crimea and Ukraine as New Generation Warfare.
Russian New Generation Warfare Components

Russia merges three other components into its New Generation Warfare targeting of the human thought processes to exert influence supportive of its war objectives. The first component consists of eight phases of escalation. The second component is Russia’s instruments of asymmetric warfare. The third component is a nine point Russian asymmetric strategy.

Asymmetry is an often-ignored aspect of Russian military art. As Vladimir Putin stated in 2006, “Quantity is not the end … our responses are to be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical and less expensive, but will certainly improve the reliability of our nuclear triad.” In its classic definition, asymmetry is a weaker opponent’s strategy to fight a stronger adversary. The main idea, per Clausewitz, is that war “is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means … the political design is the object, while war is the means, and the means can never be thought of apart from the object.” As a result, since the objective of war is to achieve political gains, the instruments of warfare may be military or nonmilitary. This means that a direct attack followed by territorial occupation and annexation might not be necessary. Warfare may be direct or indirect, as well as kinetic, hybrid, or non-kinetic.

As indicated in Russia’s eight phases of New Generation Warfare, asymmetric can mean influencing by disarming and destroying the enemy through gradual exhaustion of capabilities, equipment, troops, and moral resistance. Russia learned such lessons, in part, from military theorists and observations of combat in Asia. For Clausewitz indirect warfare was a matter of resistance and symmetric and asymmetric attacks. However, Russia bases its strategy on Sun Tzu’s idea that “warfare is the art (Tao) of deceit.” The Vietnam War is an example, where the Vietcong resisted U.S. forces long enough until the United States retracted and the war was over. The Vietcong, therefore, achieved their political objectives, and won the war, without directly defeating U.S. forces. Observing the U.S. experience, Russia learned a valuable Sino-Japanese War lesson regarding ideology in warfare. War’s ideological dimension, to win peoples’ hearts and minds, is fundamental for victory, especially during stabilization operations. Mao had a clear advantage in that he had a distinct narrative to offer, while the Japanese did not have
Bērziņš: Asymmetry in Russian New Generation Warfare

Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eight Phases of Russian New Generation Warfare</th>
<th>Asymmetric Characteristics of Phases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Non-kinetic: encompasses planned information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures to establish favorable political, economic, and military conditions.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Non-kinetic: special operations mislead political and military leaders by coordinated diplomatic, media, top government, and military agencies leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Non-kinetic: intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon duties.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Non-kinetic: use of destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent within the population, boosted by Russian militant bands escalating subversion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Kinetic: kinetic force used. It involves the establishment of no-fly zones over the targeted country, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Kinetic: commencement of military action, immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. It includes all types, forms, methods, and forces, including special operations, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Kinetic: combination of targeted information operation, electronic warfare operation, aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, combined with high-precision weapons launched from various platforms (long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles, including microwaves, radiation, non-lethal biological weapons).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Kinetic: encompasses the roll over of remaining resistance nodes and special operations destruction of surviving enemy units. Reconnaissance units are used to spot which enemy units survived and transmit their coordinates to missile and artillery units. Fire barrages from effective advanced weapons annihilate the defender's resisting army units. Air drop operations surround resistance nodes, while ground troops conduct territory mopping-up operations.</td>
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a narrative. Russian application of influence via information operations offers a narrative advantage.

Russia uses its eight phases and asymmetric characteristics as a basis for applying influence to shape the operational environment through creating an alternative reality. Successful military endeavors are dependent on military and nonmilitary relationship factors: political, psychological,
ideological, and informational—more so than on military power alone. The idea is to use these factors as channels to achieve legitimacy and victory by generating popular support for strategic objectives. Specificities of fighting weaker adversaries generated a predominant strategy: employ small numbers of specially trained troops; use preventive actions against irregular forces; apply propaganda within local populations the weaker adversary pretends to defend; give military and material support to groups in the country being attacked; scale-back combat operations and employ nonmilitary methods to pressure an opponent. From these factors and resulting strategy, one can conclude an asymmetric warfare objective is to avoid direct military operations and interference in other countries’ internal conflicts.

Russia employs instruments of asymmetric warfare to influence mindsets to generate an alternative operational environment reality. The objective is to avoid direct military operations by influencing a potential adversary to understand that military operations can result in an environmental and sociopolitical catastrophe.

Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments of Russian Asymmetric Warfare¹⁰</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use strategies to make an opponent apprehensive of the Russian Federation intentions and possible actions, including the possibility of military strikes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demonstrate Russian forces readiness and potentialities in a strategic area, to repel an invasion with consequences unacceptable to the aggressor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troop actions deter a potential enemy by guaranteed destruction of his most vulnerable military and other strategically important and potentially dangerous targets, to persuade him that his attack is a hopeless case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ state-of-the art highly effective weapons systems, including those based on new physical principles (remote versus contact).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ widespread indirect force, non-contact forms of troop/force commitment and methods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weigh benefits versus costs of seizing and holding enemy territory (not always needed) and undertake action only if the benefits are greater than the combat costs, or if a war’s end goals cannot be achieved in any other way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct information warfare as an independent form of struggle along with economic, political, ideological, diplomatic, and other forms of non-kinetic warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and psychological operations to weaken the enemy’s military potential, by affecting his information flow processes, with the objective of misleading and demoralizing the population and armed forces personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make clear to the potential adversary that military operations may turn into an environmental and sociopolitical catastrophe.</td>
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</table>
Much of what Russian military experts wrote about Russia and socio-political catastrophe is important and potentially dangerous.\textsuperscript{11} This is especially the case when analyzing Russia, its strategic challenges, and the ways and instruments the West would employ against Russia. Although Russian military analysis is mostly based on color revolutions as a result of the West’s deliberately employed strategy of controlled-chaos, it reveals more about Russian strategy. Russia formalized nine strategic points that the West allegedly uses against Russia. These nine points mirror Russian asymmetric strategy operationalized in the Ukraine, where armed conflict resulted when information operations alone failed to shape a new reality.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Russian Nine Point Asymmetric Strategy\textsuperscript{12}</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Stimulate and support armed separatist actions with an objective to promote chaos and territorial disintegration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Polarize the elite and society, resulting in a crisis of values followed by a process of reality orientation to values aligned towards Russian interests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Demoralize armed forces and the military elite.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Conduct strategically controlled degradation of the socioeconomic situation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Stimulate a socio-political crisis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Intensify simultaneous forms and models of psychological warfare.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Incite mass panic, with loss of confidence in key government institutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Defamation of political leaders not aligned with Russian interests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Annihilation of possibilities to form coalitions with foreign allies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Armed conflict can result when influence operations fail to shape a new reality, or paradigm, that an aggressor views as acceptable. Supportive of armed conflict, Russia’s nine-point asymmetric strategy suggests employing reconnaissance and subversive groups in addition to high-precision non-nuclear weapons. Destruction of strategic targets results in unacceptable damage for the targeted country and government. Russia’s strategic targeting will include top government administration and military control systems, major manufacturing, fuel and energy facilities, transportation hubs and facilities (railroad hubs, bridges, ports, airports, tunnels, etc.). Russia can potentially achieve secondary and tertiary effects by striking targets like hydroelectric power dams and complexes, chemical plant processing units, nuclear power facilities, and poison storage facilities.\textsuperscript{13}
The biggest challenge for Europe with the eight asymmetric phases and nine point asymmetric strategy is that these components of Russian strategy play a significant role in creating disarray in military control, state administration, and with defense systems. Russian application of these strategic components can sway public opinion while inciting antigovernment demonstrations and other actions to erode an opponent’s resistance capabilities.

Final Remarks

Russian New Generation Warfare key elements are comprised of influence operations combined into the eight phases, asymmetric campaign strategic points, and the nine points just identified. Russians understand that they are not strong enough to win a war against NATO, so their strategy relies on asymmetric methods combined with direct and symmetrical actions, to achieve tactical objectives. The most important consideration in this case is that this strategy involves identifying and attacking an adversary’s weak points. The Russian objective is not necessarily to gain direct support for Russia inasmuch as it is to create a schism among allies and partners. As a result, each Russian campaign can be unique.

Endnotes

Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, ed. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012),


10. Chekinov and Bogdanov, “Asimmetrichnyye deystviya.”


13. Chekinov and Bogdanov, “Asimmetrichnyye deystviya.”
Authors’ Note, October 2017: In the wake of Russia’s still on-going aggression against Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, the conceptual and policy debates started cultivating the notion of hybrid warfare. This has turned the minds of Western security and defence communities to the concept of broad national and allied resilience as a framework for countering hybrid threats. As a result, the term resilience is now an established part of NATO’s thinking and planning as well as one of the core concepts in the European Union’s Global Strategy. In a similar vein, individual nations have already begun exploring and applying this concept in their national security policies. In Estonia, the term resilience, at long last, has been officially translated into Estonian language—kerksus—while the new National Security Concept adopted in 2017 whole-heartedly

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embraced the concept of societal resilience. Although there is a multitude of understandings across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, and individual nations as to what exactly constitutes resilience and how it works, it is encouraging that, less than 5 years since we drew attention to the importance of societal resilience in coping with chronic and acute security stressors emanating from highly uncertain and dynamic strategic environment, this multi-dimensional concept has become part of the security mainstream thinking. The risk now is that this would become a passing fashion and would fail to deliver without further sustained in-depth research, operationalization and long-term action.

Introduction

Estonia’s National Security Concept (NSC) and 2010 National Defence Strategy provide counterpoint to Russian influence on Estonian society by placing strong emphasis on ‘psychological defense’ to enhance national willpower as protection against subversive, “anti-Estonian” influence. Estonia’s NSC defines psychological defense as, “development, preservation, and protection of common values associated with social cohesion and the sense of security.” Psychological defense aims is “to safeguard the security and safety of state and society, to enhance the sense of security, to avert crisis and to increase trust amongst society and towards the actions taken by the state.”

Estonia’s NSC also emphasizes resilience of social cohesion and critical services to enhance security during a national crisis. According to the NSC, the state promotes social cohesion through social (e.g. promoting greater involvement) and economic (e.g. ensuring high employment) policies.

Estonian strategic thought, however, does not establish an overarching strategic concept and narrative to explain and build a whole-of-society approach to defense and national security. Such a concept is available as societal resilience. It encompasses many of the elements that underpin psychological defense, such as common values, trust, social cohesion, greater involvement, employment, critical services and infrastructure, etc. that the NSC acknowledged. As a term, societal resilience avoids some negative connotations associated with ‘psychological defense.’ Societal resilience extends beyond the sole concern of psychological defense—the subversive influences aimed at eroding values and social cohesion. It provides a basis
for addressing the vulnerability of society to psychological shocks caused by stressors like terrorist attacks, natural disasters, industrial emergencies, financial collapses, cyber-attacks and other contingencies as a result of which the sense of security in society can be profoundly affected. It is also highly relevant and applicable in the context of unconventional war, when a society would be subjected to a prolonged duress from multiple sources. The affected society would seek to continue functioning and avoid persistent dysfunction or even collapse.

This chapter examines societal resilience, its constituent elements, and methods for achieving it and—if societal resilience is to be instrumental in advancing national security—the requirements for national policy. To an extent, societal resilience can also borrow from military resilience, the bedrock for building an effectively operating organization whose members come under intense physical, emotional and mental duress as part of their daily functioning. We argue that some techniques and approaches to building military resilience are relevant to the achievement of societal resilience, although there are certain limitations. Thus, we also seek to draw parallels between military and societal resilience to expand the possibilities for achieving the latter. In doing so, we will identify difficulties with transferring elements of a seemingly similar concept from an organizational environment to a society’s culture. We hope this study will provide a productive way of examining a whole-of-society approach to achieve a functioning society undergoing unconventional war.

Resilience in General

The term resilience is used in many contexts. It originated and evolved from the field of ecology, where it was initially understood as “the measure of the ability of an ecosystem to absorb changes and still persist.” Different fields of study adopted resilience as a concept. It also became employed at individual, community, and state levels. So far, its most popular use relating to security pertains to disaster preparedness and terrorism studies. Interest in resilience grew particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2006 Asian tsunami, although resilience has been a long established pivotal concept in framing national security thinking and behavior in countries like Israel, Japan, or Bangladesh, which have had to deal routinely with terrorism or natural disasters. An increasingly complex, unpredictable, and volatile
security environment has prompted a growing interest in, and acceptance of, resilience as a key coping strategy.

In general, resilience is defined as a “process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance,”6 as “successful adaptation to stressful events, oppressive systems, and other challenges of living”7 or simply as the “process of reintegrating from disruptions in life.”8 These definitions imply that resilience is a process, although it can also be seen as a strategy, a theory or a metaphor9 or as the “capability of a system to maintain its functions and structure in the face of internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it must.”10 It could also be useful to define resilience as a “set of networked adaptive capacities” whereby resilience draws on certain resources of the system and on “dynamic attributes of those resources (robustness, redundancy, rapidity).”11 This perspective allows a proactive approach to building resilience by accumulating necessary resources in a system and ensuring that those resources possess the dynamic attributes required for a time when disruptions occur. System managers can thereby devise policies (e.g. principles, norms and standards, priorities of investments) which are conducive to resilience. Furthermore, resilience underlines the importance of a holistic approach, whereby various aspects, levels, and dimensions, of resilience are treated as inter-related and given equal consideration at all levels and dimensions of analysis12 on an integrated approach to psychological resilience13 and a holistic strategy for urban resilience.

In defining resilience as a rational strategy, it is important to recognize the difficulty in defining the details and likelihood of occurrence for particular events and challenges.14 Usually, a traumatic event or experience shocks a system and disrupts its normal functioning by causing its various elements to fail or underperform. Stressors or “aversive circumstances that threaten the well-being or functioning”15 can differ not only in terms of their nature (e.g. environmental disasters, terrorism, war, loss of a family member, etc.), but also in terms of severity, duration and surprise, which all may require different resources and capacities to deal with. Literature already identifies systems which experience a single catastrophic event (e.g. the 9/11 attacks), that display different adaptive behaviors compared to systems which try to cope with chronic stressors (e.g. prolonged terrorist campaigns, shelling of residential areas, economic crises, or unconventional war campaigns).16 However, the variety and dynamic nature of potential stressors mean that
it is impossible to predict which of a system’s adaptive capacities will be necessary; thereby, calling for a broad-based approach to building resilience.

It is important to highlight that resilience and resistance are two distinct types of stressor coping mechanisms. Resistance is the mobilization and deployment of a system’s resources to cope with the immediate effects of stressors and to ensure that a system returns to normal functioning in pre-event environments. It is suggested that total resistance is “rare in the cases of severe, enduring, or highly surprising events” that significantly alter the environment. In a significantly altered environment, resilience—successful adaptation of a system to adverse circumstances and the eventual establishment of something which is often termed ‘new normalcy’—is a more appropriate strategy. Resistance, rather than resilience, may produce a persistent system dysfunction in an altered environment. Resilience, on the other hand, is “more than hardiness and the ability to endure pain; it is the ability to find unknown inner strengths and resources, to cope effectively with long-term pressures … resilience is therefore the ultimate measure of adaptation and flexibility.”

**Societal Resilience**

Societal (or social) resilience is defined as the “ability of a nation-state to preserve its societal cohesion when it is confronted by external and internal stresses caused by socio-political change and/or violent disturbances”. It is similar to the concept of community resilience, or a “community’s inherent capacity, hope and faith to withstand major trauma, overcome adversity and to prevail with increased resources, competence and connectedness.”

According to de Terte et al, what is “key to a community is that it operates based on a social network whereby people interact with one another in some way.” Therefore much of what is written on community resilience is applicable at the broader society level, just as many elements of individual and family resilience feed into community resilience in the model of ‘linking human systems’, or in a multisystem approach to trauma recovery and resilience. Communities may defy nation-state geographical boundaries and their societies (e.g. religious communities, virtual communities of shared interest, etc.). A person can belong to several communities simultaneously, although he/she will always be rooted in what Sonn and Fisher call “primary communities”—the ones that “provide the values, norms, stories, myths
and a sense of historical continuity.” Social networks of interacting people who share certain values, norms, principles, interests, needs, myths and history make communities and societies similar in principle. Therefore, the logic of societal and community resilience does not greatly differ.

Ganor and Ben-Lavy outlined six major ingredients (six Cs) of community resilience: (1) communication about the situation, threats, risks and available support; (2) cooperation, especially responsibility on a local level rather than expecting external help; (3) cohesion through displays of sensitivity and mutual support; (4) coping, or the ability to take action and deal with trauma; (5) credibility of leadership, especially at grass-roots level; and (6) credo for a better, inspiring future. According to them, “the good news is that community resilience does not have to be specifically created; it grows by itself. It is actually a by-product of the investment in community development in many areas, seemingly unrelated to resilience … The bad news is that resilience cannot be achieved overnight.” Societal resilience taps into a society’s inner resources and capacities (skills, relationships, assets, values, norms, etc.), built over a long period and in areas which may appear as having little to do with national security or resilience. Societal resilience is often viewed as society’s resources and capacities, nurtured by society through institutions, interactions and experiences. Norris et al distinguish a set of four inter-related resources upon which societal resilience rests.

- **Economic development** includes parameters like resource volume and diversity, equity of resource distribution, and fairness of risk and vulnerability to hazards. In this set, economic growth, employment opportunities and accessible services, such as health care, housing and schools, are very important ingredients. Groups on lower socio-economic development levels suffer more stressor-related adverse consequences compared to groups on higher development levels.

- **Social capital** is a resource derived from social relationships. Social capital refers to levels of social support in times of need, a sense of community, and formal (organizational) and informal ties linking members of a society and their attachment to a place. Citizen participation and leadership with well-defined roles, structures, and responsibilities are especially important for social capital; thus, societal resilience.
Community competence refers to a society’s knowledge, problem-solving skills and collaborative abilities. In other words, a society’s collective efficacy. Community competence as a resource depends on critical reflection skills, willingness to contribute, ability to solve conflicts in groups and to reach consensus, empowerment and opportunities for getting involved in collective decision-making. Community competence also requires a “culture that permits challenges to authority and institutions that provide a basis for coordinating a response.”

Information and communication, including trusted sources of accurate information, can provide effective transmission mechanisms and collective narratives that “give … shared meaning and purpose.” The media plays an extremely important role in shaping information and communication. For instance, inaccurate, exaggerated and dramatizing stories may establish narratives not conducive to societal resilience and prompt inadequate political reactions to stressors. As Lee and Preston put it, “the public can be swayed by the most vocal, the most active or the most politically powerful participant rather than the best informed or the most legitimate.” Thus media responsibility is a critical ingredient in strengthening societal resilience.

Mayunga’s community disaster resilience model also draws attention to different forms of capital upon which resilience depends. Social capital (trust, norms and networks) facilitates coordination, cooperation, and access to resources. Economic capital (income, savings and investments) speeds recovery processes, increases well-being and decreases poverty. Human capital (education, health, skills and knowledge/information) increases awareness of risks and the ability to manage them. Physical capital (housing, public facilities and businesses/industry) facilitates communication and transportation and increases safety. Natural capital (resources, stocks, land, water, and ecosystems) sustains all life forms, protects the environment, and offers protection against natural disasters.

Although Mayunga’s model was specifically designed with disaster resilience in mind, its forms of capital echo many of the networked resources in the model of Norris et al. (e.g. economic development, social capital, community competence). This further highlights that resilience is very broad-based (i.e. flows from a broad range of sources) and that society’s strengths and weaknesses are key determinants for resilience. In terrorism studies,
for instance, resilience has already been accepted as a vital ingredient of a broader strategy of deterrence ‘through denial’: resilient societies are difficult to coerce by means of violent acts which, in turn, denies terrorists the benefits they seek, while discouraging and deterring them from further attacks. According to Gearson:

Clearly there are political contexts where the incidence of non-state violence against communities will transcend short-term deterrent messages, but in strategic terms a resilient society is one that is … better able to withstand shocks … [and is] confident about its ability to do so, and is therefore a less attractive target for terrorist attack. Resilience then is not merely the capacity for physical recovery but of psychological grit. Terrorism’s violence as communication, replied to by society’s capacity for community strength and determination, which derives from informed and stoic acceptance of the limits of security, but also belief in its ability to cope with many challenges thanks to preparatory measures and information.  

Mayunga also makes an important contribution not just by conceptualizing community resilience but also by offering ways to measure it, increasing its attractiveness as strategy to public policymakers concerned with gauging progress and understanding how well society is prepared to cope with adversity. According to Mayunga, social capital is expressed in such indicators as the number of non-profit organizations and voluntary associations, voter participation, newspaper readership, etc. Economic capital is reflected in the indicators of household income, property value, employment, investments, and etc. Human capital is measured through educational attainment, health, population growth, demographic features, dependence ratios, and etc. Physical capital is a function of the number and quality of housing units, shelters, critical infrastructure, and etc. Natural capital can be measured through water, air and soil quality, the size of forest or wetland areas, nature reserves, etc. 

A variety of international composite indices (e.g. the Gini index for measuring socio-economic inequality, the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Education at a Glance, etc.) and standard statistical measures provide a reasonable depiction of a society’s resilience potential. Adger suggests that “social resilience is … observed by examining positive and negative
aspects of social exclusion, marginalization and social capital” expressed in income stability and distribution, demographic change, migration patterns, etc. It is extremely important to identify specific societal groups or institutions, or geographical regions where a lack of networked resources or capital underpinning societal or community resilience may create failure and breakdown when acute or chronic stressors are encountered. A Chatham House analysis indicated, “Poor communities are more vulnerable to shocks—but they are also more likely to be marginalized economically, politically or socially.” Thus increasing social and economic development, reducing social vulnerability and poverty of such groups and regions, should enhance overall societal resilience.

Social and human capital should be of particular interest to people concerned with societal resilience as a strategy to deal with national security threats. For instance, according to Buzzanell, “the process of building and utilizing social capital is essential to resilience.” This entails pursuing societies built around high levels of social equity, trust, inclusion and involvement. These societies will be highly educated and therefore able to critically assess risks, messages and leadership initiatives or to question authorities. They will have a high density of communal relationships and high levels of understanding and trust between various communities, to which racism or ethnocentrism are particularly damaging in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society. In turn, this requires sustained policies and leadership behavior consistent with and conducive to social and human capital growth and the legitimacy of society’s institutions, values and norms. A team of Israeli researchers developed and validated a tool of self-assessment for community resilience, called Cojoint Community Resiliency Assessment Measure (CCRAM), which allows community leaders to monitor, evaluate and enhance community resilience, focusing on social and human capital. The CCRAM measures 21 items in five components of resilience—leadership, collective efficacy, preparedness, attachment to place, and social trust—which capture most of the above considerations.

Nurturing societal resilience is a complicated process in the context of national security. On one hand, the intangible nature of social and human capital means that policymakers tend to focus on economic or physical capital, which is easier to measure or has greater visibility as a key ingredient of resilience. Investment of resources, time and effort, and social and human capital is critical to societal resilience, but it leads to resilience as a
Resistance Views

by-product. Resilience as a by-product often receives far less attention during national security discourse. On the other hand, explicitly establishing social and human capital as essential to national security might securitize aspects of society like education, voluntarism, community relationships, and interethnic dialogue. Securitizing these aspects of society may lead to overemphasizing responding to threats and risks as the main driver of social and human capital development.

Military Resilience

Resilience and resilience studies are a growing military topic. An expanding body of literature on resilience reflects the changed character of conflict and warfare. These changes, particularly the drawn-out nature of conflicts and the high relative importance of unconventional threats in modern military operations, have prompted armed forces to review their planning and training activities to meet new challenges. Sophisticated programs are created to increase psychological strengths of military personnel and to reduce their maladaptive responses to enhance their resilience in operations of indefinite duration and unprecedented complexity. Separate programs are created to train resilience trainers. In other words, military research has undergone a shift of emphasis from reactive coping to proactive coping due to the need to prepare soldiers to deal with military combat operational stressors. Corresponding training techniques are also emerging.

The definition of resilience within a military framework is vague and sometimes used inconsistently. Some very narrow definitions refer to a traumatized patient’s ability to function despite symptoms, while other definitions are wider and encompass domains such as survival, adaptation, recovery, etc. To define resilience in a military context, we use the Technical Cooperation Programme (TTCP) definition: the “sum total of psychological processes that permit individuals to maintain or return to previous levels of well-being and functioning in response to adversity.” As such, resilience can be a key issue because military mission readiness largely depends on the resilience of service members, their families, units, and communities.
Military studies widely use psychological hardness as a concept to explore resilient responses to stressful circumstances. Resilience is an important individual characteristic associated with stress tolerance and successful performance in highly demanding occupations. Previous research established hardness as a dispositional factor in preserving and enhancing performance and health despite stressful circumstances. A strong commitment to self, vigorousness toward one's environment, a sense of meaningfulness, and an internal locus of control facilitates hardness. The critical aspect of hardness is likely to involve individual interpretation of, or the meaning, that people attach to their place in the world of experiences and events around them. High-hardy people typically interpret experiences as interesting, challenging, and something they can control. Training can allow each soldier to manage consequences of threat exposure, as well as to mitigate psychological trauma—done by strengthening resilience before individual soldiers confront challenges and stressors.

One training technique worth introducing is the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program developed to increase and improve soldier resilience and performance. According to Casey, the program aims to train soldiers to be better before combat deployment, so that they will not have to get better after they return. By adapting to the psychological resilience level of each individual, the goal is achieved with a preventive approach that enhances soldiers’ psychological strengths which are already present in every person. The program is composed of four elements:

1. Assessment of (emotional, social, family, spiritual) fitness.

2. A special psychometric instrument, the Global Assessment Tool (GAT), developed and used to assess soldiers’ psychosocial fitness. Reassessment takes place at least once every two years throughout a soldier’s career, so that each soldier is able to monitor his/her growth, maturity and learning.

3. Individualized learning modules to improve fitness in these domains:
   a. Self-development opportunities, depending upon a soldier’s GAT results.
   b. Course outcomes are monitored. Adjustments occur when deciding what components from the list to sustain, expand, or exclude.
c. Formal resilience training: at the beginning of their Army service, soldiers receive instructions on specific mental and physical skills to enhance performance when facing challenges.

d. Special educational modules provide detailed descriptions of outcomes concerning emotional fitness, social fitness, family fitness, and spiritual fitness.

4. Training of Army master resilience trainers (MRT): primarily non-commissioned officers trained to deliver unit resilience training as they have direct daily contact with soldiers. They use a special resilience-training program composed in collaboration between civil and military academic and research institutions.

Research has revealed that military leadership plays a significant role in amplifying psychological resilience in military units. Military leadership who establish themselves as role models for subordinates to think and behave in more resilient ways can enhance morale and cultivate resilience. Several organizations and centers are available to promote resilience for military members, providers, units, families and communities.

Due to its dynamic nature, it is useful to consider the Military Demand-Resource (MDR) Model which Bates et al. designed for the military and which can help measure resilience. The MDR model aims: (1) to use a strengths-based approach to assess what resources are available and what resources are needed based on the environmental demands; (2) to understand and optimize the interactions between a person’s mind-body internal resources and the complexities of the military’s demands and external resources; and (3) to assess the dynamic interaction between demands and resources over time. This model captures the complexity of interaction between human (individual level) and military (organizational level) systems. Together, with the linkage between resilience, adaptation, and wellness, we can consider resilience ‘quasi-observable’ by measuring, monitoring and systematically studying psychological wellness indicators in the wider society (e.g. the occurrence of psychopathologies, healthy patterns of behavior, adequate functioning in social roles and the level of quality of life).

Programs to strengthen military organizations’ resilience include factors that strengthen resilience in the military at family, unit, and community levels. Individual capacities and their development are significant, but the
armed forces operate as organizations where military unit resilience is of paramount importance to mission success. In turn, organizational resilience depends upon individual personnel resilience. Meredith et al. list factors at family, unit and community levels which feed into broader military resilience (Table 1). They find that when it came to assessing various military resilience-building programs, “outcomes tended to be measured most frequently at the individual level, with fewer assessments mentioned at the family and organizational level (including unit).”

Table 1. Resilience factors at unit and community levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resilience Factors</th>
<th>Operation Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive command climate</td>
<td>Facilitating and fostering intra-unit interaction, building pride/support for the mission, leadership, positive role modeling, and implementing institutional policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamwork</td>
<td>Work coordination among team members, including flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion</td>
<td>Team ability to perform combined actions; bonding together of members to sustain commitment to each other and the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belongingness</td>
<td>Integration, friendships; group membership, including participation in spiritual/faith-based organizations, protocols, ceremonies, social services, schools, and so on; and implementing institutional policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion</td>
<td>The bonds that bring people together in the community, including shared values and interpersonal belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectedness</td>
<td>The quality and number of connections with other people in the community; includes connections with a place or people of that place; aspects include commitment, structure, roles, responsibility, and communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy</td>
<td>Group members’ perceptions of the ability of the group to work together</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Military Resilience Applicability to Society**

At first glance, the applicability of military resilience-building techniques in broader society is somewhat limited. It is highly debatable whether a planned, directive, top-down approach inherent to hierarchical organizations such as the military can work in context of a vibrant, pluralist society, in which multiple—often clashing—perspectives, interests and groups flourish, where
no single authority can strictly impose a uniform doctrinal solution. Society’s complexity and heterogeneity mean that such solutions will be either too simplistic or rejected by anyone thinking that the government is overstepping its authority, to impose a specific mind-set in a very sensitive area of individual psyche and rights. There is an obvious contrast between a planned and prescriptive path to achieving military service member resilience and a broader collective societal resilience as a useful (and not necessarily assured) ‘by-product’ of investing in social and human capital.

The military approach to building resilience reflects some key issues pertaining to societal resilience. First of all, the military approach highlights the importance of effective leadership in nurturing resilience at many levels. Leaders are positive role models in situations involving chronic or acute stressors—they serve as a critical pathway to collective resilience in the military and broader society. According to Powley and Lopes, “concerted leadership is a dimension [of unit and organizational resilience] that … improves the resilience and efficacy of organizations while simultaneously contributing to their overall success by binding all resilience factors together (adequate resources, organizational learning, and flexibility and adaptability in the face of adversity).”63 In addition, although resilience is more observable in military settings through unit and individual performance indicators, societal resilience can also be assessed through surveys of well-being and various proxy indicators as discussed earlier. This makes it worthwhile to study military experiences and to incorporate them in assessments of societal resilience, and vice versa.

The capacities of psychological fitness (emotional, social, family and spiritual) underpin human flourishing not only in the armed forces but in society at large. The successful demonstration of the effects of resilience training in soldiers and their families could also provide the basis for a model to train the civilian world,64 if designed and applied carefully. Usually, multiple government-sponsored and civic support networks and schemes already target various social groups, to induce their hardiness in coping with adverse circumstances. The inclusion of formal (research evidence-based) psychological fitness training programs could be a valuable addition to civilian resilience training, based on military experience in strengthening
individual resilience. These programs could be made available to members of society (through a national education system) and to community leaders who play an important role in societal resilience processes (through tailor-made projects and courses).

**Building Societal Resilience in Estonia**

In public discourse, Estonian society is generally considered resilient. Examples given vary from the nation’s survival under Soviet occupation, with the fabric of national values largely intact, to the absence of significant social unrest under government and private sector austerity measures to address the global financial crisis effects that started in 2009. The image of a stoical and unperturbed Estonian calmly weathering the storms of life is congruent with the notion of resilient, high-hardy individuals, communities, states and societies. International statistics appear to confirm this anecdotal evidence of resilience that may serve as a proxy indicator of societal resilience, spanning human and economic capital aspects. The UN Human Development Index ranks Estonia as 33rd, classifying it under the category of countries with “very high human development”, albeit below the average score in this category.\(^6\)

This does not mean, however, that there are no issues or challenges that need to be addressed and overcome in progressing towards an ever more resilient Estonian society. For instance, ever since its accession to NATO and the EU—two major strategic goals—Estonia has lacked a compelling, unifying, and mobilizing vision for the state and society. Achieving the definition of this kind of vision (*credo* for a better future) through an inclusive political and societal process and consensus-building is an exercise in Estonian political leadership and civic involvement. It is also a vital source of Estonian society’s resilience when dealing with turbulence and uncertainty in the security environment.

There are significant regional disparities in Estonian economic development, with peripheral counties in the north east, east, south east, and south lagging far behind leading counties.\(^6\) It is alarming that ethnic non-Estonians dominate Ida-Virumaa, an underperforming region, thus, adding an ethnic layer to the problem of insufficient development. A society’s trust factor has to be enhanced, which pertains to building trust between ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians. This requires continuous monitoring of
various social groups’ mutual perceptions and developing mechanisms for conducting an effective dialogue and establishing an enduring consensus. Various societal groups’ political, civic, economic, and cultural exclusion needs avoided not only as a matter of principle in a democratic egalitarian society, but also because it erodes society’s resilience and, by extension, undermines national security.

The level of Estonian voluntarism that could serve as an indicator of social capital is low. Some findings showed that only 4.5 percent of the population had performed voluntary work within a month before the survey in 2009–2010. The numbers of those involved in voluntary action from time to time (e.g. in large-scale civic initiatives of short duration) are higher, and by some accounts, may reach almost half of the population. However, additional sustained efforts are required to promote voluntarism in Estonian society as a way to develop social capital; thus, increase societal resilience.

The development of Estonian civil society, including various community networks and the networks of voluntary social and psychological support for individuals, families and groups, has to be actively encouraged and promoted at local, regional and national levels. Support for civil society, and strengthening the so-called third sector and mechanisms of government cooperation, should form part of Estonian national security policy aimed at building societal resilience. As a former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves pointed out in his address upon taking his oath of office, “a strong third sector is the most effective safeguard against populism and the best self-defense in cases where a crisis or catastrophe befalls society.”

Critical thinking, risk assessment and risk management skills have to be developed and maintained in Estonian society, especially through the national education system. They are indispensable enablers of resilient responses to national security issues, including in situations where there is an active hostile actor effort to erode trust in society and to undermine the fabric of its values. There are some expert opinions, however, that the Estonian education system is failing to promote critical thought and that manifestations of critical perspectives are often interpreted as harmful acts to the state and its image.

Quality of leadership in politics, civil society, public administration, and the private sector must be continuously fostered. Leadership behavior models that are conducive to societal resilience under various stressors and therefore to national security have to be well understood and practiced at various
levels. Such established formats as the Senior Courses in National Defense can impart knowledge (e.g. theoretical models and case studies) about credible leadership in sustaining resilience during national security crises.

More focus and efforts need to be also placed on general resilience training for individual society members—their sense of well-being and responses to various stressors eventually affect collective societal resilience. The U.S. Army’s example demonstrates it is possible to strengthen self-awareness and inner capacities underpinning individual resilience through programs based on behavioral research. Similar programs in the Estonian Defense Forces would not only enhance their organizational resilience but would also have a broader societal effect, especially if targeted at conscripts and members of the Defense League—Estonia retains a strong link between society and the military through these institutions which can be utilized to increase individual resilience in society at large. Elements of resilience training could also be included in the Estonian upper secondary school curriculum as part of national defense or psychology courses.

Effectiveness of crisis communication has to be enhanced and maintained. The Estonian government endorses communication effectiveness in crisis management. However, application of effective crisis communication is not always frictionless as demonstrated by the confusing information issued to the public during a gunman incident in the Estonian Ministry of Defense building in August 2011. The episode highlighted the importance of media responsibility in ensuring reliable crisis communication; thus, sustaining societal resilience during national emergencies.

The above list is not exhaustive and, of course, places an emphasis on national investments in social, human and, to a certain degree, economic capital as critical pathways to societal resilience. It is, however, worth reminding ourselves that the approach to nurturing resilience has to be holistic. It must include investments in resilient physical infrastructure, especially critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, and in preventing erosion of Estonia’s natural capital.

Conclusions

Psychological defense is attractive to Estonian policymakers and practitioners. The concept creates an impression that inputs and outputs can be controlled and therefore gives a sense of being in charge and proactive in
managing a crucial facet of national security. It also implies that certain external hostile forces are actively threatening social cohesion and values of Estonian society, which calls for active state and society defense measures. The latter is true considering Russia’s aggressive policies and hybrid warfare strategies. However, the variety of security threats and risks which may undermine a society’s sense of security and well-being remain far broader than just a chronic stressor evidenced by an external actor’s hostile efforts to sow discord in Estonian society, to undermine public self-confidence. Thus, resilience as a holistic concept is far better suited as a conceptual framework to ensure a small nation’s flexibility and adaptation to survive and prosper in a turbulent security environment.

Societal resilience provides Estonian national security and defense policies a venue for a whole-of-government effort. Nurturing resilience constituent elements—channeling investments in various forms of national capital (social, human, economic, physical, and natural)—is something that only a broad range of organizations working in long-term concert can achieve. The importance of non-governmental sector organizations in enhancing societal resilience extends well beyond the government. The significance of non-governmental organizations as a whole-of-society approach to national security calls for non-governmental organizations being at the forefront of national security efforts, with the government acting mostly as a facilitator and enabler.

Notably, societal resilience serves as a better narrative than national security or national defense (let alone psychological defense) for involving many government and non-government organizations not formally related to the national security sector. These organizations often do not view themselves as an organic part of national security or defense policy. However, in times of crisis and emergency, they play a vital role in ensuring or restoring a sense of security, well-being, and trust in a better future within various communities and society as a whole. Particular organizations’ (e.g. military) success is more likely if national security policymakers engage them and their experience when appropriate to strengthening a nation’s social, human, natural and economic capital; thus, building a country’s resilience capacity.
Endnotes


9. Norris et al., “Community Resilience as a Metaphor”.


17. Norris et al., “Community Resilience as a Metaphor”, 130. According to Maru (Yiheyis T. Maru, *Resilient Regions: Clarity of Concepts and Challenges to Systemic Measurement* [Canberra: CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems, 2010]: 11, http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/csiro/2010-04.htm), “most applications of the resilience concept on individual and social systems if not explicit have at least implicit steady-state (an equilibrium) assumption that the entity has to hold onto or bounce back to after a perturbation. Resistance and recovery are key elements of the idea of resilience in individual and social studies.” This stands in contrast to an ecological or socio-ecological perspective, whereby resilience is understood as the ability to absorb the impact, to self-organise and to adapt to a new, post-disturbance environment (see Steve Carpenter, Brian Walker, J. Marty Anderies, and Nick Abel, “From Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience of What To What?,” *Ecosystems* 4, no. 8 [December 2001]: 765–781, doi:10.1007/s10021-001-0045-9.). In our view, the latter perspective is more appropriate for complex and dynamic systems, such as a society or national security system, which constantly undergo incremental changes and occasionally more fundamental paradigm shifts and transformations.


27. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 142.
30. Ibid., 140.
32. Social media is gaining more importance as a channel of communication for individuals, communities, organizations and governments during crisis. Its impact on societal resilience is yet to be studied, although it is obvious that there are both risks and opportunities to resilience-based strategies flowing from growing reliance on social media. See Jacquelyn F. Morie and Eric Chance, *Social Networks and Virtual Worlds for Building Team Resilience* (Social Media: Risks and Opportunities in Military Applications, Meeting Proceedings, MP-HFM-201: Tallinn: NATO Science and Technology Organisation, 2012), on the use of social networks for building team resilience.
35. Mayunga, “Understanding and applying the concept of community disaster resilience.”
37. Maru, “Resilient Regions.”
41. Long, “Charting the Concept of Social Resilience.”


54. Bartone, “Psychological Hardiness Predicts Success.”

55. Casey, “Comprehensive soldier fitness.”

56. Casey, “Comprehensive soldier fitness.” For a detailed description of implementation, see Cornum, “Comprehensive Soldier Fitness.”
57. Bartone, “Psychological Hardiness Predicts Success.”
59. Ibid.
60. Norris et al., “Community Resilience as a Metaphor.”
62. Meredith et al., Promoting Psychological Resilience in the U.S. Military, 50.
65. “Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience. Human Development Report 2014,” Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme, accessed 2 January 2015, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf. The UN Human Development Index is a composite of measures reflecting the standard of living (Gross National Income), health (life expectancy) and access to knowledge (years of schooling, etc.). It is also adjusted to reflect inequalities (such as of income, gender, education) within each country.
67. A great example of the efforts made in this direction is the regular monitoring studies of the integration of Estonian society (i.e. focused on the integration of ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians) commissioned by the Estonian Ministry of Culture (see for instance, Marju Lauristin, Esta Kaal, Laura Kirss, Tanja Kriger, Anu Masso, KIRSTI NURMELA, KÜLLIKI SEPPEL, Tiit TAMMARU, MAIU UUS, PEETER VIHALEM and TRIIN VIHALEM, Eesti ühiskonna integratsiooni monitooring 2011 (Estonian Society’s Integration Monitor 2011) (Tallinn and Tartu: AS Emor, SA Polititkauuringute Keskus Praxis, Tartu Ülikool), http://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/integratsioonimonitooring_2011_est_a4.pdf). This only serves to underline the point that national security policymakers concerned with societal resilience have to scan a very broad horizon of issues, including those in the remit of an organisation that clearly does not directly deal with national security, i.e. the Ministry of Culture.
68. Risto Kaarna and KÜLV Noor, “Ülevaade vabatahtliku töö majandusliku ja sotsiaaluse väärtuse hindamise võimalustest (Overview of the Possibilities for


72. According to conclusions of a pan-European research consortium, “European citizens should be regarded as a decisive and integral part in any future Crisis Management solution. <…> Research and innovation should analyse how the public could be best enabled to actively contribute to such solutions, what the key enablers are and how the public should be educated, trained and prepared to be ready to act accordingly when the moment is there.” ESRIF Final Report (European Security Research and Innovation Forum, 2009), 114.

Major Karl Salum, Estonian Defence Forces

Introduction

When the time for performance has arrived, the time for preparation has passed. – Thomas Monson

Groups with specific political ambitions have historically preferred using unconventional warfare (UW) to undermine a militarily stronger power. External forces may or may not support politically ambitious groups, including states. Several written works elaborate on the use of UW as a potential deterrent or as a tool for achieving political goals. Numerous groups in modern history have used unconventional ways and means to fight a militarily and economically superior opponent. It is time to look at these alternate means of national defense, bearing in mind recent global conflicts where states have failed to use conventional means to defend their territory.

This chapter will assess UW’s potential role as an integral part of a small state’s national defense plan against a superior adversary’s partial or complete occupation. It will then examine UW aspects such as planning, implementation, and execution, taking into account domestic and external political, legal, and resource-related factors while looking at external support crucial for the success of resource and capability-limited small states. For the purposes of this chapter, a small state has at least two of these three criteria: a population of less than 1.5 million people, land area less than 40,000 square kilometers, and a gross domestic product less than $2.5 billion.

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This chapter consists of four parts. The first describes pertinent UW and doctrine-related terminology and definitions. The second part looks into the essence of UW on the doctrinal level and includes these questions: Why would a state need a distinct doctrine for UW? What are the basic presumptions for drafting a UW framework? How can the course of UW generally work for a small state? The third part establishes a foundation for small state UW efforts and describing UW efforts in greater detail. The main focus in the third part is command, control, and communications (C3), as well as legal factors. The third part also gives a brief overview of the key factors that must be considered regarding the potential adversary against which UW doctrine is applied. The final part addresses small state specific requirements for planning and preparations for using UW as a means of national defense.

This chapter concludes that UW is a feasible option for a small state defending against occupation; however, it requires a paradigm shift in the prevailing attitude of using conventional military capabilities as the foundation of national defense. UW as doctrine also requires meticulous and comprehensive peacetime planning. Furthermore, required UW elements will often go outside the comfort zone of various state structures and political leadership. All this presents significant challenges for utilizing the full UW potential for national defense. This chapter is not a comprehensive analysis of all UW-related aspects of national defense. It is also not a description of a UW campaign plan for defending a particular small state. Rather, this chapter should serve as a think piece, to provoke further discussion and follow-up writings or presentations in various UW subfields that this chapter describes only in general terms.

**Terminology**

Terminology is usually the first significant obstacle encountered when researching and discussing UW. Terms applied to UW participants and their activities can be viewed as clouds of words. The main problem is that within both clouds, terms are often used interchangeably, although they all have different connotations. Further, different terms can change context and, consequently, have different meanings in different UW phases, depending on the factors shaping the environment. Different meanings can be nuanced, with each term carrying a political content and flavor; hence, the importance of using appropriately correct terms.
The supporting partners’ and opposing side’s point of view must be considered—how do they view certain activities and participants in light of their particular cultural, legal, military, etc., framework? This creates different UW legal and operational implications for all UW participants, and perhaps even skews campaign plans and policies. The way different participants accept and understand a particular term determines their attitude and consequent behavior.

Different languages and interpretation create another terminology issue—translation and meaning. Often, translation changes the connotation of a particular term, making it different in another language. In other cases, a term in one language may have two or three different translations in another language and vice versa. For example, the English word resistance\textsuperscript{10} can have separate meanings in Estonian, depending on the target and intensity of resistance. The Estonian word vastuhakk is generally nonviolent and focused on single or isolated incidents, whereas vastupanu has a longer-term and wider perspective, and can involve violent means as well. At the same time, the Estonian word mäss has a general meaning which can be translated into English as rebellion, mutiny, insurgency, or revolt, depending on the circumstances.

Even in one language, UW-related terms can change meaning over time as research and the subject evolves. When UW participants discover and implement new or well-forgotten ends, ways, and means, it occurs in contemporary context and conditions. This creates a deviation from historical experience for UW users and researchers who then struggle to place their observations in an already familiar context. This results in changing existing terms, their meanings, and, frequently, inventing new ones. However, this should not be viewed as a simple linguistic exercise. The purpose of such discussions and adaptations of terms and meanings is to place old and well-forgotten ideas in modern context. It is often difficult to match new trends and observations with existing terms. Rather than generating a myriad of new terms, we should instead focus on redefining their new meaning within a modern context, to avoid cluttering clouds of terminology.

Requirements, Criteria, and Elements of a Doctrine\textsuperscript{11}

First and foremost, doctrine is understood as a foundation for preparing and conducting national defense. It offers national defense guidance on three
levels: philosophical, planning (conceptual), and implementation. On the philosophical level, doctrine explains why we fight on the planning level—what we do and how, and on the implementation level, who fights where and when. Doctrine also identifies national defense ends, ways, and means and associated risks, to enable the creation of more refined documents such as field manuals, tactical and technical publications, etc.

Another view is that doctrine serves as a crucial link between military science and operational art. There are different doctrines for different aspects of warfare: operations, logistics, intelligence, etc. Operational doctrine, for example, can further divide into individual Service doctrines for air, naval, land, and special forces.

Third, doctrine can enable different elements of a state’s national security structure to efficiently work with each other, thus facilitating better interoperability. The same applies for multistate partnerships and alliances. A common doctrine helps states unify efforts and reduce potential for miscommunication and unexpected events. NATO and its doctrinal and publication standards serve as the best example.

Why a UW Doctrine?

Why would a state contemplate using UW as a means for national defense? Normally, all states have some sort of a conventional defense plan as the overt national security backbone.² The problem that arises for small states in particular is that they lack the potential for conventionally countering an adversary possessing superior capabilities and resources, who often happen to be immediate neighbors. In addition to capability and resource shortcomings, a small state’s third key variable is a lack of territory or strategic depth. So, small states must use resources smartly and sparingly, when considering their larger neighbors’ potential threat.

Three options exist for small states to consider when applying UW in national defense. Option 1 is where UW is used as the covert backbone of national defense. Naturally, a conventional defense plan would still exist as Plan A, which the political leadership prescribes; the armed forces train for what the general public will support. Even if there are hints of resistance codified in laws and other legal acts, these hints usually appear as elements of last-resort in a Plan B that emerges when conventional forces are overrun and dispersed. Unfortunately, if Plan B preparations are not as thorough as
Plan A, or if Plan A exhausts the resources required for Plan B, Plan B is as apt to fail as Plan A.

Option 2 provides potential to use UW as Plan A in small state national security. Instead of being a small state’s haphazard Plan B, UW ought to be Plan A with the conventional defense plan providing screen for UW. This means that UW needs to be fully integrated into a small state’s national security enterprise as the crucial element in total defense. It also means that a small state’s national security organizations must be aware of and willing to accept deliberate losses in battlespace and resources, instead of stubbornly attempting to hold a conventional ground.

Option 3, to use UW for small state national security, suggests preparation and advertisement must focus on punishment or denial to deter a potential adversary. This approach requires very good planning and preparation to make it executable and believable. This approach also requires a certain degree of openness for deterrence to work; the potential adversary must receive a glimpse of what he will most likely face during hostilities. It has to be noted that, unconventional deterrence by denial would most likely not succeed if the adversary’s attack has limited aims and no long-term political objectives. The importance of considering the adversary’s strategy and capabilities will be examined further.

Basic Presumptions and Criteria

The first presumption is that a small state under attack will confront adversary-imposed gradual geographic isolation, reducing chances for allies or partners to provide assistance, especially conventional force aid. The second presumption is that an adversary will gradually escalate hostilities and use probing tactics, forcing a small state to play their hand first. The third presumption is that when an adversary attacks a small state, the adversary has a particular desired end state—partial or full occupation—and a strategy to achieve it. However, we should not make too many generalizations about the adversary and the implementation and execution of his strategy, as each potential occupation situation is unique.

Framework for Small State UW Doctrine

National security is largely a matter of survival when drafting a UW framework doctrine for small states. Survival as an issue permeates every level of
UW, all the way to an individual level. Since UW success largely depends on individual willingness, survival as a key factor must be addressed. Survival trumps mission accomplishment, especially on the individual level. On the state level, survival can best be guaranteed with the often-mentioned whole-of-government approach, involving whole-of-society. The primary impetus driving a comprehensive approach is a need for resources—the second crucial factor in small state UW.

While UW cannot be a purely military enterprise, the military should have lead the for organizing, facilitating, and conducting small state UW, due to the military’s historic experience and being the most capable actor in these UW activities. But this also means that the military ought to be able to educate, train, and prepare the public sector for UW. A successful UW effort by a small state requires a two-pronged approach where armed activities occur hand in hand with subversion—these must be executed by utilizing Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) instruments of national power within the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT) domains. The military has a key role: it must help the public sector better understand their UW campaign roles. The whole-of-government approach will only succeed if it is able to change from the existing conventional (Cold War-era) understanding of warfare to present day interests, ideas, and implementation in warfare. It is very important, that nonmilitary elements executing DIMEFIL are cognizant of their roles and responsibilities in shaping the PMESII-PT domains, to offer maximum support to a resistance movement’s three main components. To support boots on the ground, shoes on the parquet (diplomats, politician, etc.) must fulfill their mission too, utilizing unconventional ends, ways, and means, if necessary.

The six classic UW strategies are heavily dependent on local conditions and the adversary:

1. Protracted popular war
2. Conspirational
3. Military-focus
4. Urban warfare-focus
5. Identity-focus
6. Composite and Coalition

In a small-state context, the last strategy might be most applicable as it enables the state to amalgamate, or morph, the necessary elements from the other strategies into a more specific strategy applicable to the conditions and situation. Support from a coalition, or at least external partners, is vital for success.

Finally, a small state must draw parallels and lessons learned from appropriate historical UW case studies when crafting a modern UW strategy to address a particular security situation. The selection of elements from different strategies depends on the particular nation’s PMESII-PT analysis results. In *Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war*, Robert Pape highlights the importance of a proper strategy by stating that the “deterrer’s strategy is more important than the balance of military capabilities between the opponents.”

**Phases of Small State UW**

When a small state conducts UW as resistance for national defense, the classic seven UW phases that U.S. doctrine espouses does not necessarily apply and must, therefore, be amended. The main difference is that in accordance with U.S. doctrine, some of the phases may switch or skip, depending on circumstances. That is because UW will be conducted in another country, on U.S. terms, meaning that the stakes are not as high. When a small state conducts UW with its own resources and forces, the phases must follow a certain strategy and meet specific milestones before shifting into the next phase. Otherwise, small state UW efforts will not develop and are more likely to have an adversary eliminate them.

Another key difference is that survival of UW infrastructure and participants is not factored as a distinct phase in the seven-phase model. But, UW infrastructure and participants are a key determinant of success in two specific phases for a small state. Regardless of the amount and intensity of external support, UW participants on the ground must take care of their own security and survival, especially when operating on adversary-controlled
“Live to fight another day” is the UW mantra, especially when confronting an overwhelming adversary.

The reason to distinguish between peace, crisis (transition), and war is that in each of these modes there are different legal provisions regulating state daily life and functioning. Crisis and war modes usually involve stricter restrictive measures and increased obligations for the general population. Thus, it is a tough decision for governing structures to shift into a stricter mode as it will also cost more money.

Table 1. Different Views on UW Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lindsay20</th>
<th>U.S. doctrinal21</th>
<th>Small state specific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Organization of clandestine networks</td>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Preparation (includes Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Organization of intelligence and counterintelligence networks</td>
<td>Initial contact</td>
<td>Activation (and Counter-UW, if necessary)22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organization of local area commands</td>
<td>Infiltration</td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Development of communications with outside</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Development of free territory</td>
<td>Buildup</td>
<td>Buildup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Final consolidation of liberated areas</td>
<td>Combat Employment</td>
<td>Combat Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>Sustainment and Combat Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>External Assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- ◯ Occurs during peacetime within peacetime legislation
- ■ Occurs during crisis time or transition between peace and war within specific crisis legislation implemented by the state’s appropriate authority (the executive or legislative branch, depending on the political system)
- □ Occurs during war within wartime legislation implemented by the state’s appropriate authority who has declared the country to be in a state of war. The exile government could also be such an authority
Table 2. Small State UW Phases Using Own Forces and Territory
(Author’s analysis based on the views presented in table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1: Preparation and Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This covers Lindsay’s phases 1-3 and U.S. doctrinal phases 1-3. According to Lindsay, this includes the establishment of different supporting networks as well as the local command structure (area commands). U.S. doctrine stipulates that in the first phase, the population must first be turned against the occupying power as well as in favor of accepting external support. In U.S. phase 2, the cooperation with exile government and local resistance leadership begins. In the U.S. doctrinal third phase, if the cooperation is deemed sufficient for a special forces (SF) team to begin their operations, the team will infiltrate the area and establish contact with the local resistance movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In case of a small state using its own SF as UW facilitators, the phases prescribed by Lindsay and U.S. doctrine must be amended and amalgamated as the approach of domestic SF likely differs from U.S. SF. The key difference here is that unlike Lindsay’s and U.S. doctrinal approach, in order for small state’s UW preparations and establishment of the organization to succeed, this first phase should occur during peace time before any open hostilities or conflict.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Phase 2: Activation (and counter-UW, if necessary)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This covers parts of Lindsay’s phases 1-4 and parts of U.S. doctrinal phases 1-3. In phase 4, Lindsay introduces the establishment of direct communications with structures outside the UW area of operations that can contribute to or facilitate external support to the UW effort. In the case of a small state, communications with and support from the outside are determining factors in the course of the UW campaign. Ideally, this phase should be completed during the crisis but before the actual invasion, otherwise, the activation of the UW network and its communications with the outside will likely be detected by the adversary. The need for counter-UW may arise, if the adversary initiates their own UW as the first wave of the offensive. It is then best to utilize similar measures as an antidote.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Phase 3: Survival</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survival of the UW participants and structures becomes extremely important during open (conventional) conflict, until the frontier moves past and the adversary stabilizes its rear area. Only then can the UW networks wake up, assess the situation and damage caused and make repairs, if necessary. This phase requires the introduction of promises, hope or actions of assistance on behalf of external actors. This acts as an enabler or catalyst for the hatching of domestic UW efforts.</td>
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<th>Phase 4: Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>This repeats Lindsay’s phases 1-3 which are necessary to repair and restart the pre-war or pre-occupation UW network. This phase is also similar to U.S. doctrinal phase 4, but only in the sense of repairing the damages caused by the enemy in the survival phase and replacing key personnel. Most of the tasks prescribed in U.S. doctrinal phase 4 ought to be completed already during peace time as described in small-state specific phase 1.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 5: Buildup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This phase is similar to U.S. doctrinal phase 5 (buildup) and includes Lindsay’s phase 4. An additional purpose is to gain internal support for resistance. The emphasis here is on internal buildup and not so much on tangible external support. The main reason behind focusing on internal buildup is that direct external involvement (such as SF troops or resources, for example) could be detected by the adversary and evoke an active counter-UW campaign, thus forcing the UW network to switch back to phase 3, survival.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foundations and Contents of a UW Doctrine

The foundation of a small state UW doctrine should rest upon national unity focused on state survival, not necessarily a particular ethnic group’s survival. The government should try to facilitate such an attitude as much as possible among its citizens, even if it means trying to sell this concept to different ethnic groups, some of whom may even ethnically belong to a larger, hostile nation. The end goal is to make everyone, regardless of ethnicity or religion, prefer continuity of the current government (or restoration of the pre-occupation government), regardless of the adversary’s promises and propaganda. This places a heavy burden on an individual citizen who is expected to go outside his or her comfort zone to support the UW campaign. An untrained citizen cannot easily make or implement this decision. Therefore, a UW doctrine should conceptually focus on the following main themes: individual risk, legality, trust, and information.

In essence, success in small state UW often depends on citizens’ willingness to risk their way of life for state survival. A prerequisite for this
Salum: Small State UW Doctrine

is the codification of resistance (and UW) in national legislation to define and shape the general public mindset. The goals spelled out should describe maintaining or restoring the particular state order, form of government, state structures, branches of power, and, the individual level basic freedoms and rights.

Legality of small state actors and activities is important for two reasons. First, legality provides participants with a solid feeling that their actions are justified and acceptable in light of domestic and international law. Every participant is significant in small state resistance; therefore, it is not acceptable to lose them to hostile IO that argue their actions are illegal. Second, resistance legality of action helps maintain and increase external support to the UW effort and domestic constituencies. External public perception matters greatly for the external support providers and friendly governments. Even if the adversary’s legal system may label those involved in the UW effort as criminals and outlaws, the attitude and consequent actions of small state and allied friendly populations will motivate UW participants.

Both risk and legality issues affect the third key small state resistance theme: trust among participants. Trust is perhaps the most essential and vital characteristic in relationships between participants and supporters, due to sensitive operational demands and high risks. Loss of trust means reduced communications and disunited action. In worse cases, loss of trust can lead to compromise or fratricide. Loss of trust also costs time lost, capabilities, and efficiency.

To maintain legality and trust, while justifying individual risks, these concepts have to be tied into IO campaigns designed for domestic and external audiences. As highlighted previously, legality and trust are the two key pillars in small state UW efforts. If legality and trust are not incorporated into an active IO campaign at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, it is likely that these two pillars will gradually erode, injecting doubts in domestic and external audiences. For example, when the Crimean annexation disappears from mainstream media reporting, it can also stop being an issue for ordinary citizens who vote. After a while, citizens who vote may start questioning the state’s involvement in a foreign conflict and even change their attitudes against involvement, especially when the media reports failures in a particular region or conflict.
Statement of Purpose, Level of Ambition

A small state’s UW doctrine should have a strong and unambiguous mission statement, spelling out the task and purpose for conducting a national UW campaign. UW has to be politically prescribed, not just exist as a military style mission statement. There are two approaches: long- and short-term. Long-term requires that a parliament enact UW in legislation. Short-term, the executive branch enacts UW by government or ministerial decree, making it more susceptible to political competition but enhancing flexibility to make amendments, should the security situation change. Perhaps the most important question to answer when crafting small state UW doctrine is: Will the small state act alone or will there be strong potential for external assistance? The answer to this question will determine and direct how to write the remainder of the doctrine.

A clear small state national strategic end state (NSES), identifying conditions and criteria for success and ending the UW campaign and resistance, must also exist. This could be mostly military, but it has to include general political elements which would enable the state to restore status quo ante to the maximum possible extent. The NSES also determines the UW strategy and resistance campaign’s ambition level. There are three possible options:

1. **Deterrence**. In this case, a well-established UW capability is meant to deter a potential adversary from attacking the small state.

2. **Enabling conditions for victory**. In this case, UW is meant to erode the invading adversary and promote conditions for a conventional counterattack and liberation, most likely by the small state’s allies.

3. **Victory**. In this case, UW will be used as the main effort to defeat the adversary and restore sovereignty of the small state.

After defining the NSES, small states must identify what exactly constitutes victory and loss—at what decision point do UW campaigns become counterproductive? A RAND study suggests that “defeat is the condition in which one belligerent is no longer able to “mobilize, transform and employ a diverse array of human and material resources against the other for a strategic purpose.” There are two main measures for ending the campaign:

1. **Victory-focused, conditions-based**. Once certain criteria, or conditions, are met and stability is beyond doubt, resistance and UW
leadership will announce the UW campaign’s end and return to a normal state of affairs.

2. **Results-focused, events-based.** This can occur when support ends, and have the following outcomes:

   a. A frozen conflict which will become harmful to the occupying forces. Chechnya serves as a good example. Deportations of the Chechens and the Ingush from their homelands in 1944 did not help in the long term, but instead established a long-lasting animosity that culminated in two wars in the 1990s and tensions that prevail today.

   b. Total elimination of the people. For example, Spanish conquistadors eradicated the Aztecs.

   c. Assimilation. For example, certain Finno-Ugric tribes fought against the Soviet regime in the 1930s, to preserve their way of life, without collectivization. However, a mix of violent and peaceful measures gradually assimilated them.

**C3 Issues**

The first issue in implementing UW C3 has to do with C3 itself. Due to its fluid, flexible, free-flowing and often unpredictable nature, it is a challenge to utilize UW C3 in a manner similar to conventional warfare. The UW command function can be more effectively achieved by using the concept of intent. Trust in peers and subordinates must make up for difficulty in controlling the UW effort.

UW command and control is heavily reliant on successful communications, mostly via electronic means. However, it is often hindered or outright dangerous. Therefore, command and control must be augmented by ideas that are easy to transmit via other means difficult for an adversary to detect. As classical C3 components are inherent to conventional warfare, so too are intent, trust and ideas (ITI) in UW. Rigid utilization of C3 in UW will likely remain theoretical, structural, and implied while implementation of ITI can be more realistic and applicable.

The second UW C3 issue concerns transfers of authority (TOA) in various UW spheres, between different structures and during peace, crisis, and war. TOA occur between:
Resistance Views

- Standing (pre-occupation), shadow, and exile governments
- Political structures and security structures
- Internal security forces (police, intelligence) and military
- Conventional and unconventional military elements

TOA becomes an especially important challenge if the UW campaign is successful, the adversary defeated, and original state order is being restored. Different components of the UW structure and networks must accept and support implementation of the new (restored) government. UW structure deactivation and dismantling takes time. It is a gradual process as the structure and networks become aware of the new reality only by successful communication. It is likely that not all believe the initial news, thus creating additional friction in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

Legitimacy and Legal Issues

In the domestic and international legal realm, UW, its operations and support, often fall into a gray area where it is difficult to determine what is legal or illegal. Opposing sides and international and domestic legal frameworks each view and treat UW participants and their activities differently, through a cloud of words sometimes constituting different definitions. For example, an adversary may easily enter a key UW person, a resistance movement leader, visiting a friendly foreign country into the Interpol database as a wanted person. This hinders the leader’s freedom of movement in foreign countries.

In order to at least provide for some legal coherence in internal affairs, resistance and its implementation via UW must be stated in national security and defense basic documents at parliamentary, government, and ministry levels. It is obvious that not everything can be legally codified but an attempt has to be made to cover UW’s basic premises. Participants have to be aware of what they risk when deciding to participate in a UW campaign either as guerrillas, auxiliaries, or underground members. They must know what to do when there is a potential conflict between domestic and international law, regarding UW-related activities.
In addition to acknowledging international and domestic law, UW doctrine must describe a potential adversary’s legal system for largely the same reasons as mentioned above. Participants must know how the adversary’s legal system views their role and repercussions for their UW/resistance support. A UW participant’s legal status is therefore the key factor determining their fate, should the adversary capture them. Bottom line: a participant’s legal status also determines their survival possibilities.

The second area where legal issues matter a lot is the question of rules of engagement. UW will be conducted during peace, war, and the crisis period between peace and war. There are different laws and regulations that prescribe the use of force in the name of national defense or domestic order during these periods. Crimes conducted in the name of the state is a sensitive issue that can deter leaders and individuals from meeting operational requirements and fulfilling orders for fear of the risk of being convicted and punished after the war.

**Adversary’s Strategy, End State, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)**

Each UW campaign is unique in that the adversary’s specific strategy and desired end state affects its TTPs that it uses to achieve its strategy and end state. From a UW perspective, we must consider a lot more factors than in a conventional conflict. The key additional factor is the adversary’s domestic context, especially the legal system that will affect occupied territory peoples as well as stay-behind UW participants. For example, the criteria and procedures for issuing new documentation can directly affect many aspects of everyday life including availability of services, freedom of movement, employment, etc.

In addition to legal aspects, perhaps the most important UW effort questions deal with the physical conflict. Namely, what and why does the adversary want with a partial or full occupation? What does the adversary fear most? What is the adversary’s sensitivity to costs in material and human terms? Can we, on behalf of the adversary, presume a “minimum criteria of rationality or reasonable relationship between values, objectives, and decisions”?25 All of these issues must be addressed when crafting a UW strategy tailored to a specific adversary. The key is to create a strategy that
Resistance Views

utilizes an opposite approach to the adversary’s strategy, as suggested by Arreguin-Toft.26

Planning and Preparation Requirements

When a small state decides to implement UW as a part of their national defense strategy, it does not mean that conventional forces become a secondary priority. On the contrary, conventional forces serve as an excellent source of personnel training, vetting, and recruitment. But, the main conventional forces’ role is to be an umbrella, or a cocoon, for the UW campaign’s military domain. The conventional defense plan and UW must be like conjoined twins; one would not sustain and succeed without the other.

This means that small state conventional defense and UW planning must go hand in hand, taking into account operational compartmentalization necessities. Allocation of resources between conventional and UW efforts is the most burning issue, given a small state’s usual limited resources. Deliberate reliance on UW, instead of conventional forces, in defense against occupation, is a difficult reality for military, Ministry of Defense (MOD), and political leadership planners to accept and address. It will take time and education to adjust to this concept. A UW training and education program for all levels of military command and leadership should be part of professional military education and vocational training courses, as well as education programs like courses, seminars, and workshops for civilian defense officials.

In addition to balancing resources, defense planning processes must consider UW and conventional forces’ symbiosis in capability development. UW should be instituted as a comprehensive capability package that should be as subject as any conventional capability to planning and implementation procedures. UW should be broken down into Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities-Interoperability lines of development as input for capability planning. Express UW capabilities along the seven essential operational capabilities27 should be used as output or a complete package for use.

Under MOD supervision, the military should have the lead planning role for UW. Other agencies and state structures will contribute their expertise, but should not have approval authority other than in issues that require deconfliction. It is an assumption, though, that with the comprehensive UW approach, these structures will develop their own plans for UW. Herein lies
the potential for competing interests and resource turf wars. The executive branch must have final authority to approve UW concepts and plans, but more detailed implementation plans will have to stay within the military for operational security purposes.

Among other challenges, UW presents a major political challenge for democracies. Planning for and implementing, UW doctrine as a national defense entails deliberate establishment of a shadow government to retain government authority over a territory when designated to do so for a crisis. Concerns arise when the shadow government’s structures are established during peace, and the standing government has no guarantee that the shadow government will not attempt to seize power, for example, with a coup. To mitigate such a threat, there has to be sufficient oversight and control of the shadow government, while at the same time strict requirements for operational security and need-to-know must guarantee the shadow government’s security.

Preparations

Preparations to implement UW as national defense must be completed and rehearsed during peace times. There will be neither time nor resources available to prepare during crisis or war, when the whole state apparatus, and society, will likely be overwhelmed with basic tasks and survival. Since UW is perhaps the most complex aspect of national defense, the highest and most meticulous operational security demands, preparations, and rehearsals must exist for UW structures to survive an open conflict and maintain ability to function as planned after its dormancy. As a minimum, Arreguin-Toft recommends that a small state implement the following requirements to conduct guerrilla warfare, and, to a larger extent, armed resistance against an adversary:

1. Social support
2. Sanctuary, the idea of self-sacrifice being necessary and noble
3. A strategy capable of tying all three advantages into a single effort\(^28\)

However, Arreguin-Toft also cautions that “[w]hen invading or occupying forces do not exercise restraint in the use of force, or when their \textit{political objective} is the destruction rather than coercion of a weak actor’s people,
GWS [guerrilla warfare strategy] can become a prohibitively expensive defensive strategy.”29 Thus, if conducting guerrilla warfare is a central element of a small state’s UW doctrine, that state must heed this caution and find alternate ways to conduct UW.

In addition to the above requirements, a small state must plan for transitions of power during peace, crisis and war. Again, these transitions need to be codified and rehearsed so that key personnel are well aware of their roles and responsibilities when they have to take charge.

Regardless of preparations, UW efforts by individual citizens and their relationship to the official UW effort can present a problem during conflict and occupation. This can have serious implications for the latter, mainly because of failed operations and unwanted adversary attention, but also due to potential fratricide and compromise. A state-organized UW campaign is objective-oriented, thus pragmatic; self-emerged UW efforts tend to be more emotional, survival, or revenge-oriented. However, the state-organized UW campaign has responsibility to deconflict and try to use and sustain the self-emerged UW effort.

The matters of external (foreign) facilitation and support must also be addressed during peace. As described above, external support is one of the key determinants of success in small state UW efforts. Cultural issues play a significant role in UW efforts. Namely, how will local people perceive external involvement in the UW effort? On one hand, their views may be favorable: external forces usually do not have bias—there may not be a bad external force history with the local people and foreigners usually bring resources. On the other hand, locals may unfavorably view external involvement—foreigners tend to be less aware of the local situation including culture, customs, social aspects, and traditions. The second negative issue is that the locals may start questioning the foreigners’ intent and UW involvement. Why would foreigners care to support or even join the locals? This thought process can create suspicion among locals of the motive behind external support, reducing their willingness to trust and cooperate. If a small state wishes to use external support to its fullest potential, cooperation with most
potential partners and allies must be a norm in nonmilitary aspects, as well as a long-term habit.

**Conclusions: UW Implementation in a Small State**

It is viable for small states to implement UW as a core capability package, considering the prerequisites, planning considerations, and various factors related to executing UW as a means of comprehensive national defense. However, it is important to note that the eventual restoration of small state independence and sovereignty after a partial or full adversary occupation is largely a political effort. UW does not create political conditions. It may only facilitate political conditions, meaning that battlefield success must be transferred as successes into society and international politics. People must not become complacent with the occupation or, worse, start countering friendly UW efforts. A small state can wage successful UW as its principal means of national defense only if all domains of state power are utilized and foreign partners and allies continue to recognize the original governing structures or their offspring (e.g. exile government or in-state shadow government), as well as support them.

The successful implementation of UW rests on several presumptions. First, UW has to be recognized at least as an equal partner to conventional defense efforts in terms of authority and resources allocated for preparations. Similarly, the whole-of-government effort has to be utilized without significant turf wars hampering the preparations and implementation. Second, participating structures have to make sufficient preparations during peace, which means that they have to acknowledge their roles, missions, and responsibilities to establish appropriate networks. Preparations must include rehearsals, especially regarding the TOA among standing, shadow, and exile governments, and C3 ITI among conventional and UW structures. Third, external partners and allies supporting the UW campaign have to be familiar with their roles, missions, and responsibilities in providing UW support. They must continue to recognize the exiled government as the sole representative body of the occupied state. Last but not least, the general population has to remain at least neutral towards the UW effort and not actively work against it. An active IO campaign supporting the whole UW effort is a good measure to facilitate popular support for the UW effort. In order to support the IO campaign, the activities different UW participants
conduct have to be as legitimate as possible, from the perspective of domestic and world public constituencies.

Endnotes


2. In this paper, UW is defined as “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” (JP 1-02).


6. For the purposes of this paper, the author defines national defense as “actions taken by a state’s armed forces, law enforcement and intelligence structures to defend or facilitate defense of the state, its territory, and people.”


8. I use this as a broad term, including direct participants, planners, supporters, facilitators, donors etc. on all sides of the conflict. For example, the following terms for participants can be found in UW-related literature: insurgent, rebel, revolutionist, freedom fighter, underground member, mutineer, terrorist, mujahidin, auxiliary member, partisan, guerrilla, resistance member, belligerent.

9. For example: rebellion, insurrection, insurgency, mutiny, revolution, uprising, coup d’état, revolt, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency.

10. Resistance as a movement is hereby defined as an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.” (JP 3-05).

11. Doctrine is hereby understood as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” (JP 1-02). For a comprehensive
account of the history of doctrines and their different types, see Aaron P. Jackson, “The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare” (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2001).

12. For the purposes of this paper, the author defines national security as “a comprehensive approach utilizing all national domains of power to provide security to the state and its interests.”

13. The author defines total defense as “the utilization of all state and society’s capabilities and resources to defend the state, its territory and people against an invading adversary.” Total defense is especially vital in case of small states, as they need to mobilize all possible resources to provide for state survival.

14. For the purposes of this paper, deterrence means “a policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of punishment or denial, from using force to resolve a political conflict.”

15. Chikovani, “How to Stop the Bear,” 44.


18. FM 3-05.201, “Special Forces Unconventional Warfare” (2003), 1–12. See also FM 3-05.130, “Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare” (2008), 4-4, 4-5.

19. See FM 3-05.130, paragraph 4-25, 4-4.


22. For the purposes of this paper, I will define C-UW as follows: operations and activities conducted by a state to deter, disrupt or eliminate hostile UW activities in order to maintain state sovereignty, territorial integrity and form of government.


26. For a comprehensive overview of the strategic interaction thesis, see Ivan Arre- 
guin-Toft: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York, 
N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34–47.

27. Timely Force Availability, Effective Intelligence, Deployability and Mobility, 
Effective Engagement, Effective C3, Logistics Sustainability, Survivability & Force 

28. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, Unconventional Deterrence: How the Weak Deter the 
Strong, 291. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 50th Annual 
Convention “Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future”, New York Marriott 

29. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, Unconventional Deterrence, 33.
Political and military North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders are considering options to deter Russia from further destabilizing actions against its neighbors. This chapter examines the advantages of employing NATO special operations forces as a deterrent, and elaborates upon NATO’s opportunities and challenges in this environment.

Introduction

Irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, non-linear warfare, non-traditional threats, small wars, unconventional warfare, complex operations, gray zone—all new terms that have evolved to describe nuances of conflict the United States continues to encounter. Difficulties arise when the military community coins new phrases that are subjected to different interpretations. To avoid confusion, the military community needs to be clear and straightforward on what is meant and not characterize a situation by bundling it under unfamiliar and uncommon terms.

Regardless the terminology used to characterize conflict and destabilizing situations, the tools governments have at their disposal to address these situations remain static: diplomacy, trade and economic actions, law enforcement and/or military actions, intelligence collection and strategic communication. These situations challenge governments to balance carefully the application of these tools to achieve foreign policy objectives without over committing resources or provoking unfavorable responses from adversaries or partners.
NATO’s Response to Hybrid Warfare

As a result of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, NATO undertook an effort to examine the threat environment NATO nations face and to determine their military contributions across a range of ambiguous threat situations. Hybrid warfare was the terminology that emerged from NATO Allied Command Transformation to characterize approaches state and non-state actors may apply against NATO nations. Although not a new term, NATO defined hybrid warfare as threats “posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.”

General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, highlighted hybrid warfare when he served concurrently as the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command (2007–2010) and as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (2007–2009). In a conference launching the NATO Strategic Concept, General Mattis proposed that, “Amidst the complex, hybrid risks and threats that manifest today, we need better definition not just of Article 5 responses but of other circumstances that would cause NATO to deploy military forces.”

The hybrid characterization carried forward within NATO is now used to characterize Russia’s efforts to coerce and disrupt its neighbors.

After examining potential destabilizing and devastating impacts of hybrid warfare, NATO adopted a comprehensive approach to counter hybrid warfare. The comprehensive approach capitalizes on the full range of tools available to nations and the international community to which NATO contributes military capability. This approach emphasizes the need to orchestrate all tools of national and international power to achieve success. In fact, it could be argued that Russia is employing its own comprehensive approach as Russian President Vladimir Putin leverages many national assets—diplomatic, military, private, informational—to influence (some may say strong arm) neighboring states. Russia has utilized means outside of conventional force and lethal action to coerce neighbors such as mobilizing independent hacker groups; manipulating trade decisions, especially in the energy market; and using the media to spread its message.
Destabilizing Actions

There are many examples of Russian actions to influence its neighbors, impose its will on political decisions within sovereign nations by fostering civil unrest, facilitate proactive movements within many communities, or use trade tactics to elicit economic distress. In Estonia in 2007, Russian hackers undertook “massive and coordinated cyber-attacks on the websites of the [Estonian] government, banks, telecommunications companies, internet service providers and news organizations” accompanied by ethnic Russian riots and looting in Tallinn, along with “a Kremlin-run youth movement [that] sealed off and attacked Estonia’s embassy” in Moscow. These coordinated Russian actions against Estonian interests were a result of the Estonian government’s decision to relocate a Soviet WWII memorial known as the Bronze Soldier, which Russians view as a tribute to fallen Red Army soldiers that liberated Estonia from Nazis. Ethnic Russians in Estonia “tend to see the statue as a cherished memorial to wartime sacrifice. Estonians mostly see it rather as a symbol of a hated foreign occupation.” Coordinated Russian cyberattacks effectively disrupted Estonia’s governance, commerce, and essential services. Interestingly, the Russian government did not impose any consequences against its civilians meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

In the summer of 2008, Lithuania similarly experienced coordinated cyberattacks targeting government and industry websites. Attacks were “attributed … to nationalistic Russian hacker groups.” In Lithuania, attacks started after the Lithuanian government’s move to prohibit the display of Soviet emblems, symbols and memorabilia and resulted in “Web sites of government agencies, political parties and businesses … defaced with the hammer-and-sickle symbol and five-pointed stars, as well as derisive and profane anti-Lithuanian slogans.” While it is difficult to tie these actions to the Kremlin, many observers perceived that the lack of Russian government punitive action against the hacker organizations implied that the Russian government backed the attacks.

As a large supplier of natural gas to Europe, Russia has leveraged its position in the energy market to influence neighbors. In 2006, what originated as a business dispute with Ukraine regarding gas prices and transit fees evolved into a political dispute when President Putin placed extreme economic pressure on Ukraine. The Independent highlighted a Kremlin-watcher’s view...
that “Putin [intended] to destabilize Russia’s western neighbor in the hope of unseating its leader,” who won popular support and an election amidst demonstrations against Russian influence. The Russia-Ukraine gas dispute emerged again in 2009 in which Russia seized an opportunity to undermine Ukraine’s reputation among European leaders by arguing that Ukraine is “unfit for any form of integration with the EU.” Ukraine contended that the gas dispute “exposed Russia [yet again] as a bully that uses gas as a political weapon.”

Playing by different rules

As NATO considers its options on how to respond to Russia’s actions, Russia chooses not to be constrained by internationally accepted norms and laws in its influence on neighbors, creating instability in its “near abroad.” In his evaluation of Georgia’s war with Russia in 2008, Charles King mapped the evolution of Russia’s disenfranchisement with international institutions, noting that, “Russia has embarked on a new era of muscular intervention, showing little faith in multilateral institutions, such as the UN Security Council or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.” As a result, the West finds itself playing a completely different game than Russia and its moves and countermoves have little impact or consequence for Russia. Eerik Heldna, deputy director of Kapo, Estonia’s internal security service, effectively summed up this dynamic, following the abduction of an Estonian security official on Russia’s border: “It’s like a situation in which you’re trying to play chess and the other side starts wrestling.”

In many cases, sovereign nations’ internal legal structures limit opportunities for more effective responses to an external adversary’s aggression, especially when actions cannot be readily attributed such as with cyberattacks or undefined paramilitary forces’ clandestine assaults. Consequently, the onus falls on law enforcement and security forces to respond to coercive actions; but these forces may lack the experience and capacity to respond effectively to non-attributable, destabilizing actions. Such was the case in Ukraine. As Ukrainian forces were amassed to fight against the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, the whole operation was commanded by Ukrainian security forces, not the military, in order to stay within the bounds of Ukrainian law. However, security services rely heavily on the military for its experience
commanding and controlling such a large operation and for the range of military capabilities they contribute in the campaign against the separatists.

The antiquated nature of NATO’s Article 5 constrains members in their actions and means of response to hybrid warfare situations by specifying an armed attack against one nation will be an attack on all members. Stipulated over 65 years ago in the Washington Treaty, Article 5 does not account for modern means of attack. Today, the security of a nation can be threatened without using weapons. Russia’s covert and clandestine operations have “[created] militarily and legally ambiguous situations [that] require NATO to rethink its military posture.”18 In a recent Clingendael Policy Brief, authors challenged NATO “to find a convincing answer to the type of ‘ambiguous’ or ‘irregular’ warfare that the Russian Federation has shown.”19

SOF—A Flexible and Versatile Tool

As NATO evaluates its means and options to implement a comprehensive approach, it should consider that, unlike a state, it has only one tool to leverage within a cooperative and coordinated approach: military action. SOF offer unique capabilities within the Allied military tool set. Specifically designed to be flexible and adaptable within any situation, SOF provide NATO “an inherently agile instrument ideally suited to this ambiguous and dynamic operational environment.”20

An output from an Allied Command Transformation experiment in 2011 focused on countering hybrid threats and included a range of recommendations. Many recommendations involved aspects of understanding hybrid threats; enhancing mechanisms to share information; engaging nonmilitary organizations; and closing the gap between the military and law enforcement.21 While it is difficult to identify specific roles that SOF may fill in hybrid warfare, SOF are very useful in a comprehensive approach because of the nature of their operations, flexibility, and range of education.22 Identified below are some instances where SOF offer a great deal in filling the gaps identified in the Allied Command Transformation experiment.

Understanding hybrid threats

SOF personnel study, analyze, and employ forces differently than conventional forces, to approach an ambiguous problem.23 SOF are trained and educated to address the operating environment in a manner that places the population as the “‘focus of operations’ [requiring] a different mindset and
different capabilities than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily."\textsuperscript{24} SOF specifically train to operate in the precarious environment that exists prior to conflict. They understand that their role is to conduct operations involving “subversion, coercion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over a relevant population,”\textsuperscript{25} oftentimes “within the confines of a peacetime mandate.”\textsuperscript{26} Due to the experience that SOF have in hybrid warfare, they can use their knowledge to foster greater understanding among their conventional NATO military peers on how to approach ambiguous situations.

**Enhancing mechanisms to share information**

In 2006, NATO established the NATO Special Operations Coordination Center, now the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). This created a network of special operations professionals and means to share information, enhanced by U.S. Special Operations Command efforts to foster a global SOF network. The SOF network continues to grow in strength as SOF work regularly with allied counterparts, train and participate in exercises together to enhance their capabilities and ensure interoperability. NATO SOF have used the SOF network to establish systems and mechanisms to share information and intelligence. These efforts include a communications system that directly links many nations’ SOF headquarters, fostering collaboration across the network.\textsuperscript{27} A growing number of national and multinational SOF exercises facilitate information sharing within the NATO SOF network. Planners designed some exercises to enhance training and cooperation in hybrid warfare environments, collectively raising awareness of NATO SOF, while offering an opportunity to share information on different approaches in ambiguous situations.\textsuperscript{28} Bilaterally, some NATO nations’ SOF collaborate to update or build defense plans, setting a significant precedent by expanding to a new level of information sharing that has not been done before and fosters greater interoperability.\textsuperscript{29}
Engaging nonmilitary organizations
Many allied SOF adopted an approach involving regular interaction with other government ministries and agencies. The population-focused nature of many SOF operations demands close coordination with other government organizations including security services, intelligence agencies, law enforcement, development agencies, and foreign ministries. SOF also have experience working cooperatively with non-governmental and civic organizations and local political leaders. Thus, SOF can easily maneuver and adapt to other organizations’ way of doing business. As an example, SOF have worked with private business and industry associations to cooperate on logistics or transportation issues.

Closing the gap between the military and law enforcement
SOF have the ability to augment and interoperate with law enforcement and/or security forces, conducting many of the same missions as police forces but in a sustained manner. In many countries, SOF “maintain formal and informal relationships to domestic counter-terrorism organizations and can provide varying degrees of support when circumstances require additional capabilities and assistance.” A close SOF and law enforcement working relationship exists because there is often insufficient capacity within civilian security forces to address the counterterrorism challenge, creating law enforcement dependence on armed forces support. The close working relationship is essential, especially in peacetime where military forces cannot conduct operations or surveillance activities. SOF can support these efforts by providing capabilities that may be beyond those of law enforcement to attribute adversary actions. With an ability to conduct discreet reconnaissance and employ coercive and subversive tactics, SOF has valuable skills to augment law enforcement and counterintelligence agencies’ efforts.

Challenges and Considerations
SOF demonstrated they are adept at maneuvering jointly with allied and partner nations to create operational effects. Afghanistan under the International Security Assistance Force is one such example. The challenge arises when circumstances require that SOF use capabilities in pre-crisis situations but legal limitations restrict military involvement. Without countries addressing the gap created by these legal limitations allows space for
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adversaries to maneuver, especially adversaries who choose not to be constrained by traditional international and diplomatic legal frameworks.

Due to the sensitive nature of how many countries’ SOF operate, most SOF successes may only be found through bilateral cooperative efforts. Depending on the mission, SOF can be constrained in its operations when employed under a NATO or coalition effort due to countries’ concerns of divulging sensitive tactics.\(^3^6\) However, many bilateral cooperative efforts are already underway. Countries have established ongoing cooperative relationships focused on improving SOF capabilities and enhancing interoperability.

Many military leaders are not familiar with the unique capabilities, skills, and relationships of SOF. Consequently, SOF sometimes have been misemployed, underutilized, or their range of tasks constrained because they were not granted authorization to execute.\(^3^7\) SOF should consider opportunities to inform military, and political, leaders on the range of capabilities and skills that SOF offers within a comprehensive approach. Representing SOF capabilities within the NATO community, the NSHQ works to highlight where and how NATO can capitalize on these specially trained operators’ unique skills.

**Way Ahead**

One of the Clingendael Policy Brief’s recommendations suggests, “NATO should develop, as a matter of urgency, doctrines and capabilities to counter ambiguous warfare tactics”\(^3^8\) To partially address this recommendation, the author would submit that the capabilities already exist within NATO SOF. The NSHQ has put in place some doctrine.\(^3^9\) Next steps should involve developing a common understanding, beginning with a common terminology.\(^4^0\) Both the NSHQ and U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), in cooperation with the Joint Special Operations University, have implemented initiatives to explore aspects of the contemporary operating environment, to create broadly accepted definitions and a common understanding of what is required to address hybrid warfare or ambiguous warfare tactics. Many NATO members, partner nations, and the alliance as a whole, are closely examining the tactics and techniques Russia employs in its hybrid warfare approach to influence and coerce its neighbors. The NATO community and partner nations are exploring NATO’s Comprehensive Approach and identifying further SOF opportunities to support
assurance and deterrence efforts. While this paper focused on the Russian problem set, NATO member nations face other hybrid or irregular threats that have significant impact on individual states and the NATO community, such as conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. The utility of SOF is far-reaching because of its versatile nature and unique skills of these forces.

Endnotes


2. NATO SOF professional. Personal interview. 13 January 2015.


8. Ibid.


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13. “Pipe down The annual gas squabble between Russia and Ukraine turns nastier—to the alarm of much of Europe”, The Economist, 8 January 2009.

14. Ibid.


22. NATO SOF professional and military educator. Personal interview. 19 January 2015.

23. NATO SOF professional. Personal interview. 8 January 2015.


25. Ibid.


27. From author’s personal experience working with the NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre (now the NATO SOF Headquarters), 2008.


29. Ibid.

30. NATO SOF professional. Personal interview. 8 January 2015.

31. NATO SOF professionals. Personal interview. 19 January 2015.

32. Ibid.


34. NATO SOF professionals. Personal interview. 19 January 2015.
35. NATO SOF commander. Personal interview. 14 January 2015.
36. NATO SOF professional. Personal interview. 26 January 2015.
37. NATO SOF professional. Personal interview. 14 January 2015.
38. Drent, Van Ham, and Homan, “Article 5 Revisited.”
40. NATO SOF professional. Personal interview. 13 January 2015.
Chapter 5. Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Unconventional Warfare (UW)

Linda Robinson

Introduction

This chapter examines the U.S. experience in unconventional warfare (UW), using four cases in the last 35 years to illustrate outcomes achieved, the factors in those outcomes, and possible requirements for the successful conduct of UW. The U.S. role in these, and indeed most, cases of UW has been to provide support to other countries’ forces and resistance movements. Some conclusions drawn from this discussion, therefore, pertain particularly to UW support. In addition, these cases, while examined from the U.S. perspective, also lend themselves to broader conclusions about the circumstances under which UW is most successful.

The four UW cases examined here all involved substantial U.S. support to indigenous movements: the contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001–2002, the Kurdish peshmerga in northern Iraq in 2003, and the Sons of Iraq (SOI) in 2007–2008. Each of these movements enjoyed some degree of success in attaining their objectives, even if they did not entirely or singlehandedly overthrow or dislodge the opposing force or regime. The brief accounts below describe: 1) the U.S. support provided to each movement, 2) the degree to which the United States achieved its objectives, and 3) the factors that enabled that degree of success.

The cases lend themselves to a more general discussion about the range of objectives that UW can be employed to support, beyond the military overthrow of a regime or occupier. These cases also suggest possible support

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requirements and the supported group’s nature, to achieve success. The examples also illustrate the limits of UW employed as a sole tactic compared to UW’s utility as part of a broader, multifaceted campaign.

**The Contras in Nicaragua, 1980s**

In the 1980s, the U.S. government embarked on a multiyear policy of supporting armed resistance to the communist, Soviet-backed Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in Central America. After the Sandinista-led revolution overthrew the U.S.-backed Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the Sandinistas forged close ties with the Soviet Union, including military-to-military relations. With the arrival of Soviet military aid, Cuban military advisers, and stepped-up assistance to the neighboring Salvadoran communist insurgent movement, the U.S. Reagan administration decided to organize, train, and equip a military resistance force known colloquially as the counterrevolutionaries, or contras (*contrarevolucionarios*). Initially carried out as a covert operation, the assistance program became public knowledge and eventually the subject of extensive congressional debate and oversight.

The contras evolved significantly during the 1980s. Initially, former members of Somoza’s National Guard and other elements associated with the former regime dominated contra membership. Over a decade, the force changed to a largely rural Nicaraguan force with a broader political leadership. Sandinista economic policies and repressive measures increased and broadened the recruiting base. Over time, the more experienced contra force began to exert significant military pressure on the regime, culminating in its most complex military operation of the war, a simultaneous attack on three cities in central Nicaragua.

The contras’ military pressure on the Sandinista regime did not occur in a vacuum. A multifaceted diplomatic effort aimed to moderate the Sandinistas’ internal and external behavior occurred in conjunction with U.S.-imposed economic sanctions. Neighboring Central American governments, led by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias, carried out the most active diplomacy. U.S. bilateral diplomacy and the United Nations (UN) supported this sustained regional diplomacy. The contras exerted military pressure with U.S. support. This caused the Sandinistas to agree to heavily monitored and UN-supervised elections in 1990, which the Sandinistas lost. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter negotiated a critical transition deal in which the
Sandinistas retained the defense ministry while turning power over to a broad-based opposition coalition. The UN implemented a largely successful demobilization of the contra force and monitored implementation of other terms of the Carter-brokered security agreement.\(^5\)

This case of U.S. support to UW did not result singlehandedly in regime change in Nicaragua, but it did supply a critical element of military pressure to encourage the Sandinistas to compromise and accept terms offered for a diplomatic resolution. The contras, by that time, had become a force reflecting massive peasant discontent at Sandinista policies. A fair election demonstrated that the Sandinistas had lost the support of a large majority of Nicaraguans. The elections offered a weary population an end to war and sanctions.

Two factors appear to be critical enablers to this Central American outcome. First, despite the controversy the program engendered in the United States and internationally, the United States Government (USG) provided extended material support over time to the contra movement, without which it would not likely have continued. Without military pressure, the Sandinistas might not have agreed to hold free and fair elections. Second, the sustained regional and multilateral diplomatic effort, including multiple regional summits and iterated proposals, provided a path for ending the conflict and creating a new, duly constituted government accepted by the parties to the conflict and the international community.

**Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, 2001–2002**

After the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 9/11, the USG decided to support the Afghan Northern Alliance, an indigenous resistance movement that had been fighting to overthrow the Taliban regime. U.S. intelligence officers and roughly 300 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) infiltrated Afghanistan to join up primarily with the forces of the Northern Alliance, as well as some Pashtun tribes in the south who joined with Hamid Karzai, who would become the first post-Taliban president. The USG supplied cash, materiel and, perhaps most critically, air power in support of the Northern Alliance’s drive to capture Afghanistan’s capital city, Kabul. The Afghan resistance forces were experienced and well organized; many of the older leaders fought against the Soviet occupation during the 1980s, when the USG supplied robust support through Pakistan in an earlier UW campaign.\(^6\) These
forces continued fighting with only brief pauses, first among themselves after the Soviet departure, and then against the Taliban regime that took power in 1996. The Taliban was a response to the incessant Afghan warlord-driven violence of this period, but the Taliban forged close ties to al-Qaeda and harbored that organization as it planned and executed its attacks on the United States.

The Northern Alliance might have eventually overthrown the Taliban by itself, but it had not done so as of October 2001. U.S. support was likely the critical ingredient that enabled the Northern Alliance to overrun a fleeing Taliban force in Kabul. The Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, had governed from Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city, and the heart of its southern Pashtun belt. The U.S. embrace of a Pashtun leader like Hamid Karzai was likely another factor in winning the allegiance of southern Pashtuns to the post-Taliban government that he led from 2002 to 2014.

U.S. military support to the Northern Alliance consisted of SOF acting as combat advisers to Northern Alliance fighting formations. SOF brought close air support and laser target designation devices as a critical enabler to the battlefield. This relatively new Global Positioning System enabled tool allowed small military forces to direct bombs on opposing forces in the middle of battle, giving them a decided advantage over the Taliban. Ample supplies of U.S. cash helped paper over Afghan opposition leader feuds and direct the bulk of the effort against the fleeing Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.

The existence of a very experienced and fairly cohesive Afghan indigenous resistance force was one of the key factors enabling the successful overthrow of the Taliban. Whereas the United States had essentially created the contras wholesale through its support, the Northern Alliance’s leadership and fighting force were deeply rooted in Afghanistan’s Tajik and Uzbek populations. The U.S. intelligence and SOF personnel joined an Afghan insurgency that was already underway, led by the charismatic Ahmad Shah Massoud until his assassination the day before the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States.

The second key factor in Afghanistan was U.S. airpower, directed by U.S. ground forces, which resulted in the rapid collapse of the Taliban government in October 2001. U.S. ground forces also were armed with superior weaponry. The continued operations in 2002 routed most of the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.
Kurdish Peshmerga in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003

This case mirrors another successful instance of U.S. support for irregular forces that occurred as part of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. U.S. SOF deployed to Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region, effectively leading an impromptu combined campaign with the peshmerga fighters to engage 13 Iraqi army divisions along the Green Line dividing Iraq from Kurdistan. Iraqi forces were not defeated, but they were neutralized and prevented from moving south to defend Baghdad. It was a critical part of the overall campaign to topple Saddam Hussein’s government, an impromptu effort after Turkey refused permission for the U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division to enter Iraq through its territory.9

Before the initiation of major combat operations in March 2003, U.S. SOF infiltrated northern Iraq and joined with the armed militias (or Peshmerga) of the two Kurdish parties’—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—peshmerga forces. KDP and PUK political-military leaders exercised strong control over their experienced fighters, who had been fighting Iraqi forces in pursuit of a separate Kurdish state for the last 20 years.10 The U.S. forces previously assisted the Kurds in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT after retaliatory actions by Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1991. The successful combined operations in 2003 involved two battalions of 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), partnered at the team level in combat advisory roles along the Green Line, in the major population centers of Mosul and Kirkuk, and out to the Iranian border in Operation Viking Hammer.11 The critical factors in this successful partnership were: 1) the experienced, relatively cohesive and well-led Kurdish forces; and 2) the combat advisory role of U.S. SOF. The latter role included the provision of target-designated airpower, as well as operational and tactical advice to include intelligence. This permitted the peshmerga to hold off Iraqi divisions and capture Mosul and Kirkuk. The two Kurdish factions cooperated relatively well despite a history of competition.12

In this case of U.S. support to the peshmerga UW campaign, the UW effort was part of an overall military invasion of Iraq. This case differs from Afghanistan, where U.S. support to the UW campaign constituted the entire effort of U.S. ground forces’ intervention in its opening phase. The U.S. UW effort in Iraq’s north could not have toppled the Iraqi regime by itself. It is furthermore highly likely that Hussein’s regime could have crushed the
UW effort in its north if it had not been for the main U.S. invasion force advancing from the south to stage an assault on Baghdad, coupled with a massive U.S. air campaign to destroy Iraqi command and control, communications, and air force. However, the role that 10th Special Forces Group played replaced in its effects the planned major combat role of the 4th Infantry Division, which is in itself a substantial military achievement.

**SOI, 2007–2008**

In 2007, the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq began a comprehensive effort to organize, train, and equip an Iraqi insurgency resistance to al-Qaeda. Efforts to support Iraqi Sunnis who wished to fight the insurgents began earlier, with a spontaneous *Sahwa* (awakening) in various parts of Anbar province. U.S. SOF and Marine units based in Anbar pursued this tribal engagement strategy. The SOI program represented an extension of that approach to the greater Baghdad area under a plan the Multi-National Force-Iraq coalition command fashioned with two new features. First, U.S. troops were dispersed in small units in neighborhoods and the “Baghdad Belts” to interface with those who wished to provide information on insurgents or provide defenses for neighborhoods. Next, it also included Shia who wished to defend their neighborhoods.

The SOI program quickly mushroomed, attracting some 100,000 members. The recruits may have been attracted to the program by the U.S.-paid salaries, but their willingness to join was also an indication of the population’s interest in opposing the more extreme elements of the Sunni insurgency, and a sign of confidence that the U.S. coalition would back their basic interests. A number of the SOI were former insurgents or supporters of the insurgency, but they were not supportive of the methods or aims of the extremist al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). They had joined forces with the extremists as a means to counter the Shia-led Iraqi government and the Iranian-backed Shia militias, and to reassert some measure of Sunni influence or control, locally or nationally. Although the U.S. military command supported the SOI as a means to target and quell the insurgency’s more extremist elements, and to create information and defensive networks primarily in the Sunni areas, the Sunnis believed or hoped that the U.S. backing might extend to support for a wider political role.
Violence levels declined dramatically as the SOI movement grew. Several factors enabled this success. Those factors included U.S. support for the SOI, large numbers of willing Sunni recruits, and a concomitant campaign by U.S. counterterrorism forces that captured or killed large numbers of facilitators and fighters of the extremist AQI network.

Declining violence closely correlated with the growth of the SOI program—dramatically in the period from 2007 to 2008, and for some time afterward. Some analysts asserted that the violence declined due more to Sunni volition than the program per se. Others attributed at least some of the Sunnis’ motivation to Shia militias prevailing over Sunnis.

In any event, declining violence and the SOI success was temporary. The U.S. coalition reached an agreement with the Iraqi government to provide jobs or training for some SOI, but that commitment was not fully honored. The Iraqi government had not supported the program, and the U.S. coalition did not secure the Iraqi government’s agreement to pursue a wider program of reconciliation and inclusive governance. Through concerted efforts by the U.S. ambassador, Ryan Crocker, and his team, the Iraqi government did take several important steps to share revenues and adopt legislation to devolve some powers to the provinces. The UN special representative also attempted to convene Iraqi political leaders to forge resolution of a wide array of contentious political issues, including a referendum on Kirkuk’s status. At no time did a concerted diplomatic and political effort become the defining feature of U.S. policy toward Iraq, however. Thus, substantial existential questions about the nature of the Iraqi state and the relationship among Iraq’s Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish communities remained unresolved. The departure of U.S. forces at the end of 2011, and the anemic implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement thereafter, continued a pattern of drift that contributed to the resurgence of extremist violence and sectarian conflict a few years later.

The SOI contributed to a decline in violence during the height of Iraq’s sectarian conflict, although it was only a temporary achievement. The underlying causes of the violence were not addressed by the SOI program, because Sunnis remained disaffected by the new Shia-dominated democratic parliamentary system, especially as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki carried out numerous sectarian actions and refused to address the minority concerns. Following the departure of Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus, who had pursued a political-military effort to encourage
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broad-based reforms to achieve a modus vivendi, no concerted U.S. or international effort to help forge a governing consensus in Iraq. Whereas robust regional and international diplomacy leveraged military pressure applied by the contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s, there was no comparable overarching political effort that induced the Iraqi government to seek a way to resolve the internal conflict and no governing formula that all parties would welcome. There is no guarantee that such a concerted international effort would have succeeded, of course. The Iraqi government, assured of Iranian support and ample oil resources, might have refused any combination of inducements and pressure to negotiate and compromise.

The following table summarizes key elements of the four cases discussed.

Table 1. Record of U.S. Experience in UW, 1980–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Success?</th>
<th>Objective(s) Attained</th>
<th>Key Contributing Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicaraguan contras, 1980s</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Successful in pushing Sandinistas to hold free elections.</td>
<td>Intensive bilateral, regional, and multilateral diplomacy; extended U.S. effort to organize, train, and equip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshmerga, Iraq, 2003</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Contained Iraqi army divisions in northern Iraq, and enabled the capture of Mosul and Kirkuk as part of larger U.S. military intervention.</td>
<td>Cohesive, experienced indigenous force, U.S. airpower, and preoccupation of Iraqi regime with other areas, including the capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOI, 2007–2008</td>
<td>Temporary Success (Temporary due to lack of plan to gain Iraqi commitment to reconciliation and inclusive governance)</td>
<td>Successful in resisting AQI encroachment and in tamping down AQI.</td>
<td>U.S. organize, train, and equip; U.S. concomitant kinetic targeting effort.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Factors That Enable and Limit UW Success

What is success in UW? What are the required characteristics of an indigenous force and other factors that contribute to a successful UW outcome? How much leverage do UW campaign supporters have to determine possible outcomes? The answers to these questions can help policymakers and planners assess when, whether, and how UW can contribute to the achievement of national security objectives. This section provides some tentative answers based on the examination of the four previously identified cases.

What constitutes success in UW? The first observation that can be drawn from examining these cases is the variable notion of success. Each of these cases achieved success or contributed substantially to the achievement of some declared objective (table 1). In the Nicaragua case, UW contributed to a diplomatic and political outcome. In Afghanistan in 2001, UW achieved an outright military victory. In Iraq in 2003, UW contributed to a much larger military intervention that achieved regime change. In Iraq from 2007 to 2008, UW achieved a significant, if ultimately temporary, decline in violence.

Given these variable outcomes, UW might be best viewed as a possible vehicle to pursue a variety of outcomes rather than one single outcome—the military overthrow of a regime or the military defeat of an occupier. In only one of the cases examined here did the resistance movement achieve an outright military victory, that of the Northern Alliance over the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The relative military weakness of the Taliban government and the strength of the U.S.-backed resistance forces made such a clear-cut outcome possible.

In the other cases of UW examined here, claims of success can still be supported, but they must be qualified. In the case of Nicaragua, U.S. support to the contras arguably helped facilitate the diplomatic agreement and elections that led to the Sandinistas’ departure from power in 1990. In the case of the combined U.S.-Kurdish operations in northern Iraq in 2003, the U.S. support to peshmerga forces contributed significantly to the ouster of the Saddam Hussein’s government, although it was but one part of a much larger intervention, including substantial U.S. conventional forces and airpower. In the case of U.S. support to the SOI, the recruitment and hiring of 100,000 mostly Sunni Iraqis in 2007 and 2008 contributed greatly to the decline in violence at the height of the insurgency. That decline in violence, however, was not converted into a permanent arrangement that resolved the conflict.
among Iraqis and created a stable governing structure. Extremist forces with a substantial foreign fighter component were able to return and control substantial territory in Iraq under the banner of the Islamic State in 2014.

These examples suggest that UW may be more readily used as a tool of pressure than as a tool to achieve a decisive military outcome. The requirements to build an effective resistance capable of achieving the overthrow or defeat of a regime or occupying force are substantial in terms of time, resources, and resistance size and skill. The outside actor supporting a UW campaign, such as U.S. SOF, will have more control over the military inputs than the political elements of the resistance movement, which are arguably the most important factors determining the success of a UW effort.

As for characteristics of the indigenous force to be supported, a degree of legitimacy and martial competence appear requisite for a successful UW effort, no matter how a campaign’s specific objectives are defined. In all four of the cases examined, resistance forces either possessed (or, in the case of the contras, came to possess) a degree of local population support and legitimacy. The Northern Alliance and the peshmerga were both experienced and well-led fighting forces, even though both entities were plagued with leadership factional infighting. The contras gained a degree of fighting competence over a decade of guerrilla warfare. In the case of the SOI, many former insurgent members possessed critical intelligence about the extremist groups and how to counter them. The SOI were never envisioned as an autonomous force, but rather an auxiliary entity to defend neighborhoods, prevent infiltration, and provide early warning of suspected bomb-making or bomb-planting to assist U.S. coalition operations.

The cases examined above suggest that UW designed as a military operation may yield limited results, but if it is employed as one element of a broader strategy, it may contribute to a more successful, lasting outcome. At a minimum, a UW campaign should be viewed as more than a simple operation to organize, train, and equip a fighting force.

The United States may or may not contribute those elements of a broader strategy, and, in any case, a UW campaign supporter necessarily plays a more limited role than a direct participant in UW. UW is unlikely to control all the variables needed to assure a successful outcome. The decision to support a resistance movement must weigh many variables and will likely require an assessment of probabilities to support it.
In the Nicaraguan case, the United States could not maintain the program as a covert operation, a situation that is quite likely to recur in any future UW campaign of any size or duration, given the ubiquity of communications devices, social media, and global connectivity. The U.S. decision to create and support the contras was not tied to any larger U.S. political or diplomatic strategy. Actors largely opposed to the U.S. contra policy were the ones who engaged in major diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. support provided to the Northern Alliance was accompanied by a political strategy to build a new state. The Bonn multinational process sought to ensure that the major Afghan ethnic and political groups were represented in the new government, and pledged assistance in creating a functioning state. This effort was partially successful, although some of the U.S.-supported warlords captured parts of the governing apparatus to serve their own patronage networks.

As noted above, the U.S. support to the peshmerga in 2003 was primarily intended to aid the ouster of the Hussein regime. To support that objective, U.S. forces exerted what influence they could to dampen the sectarian, separatist, and factional aspects of the Kurd agenda. Despite these aspects, the United States consistently, and probably accurately, viewed the Kurds as the least problematic and most reliable partners in Iraq. The larger lapse, as seen in the 2007–2008 SOI initiative, is that the United States sought short-term palliatives and never viewed a conflict-ending strategy as the prerequisite for further involvement. While the “puzzle diagram” of the U.S. campaign plans depicted reconciliation as its overarching objective, the United States never articulated this central goal in any official policy documents, and did not pursue it as a policy objective until after 2008.

In summary, a paradox appears to confront policymakers and planners who would employ UW. UW may be most effective and successful when employed as part of a holistic campaign in conjunction with other military and/or political and diplomatic lines of effort. But the limitations of working through another force, with its own identity, interests, and frequent internal factionalism, can impede achievement of a coherent UW campaign. Similarly, other allies or diplomatic partners may not embrace UW’s proxy warfare aspects. Covert action is also increasingly difficult to accomplish in an era of near instantaneous global communications. Another difficulty is the possible reluctance of a fighting force to demobilize once desired objectives
are achieved. At a minimum, sufficient national security interests must be at stake to warrant the complex undertaking that UW represents.

**Endnotes**


12. Ibid., 224–244.


18. Ibid., 350–359.


Richard Shultz, Ph.D.

Introduction

Many, if not most, specialists in international security and military studies understand the resistance concept in terms of its armed variant, which has combat as an indispensable feature. Resistance movements are generally associated with WWII and, in particular, with the romanticism of the French resistance and other armed partisan groups that fought against Nazi occupation armies. Of course, armed resistance to foreign occupation predates WWII. In contemporary history, resistance is traceable to the Peninsular War, the Spanish resistance to Napoleon’s 1808 occupation of Spain and the installing of his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, on the Spanish throne.

WWII resistance and partisan movements were underground or clandestine organizations that took the form of secret, irregular armed groups. They employed the full range of guerrilla tactics, techniques, and procedures. They were nationalist movements and, in several cases, were also leftist in their political orientation. This was true of elements of the French resistance organizations that were part of National Council of Resistance, who fought as irregular forces throughout occupied France. In the case of Yugoslav partisan movements, the most effective element was that of the communists led by Josef Tito. The other major resistance force in Yugoslavia was Royalist in political orientation.

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Civil resistance also took place in WWII against Nazi occupation, as Bartkowski explains with respect to Denmark: “During World War II, the Danes launched a campaign of total non-cooperation with the Nazi occupiers … [They] conducted numerous strikes, work slowdowns or ‘go home early’ days as well as boycotts, demonstrations and industrial sabotage. These activities undermined German economic exploitation of the country. The Germans responded with crackdowns and states of emergency—telling evidence that the Danish actions were hurting them.” Likewise, Ackerman and Duvall found that “at the grass roots of Dutch society, resistance became an act of patriotism, and most of the population took part in it.” However, unlike the Danes, in the Netherlands “the overall resistance lacked systematic guidance.” Generally, these examples are scarcely considered in WWII literature focused on resistance to Nazi occupation.

This lack of consideration, which continued to manifest itself in post-WWII literature regarding international security and military studies, can be explained, in part, by the many misconceptions that surround civil resistance. Often, it is described as passive, pacifist, submissive, inactive, and risk and conflict adverse. Civil resistance is labeled a form of negotiation, not a strategy for political coercion. It is said to seek compromise and pursues only limited goals and certainly not regime change. Therefore, civil resistance is rarely seen as an effective form of political action, and when it does succeed, it is only due to certain political conditions. And, those circumstances necessitate a certain type of regime and certainly not a hardened dictatorship. In other words, civil resistance may work against moderate authoritarians but not against those characterized as brutal political systems. In reality, nonviolent civil resistance is hardly passive or pacifist. The purpose of this chapter will be to explain why this is the case.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part one will focus on defining nonviolent civil resistance and identifying its various constituent parts, to include elements of a civil resistance strategy. In part two, the strategy described in part one will be employed to present a case study of a successful civil resistance movement. The case selected is the civil resistance that successfully forced Slobodan Milosevic to relinquish power in Serbia in 2000.
Defining Nonviolent Civil Resistance

Mahatma Gandhi describes non-violence as “… a weapon of the strong” and “the greatest force at the disposal of mankind.” Gandhi goes on to observe that non-violence “is mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of mankind.” Gene Sharp, often described as the Clausewitz of civil resistance, defines “non-violent direct action as a strategy of social political action for applying power in a conflict.” Civil resistance, Sharp adds, is “a way for ordinary people to wield power without using violence.” It consists of acts of commission, acts of omission, or both. Finally, Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall define nonviolent resistance as seeking to “erode state power by dissolving consent and submission to the government. Such resistance,” they add, “is more effective with broad, diverse, and long-term popular support.”

While each of these classifications is about civil resistance, it is interesting to note how each is infused with the terminology of security studies. For Gandhi, civil resistance is the mightiest weapon; for Sharp, it is about strategy and wielding power; and, for Ackerman and Duvall, the goal of civil resistance is for the population to erode state power through denying the state consent. What is noticeable here is that each of these civil resistance characteristics has little in common with pacifism or pacifist actions.

Nonviolent civil resistance is based on a theory of power. But, that theory is different from the more traditional conceptions of power as Max Weber, among others, describes it. Weber argues that the state is founded on force and that it claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in the territory that it controls. For Weber, state power is based on consent, which it can derive in two ways. The first is from the legal status, recognition, and legitimacy the state receives for its competence in performing the core functions of governance. Consent of the populace is due to their acknowledgment of this competence. The second form of consent stems from the fear the state could instill in the populace through its coercive power—through the exercise of state power, submissiveness and obedience are coerced.

Now let’s contrast Weber’s conception of power with that of Sharp. The latter asserts that rulers require the support of the population they govern. Without that collaboration, they cannot secure or maintain power. To safeguard power, the state must have the cooperation, submissiveness, or obedience of a large number of people. A population’s withdrawal of their consent
to be governed can undermine these sources of power, and may suggest some commonality between Sharp’s view and that of Weber. However, the difference is that, in Sharp’s consent-based theory of power, rulers can have that consent withdrawn by the population through civil resistance action. Rulers depend on the populace as the source of their power, but power is neither guaranteed nor permanent. For Sharp, the sources of power can be restricted or withdrawn by people refusing to obey and/or cooperate. They can make the state ungovernable and rulers unable to conduct business as usual, since obedience is at the heart of state power.

Hannah Arendt, in her seminal work on revolution, described this breakdown in authority in the following terms: “where commands are no longer obeyed, the means of violence are of no use … The sudden dramatic breakdown of power that ushers in revolutions reveals in a flash how civil disobedience—to laws, to rulers, to institutions—is but the outward manifestation of support and consent.” One way to think about this power shift is to contrast Weber’s theory of authority with that of Sharp's. Weber's is hierarchical. At the top are the very powerful; in the middle are the powerful; and at the very bottom are the not very powerful. Think of this as a triangle of power distribution. Few at the top, many at the bottom. In Sharp’s theory of power, the triangle is turned upside down, so the very powerful at the top constitute the population, and the not very powerful few at the bottom, the authority of the state. The question that these two theories pose is how does such a power shift from the Weber theory to the Sharp theory take place? What are the keys to the populace being able to exert power over authority? The answer is that it takes a strategy.

**Nonviolent Civil Resistance: It Takes a Strategy**

Strategy matters in civil resistance struggles. Civil resistance movements require an overall framework within which to coordinate all appropriate and available resources. Civil resistance strategy is asymmetric and unconventional. It is, in effect, a form of UW. It involves a movement engaging in collective nontraditional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) with the discipline and audacity to achieve its objectives. In Clausewitzian terms, civil resistance movements seek to harness their own center of gravity to shift their opponent’s center of gravity. Specialists have described nonviolent civil resistance strategy as a form of “political jujitsu” in which the strength of
the opponent is used to rebound against himself. Repression can backfire when it creates more support for and attention to those who were attacked and how they are attacked. According to Srdja Popovic and Mladen Joksic:

The reason for this is simple. While oppression may appear to be a display of the government’s power, skilled activists know that it’s actually a sign of weakness. Indeed, when a regime resorts to violence, forcible arrests, or repressive legislation, it is, in fact, giving citizens an opportunity to make that oppression backfire. In this sense, making oppression backfire is a skill, a kind of political martial art.12

The elements of civil resistance in many ways could easily be confused with those of military strategy. They follow the same delineation.13 Civil resistance, like its military counterpart, must be based on a unified vision. That vision begins with a clear understanding of the present context. The vision identifies what needs to be changed and what a post-tyranny future will entail. Finally, the vision sets out a road map to transition from the present to the future.

A civil resistance strategy consists of a number of key concepts to include compellence and coercion. The goal of compellence is to use force, not violence, to pressure and coerce an adversary from continuing specific actions and policies or to pressure that adversary to undertake new actions and policies that he does not want to embark upon. Compellence employs force, but not violence, aggressively and persistently to alter the behavior of the state or regime.14

Civil resistance strategies do not occur spontaneously. They require an organization, a political-social movement to contemplate and shape them. According to one specialist, Hardy Merriman, a civil resistance organization is a collective effort “aimed at bringing about consequential change in social, economic, or political order. Social movements are civilian-based, involve widespread participation, to alert educate and mobilize people to create change. They are voluntary, representative, and often diverse.” Such social movements “do not result from spontaneous outbursts.”15

Once a movement has identified a unifying vision, key concepts, and established an organization, the next aspect of strategy is to develop a campaign plan. Like military preparation, civil resistance movements require an operational plan to achieve their objectives. Strategic alternatives are
prioritized and a broad repertoire of offensive and defensive tactics are planned for and configured to disrupt the regime.

Civil resistance TTPs are ways people wield power without employing violence. These TTPs consist of acts of commission and omission. TTPs can be divided into three categories: noncooperation, protest and persuasion, and nonviolent intervention. Noncooperation involves the mobilization of a broad stratum of society to create disruptions and stop business as usual. TTPs in this category include strikes, boycotts, refusal to pay taxes, or to participate in military service. These can be executed with little risk. Quite literally, a citizen can carry out each of these without leaving the home. Protests and persuasion are activities that seek to recruit, mobilize, and build movement capacity. TTPs in this category include petitions, rallies, handing out leaflets, displaying symbols, street theater, and demonstrations. Protest and persuasion TTPs are more risky than their noncooperation counterparts. Finally, nonviolent intervention involves disruption of business as usual by blocking important transportation routes and occupying public buildings and other facilities. Nonviolent intervention can also include building parallel cultural, social, and political institutions. Of the three TTP categories, nonviolent intervention is the most risky because it directly confronts the state security forces and puts those who do so in danger of security force repression.16

A final important element of civil resistance strategy is nonviolent discipline. If a civil resistance movement carries out violent actions, it provides the authorities with the opportunity and justification to employ repression against it. A movement’s use of violence likewise increases the risks of joining the movement in the first place and can undermine recruitment. The movement will get smaller or not grow. Consequently, nonviolent discipline is considered essential for maximizing civilian participation. Nonviolent discipline is also crucial for accelerating defection of key regime elements, especially the security forces tasked with using force. Finally, it makes such movements attractive to international actors who are more inclined to provide support to nonviolent resistance as opposed to armed groups.17

Specialists in civil resistance have identified key skill sets common to successful movements. These are also important aspects of strategy. Their assessments find that skills are a more decisive factor in the emergence of successful movements than preexisting conditions. Peter Ackerman identified the following three categories of skills common to successful civil
resistance movements. First is “the capacity to engender and sustain mass mobilization against determined ruling groups willing to use repressive acts to keep order.” Second, the capacity of a movement to marshal resources to engage in the widest possible variety of tactics to “reach the point that those who enforce the status quo cannot be sure what will come next.” The final category of skills Ackerman identified is “the capacity to execute each tactic in a way that maximizes disruption of an unjust order while maintaining strict nonviolent discipline, so that no justification can be given for the use of repressive violence.”

Does Civil Resistance Work?

There has been considerable skepticism about the effectiveness of civil resistance. However, important empirical studies provide empirical data that demonstrate the effectiveness of civil resistance. Perhaps most important was the publication by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan of their volume Why Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. In their study, the authors examined 323 nonviolent and violent campaigns between 1900 and 2006. They found that major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent campaigns. In other words, civil resistance campaigns were more than twice as successful in achieving their objectives as violent campaigns. Moreover, regime type did not have a statistically significant impact on outcome. What this means is that, contrary to the argument that civil resistance can only be successful against soft authoritarians, the findings of the Chenoweth and Stephan study demonstrate that civil resistance was also successful against highly dictatorial and repressive regimes like those that existed in Argentina, Chile, Egypt, and South Africa, to name a few.

A second important study by Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, How Freedom Is Won: From Civil Resistance to Durable Democracy, found that nonviolent civil resistance movements have a significant impact on the outcome of states as they navigate the transition process. In 50 of 67 transitions from authoritarianism to democracy taking place in the period from 1972 to 2005, the authors determined that nonviolent civil resistance was a key factor affecting the political shape of the aftermath. In other words, when transitions were influenced by the active involvement of nonviolent civil resistance groups, the outcome was more likely to be greater political
freedom. This was reflected in 32 of the 50 transitions examined, which resulted in high levels of respect for political rights, civil liberties, and adherence to the rule of law.\textsuperscript{20}  

In sum, what these two studies make evident is that civil resistance movements are more likely to bring about an end to authoritarian regimes, and in the aftermath, they are more likely to foster democratic transition and greater freedom.

Of course, not all civil resistance movements are successful. Recall the brutal repression that ended the Tiananmen Square movement of 1989 in China.\textsuperscript{21} Likewise, in 2009, the Iranian government clamped down on the Green movement during the elections. Iranian intelligence developed a counterstrategy that prevented success. Other authoritarian governments are learning from the Iranian example and developing new means to prevent civil resistance movements from gaining ground. It should not be surprising that authoritarian governments like the Iranian example are studying successful civil resistance movements and developing the means to preempt them before they get out of hand.

**Factors Contributing to Civil Resistance Success**

Following the previous discussion, several factors contribute to the successful development of civil resistance organization, strategy, and tactics. These include, first of all, the active participation by a significantly greater number of people than those who engage in armed struggle. Civil resistance movements are more successful than armed struggles because they are comprised of diverse parts of society, not small and less representative underground detachments.\textsuperscript{22}  

A second contributing factor is that civil resistance allows individuals to overcome commitment barriers by lowering the cost of taking part in a civil resistance movement. As was noted earlier, people can enter at multiple points in a civil resistance movement, and they can take part in different activities that include varying degrees of risk. In other words, commitment barriers are not as prohibitive as one finds with armed resistance.\textsuperscript{23} Also, because boycotts, failure to work, strikes, refusing to pay taxes, and other forms of noncooperation are safer than protests, these non-consent mechanisms allow all strata of society to contribute to the disruption of business as usual, constituting a third factor contributing to effectiveness.
A third factor is that civil resistance is more likely to trigger shifts in the loyalty of regime security forces than are armed groups. Soldiers and police can be convinced to see their civic duty as protecting people, and this can result in the transfer of loyalty. Defections occur in over half of all successful civil resistance movements. As will be described later, this took place in Serbia during the overthrow of the dictatorial regime of Slobodan Milosevic.

Civil resistance is more likely to induce negotiations than armed struggle. This is a fourth factor contributing to the effectiveness of civil resistance organization, strategy, and tactics. Nonviolent actions create crises that force regimes that have refused to compromise to do so. Civil resistance creates crisis-packed situations that inevitably open the door to negotiation. This likewise will be illustrated in the Serbian case study.

A fifth factor is that civil resistance generates more international-third party support than violent revolts. This support can take various forms of assistance, including skills training, material support, media coverage, and targeted sanctions. While third parties are not the drivers of successful movements, they can make an important contribution to a positive outcome. Again, this will be seen in the Serbian case study.

A sixth contributing factor relates to regime repression. Successful civil resistance movements often manipulate regime repression. They take attacks and repression by brutal regimes and use that repression to create support for themselves as victims. In today’s social media context, civil resistance movements are able to publicize in real time the repressive behavior of the state. As will be illustrated in the following case study of Serbia, police attacking nonviolent demonstrators resulted in outrage on the part of the population and movement. In other words, nonviolence can cause state repression to backfire. There are a number of examples where this backfire effect has contributed to regime demise, such as South Africa, East Timor, and, most recently, Egypt. New media tools have been employed to accelerate this backfire effect, facilitating the connection between people and their mobilization through various social network platforms. These tools break down barriers to activism and contribute to mobilization, allowing them to contribute to the backfire effect. However, it should be noted that the targets of these new Internet-based tools—dictatorial regimes—are also learning how to employ them to counter civil resistance movements.

In sum, each of these factors contributes to the effectiveness of civil resistance organization, strategy, and tactics. What follows is the Serbia case study.
in which each factor will be at play, as will the other concepts introduced above to illustrate why civil resistance can be successful, even against highly authoritarian regimes like that which existed in Serbia in the 1990s.

**Nonviolent Civil Resistance in Serbia: The Otpor (Resistance) Case Study**

In the 1990s, Slobodan Milosevic, as the president of Serbia and later the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was responsible for several Balkan wars and subsequent war crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity. These wars had a significant impact on Serbia’s internal politics and economy. With respect to the economy, the wars caused mounting unemployment, poverty and, as a result of the 78 days of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing in 1999, serious destruction of Serbia’s infrastructure. Taken together, these factors contributed to an increasingly bleak economic condition, further weakened by high levels of corruption.

Regime domestic violence and repression against political opposition likewise intensified during Milosevic’s 10-year rule. This was especially true against student protests that followed the NATO air campaign that forced the Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo. These developments, in turn, triggered international isolation of Serbia and the criminalization of Serbia, turning it into a pariah state.

**Otpor: Emergence and Evolution**

Otpor grew out of a student protest movement that began in 1996 as a result of opposition to Milosevic’s wars in the Balkans and increasing government corruption. Otpor’s founders concluded by 1998 that student marches and protests could not effectively challenge the regime. The Serbian people had to be mobilized. This was a key determination by the student leaders of their prior actions and their limitations.

Otpor means resist and its symbol is a clenched fist. It embodied defiance and refusal to accept the status quo. However, resistance would be through nonviolent actions, not the use of armed force. By 2000, Otpor evolved into a national movement with representatives in more than 70 Serbian cities. It took root across the country. Otpor was a networked movement employing cell phones and the Internet to connect its geographically dispersed parts. The use of technology enhanced Otpor’s size and operational capability.
As Otpor grew, it also became a coalition builder within Serbian politics. It turned into a facilitator that brought together Serbia’s deeply divided political parties. The approximately two dozen Serbian opposition parties were not unified against Milosevic and the Socialist Party he controlled. Rather, they were fragmented and highly distrustful of each other.

Opposition parties had little credibility with the Serbian population, who considered them highly corrupt and little different from Milosevic and his cronies. A frequently heard refrain summed this up: “If not Milosevic, then who else? Another corrupt version!” Otpor sought to change that narrative from “who else” to “let’s get rid of Milosevic first.” To do so, they had to eliminate fragmentation and distrust among the opposition political parties, fostering a fundamental change among these divided groups. This forced Otpor to play the role of coalition builder.

**Strategy: Drawing on the Tenets of Gene Sharpe**

Otpor based its approach to planning a nonviolent civil resistance strategy on the strategic principles of Gene Sharpe. Leaders knew and had studied his writings, and were in contact with Sharpe seeking his advice.

To assist Otpor, Sharpe arranged for one of his colleagues, a retired U.S. Army colonel named Robert Helvey, to tutor Otpor on the principles of civil resistance strategy and tactics. Helvey compared civil resistance to warfare. He applied the principles of war and military strategies to civil resistance, which he considered warfare without armed violence.

In many ways, the framework that Helvey proposed to Otpor was a mirror image of the principles of strategy and process for formulating strategy taught at various U.S. military schools. Key elements of this planning process for strategy formulation includes: assessing the context; crafting a vision; identifying the ends sought and the ways and means for achieving them; pinpointing the enemy’s center of gravity; seizing the initiative; directing mass against decisive points and accentuating the offensive; and finally, underscoring the importance of discipline.

Otpor adopted this framework to formulate its strategy and developed a network of leaders across Serbia to implement it. The group established a nationwide coalition and employed modern communications tools to execute their strategy. They combined symbolic protest, noncooperation, and disruptive actions, focusing on the 2000 election as the critical target. In doing so, they paid particular attention to winning over security services personnel.
They also increased the cost of repression to the regime by using their communications tools to show the Serbian people and the world the brutality of the regime. In this respect, they were able to cause regime repression to backfire.

**Coalition Building**

In February 2000, the Socialist Party of Serbia’s Second Congress, not surprisingly, selected Slobodan Milosevic as its candidate for the presidential election. At the same time, Otpor held a counter-Congress in which they invited a number of the opposition political party leaders to take part. Otpor sought to convince them to work together to defeat Milosevic. As a result of these efforts, the group played an important role in forging a coalition of 18 opposition political parties. To challenge Milosevic, they agreed to a united front that would select and support one candidate forming the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. That organization pledged to actively support Vojislav Kostunica, the head of a small political party that was largely unknown outside Serbia. Kostunica had strong nationalist credentials. He was seen as anti-U.S. because of his vocal opposition to the U.S. bombing campaign during the Kosovo war. These credentials made it hard for Milosevic and his cronies to label him a traitor or a U.S. lackey.

**External Actors: The United States and European Union**

As civil resistance movements gain traction, they can attract either direct or indirect support from third-party actors, who will assist these movements in their political struggle against what they view as illegitimate regimes. In the case of Otpor, they made contact with several members of the international community. In doing so, Otpor sought their assistance but on a “no strings attached” basis to ensure their independence as an opposition movement. Otpor sought to prevent, as much as possible, the Milosevic regime characterizing them as puppets taking orders from the United States and European Union (EU).

Assistance from the United States came through institutes and organizations supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). NED is an independent, non-profit organization funded by the U.S. Congress. Its mission is to promote the development of democracy. Members of the EU likewise engaged with Otpor through similar institutions that exist in various western European countries. External assistance included funds
for copy machines, phones, postage and printing, computers, and Internet services. The United States and EU also provided advice on how to organize a coalition-based grassroots election campaign.

**Regime Repression and the Backfire Effect**

Authoritarian regimes almost invariably turn to violence and repression when challenged. But, repression can backfire in spectacular fashion, providing opportunities for civil resistance movements to foster sympathy and broaden support. In fact, as noted earlier, civil resistance movements often include within their overall strategy the manipulation of regime repression and, in doing so, foster a backfire effect.

To justify the need for violence, the Serbian regime characterized Otpor as a neo-fascist and terrorist organization comprised largely of criminals and drug addicts. It used these depictions to justify a wave of beatings and arrests. However, such interpretations were not believable to the Serbian people, who knew Otpor members as their children and neighbors. Otpor used a variety of modern information tools to project images of their members as caricatures of fascists and terrorists, to mock the regime’s characterization of them to the Serbian population. The beating of protesters was filmed and posted on the Internet. Otpor employed street theater to ridicule regime propaganda and repression. The end result was that the regime’s efforts to smear Otpor were ineffective.

Otpor expected regime repression and prepared for it. With each arrest, protesters were mobilized to go to the jails to demonstrate and demand release. There was an information system in place to alert people to rally, when to do so, and where to go.

When the regime took control of Belgrade’s largest newspapers and television and radio stations in May, Otpor was ready for that, as well. It had established its own communication and information systems and continued to communicate with the population. This included making the population aware of how the government was manipulating them by controlling all the major media outlets in the capital.
Resistance Views

The bottom line is that the backfire effect greatly advantaged Otpor. It resulted in thousands of Serbian citizens, who had not taken part in protests before, now doing so. In other words, the government’s actions turned out to be a force multiplier for Otpor.

The Election Outcome: Fraud and Crisis

Otpor and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, with U.S. and EU assistance, established a nationwide system for counting votes and recording the results. They deployed 10,000 poll watchers across Serbia to insure transparency. Once recorded, results were instantly sent to Belgrade.

As a result of the monitoring system that the two groups established, they knew that Kostunica received more than 50 percent of the vote, negating the need for a second round of voting. They declared victory. Then, the state-controlled federal election commission reported that no candidate had received more than 50 percent of the vote, necessitating a second round.

In response to this fraud, Otpor and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia called for a general strike to paralyze Serbia and bring a halt to all “business as usual.” To do so, they employed the civil resistance tactics and procedures described earlier. In effect, they sought to prevent the regime from being able to conduct the normal business of the state. They also sought to convince members of the military forces to break with Milosevic. For example,

Key messages were specifically tailored to individuals in the armed services … military personnel under Milosevic, in contrast with the once-privileged Tito’s Yugoslav National Army, reportedly felt less valued than their colleagues in the interior police forces. Estimates showed that more than 80 percent of officers would describe the living conditions of their families as below average.

The groups “capitalized on these sentiments throughout the course of the presidential campaigns, emphasizing their relative deprivation and proposing measures to address them.”

End Game: Slobodan Milosevic Resigns

Ten days of escalating pressure followed the federal election commission’s attempt to manipulate the election results. This forced a final showdown between the regime and the opposition groups. The key event came with the opposition’s decision to call for convoys of people to organize from across
Serbia and converge on Belgrade to take control of the parliament building on 5 October 2000. Hundreds of thousands of people from around the country heeded the call.

The regime ordered the police to construct road blockades on the main arteries leading into central Belgrade. But, back-channel meetings between Otpor and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia leaders, and their counterparts in the security forces, resulted in an agreement that the security forces would set up blockades but not enforce them. In other words, a convoy would approach a blockade and it would simply drive around it. The security forces did nothing to stop them.

The end came quickly when the general strike was combined with hundreds of thousands of citizens from across Serbia converging on Belgrade. Milosevic conceded the election to Kostunica, who was sworn in on 7 October 2000. Otpor had employed civil resistance methods in a most effective way to bring about the end of Serbia’s dictatorship. As for Milosevic, he was arrested and extradited to The Hague on 1 June 2001, where he was tried for crimes against humanity. He died in 2006 before the conclusion of that trial.

Nonviolent Civil Resistance: Implications for Small States

In this study, the strategy of civil resistance was examined from the perspective of social movements challenging the authority and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. However, the theory and practice of civil resistance also has applicability today for small states facing the threat of intervention by more powerful neighbors. Consider Lithuania. In January 2015, its defense minister, Juozas Olekas, announced that the government had developed a manual to meet the threat of Russian intervention through civil resistance methods. According to the document, “citizens can resist aggression against their country not only through armed struggle. Civilian-based defense or nonviolent civil resistance is another way for citizens’ resistance against aggression.”

Bartkowski observed that Lithuania’s decision reflects a broader “recognition of the threat to European countries of unconventional warfare launched by Russia.” For such small states, he notes, armed resistance is not realistic. However, civilian nonviolent defense offers an important alternative. There is a 20th-century history of civilian-based defense theory and practice that holds many important lessons for small states like Lithuania as they face
the challenge of 21st-century hybrid warfare. Thus, history requires serious reconsideration.

Endnotes


Shultz: Nonviolent Civil Resistance Movements


30. *Bringing Down a Dictator*, documentary, written, directed, and produced by Steve York, narrated by Martin Sheen, aired in 2002 on PBS, http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/. The information for this case study is drawn from *Bringing Down a Dictator*, a documentary film that chronicles the “spectacular defeat of Slobodan Milosevic in October, 2000, not by force of arms, as many had predicted, but by an ingenious nonviolent strategy of honest elections and massive civil disobedience” led, in large part, by a “student movement named Otpor!”


34. Ibid.
Chapter 7. Winning the Peace by Living the Way We Fight

Michael Ryan

Introduction

Le temps sont courts à celui qui pense, interminables à celui qui désire. (Time is short for one who thinks, endless for one who desires.) - Auguste-Émile Chartier

We win wars. We lose the peace. We think about war. We desire peace. It is time to think about peace. It is time we think about peace in the context of war and resistance so that through careful thought we might win both. Ironically, in thinking about both in the same context, we may find that we can avoid the former and preserve the latter.

We plan to win wars and therefore we organize, train, and equip allies, partner nations, and ourselves. We train the way we intend to fight, remembering the old adage: “Difficult in peace, easy in war.” How do we train to win the peace? How might we plan to win the peace? What difficult things should we do now to make it easy on ourselves later? What should we contemplate now to maintain the peace?

We plan to win wars because war is the ultimate come-as-you-are event. Clear and present dangers may not allow for the luxury of preparation. We must pursue military victory before a war begins; however, military victory is no longer a sufficient outcome. Modern warfare requires a comprehensive approach, addressing the political, economic, and civil dimensions, alongside the military dimension. Conflict termination rarely sets the conditions for a just and lasting peace. Ultimate victory should be a lasting peace. Achieving such victory requires preparation. We, therefore, must pursue ultimate

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Resistance Views

Ultimate victory should be a lasting peace.

victory—post-conflict peace—before a war begins if we are to be ready to fight the good fight.

The military missions accomplished in Iraq and Afghanistan, while heroic, were only the beginning of the fight for victory, a fight for peace. The massive applications of national treasure that followed the militaries’ ventures do not appear to have been planned as well as the military campaigns. Students of Clausewitz may justifiably question if politicians and generals truly understand the nature of the wars upon which they are about to enter before they engage in combat.²

After more than a decade of constant war, do we really understand the nature of modern war and peace? Are we taking the time to think through the new complexities of the globally integrated 21st century? Are we preparing to win the peace? Are we organizing, training, and equipping allies, partner nations, and ourselves to win the peace? Are we training the way we intend to fight for peace? Let us begin at the end to address these questions.

Exit Strategy: Putting the Cart before the Horse

The higher level of grand strategy [is] that of conducting war with a far-sighted regard to the state of the peace that will follow. - Sir Basil H. Liddel Hart, British Strategist³

Are we winning the peace? Over the last 14 years of war, a few simple truths have emerged about exit strategies:

1. Cost. The United States and its allies cannot afford our current method for dealing with instability. We never could. Nevertheless, we will get involved again and it will be expensive until we adapt.

2. Collateral damage. Kinetic operations create a humanitarian disaster on some scale. We are not prepared in advance to deal with these consequences.

3. Collaboration. Many people are constantly engaged in improving the human condition wherever the military goes. Most of these people are unaffiliated with militaries or national governments. Mainstream military staffs generally do not know who these people are or how to
work with them, nor does their operational planning account for the activities of these people.

4. Cooperation. Armed forces are not the solution. They are part of a solution, but military planners and the civilian leadership have yet to figure out how to integrate military and civilian activities effectively.

5. Context. Preparing the exit strategy now for the next conflict, whatever it might be, is the best guarantor of our future success at winning the peace. The real question is: what does that elusive exit strategy look like?

Losing the Peace Means Losing the War

Let us begin at the end.

Truth 5: Context. Our military exit strategy. What is it? Winning is the military’s normal exit strategy. What has defined winning conflicts of the 21st century? Stability, good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, and market economics are characteristics of what winning looks like. Classic military operations have very little to do with developing any of these outcomes. To the contrary, military operations in unstable areas most often focus on defeating the enemy to provide a safe and secure environment. But, why is it the military’s role to provide a safe and secure environment? This question brings us to cooperation.

Truth 4: Cooperation. The military is not always the solution. The military can be part of the solution, though, to create a safe and secure environment so that Truth 3, Collaboration, can succeed—that is, enable other people working together to improve the human condition in the operational environment. Creating conditions for the success of others is the key military activity that ensures the existence of a tenable exit strategy.

People usually outside the military and government are the ones engaged in human and economic development, building democratic institutions, enabling good governance, and establishing respect for human rights. In other words, the attributes of success defined
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above, once realized, foster a self-sustaining, safe, and secure environment. Such an environment will not require military intervention as good governance and sustainable development take root and grow. Understanding the context in which we are operating, committing to close cooperation with those also engaged, and collaborating effectively with partners to deconflict, coordinate, and integrate all contributors’ efforts are essential requirements of a tenable exit strategy.

It is important for military planners to realize that organizations working in operational environments may already be addressing instability causes before the military arrives. Many of them remain in place during military operations, and as the safe and secure environment starts to take hold, many more will return to resume their work. This reinforces the importance of truth 3 and the military’s exit strategy.

**Truth 3: Collaboration.** Military forces cannot plan in a vacuum. To create conditions for the international community’s ultimate success, military planners must understand the operational environment ground truth before they decide the best course of action to provide a safe and secure environment that they expect will create conditions that enable others to succeed.

Ultimately, others’ success defines the military’s exit strategy. Therefore, comprehensive planning is critical. Comprehensive planning requires a wide-ranging and inclusive approach that covers military, civilian, governmental, non-governmental, national, and international planning considerations.

**Truth 2: Collateral damage.** Kinetic operations, sometimes called destructive, lethal, or violent operations, by their very nature create humanitarian catastrophes at the individual, family, clan, village, regional, or national levels. Kinetic operations compound the difficulty of adhering to truths 5, 4, and 3. Extensive collaboration, therefore, needs to inform prudent and comprehensive military planning, so that planners understand two fundamental requirements to create a tenable exit strategy within a reasonable timeframe. First, planners must understand how military activities can positively contribute to the international community’s essential work. Second, planners must structure military activities to avoid adding to negative challenges, such as perceived cultural and ethnic biases, the international community confronts. In short, collectively we must prepare to win the opening military engagements, while preparing to mitigate—through the militaries’ and others’ pre-planned works—the inevitable humanitarian consequences of
just actions. We must accomplish this while bolstering the international community’s chances of success, allowing them to be as high as possible.

With an effective comprehensive plan, militaries must be prepared to operate on the ground in unstable areas in ways that reinforce the international community’s important stability and development efforts. Keeping the end state in mind, focusing on desired political outcomes, and using knowledge of a fluctuating operational environment to continually update plans and activities to strengthen everyone’s efforts is a daily mission-essential task. Understanding, communicating with, and sometimes deferring to others will be key attributes of successful commanders who pursue ultimate victory and a military exit strategy, as indicated by retired U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) General Mattis:

> In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines.  

**Truth 1: Cost.** It is an ugly truth. We cannot afford to continue doing business [war] the way we have been doing it. Something has to change to decrease costs, while increasing stability.

**Living the Way We’ll Fight**

Comprehensive preparation to win the peace and enable an exit strategy takes time. Little time exists for extensive preparation once a military operation begins. Preparations must take place well in advance of the onset of hostilities. Preparations include building relationships with partners with whom one will work in the operational area, establishing communication links, understanding the roles, mandates, and capabilities of each partner, proving oneself trustworthy in the community, and gaining the trust of others. All this is hard and it takes time—a lot of time.

The difficulties inherent in such a comprehensive approach are compounded in peacetime by the lack of a common interest driving actual and potential partners to develop closer and more productive relationships. During a crisis, especially in the operational area, people are very good at
coming together to solve a problem. In such circumstances, necessity really is
the mother of invention, but by then it usually is too late to generate the level
of effective interaction that is capable of generating an integrated response
on the scale of the crisis and at the speed of the problem.

In an ideal world, military, civilian, and non-governmental organizations
would come together to train and exercise to operate in a comprehensive
manner. Such exercises exist. The Swedish-sponsored Exercise VIKING is
one such example. Otherwise, such exercises are few and far between. Since
we have to operate this way in a crisis—we have no other rational choices—
and since training opportunities are inadequate, we must operate this way
now, we must live this way. We must live the way we will fight. Choosing to
live and work on a daily basis in a wider circle of partners, with a view to
dealing with instability coherently and effectively wherever it may be found,
is the best way to prepare together to win the peace. This is easier said than
done.

**It’s All about Relationships**

Understanding context is appreciating what is possible. Politics is the art
of the possible. All politics are local. All local politics are personal. Rela-
tionships, therefore, are the key to creating the alliances that will shape
the possible in the context in which we operate. Good relationships are the
foundation of future success. Being an active part of a larger whole, an active
part of the international community, is being part of the solution. During all
phases of dealing with a crisis, the military has a role to play. Sometimes the
military is the supported actor—usually when kinetic solutions are required.
More often than not, though, the military is the supporting actor, working
to create the conditions in which others might succeed. This methodology
of engaging international, interagency, and public-private partners in all
phases of military activity, at all times, is putting the horse before the 21st-
century cart. This helps create synergy, avoids duplication, sustains results,
and is comprehensive. It is ultimately cheaper, more efficient, and, most of
all, it has proven to be more effective over time in places like Colombia (Plan
Colombia) on a national level and under the Marshall Plan on a continental
scale. It is also how we address the ugliest of all truths—truth 1—cost. We
just can’t afford the way we do business [war].
Affordable Peace

If we add up the cost of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military interventions since the end of the Cold War (e.g., the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, etc.) and then divide that sum by the number of interventions, we will get the average cost of an operation. Next, if we multiply that average by the number of crises and potential crises mentioned in today’s newspapers, we will come to one sobering conclusion: we cannot afford the way we do business. Something has to change.

Recent thinking regarding the need to change seems to be that we should avoid getting involved at all. In the fight against ISIS, the realization is dawning that avoidance is not a cost-effective approach either. The fight against ISIS also reminds us that the world is not a safe place, which means that we should anticipate more future military interventions. So, whatever the solution is to bringing costs down and stability up, the military will necessarily be part of the solution, whether its leadership likes it or not. As the saying goes, however, if we are not part of the solution, then we are part of the problem. Recent history has shown that not being involved with those other actors essential to winning the peace is a problem. Living the way we will fight, however, as part of a globally integrated approach to dealing with instability, can be a solution that we can afford.

Conflict Prevention Is Cheaper than Crisis Management

Ironically, it is always easier to form a coalition to manage a crisis than to create a coalition to prevent one. The silver lining of this cloud of doubt is, today, if we can build the relationships and conduct the interaction essential to operating effectively together prior to the first day of a crisis response operation, we will have built the same set of relationships and the same level of understanding required to work collectively to prevent that crisis. Even if we do not fully prevent conflict, our collective efforts can help mitigate the conflict’s consequences by reducing its intensity and shortening its duration. By focusing our collaborative efforts on building a coherent capacity to manage the world’s next crisis, we will simultaneously develop the capacity to work together effectively in hot spots while there is still time to do something preventative prior to potential conflict.

Crises grab our attention, motivating us to action, and forcing us to collaborate and cooperate. NATO has been doing this. It is time to take the
energy we put into responding individually and figure out how to work together and channel energies into preparing together to respond collectively. In this thinking about both war and peace in the same context, we see how preparing for war with a view toward the peace that follows can improve our capability to preserve the peace. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure in this case.

To summarize previous points, we cannot afford our current approach to dealing with instability. There will continue to be a need for military interventions to mitigate symptoms of an impending conflict. Military interventions requiring violence, though, inevitably create humanitarian crises on some scale. The military must be prepared in advance to deal with the inevitable consequences of resolute action and to tailor the military’s role to the overall campaign to win a just and lasting peace. Ground context should fully inform military operations in support of an international community effort to address conflict root causes.

The international community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, Save the Children, etc.; supragovernmental organizations such as United Nations (UN), World Health Organization, European Union (EU), etc.; and host nation governmental organizations normally are already in place upon the military’s arrival. These organizations often remain in place during military operations, and are still there after the military is gone. Their success can create the stability that will permit the military to leave. Therefore, the military’s exit strategy should be to create conditions in which the international community can succeed. The military of the future must integrate its efforts with myriad actors over the course of a campaign, from Phase 0 Shaping to Phase 5 Transition to Civil Authority. Lasting success will depend on how well military leadership is able to form and sustain the relationships that harmonize activities in the battle space. The imperative for doing so is evident: it results in an approach we can afford during the crisis and it’s an approach we can apply “left of the bang” (pre-crisis) in order to prevent, or at least mitigate, impending crises.

This is an urgent imperative. If we continue to view crisis response as too expensive and increasingly ineffective, countries will not respond. If we
continue to view prevention of conflict as too complicated and too amorphous, countries will not apply the needed resources in time. Only by living the way we intend to fight, doing the difficult now, can we start to develop the collective skill sets needed to engage effectively if we are to win the peace.

This is a daunting challenge. How will it work? Social media adapts a process to how people behave instead of training people how to perform a process. Therefore, it is logical that developing an integrated, inter-organizational approach appropriate to crisis management and conflict prevention involves adapting pre-crisis planning to how people behave.

First things first: the four-block approach.

The Interorganizational Team: A Deliberate Approach

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country. - Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (1 December 1862)

Our principal challenge as individuals in this complex dynamic is our knowing what to do next. Broadly, we know that we can either work together to create the conditions for market-sustained democracy (i.e., think anew) or we can start over after every crisis (i.e., relying on the dogmas of the quiet past). The question should be what should we do to contribute to the whole effort? Whatever the answer, it must be simple, straightforward, and easy to do.

The answer is that to work together we need to look around us—left, right, up, down, fore, and aft—see who our neighbors, partners, and potential partners are. Then, if we are not talking to them, we should start talking to them. We should deconflict our efforts so that we do not get in each other’s way, we do not confuse the people we are trying to help, and we do not waste resources by duplicating efforts. If we are talking and deconflicting, then we should start coordinating efforts to get more effect out of our separate contributions. Once we are well coordinated, then we need to start integrating our efforts for greater efficiency, synergy, and sustainability. When we get to this level of partnership, we next must work on harmonizing our efforts with our neighbors by coherently integrating our respective contributions.
The effort of all parties to begin living the way we will fight is the “comprehensive approach.” The comprehensive approach, broken into its component parts, is a joint, interagency, combined, multi-organizational (JIACMO) process. This process creates the conditions in which the private sector and private investment can create wealth in a marketplace. Only the marketplace can generate the wealth necessary to fund and sustain conditions for lasting stability in a country or region. Without a robust marketplace of private sector entities bankrolling investment in conflict prevention and crisis response, a country or region can inevitably slip back into decline and failure. In the event of a failure, Phase 0 through Phase 5 operations are not a linear progression. They become circular, which is to say, if there is not time and money to do it right, there is time and money to do it over.

Do we have a JIACMO process (see fig. 1) today? Not really, but if we did, how would it work?

![Figure 1. Joint, Interagency, Combined, and Multi-organizational model.](image)

**Multinational Experiment (MNE) 5**

Some efforts already have attempted to devise a sensible way forward. The MNE community, sponsored by the United States and hosted by U.S. Joint Forces Command, looked into this problem in their fifth experiment, MNE 5, which was a good start expanding the joint model to a broader community.

Beginning in June 2005, the MNE community decided to integrate the results from previous experiments with lessons learned from practitioners in the field and examine their interrelationships within a coherent, comprehensive framework. The resulting experiment is called MNE 5, which is exploring the problem statement: “Coalition partners require improved methods to conduct rapid interagency and multinational planning and coordination in order to create and carry out a unified comprehensive strategy.”

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The Swedish-sponsored Exercise VIKING series carried this work further. More fundamentally, however, the U.S. experience of establishing a joint culture among the four military services offers a useful framework for analyzing the JIACMO challenge.

The process of building a truly joint approach goes through four developmental stages, or blocks (see fig. 2). They are: deconfliction, coordination, integration, and coherent integration. The first and most basic requirement for disparate elements to operate effectively together in the same space and/or at the same time is to deconflict their activities from one another, so deconfliction is the first block. All too often we try to start with coordination, the second block, without the benefit of building trust through the deconfliction process. Simply talking to one another while living up to one’s commitments to “stay out of the way” builds sufficient trust to start the conversation called coordination.

Once deconfliction is possible—in other words, once we’ve stopped inadvertently making life more difficult for one another and for the people we are trying to help—then we can start to benefit from one another’s participation through coordination, which is the second block. NATO’s former Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer famously once said, “Everyone wants coordination, but nobody wants to be coordinated,” implying that the principle of this second block is widely accepted; however, the reality of surrendering some of one’s control by compromising in favor of someone else’s requirement is not an evident part of today’s official international cooperation. Continuous calls in some quarters for “divisions of labor” between NATO, the EU, the UN and other elements are indicative of the inherent bureaucratic and organizational difficulties involved in operating with others outside of one’s own environment. In other words, it is so difficult, many would just prefer to avoid coordination or, at the very least, minimize complications inherent in working more closely with others by dividing tasks into separate
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functional areas. That approach, however, does not build synergy and synergy is what the resource versus requirements analysis in international crisis response requires. Hence, the third block, integration, is a better way to achieve synergy while eventually making our activities less complicated.

**Monoculture Crisis Response is Hard Enough**

Adding others unlike oneself to one’s effort makes the complicated even more difficult. This is why the U.S. military’s path to joint service involved intentional steps toward creating a joint culture through integrating education, training, and exercise activities, and, finally, operations. Integration is built through a continuous process of learning by doing. It is through integrated activities built on the fundamental realization that actors from outside the dominant culture are likely the ones that enable success. And that realization only comes from established relationships, familiarity, and previous successes. The third block is, therefore, both a process and a goal. The process of deconfliction and the process of coordination are steps toward creating an environment of trust where integration is possible. The high number of retired and former U.S. military personnel in the civilian crisis response mechanisms of the United States has broken down some of the monoculture barriers in the whole-of-government approach. Similarly, the increasing number of European military officers who have served in both NATO and the EU, and the very large percentage of EU officers with NATO experience, provides a foundation upon which greater NATO-EU military integration might be built.

**Integration Happens**

Necessity often invents procedures for deconfliction and coordination of efforts during a crisis response. That necessity almost always starts on the ground in the theater of operations. In the four-block process at the political level, which seems to restart with every new situation, politicians will usually go as far as they can in the time that they have. The smaller the number of politicians, the farther they generally get, but rarely do they get beyond promises of coordination. To realize this, one only need identify the formal and informal political groupings that form to address the world’s most exasperating problems: the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), the Minsk Group (leadership sub-grouping within the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the G-7 (economic grouping of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States), and the permanent five on the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK, and United States). These small groups of nations then go back to the multinational organizations of which they are members to rally others to action. These organizations have the added value of possessing developed procedures for deconfliction and coordination and, in some cases, and in some areas, are also integrating aspects of their activities. The good news, then, is that parts of the four-block approach are already moving forward in parts of the international community, making the task of harnessing their accomplishments to the broader JIACMO process much easier.

**Can’t Leap a Chasm in Two Short Jumps**

Coherent integration, the fourth block, at this point in our collective development requires intuition, good will, excellent leadership, and a leap of faith. If the circumstances are sufficiently compelling, even coherent integration is possible. The driving idea in the construction of the EU, a Europe whole and free, is to prevent a return to Europe’s bloody past. That is a very compelling vision of the future, driven by a very compelling memory of the past. Efforts at coherently integrating activities on the ground in Afghanistan seem to be sufficiently compelling in some areas, as well. Nevertheless, the fourth block is also both a process and a milestone. One needs to pass from the first block, through the second and third blocks, in order to implement a coherently integrated approach. Every actor on every stage in the international crisis response community is today somewhere on the four-block path in relation to its immediate partners within the scope of their collective activities.

Achievement of the fourth block enables an effects-based, collaborative, network-enabled, and interdependent approach to comprehensive operations. The fourth block operates as if it were a unified actor for the purpose of delivering coherent effects, and is therefore seen as a coherent force, one that moves beyond the sum of its parts and includes nonmilitary, as well as military, attributes.

NATO transformation is in an alliance context, but the national challenge of transforming forces from previous stages of deconflicting, coordinating, and even integrating, continues. Further, the challenge for the alliance, or any grouping of nations and/or organizations, to be coherently
joint and interagency is multiplied by 28 members’ concerns in NATO and by a somewhat different 28 members in the EU. The alliance must overcome this complicated challenge in order for its members to successfully work and fight together, and for a truly comprehensive approach to problem solving to become a reality. The fourth block is not an end state. Evolution continues. The fifth block, which may involve the private sector more deliberately in governmental and non-governmental activities, is a likely future step.

The Joint Model in the Broader Community

All of these actors at all levels form a JIACMO matrix. The matrix would look like figure 3, with a path made up of the collective movement of individuals within their immediate environments:

As an international community, the direction of our collective movement must be toward the top-right sector if we are to achieve the level of synergy required for meeting the demands that the world is placing on us. That is, from military-only approaches to crisis operations toward operations that are coherently integrated JIACMO ones.

This means that, while the model appears complex, individual approaches are fairly straightforward. The interrelationships between elements, though, can be dynamic and unintended consequences, therefore, must be considered.

Because conflict prevention, crisis response, and post-conflict rehabilitation efforts occur at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the model becomes three-dimensional (see fig. 4). There is a JIACMO plane on each
Activities intersect the planes as the implications of decisions and actions traverse the 3D matrix, which means, for example, deconfliction efforts at the interagency and strategic level influence combined coordination at the tactical level. National caveats in operations are an example of one such aspect of strategic-level political considerations affecting tactical capacity.

Nevertheless, the results of individual and group actions drive the entire process forward. The international community organizing itself in this way seems utopian. Regardless of how necessary it might be, seen from the outside, it appears to be a daunting task, one which is in all likelihood impossible. However, when seen from the inside, the way ahead appears more realistic. As individuals in well-defined organizations, the tasks required to move forward and the path to take are much easier to envision—we must interact with those on our left and on our right, with those above and those below, regardless of who they are or from where they have come. In this way, at the individual and unit level we can (and must) continue the four-block process with those around us in order to go from where we are to where
we need to be. These relationships can be virtual or actual, permanent or temporary, formal or informal, but the capacity to bond as needed to move forward synergistically toward a coherently integrated JIACMO capacity in order to deliver the desire effects on the ground where and when needed is of paramount importance.

This is why progress on the four-block approach needs to emanate out in all directions, from every actor (see fig. 5). Coherence within individual components implies the potential for coherence in the overall model if the components are stitched together in a way that supports and enables integrated activity. Coherence in the overall model generates synergy at the point of attack and, in this way, synergy in the delivery of JIACMO capabilities. Conversely, conflicts, lack of coordination, or failed attempts at integration—in any row, column, or plane—create drag on the whole effort. Ultimately, this is an individual-centric approach that results in positive and dynamic group action.

Figure 5. JIACMO model in action.
As an example, in December 2007, the EU agreed to a joint strategy with the African Union (AU) to guide the future interaction of the two organizations, in particular with a view toward how best to use the EU’s significant development aid to the AU. This document deconflicts interagency activities at the strategic level in an attempt to deliver results at the regional (operational) and national (tactical) levels.

The stand-up of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) on 1 October 2008, signaled a significant U.S. attempt to organize a major command that was both joint and interagency in character to work at the operational level with nations and organizations to coordinate the delivery of effective security and development programs in Africa. At the time, the European Commission, in effect Europe’s interagency, was in the process of developing a way forward that would eventually encompass other actors in an ever-closer embrace as the EU sought to build a more effective AU. The European Commission was just starting down the JIACMO pathway with its EU-AU Africa Strategy. In the same way, USAFRICOM was, relatively speaking, just starting to connect with significant partners in the region through engagement and outreach (see fig. 6). Stitching the two efforts together would seem a reasonable way forward. At the same time, the AU also invited NATO to offer its contributions to further the development of the African Stand-By Force, a multi-national, African, contingency response effort.

Sewing the NATO thread through the fabric of the European Commission and USAFRICOM’s work with the AU is yet another synergistic imperative of the JIACMO dynamic, and one that also bridges the strategic-operational divide. The United States can play an integrating role in these efforts and between these entities so that, in addition to delivering coherent international assistance to African nations at a rate the receivers can absorb, the results of those efforts can be sustained over time. The closest thing to an integrated JIACMO entity we have seen today is the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) model, which was deployed in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The PRTs tried to sustain the international contribution by focusing collective efforts at the local level and tailoring the effort to the needs of the local population.
**Liberating Individuals to Do Their Work**

Individuals in these entities are reaching out in all directions to those with similar functions, responsibilities, and goals. Unfortunately, all too often, bureaucratic inertia, organizational dynamics, or inadequate policies make their tasks more difficult.

The current political dilemma blocking robust NATO-EU interaction is one example of the obstacles to effective integration of JIACMO efforts. Because Turkey is a NATO member, not an EU member, and Cyprus is an EU member, but not a NATO member, there is no common forum for the two nations to address their security and development grievances. NATO and EU efforts to support the peacekeeping mission of the AU in Darfur, for example, were underdeveloped in part due to this unrelated obstacle. Nevertheless, informal discussions are underway to ensure that both organizations are at least following parallel tracks.

The JIACMO dynamic (see fig. 7) would create methods of working that would empower individuals who seek to work with like-minded people by
establishing new patterns of bureaucratic behavior, building bridges between organizations, and creating a culture and climate that seeks coherent integration as the most effective means to achieve national and international aims. If we move the key JIACMO structure elements through the four-block process, from deconfliction to coherent integration, open doors between entities would result in a culture of necessity-driven empowerment. Individuals should be able to work more easily across functional and organizational boundaries, which is what they are trying to do today. The next step, therefore, is to identify the mechanisms available within the international community that could be used as the gears of the four-block process, in the same way assets were used in the United States to develop a truly joint-service approach in the U.S. Department of Defense.

In this methodology, the actors in the international community are the input. The four-block approach is the process that uses the integrating mechanisms to produce an output, and the output is the employment of coherently integrated capabilities that deliver the desired effect at the right place and time—the JIACMO dynamic. Those outputs, those capabilities, to be effective, must have certain characteristics. For example, they must be deployable, sustainable, and usable (see fig. 8). Focusing the inputs on the outputs as the four-block process develops is essential if we are to produce the types of capabilities that can deliver the comprehensive effects we need to produce. Beginning with the end in mind will enforce discipline in the selection of actions and priorities, given limited resources.

At the outset, the inputs will not be able to all work together all the time. The structure is built with combinations of inputs as the components. Joint-Combined is a subset that is at the core of NATO’s work. Joint-Interagency is
the subject of the U.S. whole-of-government approach, which also is at work in many allied and partner nations. As discussed, NATO has made efforts toward a comprehensive approach, and the EU is aiming toward more effective joint-interagency-combined operations. The more these elements succeed in their collaborations, the more likely their national experiences will carry into the international organizations in which those countries participate, thereby facilitating multi-organizational efforts toward integrated activities.

Governmental organizations and NGOs working with the private sector is another important JIACMO component. Each of these inputs and subcomponents goes through the four-block process to produce higher-order outputs on the way toward achieving the more comprehensive collective possibilities of the JIACMO dynamic. Organizing ourselves to enable individuals to move in the collective direction toward more coherent integration of our activities—actual or virtual—is the path forward for all actors in all domains.

In summary, the four-block approach is how we work together to deliver a coherent effect on the ground. We should be taking organizational tools and coherently integrating their use with relevant actors to deliver a more powerful, more efficient, and ideally more sustainable international effort that achieves our desired effects. To do this, however, we must first ensure that our multi-organizational efforts are deconflicted and coordinated, and
that we are internally structured ourselves to be able to work in this way (and toward integration) with external actors. The capability characteristics identified above will guide us in ensuring that we have the necessary physical means to deliver the intended multi-organizational effects and that the use of those means benefits from deconfliction, coordination, and integration. The more closely one can coherently integrate one’s activities with allies, and the full range of military, civilian, governmental, and non-governmental partners, the more successful we ultimately will be.

These are the qualities required of the assets needed to execute a comprehensive approach in a JIACMO framework. The who, what, where, when, why, and how of employing those capabilities would, in an operational sense, be found in the campaign strategy. The act of developing a campaign strategy is inherently linked to the development of the capabilities required to execute the strategy. This is the essence of “backward planning”—beginning with the end in mind, and then developing courses of action to get us to the desired end state. Forward planning, on the other hand, takes inventory of what capabilities and capacities we have available today and determines how we might use and further develop those assets to address today’s challenges. We need to do both types of planning. We need to know the best way to employ the assets we have today and we need to know the best way to pursue a comprehensive approach so that we can focus on acquiring the capabilities most likely required for tomorrow’s challenges. It would seem, therefore, that we need a brick-and-mortar facility for all potential participants to do JIACMO planning in all its domains.

An International Community Planning Forum (ICPF) could be such a place, as National Defense University’s Leo Michel called for in “NATO and the EU: Achieving Unity of Effort in a Comprehensive Approach.” By coming together informally to explore how an international response could be planned and executed effectively in various scenarios, an ICPF would add tremendous value to the Comprehensive Approach (see fig. 9).

The ICPF would be most useful in generic planning that would familiarize all participants with the roles and capabilities of the community of interest. Further, for those willing partners, more detailed, deliberate planning designed to elaborate how the community might deploy to address likely contingencies would be another very useful contribution. In the event of rising tensions, the ability for the ICPF to conduct more dynamic planning for specific locations would be invaluable. The collective knowledge thus
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The gained would better inform the organization, training, and equipping of all participants for the development of a civilian statement of requirements for the scenarios studied at the ICPF. All of these (fig. 9), if employed collectively, would help to prevent a crisis, diminish its intensity, and/or mitigate its consequences.

Clearly, we can do better than we have done. Militaries can prepare to respond to crises more comprehensively. Members of the international community can work more closely with the armed forces to develop trust and understanding essential for our collective success. Both efforts are essential evolutionary steps to a more comprehensive and effective crisis response mechanism. Since we all will remain on standby to respond to the next unpredictable crisis, improving our methods is certainly warranted, will lower our ultimate cost, and will speed up the transition to viable self-governance in the affected area. While welcome, these crisis response improvements would pale into insignificance if we truly changed our approach from crisis response to conflict prevention. To understand the real possibility of moving from a comprehensive crisis response to effective conflict prevention, in other words, tackling Truth 1 head-on, we need to understand how we can
all contribute as individuals through our daily work to the construction of a more dynamic international process.

The conflict prevention effort is the same as the crisis response effort, just without the preceding violence, and therefore without the destroyed property, psychologically damaged populations, and dysfunctional institutions. If we get the response right, then the area of instability is integrated into the global order, therefore ensuring a more viable and sustainable approach to governance and economic development. If we integrate areas of potential instability into the global order now through effective conflict prevention, then we can avoid the cost and suffering of a crisis we cannot afford later. Conflict prevention is the approach that we can afford. We must afford it because we cannot afford the alternative.

Is it doubted, then, that the plan I propose, if adopted, would shorten the war, and thus lessen its expenditure of money and of blood? Is it doubted that it would restore the national authority and national prosperity, and perpetuate both indefinitely? … Can we, can they, by any other means, so certainly, or so speedily, assure these vital objects? We can succeed only by concert. It is not “Can any of us imagine better?” but, “Can we all do better?” - Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (1 December 1862)

Endnotes

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88. The actual quote is, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

7. The former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Tip O’Neill is most closely associated with this phrase.

8. For more on Plan Colombia as an example, see Michael Shifter’s Retrospective in Americas Quarterly Summer 2012 http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3787.


11. Meet Admiral James Stavridis: Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Security and Defence Agenda (Brussels, December 2009), 8, quoted in Laurence McGivern, The European Union as an International Actor: Has Operation Atalanta Changed Global Perceptions of the EU as a military force?, (Central European University, Budapest, 2010), 4.


13. Lincoln et al., The Collected Works, 537.
Chapter 8. Conclusion

Colonel Kevin D. Stringer

Unconventional warfare (UW) is an enduring form of conflict. Like an organism, UW maintains core elements comparable to DNA, but adapts to new environments, situations, and technologies. Events in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe illustrate UW’s evolutionary nature. In Afghanistan, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams melded modern technology, like air assets and laser targeting, with horseback riding tribal allies to combat the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In Crimea, and later Eastern Ukraine, Russian SOF integrated political warfare doctrine from the 1920s and 1930s with modern Internet-based social media and cyber communications to conduct an almost bloodless takeover of Ukrainian territory. Given trends in instability and warfare, UW’s significance should grow. Hence, this volume offers a foundation for further discourse.

This volume provides a multinational and multidimensional perspective to UW and resistance. In analyzing and synthesizing chapter contributions, several threads of continuity and recurring themes are clear. First, societal resilience and cohesion are critical resilience factors in conducting UW against an occupier. This requires national policies that promote cohesion and national will. As Jermalavičius and Parmak asserted, the political, civic, economic, and cultural exclusion of societal groups can erode national resilience and undermine national security by creating vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the development of a healthy civil society, including community networks, should be encouraged to inoculate against subversion.

Second, SOF provide an enabler, catalyst, and subject matter experts, but successful UW requires a true whole-of-government approach and preparation. Some aspects of the latter, particularly the need for secrecy and covert planning, may not be compatible with an open and transparent democratic society. Also, as Moxon noted in her chapter, SOF offer unique competencies,

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yet many civilian and military leaders are not familiar with these unique capabilities, skills, and relationships and may not know how to apply them in a whole-of-society effort. Hence, educating national and local leaders to the comprehensive nature of UW is an urgent requirement.

Third, social media, cyber communications, and psychological operations play a large role in modern UW. It is no longer enough to create, train, and enable an underground, auxiliary, and a guerrilla force in a rural or urban context. Rather, a more complex UW aspect requires consideration: governments in exile, legal frameworks, redundant communication, financial assets abroad, the impact of biometrics and sensor surveillance on society, and much more. Closely related to this point is the quality of the supported indigenous forces. As Robinson stated, legitimacy, martial competence, and moral will are important qualities for a resistance force to possess.

Fourth, political warfare needs to be integrated into UW efforts. Yet, NATO countries often lack this tradition, as well as the organizations, expertise, and legal frameworks for implementation. Success in UW is not defined just by the military overthrow of a regime or the military defeat of an occupier, rather the achieved political outcome is the final arbiter of victory.

Lastly, doctrinal interoperability might be useful for NATO members and related states as they tackle a common approach to UW and resistance. Otherwise, unity of effort can become hampered, and inefficiencies and friction will occur at cooperative seams. While this set of distilled lessons is not conclusive, the readers are encouraged to think critically and deeply on the chapter contents and messages, and draw their own lessons and conclusions.

A key takeaway from this edited volume is that UW requires future research that broadens the scope of the discussion while encompassing unique perspectives. Specifically, UW efforts require more research and analysis on non-U.S. and non-Western UW cases, and more English-language publication for broader dissemination. For example, the Baltics offer a rich UW and resistance tradition, in particular the Lithuanian and Estonian experiences pre- and post-WWII. A closer study of Algerian support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro in Western Sahara, South African support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in Angola, and the Rhodesian creation and support of the Mozambican National Resistance in Mozambique could provide important data to inform UW efforts. These topics would contribute to the existing literature that is heavily U.S. and Western European-centric.
Finally, the integration of anthropology into studying UW is a prerequisite for developing new approaches and mastering the UW domain. In the end, the human domain is the most critical factor in successfully conducting a UW campaign, to support a partner or resist an adversary’s aggression.
## Acronym List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BALTDEFCOL</td>
<td>Baltic Defence College</td>
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<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>command, control, and communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCRAM</td>
<td>Cojoint Community Resiliency Assessment Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Soldier Fitness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMEFIL</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-I</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, personnel, facilities-interoperability</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAT</td>
<td>Global Assessment Tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICPF</td>
<td>International Community Planning Forum</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>intent, trust and ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACMO</td>
<td>joint, interagency, combined, multi-organizational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOU</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations University</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td>Kurdistan Democratic Party</td>
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<td>MDR</td>
<td>Military Demand-Resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>Multinational Experiment</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRT</td>
<td>master resilience trainers</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSES</td>
<td>national strategic end state</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSHQ</td>
<td>NATO Special Operations Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>provincial reconstruction team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUK</td>
<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan</td>
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<td>SOCEUR</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Europe</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOI</td>
<td>Sons of Iraq</td>
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<td>TOA</td>
<td>transfers of authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTCP</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTPs</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>USSOCEUR</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. SOF</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
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